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SECTION I:
INTRODUCTION
AND OVERVIEW

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Since the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, international treaties
have been negotiated on a number of transnational environmental issues, including endangered
species, ozone depletion, climate change, and the loss of biological diversity. In each of these
agreements, the parties agreed to cooperate in addressing the problem at hand by making changes
in their national policies such that these policies are consistent with each other and the terms of
the treaty. There is now growing concern that these national policy changes are not being made
in. any meaningful way. This is particularly true for those agreements, like the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), for which the required changes are politically difficult
or require a certain amount of national self-sacrifice. In 1997, the international community took
steps to strengthen the Climate Convention by signing the Kyoto Protocol. Although this
agreement will enter into force in February 2005, it is not clear that it will be effective in
inducing the requisite changes in domestic policies.
International cooperation has traditionally been viewed as a process in which self-interested
states work together to achieve a policy objective they could not each achieve on their own. This
cooperation requires that the actions or policies of separate nations be brought into conformity
with one another through a process of negotiation. However, cooperation cannot be said to take
place until each country regards the policies being followed by the others government as
conforming with the objectives that lead them to cooperate in the first place.' International
regimes and institutions, created through treaties negotiated among sovereign nations, are the
mechanisms intended to make this process of cooperation easier.2
One of the difficulties facing the international community in crafting more effective
environmental treaties is that the relationship between international agreements and domestic
policy change, the essential element of cooperation, is not well understood. A core assumption
of most international relations theories is that a nation will only ratify an agreement if it is
prepared to make the domestic policy changes necessary to comply with it. Treaty ratification is
thus viewed as synonymous with treaty implementation. However, the two are separate political
processes. Ratification, in which a national government (generally the national legislature)
formally endorses a negotiated agreement, is a commitment by that government to make the
domestic policy changes required by the agreement.3 Implementation, however, is the political
process through which the government actually carries out the requisite changes in national
Keohane, Robert 0. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press Keohane uses Linblom's definition of policy coordination, in which a set of decisions
can be said to be .."coordinated if adjustments have been made in them, such that the adverse consequences of any
one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or
overweighed." (Lindblom, Charles E. 1965. The Intelligence ofDemocracy. New York: The Free Press).
2 A number of definitions of the term "regime" exist (see, e.g., Haggard, Stephen and Beth A. Simmons. 1987.
Theories of international regimes. International Organization 41, 3: 491). The definition suggested by Krasner is
used here, where a regime is the "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." (Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural
causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. International Organization 36, 2: 185).
3 Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
policy. Treaty compliance is the recognition by the cooperating partners that national policy
changes are being implemented as required by the agreement.
Much of the literature on policy implementation has shown that committing to policy change
is quite different than making the changes themselves. As Bardach points out,
"It is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good on paper. It is harder still
to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and
the constituencies to which they are responsive. And it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in
a way that pleases anyone at all." 4
The difficulties that countries encountered in changing national policies to conform to
international agreements can be seen in the literature on treaty compliance, which suggests that
compliance with international environmental agreements is mixed at best.' For example, Parties
to a number of international environmental agreements have been inconsistent in provide reports
on policies and measures that they are pursuing to meet the treaty requirements, thus sidestepping
an important mechanism for promote compliance.' Many of these agreements themselves lack
measurable objectives, such as quantitative targets and technical criteria, against which
compliance can be measured.' Many view this lack of measurable objectives as a principle
reason why many of these agreements are inadequate for addressing complex global
environmental issues, particularly those of climate change and biodiversity.' It is not clear,
however, that the delineation of clear objectives will necessarily improve treaty compliance.'
4 Bardach, Eugene. 1977. The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes Law. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
s See, e.g., U.S.General Accounting Office. 1992. International Environment: Strengthening the Implementation of
Environmental Agreements. Washington, D.C: United States General Accounting Office; U.S.General Accounting
Office. 1992. International Environment: International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Congress; Chayes, Abram and Antonia H. Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance With
International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6 For example, at the third meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol of 1991, it was reported that a majority of
states were in effect ignoring regime requirements in that they had either failed to provide any information or had
only provided incomplete data (Sand, Peter H., ed. 1992. The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements: a Survey of Existing Legal Instruments. Cambridge, England: Grotius Publications). The situation
was sufficiently poor that by the Copenhagen meeting of 1992, doubts were cast on the viability of the tightened
controls agreed at that meeting (Vogler, John. 1995. The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis. New York: John
Wiley and Sons). In the case of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, only half of the OECD countries
required to submit reports in early 1997 had done so as of August 14, 1997, and many of these have been criticized
as sloppy and inadequate (Lanchbery, John. Failure to Report? ECO, Oct. 21, 1997. pg. 3).
7 Vogler. 1995. The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis; Sand. 1992. The Effectiveness of international
environmental agreements: a survey of existing legal instruments.
8 See, e.g., Susskind, Lawrence E. 1994. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements.
New York: Oxford University Press; Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, ed. 1991. Preserving the Global Environment:
The Challenge of Shared Leadership. New York: W.W. Norton and Company; Thomas, Caroline. 1992. The
Environment in International Relations. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs Energy and
Environmental Programme.
9 For discussions of the problems of compliance and enforcement in the context of current international relations
theory, see, e.g., Chayes and Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements; Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about
compliance good news about cooperation? International Organization 50, 3: 379; Downs, George W. and M. A.
Jones. 2002. Reputation, compliance, and international law. Journal of Legal Studies 31, 1: 95-114; and
Nadelmann, Ethan A. 1990. Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society.
While nations cooperate in setting policy objectives through the treaties they ratify, it is the
formulation and implementation of national policies and measures that ultimately determines
whether a treaty succeeds or fails.
Because implementation is so difficult, an understanding of the ways in which nations make
policy changes in response to international treaties and the factors that influence this process is
crucial to effective cooperation on global environmental issues. This study examines the
political processes through which the Framework Convention on Climate Change was negotiated
and the initial efforts of the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan to adopt national policies
and measures to implement it. Using Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) as a theoretical lens, it looks in particular at coalition behavior in the policy
processes at the international, national, and sub-national levels, and the nature of cooperation and
coordination both within and between these levels. In doing so, it attempts to shed additional
light on the capacity and propensity of national governments to implement international
environmental agreements. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss some of the current
literature on treaty compliance and implementation, and introduce the ACF and its application in
this study.
1.1 UNDERSTANDING INTERACTIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
POLICY PROCESSES
Up until the late 1980s, explanations of interstate relations were generally categorized
according to their "level of analysis," or the units in which the independent variables have been
conceptualized.'" Three levels of analysis have generally been used. International-level (or
"systemic") explanations look to a state's position in the international system; domestic-level
explanations look to the society, culture, and political institutions of individual states; and
individual-level explanations look to the personal or psychological characteristics of individual
statesmen." These three levels have traditionally been viewed as mutually exclusive, so most
attempts to explain such issues as treaty development and compliance have treated the state as a
unitary body."
Explanations of treaty compliance derived from these traditional theories have been found to
adequately explain only a limited number of problems, and are particularly weak in explaining
the political processes involved in addressing global environmental problems such as climate
change." Furthermore, no theory of international relations explains what Putnam has called
International Organization 44, 4: 479.
10 Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International
Bargaining. In Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans,
Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, pg. 3-42. Berkeley: University of California Press.
" Waltz, Kenneth N. 1975. Theory of International Relations. In Handbook of Political Science: International
Relations, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, pg. 1-86. Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley; Singer, J. David. 1960.
International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis. World Politics 12, 4: 453-461.
12 Singer, J. David. 1961. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World Politics 14, 10: 77-92.
13 See, e.g., Moravcsik. 1993. Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International
Bargaining; Rowlands, Ian H. 1995. The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change. Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press;Paterson, Matthew. 1996. Global Warming and Global Politics. London and New
York: Routledge; O'Riordan, Tim and Jill Jaeger, eds. 1996. Politics of Climate Change: A European Perspective.
"involuntary defection," which happens when a party reaching or supporting an international
agreement is unable to sustain commitments because of domestic political constraints."
"Defection" in these cases is not the result of calculating unified actors, but the outcome of
domestic political conflicts that no single actor can control.
Since the late 1980s, some attempts have been made to integrate these different levels into
an explicit theory of their interaction. Most of these have taken a game-theoretical approach,
building Putnam's concept of "two-level games."" While this approach provides a useful
framework, even its proponents admit that it does not constitute a theory with testable
hypotheses. 6 More recently, Helen Milner has proposed a more explicit framework using
rational choice theory and the concept of "domestic polyarchies", which she uses to examine
situations in which an agreement is negotiated but not ratified by domestic legislature."
However, she acknowledges that her dependence on rational choice theory presents limitations.
It also does not explain situations where a treaty is ratified, but changes are not made in existing
national policies to conform to it. It is this situation that is the classic problem of
implementation.
1.2 THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
PROCESSES
A modified version of the ACF can be useful in explaining the dynamics of treaty
implementation, as the units of analysis used in the framework, policy subsystems and advocacy
coalitions, can be applied at both the international and national levels of analysis. The ACF
portrays the policy process as a function of interactions among competing advocacy coalitions
within an issue-specific policy subsystem; changes external to that subsystem; and the effects of
system-wide parameters and events on the constraints and resources of the various coalitions.
When viewed through the lens of the ACF, treaty implementation is a function of the political
dynamics that occur among overlapping international, national and subnational subsystems.
London, New York: Routledge.
'
4Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International
Organization 42: 427-60.
'5 See, e.g., Putnam. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games; Mayer, Frederick W.
1992. Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments.
International Organization 46, Autumn: 793-818; Friman, H. Richard. 1993. Side-payments versus security cards:
domestic bargaining tactics in international economic negotiations. International Organization 47, 3: 387-410;
Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 1993. Double-Edged Diplomacy: International
Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press; Ward, Tony. 1996. Climate change
and the National Policy. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique, 1: S344; Iida,
Keisuke. 1996. Involuntary defection in two-level games. Public Choice 3-4, 89: 283; Mo, Jongryn. 1994. The
logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, Sept: 402-22;
Mo, Jongryn. 1995. Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level
Games. Review 89, 4: 914.
16 Evans, Peter B. 1993. Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and
Projections. In Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans,
Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, pg. 397-429. Berkeley: University of California Press.
'7 Milner. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: domestic politics and international relations.
An essential tenet of the ACF is that the fundamental aspects of government programs and
policies arising from each subsystem (the "policy core") reflect for the most part the belief
system of the coalition that is able to dominate the subsystem. A coalition's ability to dominate
the subsystem is in turn determined by the political resources it possesses and the political
constraints it faces. Because belief systems are very difficult to change, it can be assumed that
the "policy core" of a government program in a specific subsystem will not be significantly
revised as long as the coalition that instituted the program remains dominant within that
subsystem. This also means that policy change is substantially shaped by system-wide events
(e.g., changes in socio-economic conditions) and parameters (e.g., social structures and
constitutional rules) that affect the resources and constraints of subsystem actors.
One aspect of the ACF that has not been well developed is the relationship between these
resources and constraints and coalition dominance. I suggest that looking at these political
resources and constraints as sources of political power is a useful approach to exploring this
relationship. Kellman argues that political actors have five basic sources of power: decision-
making authority, the ability to offer inducements, persuasiveness, deference, and strategic skill. 8
In the context of the ACF, a coalition's possession of these various sources of power ultimately
defines the range and effectiveness of the various strategies, approaches and tools (guidance
instruments) that it can employ in the pursuit of its objectives. Relative power is thus an
important factor in determining the extent to which a coalition dominates, or has the potential to
dominate, a subsystem. Not all sources of power are equal, as each is constrained by both its
nature and system-wide parameters such as socio-economic conditions and the system's legal
structure.
The development and implementation of international treaties can be viewed as activities
carried out through the coordination of overlapping international and national policy subsystems.
The function of the international subsystem is to oversee cooperation among states regarding a
particular international regime, while that of national policy subsystems overlapping with this
international subsystem is to develop national policies for cooperating in this regime. The
bridges between the international and national subsystems are coalition members active in both
subsystems.
In political systems at all levels, a common set of policy beliefs is both the glue that holds
coalitions together and the point around which coordination among overlapping subsystems
revolves. Cooperation frequently occurs among actors in these overlapping subsystems, as
coalitions at one level can be expected to have "parallel" coalitions at the other level. These
"parallel" coalitions are comprised of the set of actors having identical, or substantially similar,
policy beliefs.
International cooperation on global environmental issues such as climate change may require
policy coordination among three or more different policy subsystems. While the national foreign
policy subsystem may be responsible for the development of a nation's overall policy regarding a
regime, other domestic policy subsystems might be responsible for the development and
implementation of specific aspects of this policy. For example, implementation of the climate
change treaty might involve coordination among the national climate change policy subsystem, a
18 Kelman, Steven. 1987. Making Public Policy. New York: Basic Books.
national energy policy subsystem, a national transportation policy subsystem, and a national
agriculture policy subsystem. Local or sub-national subsystems may also be involved.
1.3 ABOUT THIs STUDY
This study examines the international climate policy process and overlapping national policy
processes in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands through the lens of the ACF. These
three countries were selected for study for several reasons. First, the three countries provide
substantial opportunities for investigating the role of subsystem dynamics and overlap in treaty
implementation. Each of these countries has one or more domestic processes governing energy,
transportation and policies related to climate change, and each established during the late 1980's
and early 1990's a domestic process to coordinate the development national climate change
policies. Each country made a unilateral commitment to stabilize or reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions by 2000, and each assembled a plan for doing so that contained a wide range of actions
in a variety of functional areas. As was noted above, however, none of three countries are
expected to meet these national commitments, in part because they did not fully implement these
plans. Finally, many different individuals from a broad range of organizations in each of these
countries participated in both the international and national political processes, setting the stage
for the development of parallel coalitions in each subsystem that shared similar beliefs.
These three countries also present several advantages for comparative case studies in that
some degree of control can be established for several critical variables can be controlled. For
example, the CO2 emissions/fuel supply ratio, a general indicator of the nature of national
socioeconomic structure, is similar in all three countries.' In addition, these countries illustrate
the range of constitutional structures, or state strengths, found among industrialized countries.
The concept of "state strength" ("strong states" vs. "weak states") has been suggested as a
significant factor in treaty implementation, and thus may be an intervening variable in
determining the nature and course of treaty implementation.20
The objective of this study is quite limited. I am not attempting to argue that the failure of
these countries to achieve the goals they set out in their national action plans is due to wholly to
their failure to implement the measures proposed in these plans. My purpose is simply to
illustrate some of the difficulties that must be overcome in implementing international
agreements involving complex environmental phenomena and affecting a broad range of
19 OECD/IEA. 1996. Climate Change Policy Initiatives 1995/96 Update. Paris: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. It should be noted here that this study examines the political sources of variation in
treaty compliance. The three countries have been selected in part because of the similarities in their economic
structures, and economic factors are recognized as only one of the parameters affecting policy change. Thus no
effort will be made to explain variation across countries in their economic structures as an explanation of degree of
compliance.
20 Gourevitch suggests, for example, that in societies with stronger states, power tends to be concentrated in fewer
public institutions, facilitating domination by one coalition. In societies with weaker states, however, social forces
tend to be more developed, public institutions are fragmented, and power is distributed among a number of
agencies and institutions. This makes domination of a policy subsystem by a single coalition more difficult
(Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1978. The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics.
International Organization 32, 4: 881). Japan is one of the stronger states among OECD countries, while the
United States is the most commonly cited example of a weak state. The Netherlands, with its parliamentary system
and its multi-party coalition government represents a middle ground between these two extremes.
economic sectors. The national and subnational subsystems examined in each national case
study were not chosen at random, but were selected because they exemplify situations in which
policies and measures proposed in national climate policy subsystems were not developed or
implemented when they came under the jurisdiction of overlapping subsystems with different
political dynamics.
The study is presented in four sections. In this introductory section, I introduce the range of
political issues associated with the implementation of a climate change treaty and provide a brief
overview of the climate change issue and the political dynamics that transpired in each of the
case studies. In Section II, I discuss in greater detail the ACF and the propositions that I will be
testing in the case studies. The case studies themselves are presented in Section III. Finally, I
provide in Section IV an analysis of these cases in the context of the ACF and suggest some
conclusions that can be drawn with respect to the implementation of international environmental
agreements. Methodological details regarding the study are described in the Appendix.
16
CHAPTER 2 - OVERVIEW
The climate change issue is one of the most difficult and complex of all international
environmental policy issues. Scientists predict a warming of the world's climate by between 2
and 5 degrees Celsius over the next century, if no action is taken to deal with the "enhanced
greenhouse effect" caused by a build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This warming
would be accompanied numerous adverse impacts, including rising sea levels, changes in rainfall
and evaporation pattern, and the increased melting of snow and glaciers in mountainous regions.
Addressing climate change, however, is extraordinarily difficult. Projected changes in global
temperatures are given in time frames of decades to centuries, and much remains uncertain about
the full magnitude of climate change. Uncertainties also remain with regards to many of the
impacts of climate change and of the cost and benefits of responses. In addition, the burning of
fossil fuels, the most significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, is critical to the world
economy, and efforts to reduce these emissions requires addressing many divergent issues and
interests among the many different countries engaged in the international political process.
While much has been written about climate change policies and politics, the topic remains
an excellent subject for examining the interactions among scientific discoveries, international
events, and coalition dynamics in the formulation and implementation of international
environmental policy. The causes of the greenhouse problem are deeply embedded in the central
aspects of the world's economic and social activity, and solving it will require substantial
changes in domestic transportation, industrial, agricultural, and forestry practices. Solving it will
also require extensive coordination among and within national and international governing
institutions.' There exists a fairly clear benchmark against which the "implementation" of the
FCCC can be measured. By 1993, all industrialized countries had pledged to return their
emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000 and had developed an "action plan" describing in
detail the measures they would take to do so.2  Finally, because subsystems at all levels of
government can be delineated with relative ease, the same model of the policy process can be
applied in a similar manner to both the international and national climate change policy
processes, thus shedding some light on the interactions among the two levels.
2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUE
The theory of climate change is fairly well understood and accepted.3 The earth's climate is
sustained by a delicate balance between the amount of the sun's energy that it absorbs and the
Sebenius, James. 1991. Designing negotiations toward a new regime: the case of global warming. International
Security 15, 4: 110-48.
2 Some may argue that, because these initial commitments were made unilaterally rather than as of a formal treaty,
the failure of countries to meet these commitments does not necessarily mean that they will fail to comply with the
terms of the treaty. However, As will be discussed in the next chapter, national sovereignty softens the distinction
between "hard" and "soft" international law, as (1). countries rarely make commitments in a treaty that they are not
prepared to undertake anyway, and (2). the weak enforcement mechanisms contained in most treaties provide in
practice no greater incentive to comply then exists for unilateral commitments. More importantly, as will be shown
in the case studies, the processes through which these unilateral commitments were developed were no different
than those involved in negotiating the commitments under the treaty.
3 A general summary of what governments consider to be the current state of knowledge on climate change can be
amount of energy that it radiates back into space. About one-third of the incoming solar
radiation is reflected, with the rest being absorbed by the different components of the climate
system, including the atmosphere, oceans, and land surface. These various components in turn
emit energy in the form of infrared radiation. The long-term balance between these energy fluxes
determines the average temperature of the earth, and thus its climate.
Although the balance between these incoming and outgoing flows of energy can be disturbed
by both natural events and human activities, the effects of human activities are of greatest
concern.4 Human activities alter the energy balance by injecting into or removing from the
atmosphere heat-trapping, or "greenhouse" gases. The most significant of these include carbon
dioxide (C0 2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and their
substitutes (e.g., hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)). Once injected into the atmosphere, the long
atmospheric residence times of many of these greenhouse gases allows them to absorb energy for
decades to centuries afterwards.
Humans have contributed substantial amounts of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere since
pre-industrial times. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide for example, have increased
by thirty percent since the mid-18 century, while those of nitrous oxide have increased by
fifteen percent. Concentrations of methane have grown by 145 percent. These increased
concentrations correlate well with an observed 0.6*C increase in global average temperatures
over the last century. In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
concluded, "...most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to
the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations." The IPCC also projected that, given current
emission rates, average global temperatures could increase from 1.4*C to 5.8*C by 2100, and that
the projected rate of warming is very likely to be greater than any seen in the last ten thousand
years. '
This warming is expected to have both direct and indirect impacts on human populations and
global ecosystems. According to the IPCC, precipitation is likely to increase, particularly over
the northern mid- to high latitudes and Antarctica. Heat waves will become longer and more
intense, causing an increase in the number of heat-related deaths and illnesses. The geographical
range and seasons for disease-carrying insects would be extended, increasing the transmission
rates of such diseases as malaria, yellow fever and viral encephalitis. Crop yields are expected to
be reduced in most tropical and sub-tropical regions, and water resources in water-scarce regions
are expected to become scarcer. The average sea level is likely to rise by .09 to .88 meters by
2100 as a result of glacial and ice-sheet melting and the thermal expansion of the oceans.' This
found in the Policy-Makers Summary of the IPCC's Third Assessment Report (IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001:
The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press).
4 Natural events include variations in the amount of energy radiated by the sun and volcanic eruptions that inject ash
and sulfurous gases into the atmosphere. Fluctuations in solar radiation can have both a warming and cooling
effect, while volcanic eruptions tend to lower the average temperature of the earth by increasing the amount of
energy reflected back to space (IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
5 IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
6 .IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third
could cause the flooding and erosion of coastal regions, displacing as many as 118 million people
around the world. As many as 70 million people could be displaced in China and Bangladesh
alone. Small islands such as Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands could lose as much as 80
percent of their land area. The expected increase in climate variability is expected to cause an
increase in the frequency of severe storms, making many more low-lying areas vulnerable and
substantially increasing the cost of storm and flood insurance. As average temperatures rise, the
current range of the earth's climatic zones would migrate towards the poles, disrupting forests,
rangelands, and other ecosystems. These shifts and associated changes in precipitation patterns
could also severely disrupt fisheries and agricultural production systems.'
While the climate models upon which the predictions of climate change rest have been
refined substantially over the few decades, many uncertainties remain. Many aspects of the
biogeochemical cycling of greenhouse gases are still not well understood, and many feedback
mechanisms associated with clouds, oceans, sea ice, and vegetation are still not well represented
in climate models. More empirical data regarding various climate system variables (e.g., solar
output, hydrological cycles, ecosystem changes) is needed.' Because regional-scale climate
changes are uncertain, quantitative projections as to the impacts of these changes are difficult to
make. Finally, little is known about the impacts that the interactions of multiple climatic and
non-climatic stresses will have on both human and natural systems.'
Carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels is the most significant of the greenhouse
gases. Industrial emissions account for 43 percent of carbon released in 1995, but have been
growing at less than one percent annually in recent years. The building and the transport sectors
contributed 31 and 22 percent, respectively, of 1995 energy-related CO 2 emissions, but have been
growing at a much faster rate. Emissions from the transport sector have been increasing by 2.5
percent annually, while those from buildings have grown at a rate of almost 2 percent per year.
Deforestation, particularly through burning, also releases significant amount of carbon dioxide. 0
Significant emissions of C0 2, CH4, and N2 0 are also released through various agriculture and
waste management practices.
In the short run, improving energy efficiency is the primary means to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, particularly CO 2. Improvements in the building design, such as more efficient
windows and heating and cooling systems, can contribute significantly to emissions reductions.
In the manufacturing sector, improving energy and materials management practices,
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Recent studies have shown that the Arctic
region is already undergoing profound changes, including rising average air temperatures, thinning ice sheets,
melting permafrost, and other ecological changes not seen in the geological record.
7 IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001. Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom,
and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
8 IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group Ito the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
9 IP[CC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group Ito the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
'0 IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
cogeneration, steam recovery, using more efficient motors and other electrical devices, and
recycling materials could all reduce emissions. Modifying production processes, eliminating
solvents, replacing feedstocks and other materials, and increasing the recycling of materials could
also reduce production-related emissions. In the transport sector, energy use could be reduced
through the development and use of smaller and more energy-efficient vehicles, altering land-
use, mobility, and life-style patterns, and shifting to less energy-intensive modes of
transportation. In the longer term, as existing power plants are replaced, renewable sources of
energy will become more important."
There is considerable debate about the costs associated with these emissions reductions. The
IPCC suggests that most reductions in the building sector could be achieved for little or no
additional cost, as could about half of those in the industrial sector. Estimates of the costs of
emissions reductions in the transport sector, however, range from less that $25 per ton of carbon
(tC) to more than $50/tC. Opinions differ as to the impacts of these costs on overall GDP. Top-
down analyses of actions necessary in OECD countries to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels
suggest that the costs associated with these actions would be in the range of 0.2 percent of GDP
to about 2 percent of GDP in 2010. This cost could be reduced to 0.1 percent to 1.1 percent of
GDP if an international emissions trading system is implemented, as this approach would in
theory reductions on those areas where it is cheapest to do S0.12 This would require that
international institutions and mechanisms be established that would ensure that appropriate flows
of capital and technologies among countries takes place." .
All of these cost estimates are critically dependent on the assumptions used. Much of the
difference in the estimates are a function of different assumptions about such factors as
consumption patterns, resource and technology availability, the desired level and timing of
abatement, and the choice of policy instrument. For instance, if a carbon or energy tax is used to
reduce emissions, the cost of mitigation depends very much on how the revenues from the tax are
distributed. If the revenues are used to reduce existing taxes, they could potentially produce a net
economic benefit. On the other hand, if the taxes were used to finance programs with relatively
low economic returns, the overall economic costs of the tax would increase. There also exist
differences in baseline estimates of the energy efficiency improvements that would occur without
climate change policies.
A diverse set of actors with very different interests have become involved in efforts to
address it. Over 180 countries participated in the negotiations of the FCC and the Kyoto
Protocol, all having different concerns about climate change. Their contributions to the problem
differ, they face unequal abatement costs, and they face unequal risks from the potential impacts
of climate change. Historically, OECD countries have contributed the largest portion of GHGs in
the atmosphere, and these countries are currently responsible for about two-thirds of all GHG
emissions. Emissions from developing countries are increasing rapidly, however, as their
" IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
12 IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
13IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
populations increase and their economies grow. Although global GHG emissions increased by
nine percent between 1990 and 2003, those from developing countries increased by 37 percent
during the same period." The developing countries, particularly low-lying and island countries
of the tropics, are also among the most vulnerable to impacts of climate change." Those
developing countries with economies dependent on oil exports would also be affected by
measures that reduce overall oil consumption.'"
In addition, different sectors of the economies with each country would shoulder different
portions of the abatement costs depending on the response options chosen. For example, in
Norway, mandatory reductions in CO 2 emissions from energy generation would be costly, as
much of that country's electricity is generated through hydroelectric facilities. In contrast, the
United Kingdom reduced its CO2 emissions significantly during the 1990's with a net benefit to
the economy by privatizing, and ultimately closing, relatively inefficient coal mines.17  Some
industries, such as solar and wind power, would benefit substantially from CO 2 reduction
measures. How all of these interests interact among international and national policy processes is
not well understood.
2.2 INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY SUBSYSTEMS
This study examines the international climate policy process and overlapping national policy
processes in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands between 1988 and 1997. The
international case study describes the dynamics that occurred in the international climate policy
subsystem as emissions reductions commitments for industrialized countries were negotiated as
part of negotiations for the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and its Kyoto
Protocol. The case studies of the national climate change policy processes describe the dynamics
that occurred during this period in the corresponding domestic climate policy subsystems of the
United States, Japan, and the Netherlands, respectively, and some of the relevant policy
subsystems that overlap with the domestic climate policy subsystems in these countries. A
diagram of these overlapping international, national and subnational subsystems is provided in
Figure 2.1.18
" World Resources Institute. 2003. World Resources 2002-2004: Decision for the Earth: Balance, Voice and
Power. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
* IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
16 IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
17 Unander, Fridtjof. 2003. Understanding C02 Emission Trends in IEA Countries. Paris: International Energy
Agency.
Also overlapping with the INC/COP subsystem were climate policy subsystems within country groups, such as the
European Union (EU). the Group of 77 plus China, that had the authority to speak on behalf of their member states.
As is traditionally the case in international negotiations, countries with similar views on key issues tended to work
together as a country group. Four country groups were represented in the INC/COP subsystem: the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS).; the Group of 77 and China (G-77).; the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).; and the European Union (EU). Of these, only the EU has formally organized itself as a
regional economic integration organization (see Chapter 9). Russia, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and
other Eastern European countries ("countries in transition, or CITs). also tended to work together and speak with a
common voice, as did the non-European OECD countries. This latter group, which consisted of Japan, the United
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2.2.1. The International Climate Change Policy Subsystem
The international climate policy subsystem is comprised of the set of participants in
meetings of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for the Framework Convention
on Climate Change during the negotiations of the FCCC (1990-1992) and the Conference of the
Parties (COP) to the Framework Convention on Climate Change during the negotiations of the
Kyoto Protocol (1992-1997). These two entities, together with the political process that led to
the establishment of the INC, comprised the principle fora in which discussions on international
climate change policy have taken place, with the COP supplanting the INC once the FCCC
entered into force. They can thus be considered to be one autonomous subsystem. Overlapping
with the INC/COP climate subsystem were two other major international subsystems: the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the U.N. General Assembly.
States, Sweden, Canada, Norway, and New Zealand, became known as the "Common Interest Group" during the
INC negotiations and "JUSSCANNZ" during negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol.
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The participants in this subsystem coalesced into two major coalitions with opposing beliefs
regarding commitments that industrialized countries should make to reduce their emissions. The
"precautionary" coalition, which believed that climate change posed a real and substantial threat
to the planet, wanted these countries to reduce their emissions significantly. The "economic
growth" coalition believed that such reductions could not be justified given the potential
economic costs and the many scientific uncertainties.
The international climate policy process began in early 1988 when these two coalitions first
engaged in a sustained debate regarding international action to address climate change. These
early discussions led to the creation of the IPCC, which was charged with assessing the science
and impacts of and potential responses to climate change. As discussions regarding an
agreement by the international community to control GHG emissions continued in the IPCC
meetings, the U.N. General Assembly, and a series of high-level conferences, the INC was
established in 1990 as the forum in which such a convention would be negotiated. This
Framework Convention on Climate Change was to be completed by July 1992 and signed at the
UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. By 1990,
precautionary coalitions dominated the national climate policy processes in all industrialized
countries but the United States, and all of these countries made unilateral commitments at that
point to stabilize or reduce their emissions. Although the precautionary coalition was able to
control much of the debate in the INC, the economic growth coalition, which controlled the
climate policy process in the United States, was able to force its opponents to accept a treaty that
did not contain specific commitments for emission reductions by industrialized countries.
When the FCCC entered into force in 1994, the precautionary coalition reopened the debate
over specific commitments by industrialized countries to reduce their emissions. Having gained
control of the US climate policy subsystem in 1993 with the election of President Clinton and
Vice-President Al Gore, it was able to ensure that the Kyoto Protocol that was signed in 1997
contained the specific targets and timetables for industrialized countries. This domination by the
precautionary coalition was not complete, however, as the commitments contained in the
protocol were significantly weaker than those it had initially sought almost ten years earlier.
2.2.2. National Climate Policy Subsystems
After signing the Convention, industrialized countries began the process of formulating
national climate change programs. Most of these countries submitted in September of 1994 their
first national reports describing these initial efforts. Most of these reports state that the policies
described in them would reduce greenhouse gas emissions sufficient to meet the "aim"
established by the Convention, as well as unilaterally adopted national greenhouse gas emissions
targets.'" Although the FCCC does not bind countries to these unilateral targets, it has generally
been acknowledged that the policies and measures described in the reports failed to achieve their
goals, and greenhouse gas emissions have continued to rise.2 o Much this failure is due to
19 As will be discussed in Section 3, most OECD nations adopted unilateral emissions reductions targets (generally
reductions in emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000). in order to demonstrate a commitment to addressing
climate change.
20 In independent NGO reviews of national plans (e.g., Climate Action Network. 1995. Independent NGO
Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD Countries: Third Review, January 1995.
Washington, D.C.: United States Climate Action Network and Climate Network Europe; Climate Action Network.
difficulties encountered when the responsibility for developing and implementing various
policies and measure fell to subsystems outside of the national climate policy subsystem that
were controlled by coalitions holding beliefs quite different than those of the coalitions
controlling the national climate policy subsystems.
The U.S. Climate Policy Subsystem
When the political process began in 1988, a precautionary coalition parallel to that
dominating the international climate policy subsystem controlled the U.S. climate policy
subsystem. The economic growth coalition was able to gain control of the subsystem within the
following year, however." Although hampered by a number of external factors as well as its own
political missteps, it was able to ensure not only that U.S. climate policy between 1989 and 1992
was reflective of its beliefs but also that these beliefs were not compromised by the FCCC
negotiated in the international subsystem.
Although the precautionary coalition regained control of the U.S. climate policy subsystem
in early 1993, this control was not complete. Many powerful members of Congress became
active in the economic growth coalition in 1994, and were able to prevent the precautionary
coalition from producing policies fully reflective of its beliefs. In addition, responsibility for
developing and implementing some of the measures proposed by the precautionary coalition in
the national climate policy subsystem, such as a BTU tax and a tire efficiency labeling system,
fell to overlapping subsystems. The development and implementation of the proposed measures
ended when the coalitions dominating these overlapping subsystems determined that they were
inconsistent with their own beliefs.
The Dutch Climate Policy Subsystem
As in the international and U.S. climate policy subsystems, the Dutch national climate policy
subsystem was dominated initially by the precautionary coalition. Unlike in the United States,
however, this domination was relatively complete, and continued throughout the 1988-1997
period. Although the economic growth coalition gained some strength towards the end of this
period, it was not able to make significant changes in the Dutch national climate policy before
negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol were completed.
As in the United States, responsibility for the development and implementation of a number
of emissions reduction measures proposed in the climate policy subsystem, such as an energy tax
and a wind energy program, fell to overlapping subsystems. In the case of the energy tax,
1997. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD Countries: Fifth Review,
October 1997. Somerset, England: Climate Network Europe), national targets were the primary criteria against
which the plans were evaluated. The negotiators of the Climate Convention did not specify in detail the types of
policies and measures that must be developed or the processes that nations should use to prepare their reports,
assuming that each country would undertake a process appropriate for its national circumstances and political
processes.
2 Throughout each of the case studies I make references to "the" precautionary coalition and "the" economic growth
coalition. I do not mean to imply that there is a single precautionary or economic growth coalition active across
multiple international and national subsystems. As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, the
coalitions active in a particular subsystem are unique to that subsystem, although they may share membership with
parallel coalitions in other subsystems.
members of the economic growth coalition were able to gain sufficient strength in the energy tax
subsystem that they were able to weaken the proposal significantly. They were also able to take
advantage of allies within the overlapping EU climate and energy tax subsystems. In the case of
the Dutch wind energy policy, the national wind energy program failed to meet its goals after
regional wind energy development efforts were stymied by opposition by coalitions within local
zoning policy subsystems considering the zoning changes needed in order to construct the
individual wind towers.
The Japanese Climate Policy Subsystem
Control of the climate policy subsystem was shared by the precautionary and economic
growth coalitions throughout the 1988-1997 period. Although the economic growth coalition
was in a position to control most of the policy decisions, it was constrained both by external
events and a number of institutional, socio-economic and other factors. These same factors
provided the precautionary coalition with sufficient strength to force a compromise in Japan's
climate policy. As in the United States and the Netherlands, a number of the measures proposed
in the national climate policy subsystem were developed and implemented in other national or
subnational subsystems. In particular, efforts by MITI and utilities to enlarge Japan's nuclear
energy program were thwarted when proposals for new facilities were opposed by coalitions
controlling approval processes within the energy policy subsystems of the individual prefectures.
Details of the events and interactions that transpired within and among these various
international, national and subnational subsystems are described in greater detail in Section III.
To understand the implications of these events and interactions, however, additional detail
regarding the ACF and its application to the implementation of international environmental
agreements is required. This is undertaken in the following Section II.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE ACF AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
Although the Advocacy Coalition Framework was designed to explain policy change at the
national and sub-national levels, fundamental similarities between international and national
policy dynamics suggest that it can be used to explore policy processes at the international level.
The influence of international environmental agreements such as the Framework Convention on
Climate Change on domestic policies can then be assessed by examining the differences in
political resources and constraints among competing coalitions at each level.
The ACF builds on the view of most policy scholars that the policy subsystem is the most
useful unit of analysis through which to examine policy formulation and implementation.1 Figure
3.1 shows a general overview of the ACF. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that the best way of
understanding the complex networks of actors active in these subsystems is to group them into
"advocacy coalitions," sets of actors from different institutions sharing a set of beliefs and
coordinating their activities over time. Using a range of strategies and guidance instruments,
these coalitions compete with each to dominate the political process within the subsystem and
incorporate their beliefs into government policies. Implementation occurs when, at some point
during this process, governmental authorities make decisions regarding institutional rules,
resources allocations, and appointments pertaining to a government policy or program. These
decisions result in a set of policy outputs, which in turn produces both intended effects and a
range of unintended side effects.
As the implementation process proceeds over time, subsystem coalitions revise their beliefs
and alter their strategies according to their perception of these impacts, the adequacy of the
decision-making process, new information arising from various research efforts, and events and
changes external to the subsystem. Because belief systems are very difficult and slow to change,
however, this learning process generally produces only modest changes in policy over the long
term (a decade or more). More substantial and rapid change tends to occur when various events
external to the subsystem alter the power structure within the subsystem by changing the political
resources and constraints of subsystem actors.
The development of international treaties follows a very similar course. According to
Dubey, this process starts:
"... with the quest of ideas that become the basis of negotiations. The ideas get converted
into issues that are joined by individual and groups of countries. The formulation of
individual country, subregional, regional, and wider group positions on the issues is
(then) a very important phase of the negotiating process, ... (involving) important trade-
offs among the countries of the South and North... Then comes the crucial stage of
trade-offs and compromises.. .resulting in the adoption of resolutions, declarations, and
decisions either by consensus or by majority voting... .The final phase of the cycle,
getting the ideas translated into concrete action, maintaining their continuity, and
ensuring progress in the evolution, is the most difficult and complex part of the
negotiating process. Most of the resolutions/ declarations...provide for a built-in review
Sabatier, Paul A. and Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition
Approach. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press.
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mechanism to assess progress in implementation. But more frequently, in order to insure
implementation, it becomes necessary to initiate a whole series of new negotiating
processes. Each of these processes may constitute a separate cycle of negotiation."2
The negotiation and implementation of international environmental treaties such
FCCC occur through the coordination of overlapping international and national
subsystems.3 The role of the international subsystem is to develop the regimes through
as the
policy
which
2 Dubey, Muckund. 1985. The Main Forces at Work. In Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation, ed. Arthur S. Lall,
pg. 155-176. New York: Columbia University Press.
3 The ACF has been used by a number of authors to explore climate change policy-making processes as well as
interactions among domestic and international policy processes (e.g., Litfin, K. T. 2000. Advocacy coalitions along
the domestic-foreign frontier: Globalization and Canadian climate change policy. Policy Studies Journal 28, 1:
236-252; Bulkeley, H. 2000. Discourse coalitions and the Australian climate change policy network. Environment
and Planning C-Government and Policy 18, 6: 727-748; Dolan, C. J. 2003. Economic policy and decision making
at the intersection of domestic and international politics: The advocacy coalition framework and the National
Economic Council. Policy Studies Journal 31, 2: 209-236; Dudley, G. and Jeremy Richardson. 1999. Competing
advocacy coalitions and the process of 'frame reflection': a longitudinal analysis of EU steel policy. Journal of
European Public Policy 6, 2: 225-248;Weber, N. and T. Christophersen. 2002. The influence of non-governmental
organizations on the creation of Natura 2000 during the European Policy process. Forest Policy and Economics 4,
1: 1-12). However, none of these studies have attempted to elaborate on the basic elements of the ACF in order to
create a coherent model of the interactions among overlapping national and international subsystems. In addition,
nations cooperate in addressing an issue or problem area. National policy subsystems
overlapping with this international subsystem produce the national policies through which the
countries cooperate in the regime. Because individuals active in international subsystems are
also active in these national subsystems, coalitions at one level can be expected to have "parallel"
coalitions at the other level with identical, or substantially similar, policy beliefs. These parallel
coalitions form an important bridge between the two levels. Figure 3.2 provides a diagram of
these parallel processes.
The ACF can be used to develop specific hypotheses concerning advocacy coalitions and
policy dynamics that can be tested empirically. A list of those hypotheses particularly relevant to
advocacy coalition, policy change, and learning is provided in Table 3.1. These hypotheses,
which have been developed, tested and refined by Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith and others in a wide
range of cases, provide a useful starting point for formulating additional propositions with which
to explore the nature of national policy change in response to international environmental
treaties.4
The purpose of the three chapters of this section is to provide the theoretical underpinning of
this study. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe the nature of advocacy coalitions and
policy subsystems and suggest how corresponding elements found in the international relations
literature and the four case studies fit into the framework. In Chapter 4, I suggest how
reinterpreting political coalition resources and constraints resources as sources of political power
is a useful approach for understanding the interactions among system parameters and coalition
behavior, a critical element in the process of policy change. I describe in Chapter 5 how this
interpretation of the ACF can be used to examine interactions between the international and
national climate change policy processes and the dynamics of treaty implementation.
the subsystems in which the competing coalitions interact have not been clearly delineated and the dynamics of
interactions among coalitions in overlapping subsystems have not been explored.
4 Sabatier, Paul A. and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment. In Theories
ofthe Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
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3.1 ACTORS, COALITIONS, AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS
The policy subsystem, the fundamental element of the ACF, is defined as a semi-
autonomous arena in which the policy process takes place and from which policies emanate.' It
is not a formal institution of governance, however, but an entity delineated by the government
5 'The concept of the policy subsystem has its origins in the idea of "iron triangles," interactions among
administrative agencies, legislative committees, and interest groups, that has long been accepted by political
scientists (Sabatier, Paul A. 1993. The Advocacy Coalition Framework. In Policy Change and Learning: An
Advocacy Coalition Approach, ed. Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford:
Westview Press). Because political actors generally require specialized knowledge if they are to be successful in
influencing policy, the political elites responsible for policy-making in a specific area tend to form relatively
autonomous policy subsystems, or domains, that can be distinguished from the broader political system. These
autonomous subsystems arise because the complexity of most policy issues in terms of understanding relevant laws
and regulations, the magnitude of the problem, and the influence of various causal factors, force political actors to
specialize if they are to have any influence (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition
Framework: An Assessment). See, e.g., Griffith, Ernest. 1961. Congress: Its Contemporary Role. New York: New
York University Press; Dodd, Lawrence. 1976. Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, and Hamm, Keith. 1983. Patterns of Influence Among Committees, Agencies and Interest
Groups. Legislative Studies Quarterly 8, August: 379-426.
Table 3.1 Selected Hypotheses of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Hypotheses concerning Advocacy Coalitions
" On major controversies within a mature policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and
opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so.
* Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less
so on secondary aspects.
* An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the
policy core.
Hypotheses conceming Policy Change
* The policy core attributes of a government program in a specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the
advocacy coalition which instituted the program remains in power within than jurisdiction--except when the change is
imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction.
* Significant perturbations extemal to the subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic conditions, system-wide governing
coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core
attributes of a governmental action program.
Hypotheses Concerning Policy-Oriented Learning, Particularly Across Coalitions
" Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an intermediate level of informed conflict
between the two coalitions. This requires that (1) each coalition has the technical resources to engage in such a debate;
and that (2) the conflict is between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other or,
alternatively, between Important secondary aspects of the two belief systems.
* Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more conducive to policy-oriented learning than those
in which data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking.
* Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policy-oriented learning across belief systems than those
involving purely social or political systems because in the former many of the critical variables are not themselves active
strategists and controlled experimentation is more feasible.
* Even when the accumulation of technical information does not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have
important impacts on policy--at least in the short run--by altering the views of policy brokers.
officials, interest group representatives, journalists, scientists, and others individuals active in the
process. These actors coalesce into coalitions according to their belief systems and work
together to transform these belief systems into public policies.'
3.1.1. Actors and Beliefs
The use of the ACF to examine the policy process is based upon three fundamental precepts.
First, political actors are assumed to hold a certain set of policy-oriented beliefs and seek though
the policy process to translate these beliefs and goals into policies and programs. Second, actors
holding the same or similar beliefs and goals tend to work together as a coalition. The belief
structures of these coalitions, therefore, generally reflect those of their constituent members.
Finally, public policies can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems, and thus can
be "mapped" on the same canvas. These links among beliefs, coalitions, and policies provide a
means for assessing the influence over time that various actors have on the policy process.
The belief systems of political elites can be organized into a hierarchical structure, with
higher and broader levels constraining more specific beliefs.7 The three basic categories of
beliefs are deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary aspects. A summary of these
beliefs is shown in Table 3.2.
Deep core beliefs comprise the highest and broadest level of a policy elite's belief system.
These beliefs include the basic normative and ontological axioms defining a person's personal
philosophy (e.g., the "Left/Right" scale), and apply to all policy areas. Because deep core beliefs
are fundamentally normative in nature, they are extremely difficult to change; doing so would
require something akin to a religious conversion.
Policy core beliefs are the fundamental policy positions regarding the problem with which
the subsystem is concerned. They comprise the basic strategies for achieving core values within
the subsystem, and are comprised of both normative precepts and precepts with substantial
empirical components. Normative precepts include such elements as the value priorities
regarding the issues in question, while precepts with a substantial empirical component include
the overall seriousness of the problem, its basic causes, and the distribution of authority among
levels of government. While the normative aspects of policy core beliefs tend to make them very
difficult to change, those elements with substantial empirical elements may change over a period
of time if gradual accumulation of evidence reveals serious anomalies.
6 The discussion in this chapter of the ACF is summarized from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change
and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition
Framework: An Assessment; and Sabatier, Paul A. and Matthew A. Zafonte. 1997. Policy-Oriented Learning
Between Coalitions: Characteristics of Successful Professional/Scientific Fora..
7 See Marcus, Alfred A. and Gordon P. Rands. 1993. Public Policy, Economics, and the Environment. In Managing
Environmental Issues, ed. Roger Buchholz; Schlager, E. 1995. Policy-Making And Collective Action - Defining
Coalitions Within The Advocacy Coalition Framework. Policy Sciences 28, 3: 243-270; Green, David and Ian
Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press; and Martin, Lisa L.
1995. Heterogeneity,- Linkage and Commons Problems. In Local Commons and Global Interdependence:
Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains, ed. Robert 0. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom, pg. 253. London:
Sage publications.
Table 3.2 The Structure of Policy Elite Belief Systems
Deep Core Policy Core Secondary Aspects
Defining
characteristics
Fundamental normative and
ontological axioms.
Scope Across all policy
subsystems.
Susceptibility Very difficult; akin to a
to change religious conversion.
Illustrative 1. The nature of man:
components i. Inherently evil vs.
socially redeemable.
ii. Part of nature vs.
dominion over nature
iii. Narrow egoists vs.
contractarians.
2. Relative priority of
various ultimate values:
freedom, security,
power, knowledge,
health, love, beauty, etc.
3. Basic criteria of
distributive justice:
whose welfare counts?
Relative weights of self,
primary groups, all
people, future
generations, nonhuman
beings etc.
Fundamental policy positions
concerning the basic strategies for
achiefing core values within the
subsystem.
Subsystem-wide.
Difficult, but can occur if experience
reveals serious anomalies.
Fundamental Normative Precepts:
1. Orientation on basic value
priorities;
2. Identification of groups or other
entities whose welfare is of
greatest concern;
Precepts with a Substantial Empirical
Component:
3. Overall seriousness of the
problem:
4. Basic causes of the problem;
5. Proper distribution of authority
between government and market;
6. Proper distribution of authority
among levels of government;
7. Priority accorded various policy
instrument (e.g., regulation,
insurance, education, direct
payment, tax credits);
8. Method of financing;
9. Ability of society to solve the
problem (e.g., zero-sum
competition vs. potential for mutual
accommodation; technological
optimism vs. pessimism).
10. Participation of public vs. experts
vs. elected officials.
Instrumental decisions and
information searches
necessary to implement policy
core.
Usually only part of
subsystem.
Moderately easy; this is the
topic of most administrative
and legislative policymaking.
1. Seriousness of specific
aspects of the problem in
specific locales.
2. Importance of various
causal linkages in different
locales and over time.
3. Most decisions concerning
administrative rules;
budgetary allocations,
disposition of cases,
statutory interpretation, and
statutory revision.
4. Information regarding
performance of specific
programs or institutions.
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997
Secondary aspects of belief systems are the instrumental decisions and information searches
necessary to implement the policy core beliefs. They are usually applicable to only part of the
subsystem issues, and tend to be moderately easy to change. Because actors are generally willing
to make compromises regarding these secondary aspects before they relinquish their policy core
beliefs, they are often the principle focus of administrative and legislative policymaking.
The model of the individual used in the ACF assumes that actors are "instrumentally"
rational. While political actors are rational in the sense that they seek to use information and
other resources to achieve their goals, their ability to perceive the world and to process
information is affected by cognitive biases and constraints.' This view of the individual has a
8 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment.
9 Sabatier points out that, in an uncertain world, one needs to spend a great deal of time learning about which policies
will most like achieves one's interests, as well as the trade-offs among various interests and goals. See, e.g., Jervis,
Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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number of important implications. Because actors are limited in their ability to process and
analyze information by time and computational constraints, they have substantial incentive to use
a variety of heuristics as guides to complex situations." In addition, their perceptions are
strongly filtered by their preexisting normative and other beliefs, and they weigh losses more
heavily than gains. As a result, different actors will tend to interpret the same piece of evidence
in different ways, and actors arriving at one conclusion will frequently suspect that those arriving
at different conclusions are motivated by some hidden, nefarious purpose or interest. These
dynamics make resolving conflicts much more difficult that the rational actor model predicts."
3.1.2. Advocacy Coalitions
A large number of political elites can be active in a given subsystem at a given time, and can
include not only officials from multiple levels of government but journalists, researchers, policy
analysts, and others individuals involved in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of
policy ideas. Those actors sharing a set of beliefs and actively cooperating to achieve their policy
goals form advocacy coalitions, with the number of coalitions in a subsystem depending largely
on the scope of the issue and the number of individuals."
Advocacy coalitions are defined as "people from a variety of positions (e.g., elected and
agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system-i.e., a
set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions-and who show a non-trivial
degree of coordinated activity over time."" These coalitions form as the various subsystem
actors recognize that the probability of success increases if they pool their political resources."
In general, the number of politically significant coalitions in a subsystem is likely to be quite
small, as the forces that spur the creation of coalitions also tend to limit their number."
Elster, Jon, ed. 1986. Rational Choice. New York: NYU Press; March, James G. 1986. Bounded Rationality,
Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice. In Rational Choice, ed. Jon Elster. New York: NYU Press; Jones,
Bryan. 1994. Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Green
and Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies ofRational Choice theory; and King, Gary, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba.
1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10 One of the implications of this is that policy core beliefs, because they are fairly general in scope yet very salient,
provide more efficient guides to behavior over a wide variety of situations than do secondary aspects. This, in
turn, contributes to the ACF's assumption that the policy core provides the principal "glue" of coalitions (Sabatier
and Zafonte. 1997. Policy-Oriented Learning Between Coalitions: Characteristics of Successful
Professional/Scientific Fora).
" Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment.
12 Some agency officials and researchers may initially have no strong policy preferences. However, as conflict
between coalitions increases and as beliefs become clarified over time, most neutral actors will drop out of the
process. Those remaining tend to coalesce into increasing distinct coalitions with coherent belief systems.
'3 Sabatier, Paul A. 1988. An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented
Learning Therein. Policy Sciences 2, Summer/Fall: 129-168; and Sabatier, Paul A. 1993. Policy Change Over a
Decade or More. In Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, ed. Paul A. Sabatier and
Hank Jenkins-Smith. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press.
14See, e.g., Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action. New
York: Cambridge University Press; and Schlager. 1995. Policy-Making And Collective Action - Defining
Coalitions Within The Advocacy Coalition Framework.
is For example, the pooling of resources by one group of advocates will force their opponents to do the same if they
are to avoid defeat. Having allies then create pressures for common positions, which tend to harden over time.
The ACF assumes that policy core beliefs are the fundamental "glue" of coalitions because
they represent political actors basic normative and empirical commitments on the policy area
with which the subsystem is concerned. 6 These shared beliefs serve to simplify the significant
difficulties actors face in striving to reach a common understanding of the policy problem and the
proper means of addressing it. Beliefs concerning basic value priorities and the identification of
groups or entities whose welfare is of concern are particularly important, and the ACF assumes
that agreement on these two normative precepts is the most important characteristic defining an
advocacy coalition.
While political scientists have traditionally viewed agency officials, researchers, and
journalists as being passive or policy indifferent, there is considerable evidence that they behave
like other coalition members in terms of pursuing policy objectives that are consistent with their
beliefs." Most agencies have a fairly clear overall mission which tells them to give priority to
some values over others, and the officials who join the agency generally come to accept those
priorities, whether out of self-selection or gradual indoctrination.'" Furthermore, agencies tend to
be dominated by members of a particular profession or scientific discipline that share the norms
of colleagues outside the agency and favor policies that are consistent with "best practices" as
defined by their profession.'
This in turn inhibits the formation of new coalitions. (Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or More;
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Harper Collins Publishers).
16Sabatier notes that the ACF uses belief systems rather than economic and organizational interests as the core of
coalition stability because beliefs are more inclusive and more verifiable than interests. While belief system
models can incorporate self-interest and organizational interests, they also allow actors to establish goals in
different ways. Interest models, on the other hand, generally fail to identify a set of means and performance
indicators necessary for goal attainment, and identifying a priori a clear and falsifiable set of interests for most
actors in policy conflicts is methodologically very difficult (Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or
More).
17 Sabatier, Paul A. and Matthew A. Zafonte. 1994. Are Bureaucrats and Scientists Members of Advocacy
Coalitions? Two Models Applied to San Francisco Bay/Delta Water Project. Davis, CA: University of California,
Davis.
For example, when procedures allow State Department advocates to write the first draft of a speech or be the last
ones in the door, as they would if the President were to speak to a foreign parliament, presidential decisions reflect
the views of State Department advocates. When the procedures give the same advantage to Defense Department
advocates, as they would if with a speech were to be made to defense ministers, decisions favor them (Kelman.
1987. Making Public Policy. See also Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. 1981.
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Stupak, Ronald
J. 1978. Inside the Bureaucracy: The View From the Assistant Secretary's Desk. Boulder, CO: Westview Press;
Kellner, Peter and Lord Crowther-Hunt. 1980. The Civil Service. London: Macdonald Press; Kaufman, Herbert.
1967. The Forest Ranger: a Study in Administrative Behavior. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press;
and Knott, Jack and Gary Miller. 1987. Reforming Bureaucracy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
19 Peters points out that, almost by definition, a professional has an internalized value structure promulgated,
inculcated, and policed by the profession itself These professional value structures place the interest of the client
above that of the practitioner, and can often conflict with the values of the government as a whole. For example,
one norm of the scientific profession is the free flow of information and ideas. For scientists working in a
government research office, this norm conflicts with the restrictions placed on the flow of information by national
security laws and regulations (Peters, B. Guy. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucracy. White Plains, NY: Longman
Inc.). See also Gillespie, David F. 1975. Technology and the Conflict of Professionals in Bureaucratic
Organizations. Sociological Quarterly: 319-32; Mosher, Frederick C. 1978. Professionals and the Public Service.
Public Administration Review 38: 144-50; and Beer, Samuel H. 1976. The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing:
It should be noted here that, while agency officials generally ally themselves with that
coalition holding beliefs consistent with their agency's mission, sub-units within an agency may
in fact belong to different coalitions.20 In addition, agency officials generally advocate more
moderate positions than their NGO allies to avoid antagonizing powerful sovereigns (i.e., sources
of funding or legal authority) who may hold different policy views." Individuals representing
non-governmental organizations, generally unfettered by such concerns, usually adopt more
extreme positions.
Scientists are also not neutral participants in the policy process. While they frequently view
themselves as "objective technicians" in this process, they tend to hold a well-defined set of
normative beliefs that guide their actions, and are critical players in the policy process at both the
national and international levels." In the United States, for example, they had important roles in
highlighting the problems of endangered species and helped craft the Endangered Species Act."
A Case Study of Public Sector Politics. Public Policy 24: 157-60.
20For example, on certain issues of arms control, factions in the U.S. State Department are often allied with like-
minded factions in the Department of Defense against rival State factions who are also allied with still other
Defense factions (Hilsman, Roger. 1990. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs:
Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc). Within the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, personnel in media-specific offices have historically tended to favor traditional
command-and-control approaches to addressing environmental problems while those in policy offices, largely
economists, have favored more market-oriented solutions (Rosenbaum, Walter A. 1998. Environmental Politics
and Policy. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc, 1998; Liroff, Richard. 1986. Reforming Air Pollution
Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA's Bubble. Washington, D.C.: Conservation Foundation). See also
Eisner, Marc A. and Kenneth J. Meier. 1990. Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the
Reagan Revolution in Antitrust. American Journal ofPolitical Science 38, 11: 894-917.
21 Official testimony at legislative hearings tends to reflect this moderation, while anonymous responses of agency
personnel to a survey are more likely to reflect the "real" agency view (Sabatier and Zafonte. 1997. Policy-
Oriented Learning Between Coalitions: Characteristics of Successful Professional/Scientific Fora). In the United
States, this trend towards moderation at the federal level is enforced by the requirement that the text of all
Congressional testimony by federal employees be approved beforehand by the White House's Office of
Management and Budget and all other departments within the Administration with an interest in the issue at hand.
22 The activities of most scientists are guided by a particular "paradigm," or set of assumptions, often implicit, about
basic causal theories and proper methods of investigation, and almost all scientific disciplines contain normative
assumptions that members tend to accept uncritically. For example, biologists tend to associate greater risks with
nuclear waste disposal than do physicists, chemists and engineers. Furthermore, scientists are often drawn to
applied research because they want to solve a particular problem, and the scientists who are most active regarding a
particular issue are likely to be those who have been involved the longest and who are most committed to
defending a particular point of view. Finally, there is a growing body of literature that shows that the topics chosen
for research, the allocation of the burden of proof in areas of uncertainty, and the presentation of results are all
affected by the scientists' disciplinary paradigms, organizational interests, and policy concerns. See Kuhn, Thomas
S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Lakatos, Imre. 1971.
History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8: 42-134; Barke,
Richard and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Politics and Scientific Expertise: Scientists, Risk Perception, and Nuclear
Waste Policy. Risk Analysis, 10; Wildavsky, Aaron and Ellen Tenenbaum. 1981. The Politics of Mistrust. Beverly
Hills: Sage; Palladino, Paolo. 1990. Ecological Theory and Pest Control Practice: The Institutional and Conceptual
Dimensions of a Scientific Debate. Social Studies of Science 20: 255-281; and Yearly, Steven. 1989. Bog
Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry. Social Studies of Science 19: 421-438.
23 Rosenbaum. 1998. Environmental Politics and Policy.
Internationally, they have been important advocates for international treaties addressing
Mediterranean water pollution, stratospheric ozone depletion, and whaling."
Finally, journalist, including television and newspaper executives, reporters, editors, anchors
and producers, do not see themselves as neutral "observers" of politics but rather as active
participants." As Dye points out, they "not only report events but also discover events to report,
assign them political meaning, and predict their consequences. They seek to challenge
government officials, debate political candidates, and define the problems of society. They see
their profession as a "sacred trust" and themselves as the true voice of the people in public
affairs" 26
Because important coalition actors active in a mature subsystem (i.e., one in which distinct
coalitions with well-developed belief systems have formed) are motivated not by short-term
interests but by a commitment to their policy core beliefs, Sabatier and Jenkins Smith have found
that coalition membership at the national level tends to remain relatively stable over time.2 ' This
also holds true at the international level. As Haas points out, the most compelling argument for
an international regime's importance in promoting international order is the fact that compliance
is achieved even when the regime's norms and principles run counter to the short-term interests
of the participants.2"
Political actors who are not members of a coalition may also be active in national and
international subsystems. Most important among these are "policy brokers," individuals whose
primary objective is to limit the level of political conflict within the subsystem and reach some
"reasonable" solution to the problem. While some brokers may also be policy advocates, others
may focus solely on ensuring that the political processes within the subsystem continue to
function. 29 High-level elected officials or civil servants frequently act as policy brokers at the
national level, while diplomats, former or current heads of state, or ministerial-level officials tend
to play this role in international subsystems.4
24 Haas, Peter M. 1989. Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control.
International Organization 43, 3: 377; Peterson, M. J. 1992. Whalers, cetologists, environmentalists, and the
international management of whaling. International Organization 46, 1: 147-185; Haas, Peter M. 1992. Banning
chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone. International Organization 46, 1:
187-224.
25 Carpenter, C. 2001. Businesses, green groups and the media: the role of non-governmental organizations in the
climate change debate. International Affairs 77, 2: 313-+; McComas, K. and J. Shanahan. 1999. Telling stories
about global climate change - Measuring the impact of narratives on issue cycles. Communication Research 26, 1:
30-57; Dalby, S. 1996. Reading Rio, writing the world: The New York Times and the 'Earth Summit'. Political
Geography 15, 6-7: 593-613.
2 6 Dye, Thomas R. 1995. Who's Running America? The Clinton Years. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
27 Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or More.
28 Haas. 1989. Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control. See also Young,
Oran R. 1986. International Regimes: Toward A New Theory of Institutions. World Politics 39, 10: 106; and
Keohane, Robert 0. and Joseph S. Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence. Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman and
Company.
29 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment. See also Dudley and
Richardson. 1999. Competing advocacy coalitions and the process of 'frame reflection': a longitudinal analysis of
EU steel policy.
3* Hilsman. 1990. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: conceptual models and
3.1.3. Public Policies As Reflections of Elite Beliefs
An important premise of the ACF is that public policies and programs incorporate normative
values and implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives, and can therefore be
conceptualized in much the same way as belief systems. This correspondence of beliefs and
policies provides a means by which the influence of various actors on policy can be assessed.
This premise holds true for policies developed at the international as well as the national level.
A number of theorists that have argued that public policies involve value priorities,
perceptions of important causal relationships, and perceptions of world states, including the
magnitude of the problem, and perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments." Pressman and
Wildavsky suggest that the term "policy" be used to designate a more or less implicit hypothesis
about what will happen if certain specified actions are taken. Policy-makers holding the
normative belief that public welfare will be maximized if economic markets are permitted to
function with minimal constraints will favor market-based mechanisms such as tradable
emissions permits and tax incentives over regulatory approaches such as emissions standards to
address environmental problems. Conversely, those holding the normative belief that economic
markets cannot capture the true value of natural resources will tend to favor the regulatory
approaches."
These premises are also true for international treaties. Puchala and Hopkins argue that a
description of an international regime must include a characterization of the major principles it
upholds as well as the norms that prescribe orthodox and proscribe deviant behavior." Each
regime has a set of elites who are the practical actors within it, and "the tenets of the regime
bureaucratic politics points out that an important role of the U.S. President is to be a political broker, mediating
among the conflicting demands of the Congress, cabinet members, agency heads, individual senior bureaucrats,
members of the press, interest groups, and state, local and regional leaders. Courts and special commissions may
also play this role, such as the brokering role that the U.S. Special Commission on Base Closures played in
determining the specific military bases to be closed as part of the post-Cold War military force reduction. At the
international level, policy brokers can play roles ranging from conventional mediators to interveners with both
interests and power. For example, Terje Larsen, the head of a Norwegian NGO trained in conflict resolution acted
as a broker in 1993 during the secret discussions between Israel and the PLO that gave rise to the Oslo Peace
Process (Watkins, M. and K. Winters. 1997. Interveners with interests and power. Negotiation Journal-On the
Process of Dispute Settlement 13, 2: 119-142). President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and a
number of other U.S. officials have played this role since then. Conference chairs and Secretariats can also be
important policy brokers.
3 Sabatier. 1993. The Advocacy Coalition Framework. See also Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973.
Implementation. Berkeley: University of California Press; Majone, Giandomenico. 1980. Policies as Theories.
Omega 8: 151-162; Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1989. Rules, Norms and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press; Garrison, J. A. 2001. Framing foreign policy alternatives in the inner circle: President Carter, his advisors,
and the struggle for the arms control agenda. Political Psychology 22, 4: 775-807; Richardson, Jeremy. 2000.
Government, interest groups and policy change. Political Studies 48, 5: 1006-1025; and Drezner, D. 2000. Ideas,
bureaucratic politics, and the crafting of foreign policy. American Journal of Political Science 44, 4: 733-749.
32 See, e.g.,; Castree, N. 2002. Environmental issues: from policy to political economy. Progress in Human
Geography 26, 3: 357-365; Kirchgassner, G. and F. Schneider. 2003. On the political economy of environmental
policy. Public Choice 115, 3: 369-396; McDonell, G. 1997. Scientific and everyday knowledge: Trust and the
politics of environmental initiatives. Social Studies of Science 27, 6: 819-863.
3 As was noted in footnote 2 of Chapter 1, a regime is defined here as the implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
and decision-making around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.
come to match the values, objectives, and decision-making procedures of the pre-eminent
participant or participants."" This consistency provides a means by which the international and
domestic policy dynamics can be examined and the influence of one on the other assessed.
3.2 INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY SUBSYSTEMS
These many different political actors and coalitions interact within distinct policy
subsystems to formulate public policies. Although the concept of the policy subsystem was
developed to describe domestic policy processes, there is much in the international relations
literature that suggests that international treaty negotiations can treated as occurring within
subsystems analogous to those at the national level. Thus the subsystem becomes a unit of
analysis through which the international and national policy processes can be linked.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith define a policy subsystem as the set of actors involved in
addressing a policy problem such that:
- The participants regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community who share a domain of
expertise;
- Participants regularly or periodically seek to influence public policy within this domain over
a fairly long period of time, i.e., 7-10 years;
- There exist specialized sub-units within agencies at all relevant levels of government to deal
with policy within the domain; and,
- There exist interest groups, or specialized sub-units within interest groups, which regard the
substantive policy area as a major policy topic."
Subsystems also have a functional and a territorial component, as the policies formulated
within them generally serve specific function and some form of jurisdictional limit.36 Thus
several different subsystems can be delineated at the national, sub-national and international
levels that are addressing different aspects of a given problem area.
34Puchala, Donald J. and Raymond F. Hopkins. 1983. International Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis. In
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner, pg. 369. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. See also Mitchell, R. B.
2003. International environmental agreements: A survey of their features, formation, and effects. Annual Review of
Environment and Resources 28: 429-461; Auer, M. 2000. Who participates in global environmental governance?
Partial answers from international relations theory. Policy Sciences 33, 2: 155-180; Allison, J. E. 1999. Fortuitous
consequence: The domestic politics of the 1991 Canada-United States agreement on air quality. Policy Studies
Journal 27, 2: 347-359; Bernstein, S. 2002. International institutions and the framing of domestic policies: The
Kyoto Protocol and Canada's response to climate change. Policy Sciences 35, 2: 203-236.
35According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, this rather careful delineation is necessary because the scope of a
subsystem is the critical element that distinguishes the three levels of values and precepts that comprise the elite
belief system (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment).
36For example, an "agricultural subsystem" in the United States must be defined as either the U.S. national
agriculture or California agriculture. However, each can be intergovernmental in nature, and the same individuals
may participate in both (Zafonte, Matthew A. and Paul A. Sabatier. 1998. Shared beliefs and imposed
interdependencies as determinants of ally networks in overlapping subsystems. Journal of Theoretical Politics 10,
4: 473-505).
3.2.1. National Policy Subsystems
Several different national policy subsystems are generally involved in the development and
implementation of international environmental treaties. At a minimum, there exists a national
foreign policy subsystem through which foreign policies are developed. Depending on the issue
area, several national domestic policy subsystems, as well as several some sub-national policy
subsystems, may also be involved in implementation process.
The National Foreign Policy Subsystem
The national foreign policy subsystem is comprised of the set of actors involved in setting
the nation's foreign policy with regard to the issue, or set of issues, relevant to the environmental
treaty in question and conveying that policy to the international community. National
delegations, which represent the country in negotiating sessions, are generally drawn from a
subset of subsystem actors, and it is the policies established within this subsystem that are the
"national positions" put forth by the delegation in the negotiations.
A broad range of actors can be involved in foreign policy subsystems that deal with
international issues. In most countries, officials from foreign ministries have traditionally been
the dominant players, as the role of these ministries is to represent the country in international
relations. However, because most foreign ministry personnel tend to lack expertise in the
substance of environmental issues, personnel from environment ministries have taken on an
increasingly important role. Personnel from energy, agriculture, economic ministries and other
ministries and agencies may also participate in the subsystem, as may members of the
legislature." Finally, representatives from interest groups are also active participants in the
foreign policy process in many countries."
This broad range of actors can make managing the policy formulation process difficult. As
Crowe observes:
"The trick in the process is to ensure that all views are properly taken into account in the
discussion. This sounds like obvious common sense, but it is surprising how often it does not take
place in various countries. Governments often consist of competing baronies, and all the more so
in countries in which formal responsibility for a subject is laid on the departmental minister, not on
the prime minister or the government as a whole. One of the things which the new republics in the
former Soviet Union genuinely find very difficult is precisely the coordination of policy into a
single approach and the sharing of information. Consultation is a habit of mind which has to be
deliberately fostered. Information is power and withholding important information from others
37 Because foreign policy is generally regarded as an executive or administrative function, participation by members
of the legislature may be limited. In the United States, for example, the power to make foreign policy rests solely
with the President. While the Senate must provide its advice and consent if the United States is to become a Party
to an agreement, participation by members of Congress or their representatives in the foreign policy formulation
process itself is limited. They may join delegations as observers only, and, while they may be briefed or otherwise
consulted, generally do not active participants in the interagency process through which the policy itself is
developed.
38 Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1997. Power Shift. Foreign Affairs 76, 1: 50-66; Raustiala, Kal. 1997. States, NGOs,
and international environmental institutions. International Studies Quarterly 41, 4: 719-740; Raustiala, Kal. 1997.
The "participatory revolution" in international environmental law. Harvard Environmental Law Review 21, 2: 537-
586.
who might take a different view confers advantage in turf fights."39
Most countries have established specialized offices to generally handle the procedural issues
associated with formulating foreign policy on environmental issues." These are most frequently
located within the foreign ministry."' In the United States, for example, the State Department's
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) coordinates U.S.
foreign policy on international environmental issues. However, these offices may also be located
in the environment or other ministry, or the Chief of State's office.
National Domestic Policy Subsystems
One or more national domestic policy subsystems may also be involved in the
implementation of international environmental agreements. In the United States, the President,
through the various departments and agencies of the executive branch, is responsible for carrying
out the laws passed by Congress. It the United States signs a treaty requiring it to take specific
actions, Congress must pass implementing legislation authorizing the President to carry out those
actions before he can formally ratify the treaty. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, for
example, Congress provided the requisite implementing legislation with the passage of the 1990
Clean Air Act. This Act required the President, through EPA, the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Agriculture, and other agencies, to implement the CFC phase out in the United
States.
3.2.2. Subnational Policy Subsystems
The implementation of international environmental agreements may involve, in addition to
national policy subsystems, one or more subnational policy subsystems. This occurs most
frequently in countries such as the United States and Germany that have federal, or decentralized,
political systems. Subnational political entities such as states are often responsible for
transportation and land use policies and energy distribution policies. Even in those countries
such as Japan that have fairly strong central governments, local governments may have authority
39Crowe, Brian L. 1993. Foreign Policy-Making: Reflections of a Practitioner. Government and Opposition 28,Spring: 175-189.
40Procedural processes here include, for example, the initial drafting of position papers, circulating papers for
comment, chairing meetings, etc. For example, Crowe. 1993. Foreign Policy-Making: Reflections of a Practitioner
states that, in the UK, the process consists of the lead department preparing a paper on the issues, usually in
consultation with other interested departments, followed by a discussion and inter-departmental negotiation, if
necessary up to Cabinet level, until there is agreement on national objectives and priorities. As international
negotiations proceeds the same process can take place to modify a national position to take account of changed
circumstances. Lang points out that internal coordination at the negotiating site may often be easier to accomplish
than back home because all the participants are more intensely involved in the development of the negotiation, the
give and take, the submission of new proposals, and the introduction of compromise formulae, and are less exposed
to domestic political influences (Lang, Winfried. 1996. Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-Making. International
Negotiation 1: 65-78).
41Most international negotiations involve factors outside the immediate issues at hand that need to be taken into
account, notably political and economic objectives involving other international priorities. The job of a foreign
ministry is to provide and coordinate this kind of input. Foreign offices around the world are reorganizing in order
to respond to the much greater importance given to functional as opposed to geographical issues and to the offices
within the foreign ministry dealing with them (Crowe. 1993. Foreign Policy-Making: Reflections of a Practitioner).
over local land use and facility permitting decisions that are relevant to international
environmental issues.
3.2.3. International Policy Subsystems
There is much in the international relations literature that suggests that the concept of the
policy subsystem can be applied at the international level as well. Much of diplomacy, and
conference diplomacy in particular, focuses on negotiating agreements among nations, the
outcomes of which are international regimes.12 Much in the literature on international regimes,
which Krasner defines as the "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international
relations", suggests that they can be considered the international analogue to public policy at the
national and sub-national levels.43 For example, the international negotiations process has been
described as "diplomatic rule-making," producing not only legal commitments ("hard law") but
political and moral commitments ("soft law") as well."
Like subsystems at the national and subnational levels, the international bodies within which
environmental treaties are negotiated, and the treaties themselves, have specific functional and
territorial components." Participants in international treaty negotiations tend to form a semi-
autonomous community with a particular domain of expertise. Linkages among issue areas at the
international level tend to be relatively weak, and hierarchies among treaties or
4 2Conference diplomacy, which Kaufinann defines as "the management of relations between governments and of
relations between governments and intergovernmental organizations that takes place in international conferences,"
has among its objectives: (1). to make non-binding recommendations to governments or international
organizations; (2). to make decisions binding upon governments; (3). to make decisions giving guidance or
instructions to the secretariat of an intergovernmental organization; (4). to negotiate a treaty or other formal
international agreement; and (5). to provide for the international exchange of information; (6). to provide for the
pledging of voluntary contributions to international programs. Each of these decisions are also policy outcomes.
(Kaufnann, Johan. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff).
43 This definition is consistent with a number of other formulations (Krasner, Stephen D., ed. 1983. International
Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Keohane and Nye, for instance, describe a regime as sets of governing
arrangements that include "networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its
effects," (Keohane and Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence). Haas defines a regime as encompassing a
mutually coherent set of procedures, rules and norms (Haas, Ernst B., May Pat Williams, and Don Babai. 1978.
Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press).
4 4Legal commitments, or "hard law," are usually found in international treaties, which are defined as "international
agreement(s). concluded between states in written form and governed by international law." A state that does not
comply with a legal commitment incurs a "state responsibility" to remedy the situation and/or provide
compensation. Political or moral commitments, or "soft law," are generally contained in documents such as
declarations or statements. A state that does not comply with a political or moral commitment primarily risks
blame by public opinion and, at worst, retaliation from other countries that consider the deviant behavior as an
"unfriendly act" (Lang. 1996. Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-Making).
41 See, e.g., Beyers, J. and G. Dierickx. 1998. The working groups of the Council of the European Union:
Supranational or intergovernmental negotiations? Journal of Common Market Studies 36, 3: 289-317;
Christiansen, T. 2002. The role of supranational actors in EU treaty reform. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 9,
1: 33-53;de Senarclens, Pierre. 1993. Regime theory and the study of international organizations. International
Social Science Journal 45, 4: 453-462; Abbott, K. W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal
international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, 1: 3-32.
intergovernmental organizations are difficult to establish.46 In some cases, such as in that of the
FCCC, the U.N. General Assembly or some other intergovernmental organization may authorize
the establishment of a intergovernmental negotiating body and maintain a certain degree of
authority over the process until an agreement enters into force. Once negotiated, however, most
treaties are self-standing international instruments independent of the U.N. Charter, and the
negotiating body itself generally authorizes both the operations of its secretariat and the
procedures and rules under which the negotiations are conducted.
A wide range of actors are generally involved in the international negotiations process. The
primary participants in these negotiations are national delegates, the secretariat and its executive
head, and the presiding officers.47 Particularly important are the heads of delegations, as it is
these individuals who are given 'full powers' to represent the State for negotiating a treaty.48
Representatives of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and journalists
are also significant players in the process.
These different players generally coalesce into a number of distinct groups or coalitions.
While traditionally forming along subregional, regional lines or North-South lines, those that are
most effective are comprised of actors with similar beliefs.49 Cooperation occurs among non-
government organizations, between non-government organizations and government agencies and
among similar government agencies in different countries."0
46 Keohane and Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence; Kaufnann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory
Analysis.
4 Kaufmann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis.
48 Traditionally, international negotiations have been conducted by professional diplomats (i.e., officials from foreign
ministries who specialize in foreign policy and diplomacy)., as these persons have generally have expertise in
negotiations and knowledge of the full range of their nation's interests. More recently, however, delegations are
often headed by a minister or policy official from the ministry or agency most closely associated with the
negotiation's subject area, with the delegation itself consists mostly of personnel from the delegation head's
ministry or agency. The World Health Organization constitution requires, for example, that heads of delegations to
the annual World Health Assembly be persons responsible for public health, and the World Meteorological
Organization requires that Permanent Representatives to that organization be officials of national meteorological
offices. A number of international agreements have been negotiated by delegations composed exclusively of these
experts. For example, under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)., experts meet in
subcommittees or working parties to negotiate international standards for motor vehicles or regulations for the
registration of inland vessels (Kaufmann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis).
49 Dubey. 1985. The Main Forces at Work; Kaufmann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis.
5 See, e.g., Dolan. 2003. Economic policy and decision making at the intersection of domestic and international
politics: The advocacy coalition framework and the National Economic Council; Warleigh, A. 2000. The hustle:
citizenship practice, NGOs and 'policy coalitions' in the European Union - the cases of Auto Oil, drinking water
and unit pricing. Journal of European Public Policy 7, 2: 229-243; Newell, P. and Matthew Paterson. 1998. A
climate for business: global warming, the state and capital. Review of International Political Economy 5, 4: 679-
703; Kwon, Gi-Heon. 1995. Transnational Coalitions Among Societal State and International Actors: GM Ford
and Hyundai in the Canadian Anti-Dumping Case. World Economy 18, 6: 805; Tucker, J. B. 1996. Interagency
bargaining and international negotiation: Lessons from the open skies treaty talks. Negotiation Journal-On the
Process of Dispute Settlement 12, 3: 275-288; Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1994. Ideas Do Not Float Freely -
Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War. International Organization 48, 2:
185-214.
Most treaty negotiations also span significant periods of time or are on-going processes.",
For example, negotiations for the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea spanned a period
of ten years. 2 Although the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961, additional sub-treaties
and protocols were developed in 1964, 1972, 1980, and 1988." International trade negotiations
related to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been ongoing since 1947, as
have negotiations related to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (IWC). 4
The international analogue to the specialized government units established at the national
and sub-national levels to deal with subsystem issues is generally the treaty Secretariat, an office
established by the negotiating body to deal with procedural issues associated with the
negotiations. While the primary role of this office may be to organize meetings of the
negotiating body or bodies and prepare documents required for the negotiations, it may also play
a more substantive role in the negotiations themselves, such as collecting compliance
information and providing legal interpretations.55
Secretariats also play an important role in the international learning process. They generally
disseminate a wide range of information regarding the regime to both governments and the
general public.56 They also function as a liaison between the negotiating body and various
international research and assessment groups (e.g., the IPCC) that have been established to
conduct and assess scientific research on issues relevant to the regime.5 7
Finally, interest groups, or specialized sub-units within interest groups, exist at the
international level that regard the various international environmental issues being discussed as a
major policy topic.5" Non-governmental organizations have been part of the UN system since its
"Young describes international regimes as undergoing "continuous transformations in response to their inner
dynamics as well as to changes in their political, economic, and social environments." (Young, Oran R. 1983.
Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall in International Regimes. In International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner,
pg. 369. Ithica: Cornell University Press).
52 Richardson, Elliot L. 1992. Climate Change: Problems of Law-Making. In International Politics of the
Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, pg. 166-179. New York: Oxford University Press.
5 Susskind. 1994. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements.
54 Finlayson, Jock and Mark Zacher. 1981. The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers: regime dynamics and
functions. International Organization 35, 4; Susskind. 1994. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More
Effective Global Agreements.
55 Kaufmann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis.
56 For example, the website of the FCCC Secretariat contains a broad range of information regarding climate change,
the climate change regime, and the countries that are party to the agreement. It also provides links to other
websites from which additional information can be obtained.
57 See, e.g., Clark, W. C., J. van Eindoven, and Jill Jaeger, eds. 1999. Learning to Manage Global Environmental
Risks: A Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion and Acid Rain.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Haas, Peter M. 2000. International institutions and social learning in the management
of global environmental risks. Policy Studies Journal 28, 3: 558-575; Ulph, A. and D. Maddison. 1997.
Uncertainty Learning and International Environmental Policy Coordination. Environmental & Resource Economics
9, 4: 451.; Knopf, J. W. 2003. The importance of international learning. Review of International Studies 29: 185-
207.
18See, e.g., Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Boders: Advocacy Network in International
Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Weber and Christophersen. 2002. The influence of non-governmental
organizations on the creation of Natura 2000 during the European Policy process; Carpenter. 2001. Businesses,
green groups and the media: the role of non-governmental organizations in the climate change debate; Wapner, P.
inception in 1945, and have become increasing influential regarding international environmental
issues since the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972.'9 A number
of NGOs maintain large professional staffs and produce extensive, well-research policy papers
that contribute both to the regime and to government positions regarding it. They also provide an
important oversight function, monitoring implementation and flagging instances of non-
compliance.60
1995. Politics Beyond the State - Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. World Politics 47, 3: 311-340;
Victor, David G., Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds. 1998. The Implementation and Effectiveness of
International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Chayes and
Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements; Bramble, Barbara J.
and Gareth Porter. 1992. Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of U.S. International Environmental
Policy. In The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions, ed. Andrew Hurrell
and Benedict Kingsbury, pg. 228. New York: Oxford University Press; Campbell, M. M. 1998. Schools of thought:
An analysis of interest groups influential in international population policy. Population and Environment 19, 6:
487-512; Risse-Kappen, Thomas and Ian Bringing Manners. 1997. Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state
Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Political Studies 45, 1: 138.
59 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). are defined here as those organizations, including trade or business
associations, engaged in lobbying and advocacy, direct political or social action, or policy work (Raustiala. 1997.
States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions). See e.g., Raustiala. 1997. The "participatory
revolution" in international environmental law.
60 For example, Greenpeace and others have devoted significant resources to monitoring the whaling agreements(Peterson. 1992. Whalers, cetologists, environmentalists, and the international management of whaling)., while the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). has conducted assessments of state compliance with UNCED
pledges. Within CITES, TRAFFIC International has been instrumental in tracking the wildlife trade and evaluating
the progress of the regime (Raustiala. 1997. The "participatory revolution" in international environmental law).
Several business organizations, including the Global Climate Coalition and the Climate Council, were established
specifically to monitor issues involving the climate change treaty negotiations (Levy, D. L. and D. Egan. 2003. A
neo-gramscian approach to corporate political strategy: Conflict and accommodation in the climate change
negotiations. Journal ofManagement Studies 40, 4: 803-829).
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CHAPTER 4 - STRATEGY, POWER AND COALITION DOMINANCE
The degree to which the policies emanating from a given policy subsystem reflect a
coalition's belief system depends very much on the extent to which that coalition is able to
dominate that subsystem. A coalition's ability to dominate the subsystem is in turn determined
by the political resources it possesses and the political constraints it faces. A substantial body of
literature exists on various aspects of these resources and constraints. However, the relationship
between these resources and constraints and coalition dominance however has not been well
developed in the context of the ACF.
A useful way of looking at the political resources and constraints is to view them as sources
of political power. A coalition has political power within a subsystem if, for example, it has the
authority to make decisions or is able to offer inducements to other actors in exchange for their
cooperation. The range and effectiveness of the various strategies, approaches and tools
(guidance instruments) that a coalition can employ in the pursuit of its objectives are ultimately
defined by the coalition's sources of power. These sources of power are thus important factors in
determining the extent to which a coalition dominates, or has the potential to dominate, a
subsystem. Furthermore, not all sources of power are equal. Each is constrained by both its
particular nature and system-wide parameters such as socio-economic conditions and the
system's legal structure.
4.1 GUIDANCE INSTRUMENTS
Political actors use different approaches, strategies and tools, or what Sabatier calls
"guidance instruments," at different points in the policy process to effect decisions. In national
and sub-national subsystems, most of these strategies and tools are directed towards the
administrative agency (or other administrative unit) responsible for the issue in question. Some
instruments, such as testimony, media events, or the release of reports, directed towards the
agency's decision-making process itself. Others attempt to influence this process indirectly by
appealing to processes in other subsystems that control the agency's budget and legal authority.
Table 4.1 list the principle guidance instruments available at the national and sub-national
levels along with estimates of their costs and efficacy.' According to Sabatier, a critical factor in
a coalition's choice of instrument is the costs associated with employing that instrument
successfully. These costs are determined primarily by the number of veto points involved and
whether or not the actors occupying those veto point are members of or sympathetic to the
coalition.2 For example, a simple agency or court decision may involve a single veto point, while
obtaining a change in law or an agency's budget may involve five or more veto points in several
different subsystems. Pursuing the former would entail much a lower cost than attempting to
achieve the latter. These costs are also very much a function of the receptivity of the persons
'In compiling this list, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggest that the range of instruments is much broader than simply
changing the legal rules affecting the agency, an approach that has been the focus of most institutional choice
theorists (e.g., Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action).
2 Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or More.
whom the coalition is seeking to influence. If they are sympathetic, the costs tend to be low to
moderate; if they are opposed, the costs are high to impossible.
Table 4.1 National-level Guidance Instruments, their Cost and Efficacy
Probable Costs When Decision-Makers are: Probable Efficacy
Supportive/
Coalition
Guidance Instrument Members Neutral/mixed Opposed Scope Duration Lag Time
Intra-subsystem Instruments
1. Persuade through testimony Low Low Moderate Low Low Short
2. Change personnel making
decision via transfer or
reorganization Low Moderate High Low to high Low Short
3. Change professional
background of agency staff Low Moderate High High High Long
4. Obtain media publicity - Low Low Low to moderate Low Short
5. Provide research reports Low Moderate High Varies Varies Long
6. Pursue major changes in Short to
legislation/legal authority Moderate High Impossible High High moderate
7. Pursue major changes in Moderate to
agency's budget Moderate High Impossible high Low short
8. Offer inducements (e.g.,
bribes) Low High High Low Low Short
Inter-subsystem Instruments
1. Conduct systematic review of
agency rules Low Moderate High Low to moderate Low to moderate Short
2. Alter political appointees Low Low High Low to moderate Low Low
Moderate to Short to
3. Pursue litigation high - - Usually low Varies moderate
4. Pursue major changes in
legislation/legal authority Low Moderate High Moderate Low to moderate Short
5. Pursue major changes in
agency's budget Low Moderate High Low to moderate Low Short
System-wide Instruments
1. Pursue electoral strategy - High Very high ? High Long
2. Change public opinion Moderate High Very high Varies Varies Long
3. Alter target behavior though
demonstrations/boycotts Moderate High Very high Varies Varies Long
Source: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993); Sabatier (1997)
In addition, the efficacy of most instruments is roughly proportional to their cost.3 While
testimony at an agency hearing may be a low-cost effort, the scope of most agency decisions is
quite narrow and duration of the decision's impact fairly short. In contrast, obtaining a major
change in a law, while much more effective in terms of lasting policy change, is generally
extremely difficult and expensive.4 Thus a coalition's choice of guidance instrument, and the
range of instruments from which it can choose, is heavily dependent on the political resources it
has available.
Table 4.4 lists the guidance instruments available at the international level, the costs
associated with them, and their efficacy. Coalitions have far fewer guidance instruments
available to them at this level because of the unique characteristics of international subsystems
and the nature of the international system itself. For example, the autonomous nature of most
international subsystems limits the extent to which a coalition can employ inter-subsystem
instruments, such as appeals to other international subsystems for changes in rules, legal
authority or budgets. The number of potential veto points within international subsystems is also
substantially higher than in most national and sub-national subsystems because decision-making
authority is shared among all participating delegations. This increases the political costs
associated with using those instruments that are available. Replacing enough individual
decision-makers (i.e., delegation heads) or their staffs to alter a decision would be a difficult, if
not impossible, task, for example. In a similar vein, the large number of delegations generally
involved in international environmental negotiations makes the costs associated with offering
inducements much higher than in most national and sub-national subsystems.
4.2 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND SOURCES OF POWER
The ability of a subsystem coalition to achieve its political objectives is a function of the
political resources that it has at its disposal at any given time. These resources may also be
thought of as political power. Power can be defined in political terms as having the ability to
affect the content of political choices.' In the context of the ACF, the coalition that has the most
3The efficacy of a guidance instrument can be measured in terms of both its scope and duration and the lag time until
it becomes effective. Testifying at a hearing can only change the agency's decision, which is likely to be fairly
narrow in scope and perhaps of relatively short duration. Changes in law, on the other hand, tend to be much
broader in scope and much longer in duration. Similarly, the long lag times involved in producing a report or
attempting to alter public opinion can render these approaches ineffective if events evolve relatively quickly.
4 This is particularly true in systems, such as in the United States, in which decision-making authority is diffuse
(Moe, Terry. 1990. Political Institutions: the Neglected Side of the Story. Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 6: 213-253).
Kelman. 1987. Making Public Policy. It must be noted here that a number of different conceptions of power exist
in the vast literature of political power. Some adopt Weber's classic view of power in which the potential to act is
more important than the act itself (e.g., Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University
Press; Dye. 1995. Who's Running America? The Clinton Years; Schultze, Robert 0. 1961. The Bifurcation of
Power in a Satellite City. In Community Political Systems, ed. Morris Janowitz. Glencoe: Free Press). Power is the
capacity or potential of persons in certain roles to make decisions that affect the conduct of others in the social
system. Others distinguish between the 'potential' for power and 'actual' power, which requires active
participation in decision-making. (e.g., Dahl, Robert A. 1958. Critique of the Ruling Elite Model. American
Political Science Review 52, 6: 66; Polsby, Nelson. 1963. Community Power and Political Theory. New Haven:
Yale University Press; Walker, Jack L. 1966. A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy. American Political
power within a subsystem can be expected to have the most substantial effect on the content of
the political choices within the subsystem. Thus the extent to which a coalition dominates a
Table 4.4 Guidance Instruments Available in International Policy Subsystems
Probable Costs When Decision-Makers are: Probable Efficacy
Supportive/
Coalition
Guidance Instrument Members Neutral/mixed Opposed Scope Duration Lag Time
Intra-subsystem Instruments
1. Persuade through
speeches/interventions Low Moderate High Low Low Short
2. Obtain media publicity - Low Low Low to moderate Low Short
3. Provide research reports Low Moderate High Varies Varies Long
4. Pursue major changes in Short to
treaty/legal authority Moderate High Impossible High High moderate
5. Pursue major changes in Moderate to
Secretariat's budget Moderate High Impossible high Low short
6. Offer inducements/linkages Moderate High Impossible Low Low Short
Inter-subsystem Instruments
1. Alter conference Leadership Moderate High Impossible Low to moderate Low Low
2. Pursue major changes in
Secretariats budget Moderate High Impossible Low to moderate Low Short
System-wide Instruments
1. Change public opinion Moderate High Impossible Varies Varies Long
2. Alter target behavior though
demonstrations/ boycotts Moderate High Impossible Varies Varies Long
subsystem depends on the relative power that coalitions within each subsystem possess.
Science Review 60, 6: 286). "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do." (Dahl, Robert A. 1957. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science 2: 202). Dowding makes a
further distinguish between outcome power, or the ability of an actor to bring about or help to bring about
outcomes, and social power, which is the ability of an actor to change deliberately the incentive structure of
another actor or actors to bring about to help to bring about outcomes (Dowding, Keith. 1996. Power.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).
Kelman suggests a typology of power resources that is useful for integrating into the concept
of power into the ACF.6 He suggests that political actors have five general sources of political
power:
. Formal authority to make decisions;
. Contingent inducements to influence other participants;
. Persuasiveness;
. Deference from other participants; and
. Strategic skills.
Some aspects of these power resources are derived from system-wide parameters, such as
societal rules that grant them formal authority to make decisions. Others, such as persuasiveness
or strategic skills, may be a function of their unique characters or capabilities. Still others may
be derived not by any individual actor, but by the collection of actors working together as a
coalition. The relative value of these sources of power is dependant on a variety of parameters,
including the particular circumstances in which they are used.
4.2.1. The Power of Decision-Making Authority
The formal authority to make decisions is a critical source of power in subsystems at all
levels. Formal decision-making authority is the power to make decisions that are viewed as law-
bound and legitimate by others.7 Actors with the authority to decide the substance of a policy can
ensure that the policy reflects his or her beliefs and can veto unacceptable policy outcomes.
Having the authority to decide procedural and administrative issues is also important, as those
who control the process through which decisions are made have the power to block decisions or
even prevent issues from being discussed.! Finally, decision-making authority includes the
power to make "non-decisions," which can be as important as decisions.'
6 Kelan's approach does not differ significantly from other typologies that can be found in the literature. Harsany,
for example, suggests four sources of power: knowledge or information, legitimate authority, unconditional
incentives to affect the interests of others, and conditional incentives to affect the interests of others (Harsanyi, J.
D. 1976. Measurement of Social Power in N-Person Reciprocal Power Situation. In Essays on Ethics, Social
Behavior and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht: Reidel). Dowding adds reputation to this list (Dowding. 1996.
Power).
7 It is this decision-making authority that is embodied in Downs' concept of a "sovereign," or decision-maker
(Downs, Anthony. 1966. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown). Actions motivated by this mixed notion of
force and compliance are explained by legal theorists as being "content-independent," that is, the reasons carrying
out actions are independent of the content of those actions. As Dowding put it, 'I do what you say, not because
what you say is what I think is right, but because I think it right that what you say is the right thing to do. However,
my acceptance of your authority may be undermined if you continually order me to carry out actions which I think
are wrong, or which continue to have bad consequences' (Dowding. 1996. Power). See also Green, L. 1988. The
Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Hart, H. L. A. 1982. Essays on Bentham. Oxford: Clarendon
Press; and Raz, J. 1986. The Morality ofFreedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8 For example, secretariats and presiding officers in multilateral negotiations can shape the direction of the debate by
setting the agenda and determining when debate on a particular issue has ended (Berridge, G. R. and A. Jennings,
eds. 1985. Diplomacy at the UN. New York: St. Martin's Press). See also Tallberg, J. 2003. The agenda-shaping
powers of the EU Council Presidency. Journal of European Public Policy 10, 1: 1-19; Kaufmann. 1988.
Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis.Kille, K. J. and R. M. Scully. 2003. Executive heads and the role
In certain situations, several individuals within a subsystem can hold joint, or shared,
decision-making authority. Joint decision-making occurs when "all actors participate in
determining the decisions of each actor. It implies that there was interaction between all the
actors prior to the decisions and that this interaction shaped the decision of each actor." 0 In these
situations, the actual decision-making authority held by each individual is relatively small, as it
use is dependent on the cooperation of all the other individuals sharing it.
In subsystems at the national and subnational levels, an individual or group of individuals
generally has decision-making authority over the policy outcome. This power generally resides
in the legislature if the policy emerges in the form of a new or amended law." However, their
ability to freely exercise this authority is often constrained by political pressures brought about by
others with political power, including individuals wielding similar decision-making powers in
other subsystems who can institute policies which negate or otherwise influence the desired
policy outcome. A tremendous amount of decision-making authority resides with agency
bureaucrats, who are relatively free of such procedural constraints as rules concerning free
discussion and voting and do not need to be as sensitive to the political pressures that may be
coming from constituents in making their decisions."
Unlike subsystems at the national level, decision-making authority at the international levels
is shared among multiple actors, making it much more diffuse." In the international
negotiations from which treaties emerge, the principle of sovereignty dictates that decision-
making authority is shared among the heads of all delegations participating in the discussions."
of intergovernmental organizations: Expansionist leadership in the United Nations and the European Union.
Political Psychology 24, 1: 175-198.
9 Berle observes that elites "are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Their failure to make a
decision, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make." Just as A has power
over B when he or she can influence B's behavior, A has power over B when he or she succeeds in suppressing
issues that might in their resolution be detrimental to A's preferences (Berle, Adolf A. 1967. Power. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). See also Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. 1967. Decisions and Non-Decisions.
American Political Science Review 57, 9: 632-42.
'0 Goodin, Robert. 1976. The Politics ofRational Man. London: Wiley.
" In the United States, for example, the chairmen of Congressional subcommittees have decision-making authority
over the substance of bills to be sent forward to full House or Senate for consideration (Eavey, C. L. and Gary
Miller. 1995. Subcommittee Agenda Control. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, 2: 125-156; Hall, R. L. and C. L.
Evans. 1990. The Power of Subcommittees. Journal of Politics 52, 2: 335-355).; Tiefer, C. 1998. Congressional
oversight of the Clinton administration and congressional procedure. Administrative Law Review 50, 1: 199-216.
'
2A decision by a State Department consular officer to deny a visa application of a student activist is as much a U.S.
foreign policy decision as a formal proclamation against student radicalism (Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy:
What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books). See also Peters. 1989. The
Politics of Bureaucracy; Freedman, James 0. 1981. Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and
Government. New York: Cambridge University Press; and Drezner. 2000. Ideas, bureaucratic politics, and the
crafting of foreign policy.
13In the environment of complex interdependence that characterizes modem international relations, international
regimes exist when state behavior is modified as a result of joint rather than independent decision making (Stein,
Arthur A. 1983. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. In International Regimes, ed.
Stephen D. Krasner, pg. 369. Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
" The extent to which power is shared depends on the decision-rules in place (Kaufnann. 1988. Conference
Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis).
A few individuals are vested some limited procedural authority. The presiding officer, for
example, has a certain amount of authority to make procedural decisions, and secretariats have
some authority to propose conference agendas. Individuals in these positions, however, must be
extremely cautious in using this authority to further their own policy objectives, as the legitimacy
of their authority is highly dependent on their reputations for being fair and impartial." This
shared power of decision-making makes other sources of power, such as the ability to offer
inducements, more important.
4.2.2. The Power of Contingent Inducements
The ability to offer inducements of some kind is a second source of power. Kellman
suggests that inducements may be classified along two dimensions: (1) as normative, economic,
or coercive, and (2) as reward or punishment. Normative inducements are those involving
esteem or prestige, such as an appointment to a prestigious position. The emotional aspects of
friendship, loyalty, and trust can also be construed as normative inducements. Economic
inducements are inducements that involve material goods (bribes, rewards, etc). Coercive
inducements in the political sense might include threats to an actor's political future, removal
from office, or, in extreme cases, physical harm.
In general, actors lacking decision-making authority will offer inducements to those who
have it in exchange for cooperative behavior.' However, the effectiveness of an inducement is
directly related to its size or weight." Coalitions that are able to effectively pool the resources of
its members are able to offer decision-makers larger inducements than the individuals themselves
would be able to do. Ultimately, the weight of an inducement will be determined by the
individual being offered it, as an inducement has little weight if it is of little or no value to him or
her.
Competing inducements can create a significant dilemma for those holding decision-making
authority. In the case of many environmental issues, for example, decision-makers are faced with
two competing normative inducements: being cast as a savior of the environment or being cast as
a savior of jobs that might be lost if pollution are reduced. To resolve this problem, decision-
makers tend to compare policy alternatives against a single value or criterion depending on which
"face of the issue" they see at the time that they must make a choice, placing little or no value on
that face that is inconsistent with their beliefs.'"
15Kaufmann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis.
16For example, trade unions offer legislators votes, and interest groups offer campaign contributions. Dye states that
"Washington is a city of "representatives"-agents, advocates, lawyers, lobbyists and "fixers" who offer to
influence government policy for a price." Particular important are those former high-level government officials-
former Congress members, Cabinet secretaries and White House aides--who "know their way around" and are able
to use their personal influence to open doors and influence policy (Dye. 1995. Who's Running America? The
Clinton Years).
" As Kellman points out, the threat of 50,000 angry voters is more likely to have an effect on a legislator than one of
50 angry voters (Kelman. 1987. Making Public Policy).
'
8For example, if an environmental regulation has implications in terms of saving lives and spending money,
individuals will choose stricter regulations if they view the problem in terms of lung cancer but will oppose stricter
regulations if they view the problem in terms of dollars (Kelman. 1987. Making Public Policy). See also Lau,
Richard R., Richard A. Smith, and Susan T. Fiske. 1991. Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations, and Political
Because decision-making authority at the international level is particularly diffuse,
inducements are an important source of power.'9 Observer groups can offer negotiators domestic
support and rival negotiators can threaten sanctions.2 o Negotiators can offer inducements can
also be made by linking related issues, or by offering side-payments to recalcitrant parties."
However, the costs associated with offering inducements in international subsystems tends also
to increase, as the large number of actors and coalitions participating in most international
subsystems increases the probability of that critical players are offered competing inducements.
4.2.3. The Power of Persuasiveness
A third source of power is persuasiveness. Persuasiveness is the ability of political actors to
influence others to support their positions through the use of argument and information." As
such, it is an important source of power for those actors lacking decision-making authority or the
ability to offer inducements. Much of the power of individuals within the bureaucracy lies in
their access to and control of knowledge and technical information." Even though organizational
charts suggest that political executives are in positions to control the bureaucracy, individuals
within the bureaucracy are capable of substantially influencing agency policy, if not determining
it, through their ability to control information, proposals for policy, and knowledge concerning
Persuasion. Journal ofPolitics 53, 3: 644-675.
19 While this use of the ACF departs from the traditional models of international relations, much in this traditional IR
literature emphasizes the use of inducements to promote cooperative behavior. The classic characterization of
international politics holds that states are autonomous sovereign entities that develop their own strategies, chart
their own courses, and make their own decisions (Stein. 1983. Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an
anarchic world). The very notion of "hegemonic stability" is rooted in the concept that powerful states will use the
threat of force to induce weaker states to cooperate. Because state behavior is guided purely by their self-interest,
inducements are necessary means to achieve international cooperation.
20 Raustiala. 1997. States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions.
21 Susskind. 1994. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements; Mayer. 1992.
Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments.
12 Neustadt argues that, while the President of the United States has often been called the most powerful person in the
world, presidential power is ultimately "the power to persuade." He writes that "underneath our images of
Presidents-in-boots, astride decisions, are the half-observed realities of Presidents-in-sneakers, stirrups in hand,
trying to induce particular department heads, or congressmen, or senators to climb aboard." (Neustadt, Richard E.
1966. White House and Whitehall. Public Interest 2, Winter: 2). Along these same lines, Franklin D. Roosevelt
once complained that "The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I fmd it is almost
impossible to get the action and results I want.. .But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State
Department... (and). the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Navy... To
change anything in the Navy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right hand and you punch it
with your left until you are finally exhausted and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started
punching" (Hilsman. 1990. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: conceptual models and
bureaucratic politics).
23Weber writes that "Apart from being rooted in the administrative division of labor, the power of all bureaucrats
rests upon knowledge of two kinds: First, technical know-how in the widest sense of the word acquired through
specialized training...However, expertise alone does not explain the power of the bureaucracy. In addition, the
bureaucrat has official information, which is available through administrative channels and which provides him
with the facts on which he can base his actions. Only he who can get access to these facts independently of the
officials' good will can effectively supervise the administration (Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley:
University of California Press).
feasibility." They can also undermine policies with which they are unhappy by leaking classified
information to powerful individuals outside the agency.25
Persuasion is also an important source of power for members of the news media. While
journalists may not be involved in the decision-making itself, they can set the political agenda by
persuading others as to what issues are important. 2' As Cohen puts it, members of the media,
while they "may not be successful in telling us what to think, they are stunningly successful in
telling us what to think about."2  There is also evidence that they play an important role in
reinforcing beliefs.
Because decision-making power at the international level is generally diffuse and actors tend
to be faced with many competing inducements, persuasiveness is a critical source of power in
international subsystems. 29 As Colosi points out:
24Political executives are particularly dependant on their staff, and they tend to lack the skills relevant to
understanding the policies that must be made and a lack of time to both gain and understanding and manage the
policies (Peters. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucracy). For example, of the fifty-one appointments to departmental
ministerial posts in the United Kingdom between 1964 and 1970, only five had any substantial prior knowledge of
the policy area (Headey, Bruce. 1974. British Cabinet Ministers. London: George Allen and Unwin). These
difficulties increase with decentralization. See also Botcheva, L. 2001. Expertise and international governance:
Eastern Europe and the adoption of European Union environmental legislation. Global Governance 7, 2: 197-224;
Christiansen. 2002. The role of supranational actors in EU treaty reform; Dimitrov, R. 2003. Knowledge, power,
and interests in environmental regime formation. International Studies Quarterly 47, 1: 123-150; and Dudley and
Richardson. 1999. Competing advocacy coalitions and the process of 'frame reflection': a longitudinal analysis of
EU steel policy.
25For example, leaks from Environmental Protection Agency officials to environmental groups and Congress during
the early 1980's revealed the extent to which the Reagan Administration's appointee for EPA Administrator, Anne
Burford, was using administrative procedures to undermine environmental laws. These revelations eventually
forced her to resign (Cook, Brian and Dan Wood. 1989. Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of
Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review 83, 9: 965-978). See also Bovens, M. A., H. G. Geveke, and J.
de Vries. 1995. Open public administration in the Netherlands: The politics of leaking. International Review of
Administrative Sciences 61, 1: 17.
26 Mazur, Allan and Jinling Lee. 1993. Sounding the Global Alarm: Environmental Issues in the US National News.
Social Studies of Science 23: 681-720 White, in writing about the power of the press in the United States, asserts:
"The power of the press... is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political
power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will talk about and think about-an authority that in
other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties, and mandarins." (White, Theodore. 1972. The Making of the
President, 1972. New York: Bantam).
27Cohen, Bernard C. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. See also
McCoombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. 1984. The Agenda Setting Function of the Press. In Media Power in
Politics, ed. Doris Graber. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc; McComas and Shanahan. 1999. Telling
stories about global climate change - Measuring the impact of narratives on issue cycles; Ungar, S. 1998. Hot
crises and media reassurance: a comparison of emerging diseases and Ebola Zaire. British Journal ofSociology 49,
1: 36-56: and Mazur and Lee. 1993. Sounding the Global Alarm: Environmental Issues in the US National News.
28 Ader, Christine R. 1995. A Longitudal Study of Agenda Setting for the Issue of Environmental Pollution.
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 72, 2: 300-311; Sears, David 0. and Richard E. Whitney. 1973.
Political Persuasion. In Handbook of Communication, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool. Chicago: Rand McNally.
29 This is one reason that foreign service officers at the U.S. State Department have historically placed a high value
on "the diplomatic approach," meaning "subtlety, skill in negotiation, cultural sophistication, and good manners"
(Warwick, Donald P. 1975. A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State
Department. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). See also Litfin, K. T. 1995. Framing Science -
"The basic job of all negotiators, if the parties do not agree with their positions, is to create doubts
and uncertainties in the minds of the other parties' positions. The activity of "doubt creation" is
central to the art of persuasion...Negotiators create both "facts" and "non-facts" by mutual
agreement. In negotiation, an unchallenged assumption usually becomes a "fact" (for that
particular negotiation).. .Parties will then concentrate on how to explain the "facts" and "non-facts"
in a way acceptable to interested others."30
NGOs in the international subsystems are particularly dependent on the power of persuasion,
and have become adept at using it.31  In addition to the informal "corridor lobbying" of
government delegates, procedural rules for most international environmental agreements now
allow NGOs to speak from the floor with simultaneous translation, circulate draft texts of their
own design, and distribute their own materials and commentaries.3" The organizations also play
important roles in persuading governments whether or not to ratify treaties and monitoring the
status of states' compliance with these treaties."
Closely related to the notion of persuasion as a source of political power is the role that
policy analysis and the exchange of technical information plays in shaping the emergence of an
issue and perceptions of its seriousness, causes, and the likely consequences of various policy
alternatives. These analyses and information exchanges are important aspects of policy-oriented
learning, which is the process through which beliefs change over time.
Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties. Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies 24, 2: 251-277; and
Price, R. 1998. Reversing the gun sights: Transnational civil society targets land mines. International Organization
52, 3: 613+.
30 Colosi, Thomas R. 1986. The Iceberg Principle: Secrecy in Negotiation. In Perspectives on Negotiation, ed. Diane
B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, pg. 243-306. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute.
3 One difficulty with this increased participation is that agreements on difficult issues are often only reached when
negotiations take place behind closed doors (Colosi. 1986. The Iceberg Principle: Secrecy in Negotiation). In
reaction to this increased formal NGO participation, governments have taken to conducting much of their
substantive negotiations in "informal consultations," "extended bureau meetings," and "informal informals"--
meetings too informal for NGOs to participate but where most of the decisions are made (Raustiala. 1997. The
"participatory revolution" in international environmental law).
32 NGO draft documents are often widely relied by states and have influenced the evolution and creation of several
environmental treaties (Raustiala. 1997. The "participatory revolution" in international environmental law). For
example, an independent legal opinion circulated the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). at the Seventh CITES
meeting was instrumental in discrediting a number of the arguments being offered against the proposed total ban on
the ivory trade (Princen, Thomas. 1995. Ivory, Conservation, and Environmental Transnational Coalitions. In
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, ed.
Thomas Risse-Kappen, pg. 227. New York: Cambridge University Press). Similarly, the RAINS model of acid
deposition developed by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis played a central role in the
development of the LRTAP regime (Raustiala. 1997. States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions).
33 Haas has suggests that governments committed to the Mediterranean Action Plan only after foreign ministry
officials were persuaded of the need to do so by marine scientists and members of the ecological community (Haas.
1989. Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control). Governments rejected,
however, the Convention on the Regulation of Arctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMA). after it was opposed
by Greenpeace, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). and other NGOs (Raustiala. 1997. States, NGOs, and
international environmental institutions). See also Chayes and Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance
with International Regulatory Agreements; and Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff. 1998. The Implementation and
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice.
3 Policy-oriented learning is defined as the relatively enduring changes in perceptions or behavioral intentions, and
encompasses all forms of learning through experience (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition
Policy-oriented learning is not part of a disinterested search for the "truth," but takes place in
the context of a political process in which people are competing over the authoritative allocation
of values and over the ability to use the instruments of government in their behalf. Coalitions
that are not dominant have substantial incentives to document performance gaps in existing
policies and programs and improve their understanding of the causal reasons for such gaps. The
dominant coalition has incentives to provide evidence that no such gaps exist. The result is an
analytical debate in which each side attempts to persuade the others--as well as neutral parties,
particularly potential policy brokers--of the validity of its claims."
The learning process is also shaped by a variety of cognitive constraints. Time and
computation constraints limit the ability of an actor to process and analyze information, and
preexisting normative and other beliefs act as filters on their perceptions of this information. In
addition, the environment in which it takes place is one in which:
"...performance gaps are difficult to measure, well-developed causal theories are often lacking,
controlled experimentation is virtually impossible, opponents are doing everything possible to
muddle the situation, and even allies' motives are often suspect because of personal and
organizational rivalries."36
As a result, actors in different coalitions perceive the world through different "lenses and can
have very different interpretations of a given piece of evidence.
Given this environment, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier suggest that four principles generally
govern the use of analysis in the policy process:
Framework: An Assessment). Particularly important are those perceptions regarding (1). the state of variables
defined as important by one's belief system, (2). the status of causal relationships in one's belief system, (3).
feedbacks concerning existing policies, and (4). political opportunities and constraints that result from experience
or the accumulation of information. The ACF places particular emphasis on the role of policy-oriented learning,
and represents one of the more detailed attempts to delineate the role that ideas play in public policy. Other
approaches to this concept include Heclo, Hugh. 1974. Social Policy in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale
University Press; Kingdon. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Reich, Robert B., ed. 1988. The
Power of Public Ideas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Hall, Peter A. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social
Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25, 4: 275-296; and
Goldstein, Judith and Robert 0. Keohane, eds. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
35 Jenkins-Smith cites the example of the air pollution, where the accumulation of scientific information over the past
thirty years has greatly improved the knowledge of pollutants in different cities and the perceptions of their effects
on human health. He points out that scientific understanding of acid rain was substantially improved through two
decades of debate between members of the two coalitions concerning the seriousness of the problem, the relative
contributions of natural processes versus emissions from mid-western utilities as causal factors, and the appropriate
policy instruments to be used in addressing the problem (Jenkins-Smith, Hank and Paul A. Sabatier. 1993. The
Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning. In Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, ed.
Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press). See also
Bressers, H. T. A. and Walter A. Rosenbaum. 2000. Innovation, learning, and environmental policy: Overcoming
"a plague of uncertainties". Policy Studies Journal 28, 3: 523-539; Haas. 2000. International institutions and social
learning in the management of global environmental risks; and Clark, Eindoven, and Jaeger. 1999. Learning to
Manage Global Environmental Risks: A Comparative History of social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone
Depletion and Acid Rain.
36 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier. 1993. The Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning pg 44.
= Analysis is stimulated usually by either threats to core values or perceived opportunities to
realize core values;
" The crucial role of technical information is to alert people to the extent to which a given
situation affects their interests and values;
= Once political actors have developed a position on a policy issue, analysis is used primarily in
an "advocacy" fashion, that is, to justify and elaborate on that position; and,
- Actors generally find it necessary to engage in an analytical debate-that is, to present
technical substantiation for their positions-if they are to succeed in translating their beliefs
into policy.37
4.2.4. The Power of Deference
Deference as a source of power is the ability of an actor to affect change simply through his
or her reputation or name recognition. It is related to both the use of inducements and
persuasiveness in that an actor gains deference from other actors after he or she has repeated
success at gaining influence through the use of inducements or persuasiveness. The greater
deference an individual receives, the less he or she need to then rely on inducements or
persuasion. At the international level, the seniority of the individual heading a delegation is
usually taken to the an indication of the importance that the country attaches to the negotiations,
and very senior diplomats, heads of international organizations, or other internationally renowned
individuals are often asked to chair major international conferences because the respect they
command assists them in resolving differences among parties.38 In addition, Haas and others
have argued that much of the influence that epistemic communities have been able to exert on
policy-makers is related to the stature of individuals within these communities.39
37 As an illustration of this last point, a survey of Washington interest groups showed that "a reputation for being
credible and trustworthy" was their most important resource, while "a large budget" was perceived as the least
important (Kelman. 1987. Making Public Policy, pg 35). See also Jenkins-Smith, Hank and David Weimer. 1985.
Analysis as Retrograde Action. Public Administration Review 45, 7: 485-494; Sabatier, Paul A. 1978. The
Acquisition and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative Agencies. Administrative Science
Quarterly 23, 9: 386-411; Wildavsky, Aaron. 1979. Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy
Analysis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company; and Mazur, Allan. 1981. The Dynamics of Technical Controversy.
Washington, D.C.: Communications Press.
38 Berridge and Jennings. 1985. Diplomacy at the UN; Kaufmann. 1988. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory
Analysis.
39 Haas. 1989. Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control. See also Kaelberer,
M. 2003. Knowledge, power and monetary bargaining: central bankers and the creation of monetary union in
Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 10, 3: 365-379; Zito, A. R. 2001. Epistemic communities, collective
entrepreneurship and European integration. Journal of European Public Policy 8, 4: 585-603; Gough, C and
Simon Shackley. 2001. The respectable politics of climate change: the epistemic communities and NGOs.
International Affairs 77, 2: 329; Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and
international cooperation. International Organization 53, 2: 267; and Verdun, A. 1999. The role of the Delors
Committee in the creation of EMU: an epistemic community? Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 6, 2: 308-328.
4.2.5. The Power of Strategic Skill
A fifth source of power is strategic skill. A political strategy is a plan to maximize one's
chances of success, given a set of institutional arrangements and resources.4 0 A skillful actor is
one who makes efficient use of political resources by accurately assessing the relative costs and
benefits of each instrument and using these instruments in such a way that the costs are
minimized and benefits maximized. A skillful actor also knows when and how to seeks solutions
in other subsystems. "
Strategic skill as a source of power also includes knowing how and when to use other
sources of power. For example, an actor might have resources at his or her disposal to provide a
substantial inducement, but knowing how to offer the inducement to what person requires
strategic skill. If a set of actors share decision-making authority, those with greater strategic
skills may be able substantially shape the decisions of those with less skill. Thus strategic skill
can amplify other sources of power."
This notion of strategic skill as a source of power is consistent with Mintrom and Vergari's
argument that the policy entrepreneurship (PE) model fits well with the ACF's explanation of
policy change." Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who are able to advance their political
goals by introducing new ideas and approaches into the policy process.4 They tend to define
40 Kelman. 1987. Making Public Policy.
41Kelman suggests that much of President Reagan's success during the early month's of his presidency in 1981 was
due to strategic skill of his administration. It took advantage of the economic disarray and a substantial electoral
margin to put in place a specific plan of action, concentrated energies on only a few issues (budget and tax
changes). rather than dissipating them over a large agenda, and presented a face on these issues that was most
favorable to their views-the idea that the country would collapse economically if the changes were not adopted.
In a similar vein, William Safire describes how, in a meeting President Nixon convened with his economic advisors
to discuss the wage-price decision, very little time was spent discussing which policy to follow, but a tremendous
amount of time was devoted to tailoring the policy so as to enlist the support or head off the opposition of
Congress, the press and TV, various special interests and constituencies, and other nations who use the dollar as
their reserve currency (Safire, William. 1975. Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre- Watergate White House.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday).
42For a good discussion of leadership and strategic skill at the international level, see Young, Oran R. 1991. Political
leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society. International
Organization 45, 3: 281-308.
43 Mintrom, M. and S. Vergari. 1996. Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, and policy change. Policy Studies
Journal 24, 3: 420-434.
"According to Mintrom and Vergari, policy entrepreneurs do "...for the policymaking process what business
entrepreneurs do for the marketplace. That is to say, policy entrepreneurs serve to bring new policy ideas into
good currency" Mintrom and Vergari. 1996. Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, and policy change, pg 422.
They do so by carrying out three functions: (1). they discover unfulfilled needs and suggest innovative means to
satisfy them; (2). they take on the risks associated with pursuing actions that have uncertain consequences; and, (3).
they serve to resolve the problems of collective action by assembling and coordinating networks of individuals and
organizations. For a further discussion of policy entrepreneurs, see, e.g., Baumgartner, Frank and Bryan Jones.
1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Kingdon. 1984.
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Cobb, R. W. and C. W. Elder. 1983. Agendas and Instability in
American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Arrow, K. J., J. K. Parikh, and G. Pillet. 1996. Decision-
Making Frameworks for Addressing Climate Change. In Climate Change 1995 - Economic and Social Dimensions
of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, ed. J. Bruce and Hoesung Lee. New York: Cambridge University Press; Polsby, N.
policy problems in ways that both attract the attention of decision-makers and indicate
appropriate policy responses, and are skilled in crafting their ideas in different ways for different
audiences.45 They also tend to spend large amount of time networking in and around
government, which gives them insights into how other people think about policy problems and
how they might best shape their arguments. This networking also enables them to build
coalitions that support their ideas and enhances their reputation for being trustworthy and
credible.46
4.3 CONSTRAINTS ON POWER: SYSTEM-WIDE PARAMETERS AND OVERLAPPING
SUBSYSTEMS
These various sources of power are both enhanced and constrained by a variety of social,
legal, and resource features of broader political system in which the subsystem resides.47 The
extent to which the political system fosters some degree of overlap among subsystems within it is
particularly important, as this overlap provides a mechanism through which coalitions without
power in one subsystem can seek alternative solutions in another, more sympathetic subsystem.
In systems where these overlapping subsystems proliferate, cooperation among these overlapping
subsystems is necessary if the policies they develop are to be implemented as they intend.
4.3.1. System-Wide Parameters
While subsystem actors derive some of their power from qualities inherent within
themselves, others are derived from, and are constrained by, the social, economic, and legal
features of the larger political system. Most important among these system-wide parameters are
the basic attributes of the problem area, the basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental
cultural values and social structure, and basic legal structure. These parameters, which are
generally stable over the course of several decades, determine relationships both among
subsystems and between subsystems and the broader political system. Because they are difficult
to change, subsystem actors do not generally regard them as objects of strategizing behavior.
However, they are extremely important in both constraining and enhancing subsystem actors'
political resources, and are thus critical factors in determining the dominant coalition.
1984. Political Innovation in America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; and Smith, J. A. 1991. The Idea
Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite. New York: The Free Press.
45 see, e.g., Dupont, Christophe. 1996. Negotiation as Coalition Building. International Negotiation 1: 47-64.
46 See e.g., Garrison. 2001. Framing foreign policy alternatives in the inner circle: President Carter, his advisors, and
the struggle for the arms control agenda; Moravcsik. 1999. A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and
international cooperation; Young, Oran R. 1999. Comment on Andrew Moravcsik, "A new statecraft?
Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation". International Organization 53, 4: 805-809.
47 See, e.g., Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1986. Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the
Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. New York: Basic Books; Hofferbert, Richard. 1974. The Study of
Public Policy. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill; Kiser, Larry and Elinor Ostrom. 1982. The Three Worlds of Action. In
Strategies of Political Inquiry, ed. Elinor Ostrom, pg. 119-148. Beverly Hills: Sage; Buzan, Barry. 1993. From
international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school.
International Organization 47, 3: 327-352.
The Characteristics of the Problem Area
The characteristics of the problem area can constrain a coalition's sources of power in a
variety of ways. For example, difficulties in assigning property rights to certain resources can
constrain persuasion as a source of power by limiting both the institutional options that are
considered feasible and the policy-oriented learning that is associated with it.48 While ozone
depletion and climate change have been recognized as problems that are best addressed through
global intergovernmental agreements, the time differences between national capitals and
negotiation sites and the prolonged duration of the negotiating sessions place significant
constraints on decision-making processes through which these global treaties are negotiated."
Interactions among the attributes of the problem area and such system-wide sociological
phenomena as the "issue-attention cycle" can also affect various sources of power, limiting, for
example, the value of inducements and the effectiveness of persuasion."
The Distribution of Natural Resources
The distribution of natural resources affects a society's overall wealth and the viability of
different economic sectors and many aspects of its culture." These factors in turn can determine
which individuals hold positions of authority and shape the nature of inducements." The
distribution of resources also restricts the range of viable policy options and the ability of
4 8Experiences in a number of different countries have shown that problems affecting common pool resources such as
ocean fisheries and large underground aquifers are more effectively addressed by government regulation then by
the markets (Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action). While
advocates of free markets may continue to advocate market solutions to common pool resource problems, their
ability to persuade others that these sorts of problems can be effectively addressed without some of government
regulation may limited. Along the same lines, a problem's susceptibility to quantitative measurement and the
existence of robust causal models strengthens the hand of those trying to persuade others as to the nature of the
problem and the deficiencies of existing policies. For instance, improvements in models of chlorine chemistry in
the atmosphere and clear, quantitative evidence of ozone depletion prompted DuPont, the world's leading producer
of CFCs, to announce in 1988 that it would cease production of the chemicals and support a global phase-out of
them (Benedick, Richard Elliot. 1998. Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press).
49 The time differences between national capitals and negotiation sites impairs not only the physical condition of the
negotiators (through, for example, jet lag)., but also the quality and intensity of communications between
negotiators and the central government authorities. The prolonged duration of many global treaty negotiations,
which can involve 16- to 20-hour days for several weeks on end, can have substantial physical and psychological
impacts, resulting in inflexibility or, in some cases, a loss of temper. Finally, the large number of players and the
tendency of like-minded delegations to work together as regional or other groups requires that tremendous amounts
of time is spent coordinating positions rather than negotiating. (Lang. 1996. Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-
Making).
50 Downs, Anthony. 1972. Up and Down with Ecology--the "Issue-Attention Cycle". Public Interest, 28: 38-49.
51 It should be noted that the inclusion of distribution of natural resources as a system-wide parameter presumes that
these resources are converted to wealth. Many developing countries, such as the Congo or Nigeria, have vast
natural resources but lack the technologies or social institutions to exploit them effectively. The existence of
substantial natural resources is also not necessarily a prerequisite for wealth.
s2For example, corporate and political elites in the United States tend to be recruited from the well-educated,
prestigiously employed, older, affluent, upper- and upper-middle-class populations of the nation (Alba, Richard D.
and Gwen Moore. 1982. Ethnicity in the American Elite. American Sociological Review 47, 6). Dye estimates that
30 percent of the institutional elites have upper-class backgrounds, as compared to less than 1 percent for the
general population (Dye. 1995. Who's Running America? The Clinton Years).
individuals to collect information, in turn affects powers of persuasion." Finally, wealth
provides coalition actors without access to those in positions of authority, or without powers of
persuasion, deference, or strategic skill, to hire the services of individuals with these powers.54
The distribution of natural resources, and the economic influence that results from this
distribution, also constrains power at the international level. Structural factors as the global
distribution of economic power shape both the bargaining context and the perceptions of various
actors in this bargaining." Because many transboundary environmental problems are associated
with economic activity, participants engaged in environmental treaty negotiations must take into
account the fact that solutions are unlikely to be achieved against the will of players with
significant economic power that are participating in the negotiations. Concessions must be made
and special advantages granted to lure them into a treaty. At the same time, countries at different
levels of economic development may refuse to join the treaty unless the least developed among
them obtain special treatment in terms of lesser or later obligations. This can lead to dilemma the
confronting many negotiators: to have a weak treaty or no treaty at all.
Because of the substantial costs associated with participating in the international policy
process, the distribution of wealth among countries also affects the abilities of various coalition
members to participate in the process and bring to bear other sources of power that they might
have at their disposal. Industrialized country governments, for example, can afford to send to
international negotiating sessions delegations that are larger than those of most developing
countries, in turn allows them to participate more actively in the sessions and consult more
frequently with their allies.56 In many recent international environmental negotiations,
delegations from the poorer developing countries have often worked closely with international
environmental advocacy groups in transnational coalitions in order to overcome some of the
disadvantages they face in negotiating with delegations from industrialized countries." NGOs
s For example, because the United States has relatively abundant coal reserves, the government could encourage
utilities to shift from oil to coal in the 1970s while France, lacking coal, turned to nuclear power. As will be
discussed in Section 3, the dependence of West Virginia and other states on these same coal reserves has ignited
fierce opposition in the U.S. Congress to the consideration of a carbon tax to address climate change.
54Nelson, P. J. 1997. Conflict, legitimacy, and effectiveness: Who speaks for whom in transnational NGO networks
lobbying the World Bank? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 26, 4: 421-441; Austensmith, D. 1993.
Information and Influence - Lobbying For Agendas and Votes. American Journal of Political Science 37, 3: 799-
833; Warleigh. 2000. The hustle: citizenship practice, NGOs and 'policy coalitions' in the European Union - the
cases of Auto Oil, drinking water and unit pricing.
ss Stein. 1983. Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world.
56 An important part of multilateral negotiations is knowing the positions of, and persuading, other countries'
negotiators before they arrive at the negotiating table. While embassies have an important role to play in this
process, so does direct contact by telephone, fax and face-to-face meetings, all of which require resources. Again,
the more developed countries have an advantage here (Crowe. 1993. Foreign Policy-Making: Reflections of a
Practitioner).
57See, e.g., Raustiala. 1997. States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions; Reimann, Kim D and
Forrest, Richard. 2002. Connecting Global and Local Societal Activism: International Politics, NGOs and the
Environmental Movement of Japan.; Wapner. 1995. Politics Beyond the State - Environmental Activism and
World Civic Politics.
with larger staffs, larger budgets, and larger memberships are also likely to be more active on
issues such as climate change."
Fundamental Cultural Values and Social Structure
Fundamental cultural values and social structure also constrain actors' sources of power. At
the national level, culture can be defined as the set of attitudes and beliefs that makes a person
distinctively American, British, French, Japanese, or Chinese.59 As part of this culture, most
members of a society share a "political culture," a set of complex cognitive and evaluative
structures that create a common view of what constitutes good government and proper
administration.60 While general values in a society influence the behavior of individuals, the
political culture structures in part the relationships between political and bureaucratic elites, and
between the population and the government. A culture may virtually mandate certain actions and
prohibit others by defining what in government is good and bad.6
These cultural values and social structures are critical in constraining all sources of power.
In many countries, the vast majority of the wealth is controlled by a very small percentage of the
population. In addition to possessing the resources necessary to offer elites, these elites often
control positions of authority within the state, which provides them with significant decision-
making authority as well.62 The decisions themselves also have a cultural dynamic. For
example, in much of the non-Western world, and even in portions of the Western world, all
decisions are assumed to be subject to influence through personal bargaining and negotiation.63
5 Dalton, Russell J., Steve Recchia, and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003. The Environmental Movement and the Modes
of Political Action. Comparative Political Studies 36, 7: 743-77 1.
59Alexis de Tocqueville noted that Americans have a commitment in the ideals, laws, and customs to what he called
"equality of condition". Various other observers have noted that Americans are individualistic, competitive, and
tend toward a moral dualism (i.e., preferring policies that are both morally "good" and "good for business." See
also Exoo, Calvin F. 1987. Democracy Upside Down: Public Opinion and Cultural Hegemony in the United
States. New York: Praeger; Neuman, W. Russell. 1986. The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in
the American Electorate. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; and McClosky, Herbert and John Zaller. 1984.
The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
60 Peters. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucracy.
61 While some aspects of this political culture are directed towards the content of policy, others direct the style of
governance. That is, not only must governments do certain things in order to be considered a proper government,
but those developing and administering policies must perform their duties in certain ways. See also, e.g., Pye,
Lucian W. and Sidney Verba. 1965. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University
Press; Douglas, Mary T. and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press.
62 Bealey, F. 1996. Democratic elitism and the autonomy of elites. International Political Science Review 17, 3: 319-
331; Putnam, Robert D. 1976. The Comparative Study ofPolitical Elites. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
63Formal rules promulgated by the bureaucracy constitute merely a place to begin the bargaining. In other societies,
in particular some of the newly industrialized countries, a "prismatic" style decision-making exists in which a law
establishes one policy although in practice a different policy prevails. A rule is formally announced but is not
effectively enforced. The formalistic appearance of the rule contrasts with its actual administration-officials are
free to make choices, enforcing or disregarding the rule at will. This form of administrative "double-talk" is
prevalent in societies with well-developed bureaucratic apparatuses but without the cultural infrastructure to
support it. (Peters. 1989. The Politics ofBureaucracy.
Societal norms are also important in constraining subsystem actors' power of persuasion by
limiting the kinds of policy options that could be considered.'
Similar concepts also apply at the international level, with international regimes often being
defined as a set of internationally accepted values and norms that constrain behavior.65
International regimes are usually embodied within, and derived from, an international legal
framework such as a treaty. However, internationally accepted norms that influence individual
actors can also develop in the absence of such a framework.66 For example, the development of
the international treaty banning land mines has been attributed to the global diffusion of a set of
norms by transnational coalitions of NGOs functioning as a "global civil society." 7
The Basic Legal Structure
A system's basic legal structure is a third parameter constraining power within a subsystem.
The basic legal structure is the set of rules that authorize individuals operating within the system
to act in certain ways, and establish the context within which advocacy coalitions engage in
collective action to realize common goals.68 The most important impact of the basic legal
structure is to define the parameters of formal decision-making authority." The rules and
64 For instance, large-scale nationalization of certain industries may be a viable policy option in certain countries in
Europe but cannot be considered in the United States largely because of differences in social norms (Kratochwil.
1989. Rules, Norms and Decisions). See also Checkel, J. T. 1999. Norms, institutions, and national identity in
contemporary Europe. International Studies Quarterly 43, 1: 83-114. It should be noted here that culture is
subject to change, and there is a constant interaction of culture and politics that redefines the role of government.
Peters suggests that the latitude of action allowed to most democratic governments at present would have been
unthinkable in at the beginning of the 19th century, before two world wars, a major economic depression, and a
cold war fundamentally altered popular perceptions of the role of government. However, change such as this
occurs only gradually over periods of decades, and thus is not generally an object of political strategy (Peters.
1989. The Politics of Bureaucracy). See also Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
65 Krasner. 1983. International Regimes.
66 See, e.g., Cortell, A. P. and J. W. Davis. 1996. How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of
international rules and norms. International Studies Quarterly 40, 4: 451-478.
67 Price. 1998. Reversing the gun sights: Transnational civil society targets land mines. See also Elgstrom, Ole.
1990. Norms, Culture, and Cognitive Patterns in Foreign-Aid Negotiations. Negotiation Journal-On the Process of
Dispute Settlement 6, 2: 147-159; Nadelmann. 1990. Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in
international society; Maher, I. 2002. Competition law in the international domain: Networks as a new form of
governance. Journal ofLaw and Society 29, 1: 111-136.
68 Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action. While including
"legal" rules, the basic legal structure extends beyond this to include tacit rules, explicit rules, and precepts
(Kratochwil. 1989. Rules, Norms and Decisions). These basic legal norms are quite resistant to change in most
political systems. The U.S. Constitution, for example, has not been significantly altered since the granting of
women's suffrage in 1920, and the legal institutions of Great Britain have remained virtually unchanged for almost
a century (Sabatier. 1993. The Advocacy Coalition Framework).
69 In the United States, for example, the decision-making authorities of the President, Congress, and the Courts are
constrained by the Constitution, which defines the roles of each branch and provides for a sharing of authority
among them. While Congress has the sole authority to pass laws, the President has the sole authority to conduct
foreign policy, although only the Senate can ratify a treaty negotiated by the President. It should be noted here that
this legal structure also gives rise to implied decision-making authority, or authority to make those decisions
necessary to carry out one's assigned responsibilities. For instance, the President's right to appoint cabinet
officials with the advice and consent of the Senate implies that he has the right to direct the work of those cabinet
regulations established by this structure generally provide one group with an advantage over
another by allowing those decision-making authority to maintain it over time and preventing
those without this authority from acquiring it.70 However, these rules can also create situations in
which decision-making authority is shared either among agencies, among sub-units of an agency,
or both, substantially reduces its value as a source of power.7' However, the basic legal structure
also constrains other sources of power. For example, most countries have laws strictly regulating
the form and amount of payments that government officials can receive from private individuals
or groups, thus limiting the form and value of inducements.72 Laws limiting access to both
information and decision-makers constrain the use of persuasion.7 3 Finally, national legal
officials. While Congress can pass legislation requiring that certain agencies carry out certain activities, it has not
contested the President's authority to give orders to a cabinet member since the early 19'h century (Peters. 1989.
The Politics of Bureaucracy).
70 The rules of the U.S. Congress have required that Committee and sub-committee chairmen be appointed by the
majority party strictly according to seniority. Thus the chairs have usually been members from safe, one-party,
often rural districts, as these districts most frequently re-elect their representatives (Hinckley, Barbara. 1988.
Stability and Change in Congress. New York: Harper and Row; McCubbins, Matthew D. and Terry Sullivan.
1987. Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Similarly, bureaucratic jurisdiction
and authority are carefully defined by strict rules that specify what the bureaus, offices, and individuals can deal
with, how they must deal with it, and how they can ensure compliance with their decisions, and most government
organizations have in place rules that require bureaucrats to be recruited on the basis of competence, special
training, expertise, and experience (Hilsman. 1990. The Politics ofPolicy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs:
conceptual models and bureaucratic politics). Finally, the division of labor among agencies is often based on
clientele. For example, the Department of Commerce in general serves business and the Department of Labor in
general serves workers. The division of labor might also be based on "subject matters deemed to be related." The
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration was placed within the Department of Commerce because
the primary clientele for issues related to the oceans and atmosphere (i.e., weather). was business. The division of
labor might also be the nature of the work process, with the Government Printing Office being responsible for
printing all government documents, or geographical, such as the regional offices of the Environmental Protection
Agency. Large organizations will employ, at different levels, units based on all of these criteria: clientele, subject,
process and territory.
71 For example, one of the most persistent criticisms of the U.S. State Department is that it shows little leadership and
is slow to act, requiring endless clearances from various bureaus and offices before making a move. However, the
very nature of foreign affairs creates this situation, as it must deal with almost two hundred nations and a variety of
international organizations, each of which has its own rivalries and interests that clash with those of others. As a
result, the bureaucrats who deal with particular nations and problems must each compete for priority, as policies
that help one nation or problem may hurt others. Thus it is very difficult for the State Department bureaucracy to
present a strong and unified front to the rest of the government (Hilsman. 1990. The Politics of Policy Making in
Defense and Foreign Affairs: conceptual models and bureaucratic politics).
72 Bribery, that is, explicit offers of payment in exchange for a favorable policy decision, is prohibited in most
countries. In the United States, a private person may donate no more than $1000 to the campaign of any individual
Congressional or Presidential candidate, and civil servants are prohibited from received gifts, of any value,
including meals. In some other countries, however, the offering of bribes is more socially acceptable, and even in
the United States Congress has found it difficult to put substantial limits on less overt forms of payment as "lecture
fees."
73 For instance, the concentration of policy-making authority in the British cabinet and higher civil service-coupled
with the secrecy that permeates that system-inhibit outsiders from making intelligent evaluations of present policy
(Ashford, Douglas. 1981. Policy and Politics in Britain. Philadelphia: Temple University Press). Similarly, public
choice theorists have shown that decentralized political systems facilitate learning by providing opportunities for
policy experimentation and a range of experiences with different policy instruments from which realistic
comparisons can be made (Ostrom, Vincent, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warren. 1961. The organization of
Government in Metropolitan Areas. American Political Science Review 55, December: 831-842).
structures substantially influence political strategies by constraining the political choices of some
actors while expanding those of others.74
A system-wide legal structure also exists at the international level that constrains the various
sources of power of actors engaging in international negotiations. The concept of sovereignty, in
which states are independent and have the right to be free from interference in their domestic
affairs, has been the fundamental legal principle constraining behavior at the international level,
and has been the basis for all intergovernmental activities.7" The most important ramification of
this is that decision-making authority is shared among all nations involved in discussions about
an issue instead of being vested in a central organization or institution.
Further constraints are created by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
establishes the procedural and institutional rules governing all international agreements. 76 This
structure is augmented by the network of existing treaties and agreements that constrain the
behavior of parties in certain ways. For example, environmental treaties which compel
compliance through the use of trade sanctions, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, need to take into account international trade law as established by such
agreements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
4.3.2. System-wide Parameters and the Institutionalization of Power
An important aspect of these sources of power is the degree to which they are
institutionalized. Institutionalized sources of power are those that are derived from system-wide
parameters rather than qualities innate to the individual actors themselves. All five sources of
power-decision-making authority, the ability to offer inducements, persuasion, deference, and
strategic skill-have aspects derived from both system-wide parameters and qualities innate to
the individuals. However, decision-making authority and the ability to offer inducements is
primarily a function of system-wide, or institutional, parameters, while persuasion, deference and
strategic skill are largely qualities innate to individual.
As elite power theorists have pointed out, power associated with the authority to make
decisions is largely derived from system-wide rules and norms. While an individual's particular
qualities may be helpful in gaining a position of decision-making authority, it is the position
rather than the person that gives him or her control over the activities of others. For example, in
the United States, congressional rules have historically specified that committee chairs are to be
awarded strictly on the basis of seniority, so that influences from outside are minimized.78 The
74 Moe, Terry. 1990. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In Organization
Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver Williamson, pg. 116-153. New York:
Oxford University Press.
75In recent years, the increasing interdependence of nations has led to a weakening in the principle, and, in the
European Union, given rise to the concept of "subsidiarity." Under this notion of subsidiarity, rules negotiated
internationally can be applied domestically where the matter to be regulated has a transboundary effect that can not
be managed adequately at the domestic level (Lang. 1996. Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-Making).
76 This treaty, which codifies long-standing customary law, is the frame of reference for negotiators regarding the
conclusion, ratification and termination of treaties.
77 Lang. 1996. Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-Making.
78 As exceptions to these rules have been made with increasing frequency in past decades, outside influences on
committee chairs have increased (Kelman. 1987. Making Public Policy).
ability to use this power effectively may vary from individual to individual. However, those
actors who might be somewhat less effective in using their authority are likely to be strongly
supported by other coalition members such that the coalition as a whole retains control of the
decision-making authority.
Like decision-making authority, inducements as a source of power are ultimately derived
from system-wide parameters rather from the innate qualities of subsystem actors. Various
actors may bring to the subsystem capabilities to provide inducements, such as economic wealth
or societal influence. The origins of these inducements, however, generally lie beyond the
boundaries of the subsystem.79 Similarly, normative inducements are very much dependent on
fundamental socio-cultural values. Offering to portray a decision-maker as a savior of the
environment will only serve as an inducement if society in general places a high value on
environmental protection." Coercive inducements, such as removal from office, will only work
if the constitutional structure provides for this.
Persuasiveness and deference as sources of power can be derived from both system-wide
parameters and the innate qualities of the coalition actors themselves. They are derived from
system-wide parameters to the extent that their efficacy is a function of the position or office
rather than the individual. People are more likely to defer to, and receive with greater amenity a
message delivered by, an individual holding a position of authority or having significant wealth
than an individual without such a position or wealth." Much of the media's power to persuade
79 For example, the economic wealth necessary to provide such inducements as votes, industry relocations, etc.,
resides for the most part within large economic institutions-industrial corporations, banks, utilities, insurance
companies and investment firms. While individuals having positions of presidents, officer-directors, and directors
of these institutions may control how this wealth is used, the power of the inducements resides in the wealth of the
institutions themselves, which in turn are defined by the distribution of natural resources, socio-cultural values, and
constitutional structures. Dye points out that that this power tends to be concentrated among a relatively few
individuals. In the United States, only about 4,300 individuals-two one-thousandths of 1 percent of the
population-control more than one half of the nation's industrial assets, two thirds of all banking assets, one half of
all assets in communications and utilities, and more than two thirds of all insurance assets. The five largest
industrial corporations-General Electric, General Motors, Ford Motors, IBM and Exxon-control 28 percent of
all industrial assets (Dye, Thomas R. 1990. Who's Running America? The Bush Era. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, Inc).
80For instance, Greenpeace and others environmental groups suggested that Prime Minister Gro Brundtland
reputation for environmental concern, and that of the Norwegian government in general, would suffer if she
allowed commercial whaling to continue (Peterson. 1992. Whalers, cetologists, environmentalists, and the
international management of whaling).
81 Much of the power of individuals from nation's large foundations to influence policy rests in their ability to
channel corporate and personal wealth into financial support for and the direction of policy analyses conducted by
universities and non-governmental organizations (Dye. 1995. Who's Running America? The Clinton Years). For
example, David Rockefeller, when asked about how he exerts power, responded:
"we accomplish things through cooperative action, which is quite different than exerting power in
some mysterious and presumably evil way. I have no power in the sense that I can call anybody in
the government and tell them what to do. Because of my position, I'm more apt to get through on
the telephone than somebody else, but what happens to what I suggest depends on whether they
feel this make sense in terms of what they are already doing (cited in Dye. 1995. Who's Running
America? The Clinton Years).
The degree to which individuals tend to be granted deference also tends to be a function of societal norms. Several
studies of administration in developing countries point out that orders from a superior may be obeyed as a function
is a function of its acceptance by the public as legitimate and authoritative." However,
persuasiveness and deference are also very much a function of the actors themselves. A skilled
orator can deliver a highly persuasive argument even if the facts supporting it are weak, while the
most compelling set of facts can be rendered useless if the individual presenting them is unable
to assemble them into a coherent argument. 83
4.3.3. Overlapping Subsystems
Another facet of the system-wide environment that has particularly important implications
for policy implementation is overlapping subsystems. Subsystems overlap when policies arising
in one subsystem affect or are affected by policies arising from the others. Overlap among
subsystems within the same political system is generally created by that system's legal structure.
However, it can also occur among subsystems in different political systems, a situation that
occurs in the development and implementation of international treaties.
Overlapping subsystems make the process of policy implementation difficult, as policies
arising from one can negate those developed in the other. As coalition actors in one subsystem
discover that they lack the political resources necessary to use effective guidance instruments
within a subsystem, they tend to "shop around" for powerful individuals receptive to their
influence. In doing so, they frequently appeal to processes in overlapping subsystems to obtain a
change in budget, legal authority or simply a conflicting policy decision." Actors in the
overlapping subsystems can minimize these adverse impacts if they coordinate their activities,
but doing so presents significant challenges.
Overlapping Subsystems Defined
Overlapping subsystems are subsystems with the same or sufficiently related functional
domains such that policies arising in one have an impact in the other. The extent of the overlap
is determined by the degree to which political actors participate in both, and overlapping
subsystems may be nested, interrelated, or both.
The greatest degree of overlap occurs in situations where subsystems are nested. Nested
subsystems have the same or very similar functional domains and the boundaries of one or
of the personal following of that individual rather than from an acceptance of the authority of the position (Peters.
1989. The Politics of Bureaucracy).
82 Ungar. 1998. Hot crises and media reassurance: a comparison of emerging diseases and Ebola Zaire. Television is
particularly powerful in this regard, as it is the "most trusted" medium of communication (American Enterprise,
July-August, 1991, pg 96, cited in Dye. 1995. Who's Running America? The Clinton Years).
83 Watkins, M. and S. Rosegrant. 1996. Sources of power in coalition building. Negotiation Journal-On the Process
of Dispute Settlement 12, 1: 47-68; Lau, Smith, and Fiske. 1991. Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations, and
Political Persuasion.
84 Baumgartner and Jones describe this approach as "venue-shopping." (Baumgartner and Jones. 1993. Agendas and
Instability in American Politics). Coalitions frequently pursue multiple venues, often simultaneously, in a broad-
based effort to achieve their objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework:
An Assessment). On the wider international stage, proponents of certain policies opposed by important interest
groups at home can be more easily introduced if they have been negotiated as part of an international deal, as
illustrated by the acceptance of the agricultural consequences of a successful Uruguay Round in France, Japan,
Canada and other countries (Crowe. 1993. Foreign Policy-Making: Reflections of a Practitioner).
several are completely enclosed by the other, larger and hierarchically superior subsystem. This
nesting frequently occurs when the subsystems have different territorial boundaries."
Lesser degrees of overlap occur when subsystems are interrelated but not nested. This
generally occurs when different functional domains subsystems of are sufficiently related such
that a subset of actors in one subsystem is also part of the other. However, the relationship
between them is not hierarchical because they are at the same level of government, have the same
territorial domain, or are contained within different political systems.86
Combinations of nested and interrelated subsystems give rise to a wide range of
permutations. Policy regarding a particular issue might involve interactions of multiple
functional subsystems in a given territory, nested territorial subsystems involving a given
function, or both multiple functions and nested territories. Examples of some of these
permutations are shown in Figure 4.3.
Power and Coordination in Overlapping Subsystems
The presence of overlapping subsystems presents a significant constraint on the power of a
dominant coalition within a subsystem, as it must achieve some degree of coordination with
those in the overlapping subsystems if it is to achieve its policy objective. Without coordination,
policies developed in one subsystem may be thwarted, reversed, or otherwise hindered by those
developed in the other. Because policies arising from a subsystem reflect the beliefs of dominant
coalition, the extent to which policies in overlapping subsystems are coordinated ultimately
depends on the extent to which they are each dominated by the same or parallel coalitions.
85 For example, the U.S. welfare "subsystem" is, in fact, the group of state welfare subsystems nested within the
larger national welfare subsystem. Most actors in each state welfare subsystem are part of the national welfare
subsystem, as they all involved at some level in developing or implementing the national welfare policies. Not all
actors in the national welfare subsystem, however, are part of a given state welfare subsystem (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment).
86 Examples of interrelated subsystems within the same system include national foreign, defense and international
trade policy; energy and air pollution; and agriculture and water quality. An example of overlapping subsystems
contained within different political systems is cooperation between two countries to control transboundary air
pollution.
Figure 4.3 Variations In Nested and Overlapping Policy Subsystems
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Actors in overlapping subsystems can be expected to coordinate their behavior only when
the subsystems are interdependent, are not engaged in serious policy conflicts with each other,
and are relatively free of serious internal conflicts."? A common function will not necessarily
lead individuals and organizations cooperate with each other or to coordinate their activities
when internal value conflict is high, as much of their energy will be focused on the struggle for
domination within their own subsystem.
Conflicts among subsystems are least likely to occur where the overlapping subsystems are
dominated by "parallel" coalitions, i.e., coalitions whose actors share many of the same or
complementary beliefs and have the same or complementary policy objectives. In some
situations, these parallel coalitions may in fact be comprised of the same actors, and are
87 Zafonte and Sabatier. 1998. Shared beliefs and imposed interdependencies as determinants of ally networks in
overlapping subsystems. It should be noted here that, while a number of policy elite theorists have suggested that
these problems of coordination are resolved by a "central core" of authoritative private mediators who act as power
brokers among the different subsystems, fairly strong empirical evidence.
I Territorial
I Boundary
distinguished only by the functional or territorial domain of the subsystem in which they are
active.
While an absence of value and policy conflicts creates conditions conducive to cooperation
among overlapping subsystems, there must also be some degree of interdependence if
cooperation is to be ensured. Functional interdependence occurs when the behavior of actors in
one subsystem actually affects the ability of actors in the other to achieve their political goals and
vice-versa. If the actions of the first affects the second, but those of the second do not affect the
first, the two are not interdependent, as coordination becomes the choice of the first.
Alternatively, the two subsystems may have what Chisholm has labeled an "imposed
interdependency", i.e., they are part of a larger system that has the authority to set rules affecting
both."
Given these conditions, the degree to which the policy processes in multiple overlapping
subsystems are coordinated depends largely on the nature of the overlap. Cooperation is least
likely to occur among functionally and territorially different subsystems. Differences in
functional domains reduce the possibility that the actors are interdependent, as policies arising
from one may not affect the other. Because the subset of actors participating in both subsystems
is smaller, the probability that each is dominated by a different coalition is higher, in turn
increasing the likelihood of conflicts in both values and policy. Cooperation becomes even more
difficult as the number of subsystems that overlap increases, as this reduces the probability of
interdependence and increases the number of potential or real value or policy conflicts.
Cooperation is most likely to occur among nested subsystems. Actors in these subsystems
are more likely to be interdependent (through either functional or imposed interdependence), as
policies developed in each are quite likely to affect the other. Most importantly, because many of
the same actors participate in both subsystems, the possibility of serious value or policy conflicts
is reduced by the increased likelihood that each subsystem is dominated by the same set of
political actors.89
Overlapping Subsystems in International Treaty Negotiation and Implementation
The development and implementation of international environmental treaties involves
coordination among multiple policy subsystems within the same and different political systems.90
88 Chisholm, D. W. 1989. Coordination Without Hierarchy. Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
89 An important aspect of this overlap is bureaucratic competition (Peters. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucracy;
Niskanen, William A. 1979. Competition among Government Agencies. American Behavioral Scientist 22: 517-
24; Downs. 1966. Inside Bureaucracy). This competition is most frequently played out through the budget process
without the involvement of elected officials, and occurs not only among different government agencies but among
different units with a single agency. As a result, "priority setting in the bureaucracy resembles nineteenth-century
capitalism; priorities are established by aggressive entrepreneurs at the operating levels of government" (Natchez,
Peter B. and Irving C. Bupp. 1973. Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process. American Political Science
Review 67: 963).
90 Keohane and Nye argue that modern international politics are characterized by multiple channels of contact among
states and societies that blur the distinction between domestic and international politics, and that the availability of
partners in political coalitions is not limited by national boundaries (Keohane, Robert 0. and Joseph S. Nye, eds.
1972. Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). International
environmental law itself serves to integrate national economies, as the activities international law regulates
In particular, coordination may be required among overlapping international subsystems, national
foreign subsystems, and various different domestic policy subsystems. Figure 4.4 suggests
possible variations in these overlapping subsystems.
The first area of overlap is among one or more international policy subsystems and multiple
national foreign policy subsystems. These international and national foreign policy subsystems
are interrelated because many of the government and NGO representatives involved in the
international policy subsystem also play important roles in the formation of their respective
national foreign policy positions. However, these foreign policy subsystems are not subordinate
to the international subsystem because of the limits national sovereignty places on the scope of
international treaties.
Figure 4.4 Examples of Overlapping Policy Subsystems In International Cooperation
generally occur within the borders of states. As Raustiala points out, "the locus of political attention is domestic,
but the locus of political activity is international: it is not just at the national but at the international level that
important new legal and political decisions are made." (Raustiala. 1997. States, NGOs, and international
environmental institutions).
National foreign policy subsystems may also overlap with one or more domestic policy
subsystems. In the case of climate change, national climate change foreign policy subsystems
may overlap with national domestic energy policy subsystems, transportation policy subsystems,
and others. These national-level subsystems are most likely to be inter-related without being
nested; they would be nested if the development and implementation of the foreign and domestic
policies occur through the same processes, involve many of the same actors, and there is a
hierarchical relationship among the institutions involved.
In many countries, these national foreign and domestic policy subsystems also overlap with a
number of state or local domestic policy subsystems.' The degree to which these sub-national
subsystems are nested within national policy subsystems depends on the country's political
system. Nested subsystems are more likely to occur in countries like Japan that have strong
central governments, while they are less likely to occur in countries like the United States and
Germany that have a federal system of government.
It should be noted here that the existence of the European Union adds yet one more layer of
complexity for European countries. EU institutions such as the European Commission, the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are increasingly displacing national
institutions as the principal loci of policy change, including the coordination of foreign policy on
certain issues.2 However, national institutions remain largely responsible for implementation,
creating a situation in which the implementation of environmental treaties involves coordination
among overlapping subsystems at four or more different levels of government.
4.4 RELATIVE POWER AND SUBSYSTEM DOMINANCE
The potential for a coalition to achieve its political objectives is a function of the power that
it possesses. All coalitions active within a subsystem can be expected to employ whatever
political resources they have at their disposal, no matter how limited. However, those coalitions
with the political resources sufficient to employ the more costly, but more effective, guidance
instruments are likely to succeed over those with fewer resources. The degree to which a
coalition can dominate a subsystem, therefore, is a function of that coalition's power relative to
that of other coalitions. The greater a coalition's relative power, the more likely that it will
dominate the subsystem and ensure that policy outcomes are consistent with its belief system and
policy objectives.
The power distribution of the various actors involved in the subsystem at any given point in
time is very difficult to predict. Actors in one coalition might have the power of formal decision-
making authority, but actors in another coalition might have substantial power of inducements
and persuasion. In many situations, actors in different coalitions may share decision-making
authority, have substantial powers of inducements, persuasion, and deference, and employ many
different forms of strategic skill. Measuring these, and comparing each against the others,
presents substantial methodological difficulties.
91 In the United States, for example, transportation policy is generally set at the state level, with national authority
only extending to the use of federal funds.
92 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment; Peterson, John. 1995.
Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a framework of analysis. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 2,
3: 69-93. The emerging role of the EU in the context of climate policy is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9.
Like belief systems, a coalition's relative power at any given time may be best determined by
examining the interactions among the subsystem coalitions and the extent to which the policy
outcomes reflect the beliefs of one coalition or another. A policy outcome that reflects strongly
the belief system of a single coalition (i.e., there appears that little compromise occurred)
suggests that the majority coalition has significantly more power than minority coalitions.
However, a policy outcome containing elements of several coalitions' beliefs systems reflects
more of a balance of power such that coalitions were forced to compromise.
As a first step towards operationalizing thisconceptualization of political power independent
of policy success, I suggest that the five sources of power described in this chapter can be
separated into two categories: (1) primary sources of power, and (2) secondary sources of power.
Primary sources of power are those sources that enable the possessors with direct control over the
decisions being made within the subsystem. Decision-making authority is the most clear-cut
example of such a source of power. However, I also suggest that the ability to offer inducements
can be a primary source of power when those inducements are sufficient to compel the
cooperation of those possessing the decision-making authority. Such an inducement would be
along the lines of "an offer that can't be refused." Although such an inducement could be
positive, it is more likely to be negative, such as a credible threat of retaliation or actions that
would effectively negate the decisions being made. Secondary sources of power are those
sources that depend on circumstance or the receptivity of those possessing decision-making
authority in order to have the desired effect. These include persuasion, deference, and strategic
skill. The ability to offer inducements can also be considered a secondary source of power when
the inducements by themselves are not sufficient to compel favorable decisions. I describe a
proposition that can be used to examine the relationships among these primary and secondary
sources of power and policy change, as well as several other propositions that can be used to
analyze the interactions among international and domestic policy processes, in the following
chapter,
CHAPTER 5 - THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY CHANGE AND TREATY
IMPLEMENTATION
The description of policy subsystems and coalition interactions given thus far is a static
"snapshot" of the policy process at a given point in time (i.e., a year or so). Policy
implementation, however, is a dynamic process that occurs over time: Sabatier argues that
understanding policy change requires a time perspective of a decade or more, and much of the
literature on policy implementation suggests that such a time period is necessary to complete at
least one cycle of formulation, implementation, assessment, and reformulation.'
If the policies arising from a subsystem at any point in time reflect the belief system of the
coalition dominating the subsystem, then policy change over time is determined by the degree to
which these beliefs change, the distribution of power among coalitions changes, or some
combination of the two. Because the processes through which belief systems change tend to be
slow and incremental, substantial changes in policy tend to be driven by shifts in power resulting
from perturbations to the subsystem. In this chapter, I suggest how the various elements of the
ACF and the various sources of coalition power interact over time in the dynamic process of
policy change. I then describe how all of these elements come together in the process of treaty
implementation, and suggest some propositions that can be used to explore this process.
5.1 THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY CHANGE OVER TIME
As a government program is implemented, the coalitions engaged in the development of the
program may revise their beliefs or alter their strategies according to their perceptions of the
adequacy of the decisions, the policy outputs, their effects on the problem as well as any side
effects, and any new information that arises from research or dynamics external to the subsystem.
It may then seek changes in the initial government program or more minor changes in the various
policy outputs of the program. It may also attempt to change subsystem policies by altering
critical system-wide parameters, such as the system-wide governing coalition.2
A focus on short-term decision making tends to underestimate the influence of policy analysis, a tool that is
important to those who have little power other than that of persuasion (Sabatier. 1993. The Advocacy Coalition
Framework). Weiss argues that policy analysis is used primarily to alter the perceptions and conceptual apparatus
of policy makers over time (Weiss, Carol H. 1977. Research for Policy's Sake: The Enlightenment Function of
social research. Policy Analysis 3, Fall: 531-545). This is consistent with Lindblom and Cohen's suggestion that it
is the cumulative effect of findings from different studies and from ordinary knowledge that has the greatest
influence on policy (Lindblom, Charles E. and David Cohen. 1979. Usable Knowledge. New Haven: Yale
University Press). See also Mazmanian, Daniel A. and Paul A. Sabatier. 1989. Implementation and Public Policy.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
2 Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or More. It should be noted here that, in certain situations, coalitions
may be willing to enter negotiations in the hope of finding a compromise if they all view the status quo as
unacceptable (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997. The Advocacy Coalition Framewofk: An Assessment). This
tends to occur when each coalition has the ability to impose unacceptable costs. The end result of such a process is
not a dominant coalition and several minority coalitions but what might be regarded as "power sharing" among
coalitions. This is analogous to a "grand coalition" in parliamentary systems or the tradition of consensus
negotiations in such countries as Switzerland or the Netherlands. These "consensus regimes" are likely to be quite
unstable, however, unless the arrangement produces a distribution of benefits over time that all coalitions regard as
"fair" and new leaders committed to consensus replace old "warriors" within the coalitions.
One of the major strengths of the ACF is that it provides a relatively clear-cut criterion for
distinguishing "major" from "minor" policy change. Major change is change in the policy core
aspects of a policy or program, whereas minor change is change in the secondary aspects. Thus it
is the topic and scope of policy change that determines whether it is major or minor. In situations
involving nested subsystems, a change may be "minor" for the larger subsystem but "major" for
the subsystem nested within it.3
5.1.1. Policy Change Through Changes in Beliefs
If one or more subsystem coalitions revise their beliefs in response to their perceptions of the
effects of the policy outputs, new information or other factors, they may seek to revise subsystem
policies in order to make them conform to these revised beliefs. Coalitions beliefs may change
as a result of learning, turnover among subsystem actors, or some combination of the two. Both
of these processes tend to be incremental in nature and focused on secondary aspects rather than
policy core beliefs. As a result, they generally do not cause major changes in policy.
Learning
As discussed in the previous chapter, policy-oriented learning is the change over time in the
distribution of beliefs among actors within a coalition or among coalitions within the subsystem.
While important aspects of this learning are policy analysis and the exchange of information, the
learning process itself is an ongoing exercise of exploration and adaptation in which actors
experiment with a variety of guidance instruments and other implementing mechanisms over
time to achieve their policy goals. They re-examine their strategies when they become
dissatisfied with the performance of any of these various mechanisms, either in terms of its
policy outputs or in the ability of these outputs to address the problems satisfactorily.4 Because
they filter new information through their existing beliefs, however, they tend to accept
information confirming existing beliefs and screen out dissonant information. As a result,
changes in beliefs are generally very difficult to achieve.
When learning does take place, it usually affects the secondary aspects of belief systems
rather than the policy core.' Much of the policy core consists of deeply held normative beliefs
that are very difficult to change through the presentation of empirical evidence. Actors may
occasionally alter aspects of their policy core beliefs on the basis of information coming from
others within the same coalition.' However, this almost always requires what Weiss refers to as
"enlightenment"--the accumulation of considerable evidence from a variety of sources for over a
decade or more.' Even changes to secondary aspects, which are those aspects of belief systems
that are most susceptible to empirical challenge, can take several years.
3 For example, changing automotive emission standards may be "major" for the U.S. automotive pollution control
subsystem but relatively minor for the larger air pollution control subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1997.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment).
4 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier. 1993. The Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning.
5 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier. 1993. The Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning.
6 Eberg, Jan 1997. Waste Policy and Learning: Policy Dynamics of Waste Management and Waste Incineration in
the Netherlands and Bavaria. University of Netherlands.
7 Weiss. 1977. Research for Policy's Sake: The Enlightenment Function of social research.
Despite these difficulties, major policy change through learning can and does occur in
subsystems at all levels of governance. For example, a major factor in the shift in the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments from a "command-and-control" approach to controlling emissions of air
pollutants to the tradable permit system was the recognition and subsequent support by the
Environmental Defense Fund and others in the environmental community that the flexibility
provided by this market-based approach can result in greater improvements in air quality.!
Similarly, the change in the international regime controlling ocean dumping of low-level
radioactive waste from initially permitting the dumping of low-level waste to prohibiting the
dumping of this waste has been linked to a change in views by those initially opposed to the
prohibition.'
Turnover Within Coalitions
The belief system of a coalition as a whole can also change through changes in the actors of
which it is comprised. Although coalitions themselves tend to be relatively stable over time,
there may be a substantial amount of turnover within the coalition as individuals are promoted,
change jobs and organizations, and retire. For example, some civil service systems require its
officials to change positions every few years in order to ensure that they are not "captured" by
local interests.' As a younger generation of actors start to replace those actors who were
involved at the beginning of the policy process, they can bring new perspectives and ideas to the
table.
5.1.2. Policy Change Though Shifts in Power
Policies can change more dramatically when the distribution of power among subsystem
coalitions changes, particularly if a minority coalition gains dominance. In mature subsystem,
the primary sources of power of the dominant coalition tend to be institutionalized, i.e., derived
from system-wide parameters. Thus shifts in the distribution of power within a subsystem are
usually caused by system-wide events such as elections or changes in socio-economic conditions.
The impact of these events can be substantial over the course of a few years or a decade and
provide political actors with "windows of opportunity" to gain power."
Institutionalized Power and the Potential for Change
8Cohen, Richard. 1992. Washington at Work: Back Rooms and Clean Air. New York: Macmillan, in Sabatier. 1993.
Policy Change over a Decade or More.
9 Lidskog, R. and G. Sundqvist. 2002. The role of science in environmental regimes: The case of LRTAP. European
Journal of International Relations 8, 1: 77-101. See also Bressers and Rosenbaum. 2000. Innovation, learning,
and environmental policy: Overcoming "a plague of uncertainties"; Clark, Eindoven, and Jaeger. 1999. Learning to
Manage Global Environmental Risks: A Comparative History of social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone
Depletion and Acid Rain; Haas. 2000. International institutions and social learning in the management of global
environmental risks; Jenkins-Smith, Hank. 1988. Analytical Debates and Policy Learning: Analysis and Change in
the Federal bureaucracy. Policy Sciences 21: 169-212; Ulph and Maddison. 1997. Uncertainty Learning and
International Environmental Policy Coordination.
10 Wilson. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.
" Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or More; Kingdon. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public
Policies.
A coalition's ability to remain dominant in a subsystem over time depends very much on the
degree to which its -sources of power are institutionalized, that is, derived from system-wide
parameters rather than qualities inherent to particular coalition members." As coalition members
enter and leave the subsystem, those coalitions whose power is institutionalized are more likely
to be able to maintain more power relative to those whose power is derived from the individuals
themselves, and thus come to dominate the subsystem. A coalition that derives much of its
power from a few actors with unique persuasive abilities or strategic skill will lose power if these
actors leave the subsystem. On the other hand, a coalition losing an individual possessing power
derived from system-wide parameters, such as decision-making authority or the ability to offer
inducements, does not necessarily lose power if he or she is replaced with an individual who
holds similar beliefs and cooperates with other coalition actors."
The logical extension of this is that those sources of power derived from system-wide
sources, in particular decision-making authority and the ability to offer inducements, are more
important to a coalition in the long run than those sources of power derived from qualities unique
to particular individuals. Over time, that coalition with individuals having decision-making
authority and the ability to offer inducements is most likely to become dominant and then
maintain their dominance until such time that the power of these individuals is altered by
external events.
External Events and Shifts in Power
Three types of system-wide events can cause a change in the distribution of power: changes
in socioeconomic conditions and technology, system-wide political events, and policy decisions
and impacts from other subsystems." These events can alter directly a coalition's sources of
power by causing powerful actors to leave the subsystem, change the power of those remaining in
the subsystem, and cause new actors enter the subsystem and assume power. System-wide
events may also affect a coalition's power indirectly by changing some of the basic system
parameters, although this tends to occur over a longer time period.
Changes in Socioeconomic Conditions and Technology
Changes in socioeconomic conditions and technology can affect a subsystem in a number of
ways. These changes can undermine the causal assumptions of the present policies or
12 As Berle points out, "power is invariably organized and transmitted through institutions. Top power holders must
work through existing institutions, perhaps extending or modifying them, or must at once create new institutions.
There is no other way of exercising power." (Berle. 1967. Power). C. Wright Mills likewise observes that "no
one.. .can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these
institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance powerful." (Mills. 1956. The Power
Elite).
" This scenario is most likely to occur if the departure is due to personal reasons, as the coalition losing the
individual is likely to be able to control the replacement process.
14 Sabatier refers to the second type of system-wide event as changes in systemic governing coalitions, but goes on to
suggest that more limited but still important changes can occur when the systemic governing coalition loses power
but does not actually change. He also suggests that these changes are caused by such political events such as
elections. Referring to this second type of events as "system-wide political events" captures his intent more
accurately (Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a Decade or More).
significantly altering the political support of various coalitions." In doing so, they can change
the value of inducements and persuasion as sources of power." For example, the growth of the
Internet in the 1990s provided a new, inexpensive means for NGOs to communicate, enhancing
their ability to organize and exchange information through transnational networks and mobilize
public support for their views. 7 These changes can also have an indirect effect by causing basic
system parameters to change. A number of observers suggest that the tremendous growth of the
environmental movement in the United States that began in the mid-1960's marked the
beginning of a fundamental shift in cultural values. This shift helped environmentalists and other
public interest advocates obtain in the early 1970's radical changes in both air and water
pollution laws.'" Similarly, international efforts to phase out the production and use of CFCs
made little progress until it became clear in the mid-1980s that viable alternatives were available,
after which they gained significant momentum.'"
System- Wide Political Events
At the national and subnational levels, system-wide political events such as elections can
bring about policy change within subsystems by causing turnover among coalition actors and
altering the various sources of power held by those remaining. For example, substantial change
is likely to occur if political party, in assuming control of the political system as a whole after a
"critical election", is able to replace most or all individuals from the dominant coalition that have
decision-making authority with individuals from a minority coalition.2" A change in the political
'" Sabatier. 1993. The Advocacy Coalition Framework.
16 For example, the Marshall Plan to help the post war recovery of Europe was making little progress in Congress
until, in 1948, the Communists took over Czechoslovakia in a coup d'etat-after which the act passed immediately
(Hilsman. 1990. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: conceptual models and
bureaucratic politics).
17 Mathews. 1997. Power Shift; Zelwietro, Joseph. 1998. The Politicization of Environmental Organizations through
the Internet. Information Society 14: 45-56.
18For example, public furor caused by the mishandling by both business and government of the toxic waste
contamination problems at Love Canal in the late 1970's spurred the U.S. Congress to take a new "shovels first,
lawyers later" approach in crafting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (Layzer, Judy. 1998. Case Studies in Environmental Politics. Cambridge: MIT Project on Environmental
Politics and Policy). Mazmanian and Morell write that "Love Canal was one of those rare catalytic events, one of
those seemingly isolated incidents that so often throws an entire nation into turmoil. This unpredictable turning
point.. .bared both the sensitive chemophobic nerve lurking just below the surface of American public
consciousness and the growing lack of trust in both business and government expertise" (Mazmanian, Daniel A.
and David Morell. 1992. Beyond Superfailure: America's Toxics Policy for the 1990s. Boulder: Westview Press,
pg 6). See also Rosenbaum. 1998. Environmental Politics and Policy; Milbrath, Lester. 1984. Environmentalists:
Vanguard for a New Society. Albany: SUNY Press; Dunlap, Riley E. and K. Van Liere. 1978. The New
Environmental Paradigm. Journal of Environmental Education 9, 4: 10-19; Hays, Samuel P. 1987. The Politics of
Environmental Administration. In The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies Since World War II, ed.
Louis Galambos, pg. 21-53. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Quarles, John. 1976. Cleaning Up
America: An Insider's View ofEnvironmental Protection. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; Harris, Richard A.
and Sidney M. Milkis. 1989. The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies. New York: Oxford
University Press.
19 Benedick, Richard Elliot. 1991. Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in Diplomacy. In Preserving the
Global Environment: The Challenge of Shared Leadership, ed. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, pg. 362. New York:
W.W. Norton and Company.
20 Sabatier points out that these critical elections are relatively rare in countries such as the United States where the
party controlling one part of the political system can also bring changes. For instance, after the
Reagan administration took over the White House in 1980, it was able to make significant
changes in national environmental policies even though the Democratic Party stilled controlled
both houses of Congress."
Policy Decisions and Impacts from Other Subsystems
The third type of external event is policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.
These decisions and impacts may arise from overlapping subsystems or from a completely
independent subsystem. They may be in the form of procedural rules or decisions, budgetary
decisions, or changes in political jurisdictions that can affect both direct and indirect effects a
coalition's sources of power directly or indirectly. For example, members of Congress frequently
use the appropriations process to affect decisions being made within executive agencies that they
could not otherwise control." Rules governing service within the bureaucracy can remove key
individuals from a dominant coalition, causing it to lose such powers as deference or strategic
skill." Similarly, changes in rules governing subsystem procedures can provide coalitions with
new or additional strategies through which to pursue their objectives."
5.1.3. Treaty Implementation And Policy Change
All of these different elements and dynamic processes can be brought together to provide an
"ACF" perspective on the development and implementation of international environmental
treaties." In this perspective, an international regime is created within an international policy
executive and legislative functions are separated, as it normally requires that the same coalition control the chief
executive's office and both houses of the legislature. They may occur more frequently in countries such as Japan
and the United Kingdom that have parliamentary systems of government, as the coalition that is able to dominate
the legislature automatically assumes control of the Chief Executive's office (Sabatier. 1993. Policy Change over a
Decade or More).
21 Hammond, T. H. and Jack Knott. 1996. Who controls the bureaucracy?: Presidential power, congressional
dominance, legal constraints, and bureaucratic autonomy in a model of multi-institutional policy-making. Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization 12, 1: 119-166; Steunenberg, B. 1992. Congress, Bureaucracy, and
Regulatory Policy-Making. Journal ofLaw, Economics and Organization 8, 3: 673-694.
22 Hammond and Knott. 1996. Who controls the bureaucracy?: Presidential power, congressional dominance, legal
constraints, and bureaucratic autonomy in a model of multi-institutional policy-making; Steunenberg. 1992.
Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy-Making.
23 In Japan, for example, career bureaucrats within the administration are expected to move to a different position
every two to three years, and the careers of U.S. Foreign Service members are built on two-year rotating
assignments.
24 For example, Congress passed the Data Quality Act in response to complaints by industry groups that they were
not able to gain access to data EPA used to support strengthened air quality regulations. This act allows members
of the public to challenge the accuracy of data used to support administrative rulemaking. In doing so, it provided
industry groups with an additional mechanism through which to challenge regulatory actions undertaken by EPA
and other agencies (Herrick, Charles N. 2004. Objectivity versus narrative coherence: science, environmental
policy, and the U.S. Data Quality Act. Environmental Science & Policy xxxx, xxxx).
25 In commenting on the interactions between domestic politics and international negotiations, Crowe states: "What
emerges for the practitioner is the complexity of the situation: the number of issues which the diplomat must deal
with, the number of countries with which he must negotiate in dealing with them, the multilateralization of such
international dealings and the proliferation of fora. These impose great demands in terms not only of time spent in
travel and negotiations, which seems to increase exponentially as the number of participants rises, but also of time
subsystem in which several coalitions compete to embed their belief systems in the treaty being
developed. National policies regarding the regime are developed within overlapping national
policy subsystems. While the national foreign policy subsystem may be responsible for the
development of a nation's overall policy regarding a regime, other domestic policy subsystems,
including local sub-national subsystems might also be responsible for the development and
implementation of specific aspects of this policy.
The regime implemented when the relevant policies developed within these overlapping
national and sub-national subsystem are changed to be consistent with those resulting from the
international subsystem. The coalition interested in achieving implementation (the
"implementing coalition") can do so relatively easily if the coalitions dominating the overlapping
subsystems hold similar policy core beliefs. In these situations, the treaty negotiated in the
international subsystem is likely to be compatible with the policy core beliefs of these other
coalitions, and policy changes are likely to be needed only in the secondary aspects of these
policies.
Implementation becomes more difficult when the treaty is inconsistent with the policy core
beliefs of coalitions dominating the relevant national and subnational subsystems. In these
situations, the implementing coalition must either seek to change the policy core beliefs of the
dominant coalition or attempt to have the dominant coalition replaced with one holding more
compatible beliefs.
As discussed in Section 5.1, a coalition's policy core beliefs can change through learning or
the turnover among actors within the coalition. However, both of these processes is likely to be
slow, taking place over the course of a decade or longer. Although the implementing coalition
may try to speed the learning process through persuasion, those opposed to the treaty may be
using persuasion to slow it down.
An implementing coalition is more likely to be successful if it can cause recalcitrant
coalitions controlling important overlapping subsystems to be replaced by coalitions holding
policy core beliefs more compatible with the treaty being implemented. They can do so by
manipulating or otherwise taking advantage of external events such that the dominant coalition
loses control of the subsystem and a parallel coalition gains power sufficient to dominate the
subsystem.
5.2 PROPOSITIONS REGARDING SUBSYSTEMS, POWER AND TREATY
IMPLEMENTATION
As was noted previously, a particular strength of the ACF is that specific hypotheses
concerning the nature of policy change that can be tested empirically. In the remainder of this
chapter, I suggest a number of propositions that can be used to test this ACF perspective on treaty
implementation.26 The first four of these, derived from the initial ACF hypotheses developed by
and effort spent in preparing negotiating positions nationally in the home capital among competing interests. At
home many more players, representing what have in the past been purely domestic interests, have become involved
both in formulating policy for international negotiations and in the negotiations themselves. The planeloads of
travelers in and out of London every week from various government departments must be a major source of airline
revenue." (Crowe. 1993. Foreign Policy-Making: Reflections of a Practitioner; pg 178).
26 1 am not at this point describing these propositions as hypotheses because of the difficulties in testing hypotheses
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, address dynamics within and among subsystems. The final
proposition is based on the discussion of power contained in Chapter 4, and is intended to
evaluate the relationship between coalition power and treaty implementation. In Chapter 11, I
provide additional discussion of these propositions in the context of the four cases presented in
Section III.
5.2.1. Propositions 1 And 2: Subsystem Dynamics And Policy Change
The first two propositions pertain to the relationship between subsystem dynamics and treaty
implementation.
Proposition 1: Policy Change and Dominant Coalitions
Proposition (1): The policy core attributes of a domestic government program are
most likely to be significantly revised to implement an international agreement
when (1) the coalition that instituted the initial domestic program does not remain
in power within the national subsystem, and (2) the international and national
policy subsystems are dominated by parallel coalitions.
This proposition contends that, if dominant coalition in a national policy subsystem is not
the same one that dominates the international policy subsystem, then the policy core attributes of
national government programs will not change as long as the dominant coalition that instituted
that policy remains in power. As a result, requirements of an international treaty are not likely to
be fully implemented if they require major changes in national policy.27 This is consistent with
many observations concerning treaty compliance.2" For example, Downs argues that most
countries only sign on to treaties that require them to take steps that they are already taking or
have planned.29
From this, it follows that significant perturbations external to the national policy subsystems
are a necessary condition for policy change if the coalition that dominated the international
subsystem does not also dominate the national subsystem.
Proposition 2: Policy Change and External Events
Proposition (2): If the international and national policy subsystems are not
dominated by parallel coalitions, then significant perturbations external to the
national subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion,
system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a
with only a single case study.
27This proposition can be viewed as a corollary to the hypothesis proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith that policy
core attributes of a government program in a specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the
advocacy coalition which instituted the program remains in power within that jurisdiction. However, I have
modified it to take into account coalition dynamics at the international level (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1993.
Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach).
28See also Vogel, David. 1993. Representing Diffuse Interests in Environmental Policymaking. In Do Institutions
Matter? Government Capabilities in the Unites States and Abroad, ed. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution; and Chayes and Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance
with International Regulatory Agreements.
29 Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a
national governmental program,
External changes are necessary to substantially alter the distribution of political resources
among coalitions within the national subsystem. In the context of international relations, an
external perturbation could be threats from a hegemon or international sanctions." However,
such perturbations are not, by themselves, sufficient to cause changes in national policy. The
minority coalition must also be able to exploit the changed conditions such that it is able to
achieve dominance and bring about the necessary policy changes.
5.2.2. Propositions 3 And 4: Actors, Coalitions, and Overlapping Subsystems
The second two propositions pertain to the relationships among overlapping subsystems and
the effect of these relationships on treaty implementation.
Proposition 3: Actor participation in overlapping subsystems
Proposition (3): The degree to which the content of national government
programs are changed to be consistent with an international agreement is directly
related to extent to which significant actors the national policy subsystems
traditionally responsible for the programs to be changed also participated in the
national policy subsystem that was involved in negotiating the agreement.
This proposition argues that the extent to which national government programs are changed
in response to an international agreement is a function of the extent to which the subsystems
responsible for the programs are nested within the subsystem involved in negotiating the
agreement. It is assumed here that the distribution of responsibilities among the various national
subsystems is not changed in response to the agreement." Because actors (coalitions) in nested
subsystems are more likely to share policy beliefs than those in policy subsystems with a lesser
degree of overlap, the greatest degree of cooperation and coordination is expected to occur
among the former subsystems. There is also more likely to be a greater correspondence in nested
subsystems in the number of subsystem coalitions and the nature of the power dynamics within
the subsystem. Finally, if policy-oriented learning is the only mechanism through which belief
systems change and cooperation develops, then the greatest degree of cooperation is likely to
occur in situations where significant domestic players in relevant national subsystems are able
participate in the international fora in which policy-oriented learning is taking place.
Proposition 4: Overlapping Subsystems and Policy Change
Proposition (4): The degree to which national government programs are changed
to be consistent with an international agreement is inversely related to the
30 For example, substantial public pressure from the United States and other countries was widely credited with
forcing Japan to change its position concerning the banning of whaling (Chayes and Chayes. 1995. The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements).
3 The proposition is based on the finding by Zafonte and Sabatier that shared policy beliefs among subsystem actors
are a primary factor in determining coordination among overlapping subsystems. (Zafonte and Sabatier. 1998.
Shared beliefs and imposed interdependencies as determinants of ally networks in overlapping subsystems).
number of overlapping national (and sub-national) policy subsystems falling
within the policy domain of the international agreement.
This proposition can be viewed as the converse of Proposition (3), and is very much
consistent with much of the "bottom-up" literature on implementation. In general, the broader
the policy domain of an international agreement, the more complex the national program will be
to implement it. As the complexity of this national program increases, so does the number of
different subsystems having responsibility for various aspects of it. Coordination and
cooperation among subsystems increase as their numbers increase, making policy change less
likely. Thus national policy change is most likely with international agreements that have a very
limited scope, while it is less with agreements to deal with complex global problems such as
climate change and the loss of biodiversity. In extreme cases, the problems of coordination may
be so overwhelming that the implementation of complex international agreements may wind up
being driven largely by external events, such as changes in socioeconomic conditions.
5.2.3. Proposition 5: Treaty Implementation and Sources of Power
The final proposition pertains to the relationship between coalition dynamics and sources of
power:
Proposition (5): In the absence of external events, a government program is not
likely to be changed in response to an international agreement unless the
coalition advocating the change possesses, or is able to acquire, (1) decision-
making authority or (2) the ability to offer inducements sufficient to compel the
cooperation of those possessing decision-making authority.
With Proposition 5, I suggest that coalitions will not be able to cause substantial changes in
government programs to implement international agreements solely through the use of
persuasion, deference or strategic skill. This is primarily due to the difficulty with which policy
core beliefs change and the large number of actors engaged in the multiple overlapping
subsystems that mark treaty implementation. The large number of actors also increases the
probability that opposing coalitions will be able to offer competing inducements unless one
coalition is able to offer an inducement sufficiently compelling that it cannot be matched by the
other coalitions.
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CHAPTER 6 - COALITIONS IN THE CLIMATE POLICY SUBSYSTEMS
This third section examines the development and implementation of the climate change
regime between 1988 and 1997 in the context of the theoretical framework described in the
previous section. The first chapter of this section describes the set of parallel coalitions active in
the international climate policy subsystem and the climate policy subsystems of the United
States, Japan, and the Netherlands. The political dynamics that transpired in these subsystems
and several overlapping subsystems are described Chapters 7 through 10.
In the international climate policy subsystem, the individuals and organizations participating
in international climate change debate coalesced into two coalitions: a "Precautionary" coalition
and an "Economic Growth" coalition.' Within each of these coalitions, members shared a similar
set of policy beliefs regarding key climate change policy issues and worked together during the
various phases of the policy process in an effort to ensure that the policy outcomes reflected these
beliefs. Precautionary and economic growth coalitions were also active in each of the national
climate policy subsystems that were parallel to the two international coalitions in that many
individuals were active in both coalitions and the membership as a whole held similar policy core
beliefs. The methodology used for determining these coalitions and their beliefs is described in
the Appendix.
6.1 THE PRECAUTIONARY COALITIONS
The "Precautionary" coalitions consists of those actors and organizations that are concerned
that climate change presents a significant threat and believe that strong measures are necessary to
address it. These coalitions are so named because most members embrace as a fundamental
normative precept the "Precautionary Principle," which holds that government action to forestall
an environmental threat is legitimate and appropriate even when the science concerning that
threat is uncertain.2
6.1.1. Beliefs of the Precautionary Coalitions
The policy core beliefs of the Precautionary Coalitions can be summarized as follows:
Climate change presents a real and significant threat;
This analysis focuses specifically on the coalitions that formed around the debate over the science and impacts of
climate change and nature of industrialized countries' commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
commitments under the Framework Convention on Climate Change. It should be noted, however, that the
international climate change debate has been marked by the formation of multiple coalitions concerned with a wide
range of issues. These included national commitments for developed and developing countries, financial
assistance, technology transfer, and others (Bodansky, Daniel. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: A Commentary. Yale Journal ofInternational Law 18: 451-547).
2 The only definition agreed to by the international community appears in the Rio Declaration as Principle 15, which
states that "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation."
= The potential impacts of climate change outweigh the economic costs of mitigating this
change;
- Action should be taken immediately to reduce the threat of climate change;
= Industrialized countries have the primary responsibility for reducing emissions; and
= These countries should reduce their domestic emissions rather than to try to offset these
emissions by emissions reductions in other countries.
Table 6.1 lists the range of policy core beliefs of participants in the Precautionary Coalition.
In general, statements by members of the precautionary coalitions would generally receive a
score of around 4 or 5 (on a scale of 1 to 5) when coded using the coding framework, although
they may express ambivilance with regard to a particular issue (i.e., their expressed belief on that
issue was coded as a "3").3
Table 6.1. Policy Core Beliefs of the Precautionary Coalitions
Validity of theory that 5. Theory is completely valid/any warming is due to human activity
anthropogenic GHG 4. Theory is probably valid/any warming is most likely due to human activity
emissions are causing 3. Theory is somewhat uncertain/cause of any warming is unclear
global warming.
Precision of climate 5. Models are highly accurate/very consistent with observational data4. Models are generally accurate/mostly consistent with observational data.
3. Models are of uncertain accuracy/partially consistent with observational data
Clarity of current climate 5. The global climate is warming4. The global climate appears to be warmingtrends 3. Current trends are unclear
Policy core beliefs concerning Impacts of climate change and responses
Threat posed by climate 5. Climate change is presents a most significant threatThrat e 4. Climate change could present a significant threat
change 3. Risk is unclear
Economic costs of short- 5. Near-term responses will be much less than impacts/could have economic benefits4. Costs of short-term responses are likely to be less than costs of impactsterm responses 3. Costs of short-term responses are not clear/may be as high as costs of impacts
Policy core beliefs concerning nature of policy responses
5. Strong policy responses must be taken immediately.Basis for national policy 4. Moderate responses are justified now/strong measures should be phased in over time
responses 3. Low cost/cost effective responses are justified now
industrialized country 5. Countries should reduce emissions 20% by 2005 (i.e., Toronto target)
responses/commitments 4. Countries should stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000
before 2000. 3. Countries should stabilize emissions, but no timetable should be adopted
5. Countries must commit to reductions of 20% by 2005 (Toronto target)
Commitments after 2000 4. Countries must commit to reductions with same target for all countries/minimal flexibility
3. Countries should commit to stabilization with differentiated targets and/or flexibility.
coordinated 5. Impose full range of market-oriented and regulatory command-and control policies.Mandated/rdnte 4. Adopt strong market-oriented policies, limited regulatory policies (e.g., tech. standards)
policy instruments 3. Adopt some market-oriented policies (i.e., taxes), encourage voluntary actions.
Policy core beliefs concerning scope and coordination of commitments
Developing country vs. 5. Industrialized countries alone must commit to reducing emissions.
industrialized country 4. Developing countries may commit to limiting/reducing emissions voluntarily.
commitments. 3. Developing countries must commit to limiting growth in emissions.
Coordination or 5. National responses may not be coordinated
cooperation in national 4. National responses may only be coordinated among industrialized countries.
responses/ joint 3. National responses may be coordinated among industrialized countries/other countries with limits.implementation11
3 As is discussed in the Appendix, participants whose average belief score across the spectrum of policy core issues
was 3 were included in a coalition if they demonstrated sustained cooperative behavior with other members of that
Policy core beliefs cocriaciaecau hoyand models
6.1.2. The Precautionary Coalition in the International Climate Policy Subsystem
The principal members of the Precautionary Coalition participating in the International
Climate Policy Subsystem were representatives of environment and science ministries,
meteorological services, environmental and social advocacy organizations, international
organizations such as UNEP and UNDP, and some policy and scientific research organizations.
Representatives of foreign and other ministries from the European Union and the G-77 were also
members of this coalition. Particularly vocal were individuals from vulnerable countries, such as
small island nations, and historically "green" states, such as the Netherlands, Germany and
Austria. Table 6.2 lists some of the members of the Precautionary Coalition and their belief
scores for the periods 1988-1992 and 1992-1997, while Table 6.3 lists some of the major non-
government organizations that participated in this coalition.4
It is important to point out here that the principle policy belief that many participants from
developing countries shared with others in the Precautionary Coalition was that only
industrialized countries should be required have binding obligations to reduce emissions.
Participants from developing countries, particularly larger countries like India, China and Brazil
argued that, for the sake of equity, emissions from developing countries should be allowed to
grow until they reach the same per capita level as the emissions of developed countries, and that
the right of their countries to develop must be preserved.' While they could agree to reduce, or
at least limit the growth of emissions, they would do so only on a contractual basis such that
industrialized countries would pay for all incremental costs incurred.
The Precautionary Coalition had substantial resources as the political process commenced
within the international climate policy subsystem. These resources included an understanding of
the scientific complexities of the issue and a strong communications network through which they
were able to set the agenda for many of the meetings and mobilize support at these meetings.
They also acquired a certain amount of decision-making authority, as the heads of many
delegations were Environment Ministers or members of these ministries, although their use of
this authority was constrained by the consensual nature of the international policymaking
process. In addition, the Coalition acquired significant public support during the 1988-1992
period as a result of preparations for the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) that were taking place during the same time period.
coalition.
4 The organizations included on this table are those that participated in three or more meetings of the IPCC, the INC,
or the FCCC's COP. Although many more organizations participated in one or two meetings, they were not
considered to be major coalition members because of the short duration of their involvement.
5 In a "non-paper" circulated at the first INC session, the delegation from India suggested "the problem of global
warming is caused not by emissions of greenhouse gases as such but by excessive levels of per capita emissions of
these gases. If per capita emissions of all countries had been on the same levels as that of the developing countries,
the world would not today have faced the threat of global warming. It follows, therefore, that developed countries
with high per capita emission levels are responsible for incremental global warming. In these negotiations, the
principle of equity should be the touchstone for judging any proposal. Those responsible for environmental
degradation should also be responsible for taking corrective measures. Since developed countries with high per
capita emissions of greenhouse gases are responsible for incremental global warming, it follows that they have a
corresponding obligation to take corrective action." Quoted in Dasgupta, Chandrashekhar. 1994. The Climate
Change Negotiations. In Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M.
Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Table 6.2 International Precautionary Coalition Belief Scores
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Table 6.3 Major NGOs and IGOs in the international Precautionary Coalition
Alliance To Save Energy
Caribbean Environmental Institute
Center for International Environmental Law
Center for Our Common Future
Citizens Alliance for Saving the Atmosphere arid Earth
Climate Action Network
Environment and Energy Study Institute
Environmental Defense Fund
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development
Friends of the Earth International
Germanwatch
Global Commons Institute
Greenpeace International
Indonesian Environmental Forum (Walhi)
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
International Council of Environmental Law
International Institute for Energy Conservation
Kenya Energy and Environment Organizations
National Audubon Society
Natural Resources Defense Council
Sierra Club
South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP)
Union of Concerned Scientists
United Nations Environment Program
World Conservation Union
World Resources Institute
World Wide Fund for Nature
World Wildlife Fund
Wordwatch Institute
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
Solar Electric Light Fund
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee
Food and Agriculture Organization
Habitat
International Council of Women
Thailand Development Research Institute
UNIDO
UNITAR
United Nations Commission on Technology and Development
United Nations Development Program
World Council of Churches
World Health Organization
Center for Clean Air Policy
Center for Global Change
Center for Intemational Climate and Energy Research
Climate Institute
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
Stockholm Environment Institute
Tate Energy Research Institute
Woods Hole Research Center
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
Global Environment Facility -World Bank
UN Economic and Social Council
World Bank
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
International Council of Scientific Unions
UNSCO
World Meteorological Organization
Many members of the Precautionary Coalition were able to develop a strong understanding
of the scientific complexities of the climate change issue before the political debates began as
well as a network through which to communicate and coordinate their activities. Though out the
1970's and 1980's, scientists in both government and academia worked together through such
international mechanisms as the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP), the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to reach a
consensus among themselves regarding the scientific basis of the issue. Particularly important
were the creation of the World Climate Program by UNEP and the WMO in 1979 and a series of
meeting sponsored by UNEP, WMO, and ICSU in 1986 and 1987 that produced the initial
scientific assessments of climate change and set the agenda for the ensuing negotiations.'
In addition, many of these same scientists, as well as other policy makers, worked together in
similar international environmental negotiations such as those for the Vienna Convention on the
Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer in 1985 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987. Not only did the process through which these two
agreements were negotiated help the coalition establish a strong network of individuals for
communication and organization, but the agreements themselves provided the coalition with a
6 See Hecht, Alan D. and Dennis Tirpak. 1995. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy
History. Climatic Change 29, 4: 371 and Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary.
model on which to base a climate change treaty.' This enabled them to set the agenda and terms
of debate for the upcoming climate negotiations.!
These networks were enhanced when environmental groups from Europe and North America
established a "Climate Action Network" in 1989 to disseminate information on climate change.
NGOs from other regions joined in soon afterwards, and the CAN network became an important
mechanism for fostering cooperation among environment and development groups from both the
North and the South.' Many individuals in these non-government organizations also had close
ties to individuals from environment ministries, and worked closely with them during the
negotiations. For example, representatives of the Natural Resources Defense Council and the
World Wildlife Fund had worked on the climate change issue as officials of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, and maintained close ties with their former colleagues
through the negotiations. 0 Similarly, representatives from the Netherlands' VROM worked
informally with the Dutch environmental groups Milleudefense and Greenpeace Netherlands
during the final stages of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations to gain support for its position on such
issues as targets and timetables." Ties between environment ministries and environmental
NGOs were particularly close among those countries forming the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS). In several instances, members of such organizations as the Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL) and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and
Development (FIELD) comprised the bulk of the delegations from several of these countries.
The Precautionary Coalition was able to use these networks to marshal substantial
participation by coalition members throughout the international policy process. As can be seen
in Figure 6.2, members of the Precautionary Coalition, particularly environmental groups,
environmental ministries, and science-oriented organizations comprised the majority all
participants in the international policy process.
Environment ministers or other representatives of environment ministries also headed many
of the delegations at the negotiating sessions, which provided the Precautionary Coalition with a
substantial amount of decision-making authority. As was noted in Chapter 2, only the head of
the delegation has the formal authority to represent the State in treaty negotiations. Figure 6.3
shows the percentage of various ministries heading delegations for the 1988-1992 and 1992-1997
period and the average and range of belief scores for individuals within these ministries.
7 See, e.g., Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary and
Reinstein, Robert A. 1993. Climate Negotiations. Washington Quarterly 16, 1: 79-93.
8 Mathews. 1997. Power Shift.
9 See, e.g., Rowlands. 1995. The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change; Rahman, Atiq and Annie Roncerel. 1994.
A View From the Ground Up. In Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving
M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Raustiala. 1997. States, NGOs, and
international environmental institutions; and Mathews. 1991. Preserving the Global Environment: The Challenge
of Shared Leadership.
10 Interview #18. Environmental Protection Agency, United States. Mar., 1998.
" Interview #39. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Feb., 2002.
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Members of the Precautionary Coalition were also able to use this authority to enhance
coordination among them. For example, most of the preparations for the 1989 Noordwijk
Conference, including the proposed text of the Noordwijk Declaration, were coordinated through
environment ministries rather than through foreign ministries." Similarly, many of the
preparations for meetings of the IPCC were coordinated through science ministries,
meteorological services, and environment ministries.
In addition to these system-wide parameters, a number of events transpired during the 1980's
that provided the precautionary coalition with substantial public support. Particularly important
was the release in 1987 of the Brundtland Commission's Report "Our Common Future" and the
preparations for the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The
Brundtland Commission report, commissioned by the United Nations and prepared by a highly-
esteemed group of ministers, scientists, diplomats, and law-makers, engendered substantial
public concern about the current state of the global environment and the need to conserve
environmental resources for future generations." Soon after its publication, the U.N. General
Assembly initiated planning for UNCED, which was to both commemorate the twentieth
anniversary of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and initiate a global effort
to foster sustainable development.
The Precautionary Coalition was constrained in the use of these resources by the consensual
nature of the international political process. As was discussed in Chapter 4, decision-making
authority in the international policy process is shared among all nations involved in discussions
about an issue instead of being vested in a central organization or institution. Because the
majority of countries cannot simply over-rule the views of a minority, any final political outcome
must accommodate these minority views if the countries holding the views are to consider
themselves bound to the final agreement. Although members of the Precautionary Coalition
greatly outnumbered those of the Economic Growth Coalition during the negotiating sessions
and headed most of the delegations attending these sessions, they still needed to negotiate an
agreement that could be accepted by all those participating in the discussions.
6.1.3. The Precautionary Coalition in the United States
The Precautionary Coalition in the U.S. climate change policy subsystem that was parallel to
that of the international climate policy subsystem was comprised of many of the same individuals
and organizations. Although the U.S. coalition enjoyed some of the same resources as its
counterpart in the international subsystem, several features of the U.S. political system, as well as
the nature climate change issue itself, presented it with significant constraints.
Between 1988 and 1992, the major actors in the U.S. Precautionary Coalition came from
environmental organizations (e.g., GreenPeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Environmental Defense Fund), the scientific community, and a few members of Congress, most
12Interview #53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Jan., 2005. See also
Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary.
13 The WMO, one of the parent bodies of the IPCC, actually requires that national representatives to it be officials of
national meteorological organizations, and communicates to national governments through that representative.
'4 See, e.g., Mintzer, Irving M. and J. Amber Leonard, eds. 1994. Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of
the Rio Convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
notably the Democratic Senators Timothy Wirth and Al Gore. Individuals from federal scientific
agencies concerned with climate change (e.g., NASA, NSF and NOAA) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) also participated in the coalition, such as EPA Administration William
Reilly, and Eileen Claussen (EPA's Assistant Administer for Air and Radiation). Some
representatives of the U.S. State Department, such as Fred Bernthal (Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs) and William Nitze (Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Environment) were also members of this coalition at the onset of the policy process,
although they were removed from their positions in 1989 by the White House. Table 6.4 lists the
major organizations participating in the precautionary coalition during this period, while Table
6.5 shows the coalition's average belief scores.
Table 6.4 Organizations participating in the U.S. Precautionary Coalition
Government Agencies
Environmental Protection Agency
Council on Environmental Quality
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Legislature
Senate
House of Representatives
Science Research Org.
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Utility/Energy Distribution Company
Southern California Edison
Pacific Gas and Electric
Environmental Organizations
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
International Institute for Energy Conservation
Sierra Club
Union of Concerned Scientists
World Wildlife Fund
Natural Resources Defense Council
U.S. Public Interest Research Group
Climate Action Network
Environment and Energy Study Institute
World Resources Institute
Alliance To Save Energy
Conservation Law Foundation
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Policy Research Organizations
Rocky Mountain Institute
Woods Hole Research Center
Fossil Fuels Companies
ENRON Corporation
General Industry Associations
Business Council for A Sustainable Energy Future
1988-1992
Environmental Organizations
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
International Institute for Energy Conservation
Wilderness Society
Environmental Defense Fund
World Wildlife Fund
Friends of the Earth International
National Audubon Society
Alliance To Save Energy
Center for International Environmental Law
Natural Resources Defense Council
World Resources Institute
Union of Concerned Scientists
Sierra Club
Climate Action Network
Greenpeace International
Environmental Law Institute
Center for Global Change
1992-1997
General Policy Research Organizations
Council on Foreign Relations
Office of Technology Assessment
Government
Office of the President
Office of the Vice President
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of State
Department of Energy
Department of Commerce
insurance Industry Associations
Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction
Local/Regional Government Associations
National Association of State Energy Officials
Science Research Organizations
National Center for Atmospheric Research
National Academy of Engineering
Utility/Energy Distribution Companies
Montreaux Energy Corporation
New England Electric Systems
U.S. Precautionary Coalition Belief Scores
Organization
Environmental Organizations
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
International Institute for Energy Conservation
Wildemess Society
Environmental Defense Fund
World Wildlife Fund
Friends of the Earth International
National Audubon Society
Alliance To Save Energy
Center for International Environmental Law
Natural Resources Defense Council
World Resources Institute
Union of Concerned Scientists
Sierra Club
Climate Action Network
Greenpeace International
Environmental Law Institute
Center for Global Change
Environmental Organizations
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
International Institute for Energy Conservation
Sierra Club
Union of Concerned Scientists
World Wildlife Fund
Natural Resources Defense Council
U.S. Public Interest Research Group
Climate Action Network
Environment and Energy Study Institute
World Resources Institute
Alliance To Save Energy
Conservation Law Foundation
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Policy Research Organizations
Rocky Mountain Institute
Woods Hole Research Center
General Industry Associations
Business Council for A Sustainable Energy Future
Local/Regional Government Associations
National Association of State Energy Officials
1988-IS
Belief Score
5.0
5.0
4.8
4.8
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.6
4.6
4.5
4.4
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Organization
Government
Environmental Protection Agency
Council on Environmental Quality
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Legislature
Senate
House of Representatives
Science Research Org.
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Utility/Energy Distribution Company
Southen California Edison
Pacific Gas and Electric
1992-1997
General Policy Research Organizations
5.0 Council on Foreign Relations
5.0 Office of Technology Assessment
5.0 Government
5.0 Office of the President
5.0 Office of the Vice President
5.0 Office of Science and Technology Policy
4.9 Environmental Protection Agency
4.7 Department of State
4.5 Department of Energy
4.5 Department of Commerce
4.2 Insurance Industry Associations
4.0 Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction
4.0 Science Research Organizations
3.8 National Center for Atmospheric Research
National Academy of Engineering
5.0 Utility/Energy Distribution Companies
3.4 Montreaux Energy Corporation
New England Electric Systems
3.0 Fossil Fuels Companies
British Petroleum
3.0 ENRON Corporation
As was noted above, mar
participated in the parallel
observers at IPCC, INC, and
y members of the precautionary coalition in the United States also
international precautionary coalition as both as delegates and
COP meetings. Table 6.6 lists some of the organizations whose
members were active in both processes during the 1988-1992 and 1992-1997 periods.
Like its international counterpart, a major strength of the precautionary coalition in the
United States as the policy process began was its organization and understanding of the issue.
Environmental groups such as NRDC, EDF and the Sierra Club started to work together on the
issue as early as 1987, and were among the principal organizers of the Climate Action Network
Belief Score
3.4
3.0
3.0
3.9
3.3
4.4
4.0
3.7
Table 6.5
(CAN). The coalition also benefited from the substantial overlap with the international
precautionary coalition. Because many of the important environmental groups and government
agencies participated in both the U.S. and international policy processes, they had a strong
understanding of the complexities of the issue, and were in a position to use developments in the
international subsystem to advance the issue in the U.S. subsystem.
Table 6.6 Organizations participating in
Coalitions
Alliance To Save Energy
Center for Global Change
Center for International Environmental Law
Council on Environmental Quality
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Protection Agency
Greenpeace International
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Alliance To Save Energy
Business Council for A Sustainable Energy Future
Department of Commerce
Department of Energy
Department of State
Environment and Energy Study Institute
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Protection Agency
International Institute for Energy Conservation
both the U.S. and International Precautionary
1988-1992
National Audubon Society
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Natural Resources Defense Council
Sierra Club
Union of Concerned Scientists
World Resources Institute
World Wildlife Fund
1992-1997
Natural Resources Defense Council
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of the President
Office of the Vice President
Sierra Club
Union of Concerned Scientists
World Resources Institute
World Wildlife Fund
The ability of the U.S. precautionary coalition to take advantage of these resources was
constrained by a number of political and institutional features of the U.S. policy process. One
such constraint is the relatively low status of the various environmental and scientific agencies
within the government. The Environmental Protection Agency is an independent agency, while
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is part of the Department of Commerce.
Although the Council on Environmental Quality is part of the Office of the White House, it does
not have the same stature as other White House advisory councils, such as the Council of
Economic Advisors.
In addition, responsibility within the executive branch for various aspects of environmental
policy is fragmented, with no one agency having full responsibility for all aspects of the climate
change issue. The Department of Energy coordinates and administers the energy functions of the
Federal Government, while the Environmental Protection Agency has responsibility for
environmental matters. Other aspects of energy and environmental policy issues are handled by
the Department of the Interior (licensing), the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Commerce (coal and trade issues), while the Department of State has responsibility for most
international environmental issues. Scientific issues related to climate change are also handled
by NOAA, NASA, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS). Finally, state governments have the authority to legislate their own energy policies and
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programs independent of the federal government, particularly in the area of setting electricity and
gas rates and service standards."
Finally, the ability of members of Congress who were active in the U.S. precautionary
coalition to participate in the international policy process prior to 1992 was limited by the
Constitutional mandate that only the President has the authority to carry out U.S. foreign policy.
They were able to influence to some degree the foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch
during this period through their oversight and budgetary roles. However, they were unable to
engage in the international debate as official representatives of the U.S. government until after
the 1992 elections.
With the election in 1992 of President Bill Clinton and Vice-President Al Gore, a number of
individuals from environmental advocacy groups were appointed to high-level positions within
the new administration, as were a few members of Congress and lower-ranking representatives of
EPA and other agencies. This enabled them to engage more fully in the international debate. In
addition, the coalition attracted the participation of several private sector companies and
associations, such as ENRON and the Business Council for A Sustainable Energy Future.
6.1.4. The Precautionary Coalition in the Netherlands
Virtually all of the members of international precautionary coalition from the Netherlands
were members of the Netherlands precautionary coalition as well. This coalition had substantial
resources with which to pursue their policy objectives due to a number of systemic factors,
including the structure of the administrative bureaucracy within the Netherlands, the nature of the
relationships between the government and industry, and geographic features of the Netherlands.
The precautionary coalition in the Netherlands was comprised primarily of the Environment
Ministry, government environmental research organizations such as RIVM, environmental
groups, and several political parties. Participation in the coalition was relatively stable
throughout the period between 1988 and 1997, although a few more environmental groups and
research organizations became active after 1992. Table 6.7 lists the organizations participating in
this coalition during the 1988-1992 and 1992-1997 period. Table 6.8 indicates the belief scores
for most of these organizations.
A number of factors provided the precautionary coalition with substantial resources with
which to pursue their policy objectives at the onset of the climate change debate, including
financial and technical resources, public support, and several fortuitous system-wide events. The
principal actor in the Dutch precautionary coalition has been the Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and Environment (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
Milieubeheer - VROM). Because VROM is responsible for physical planning as well as the
development and implementation of environmental policy, it has enjoyed substantially more
influence within the government than most environmental ministries. 6 VROM had considerably
1s Vernon, Raymond. 1993. Behind The Scenes: How Policymaking In The European Community, Japan, And The
United States Affects Global Negotiations. Environment 35, 5: 12oitlines how the U.S. political structure and its
separation of powers makes coordinating national policies with international positions difficult. See also Nitze,
William A. 1991. Improving U.S. Interagency Coordination of International Environmental Policy Development.
Environment 33, 4.
16 Notably, the Netherlands was one of the first European countries to raise the environment agency to the Ministerial
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more personnel working on the issue than any of the other Ministries, which allowed it to set the
agenda for the policy debate within the Dutch climate change policy process." The heads of
VROM's climate unit, Pier Vellinga (1988-1992) and Bert Metz (1992-1997), were particularly
influential." In addition, NEPP planning process that gave rise to NEPP-II had been
established in the mid-1980's and had gone through several planning cycles, the legitimacy of
both the process itself and VROM's leadership of it was well-established.'"
Organizations participating in the Dutch Precautionary Coalition
1988-1992
Government Agencies
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)
National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Legislature
D66
Christian Democrat Party
Labor Party (PvdA)
1992-1997
Government Agencies
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)
National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN)
Legislature
D66
Christian Democrat Party
Labor Party (PvdA)
Environmental Organizations
Milleudefense/Friends of the Earth International
Stichting Natuur en Millieu
Greenpeace Netherlands
Environmental Organizations
Climate Action Network
World Wide Fund for Nature
Milleudefense/Friends of the Earth international
Netherlands Committee for IUCN
Stichting Natuur en Millieu
Greenpeace Netherlands
Several institutional factors also strengthened the hand of the precautionary coalition. The
Netherlands' parliamentary system of government provided some assurance of an initial base of
legislative support for the plan, and its involvement in the European Union established
legitimacy for the international decision-making process.2" In addition, VROM was able to limit
level. See Pettenger, Mary. 2002. Consensus Policymaking and the Dutch Environmental Model.
7Interview #50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 1908 VROM's Climate Change section was staffed
by over two dozen people by the end of 1997, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BuZa). had only two people
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs had only one person working on the issue full time (Interview #46. Ministry
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Feb., 1908).
' Vellinga was formerly a deputy director of the Delft Hydraulics Laboratory.
19 Benett points out that two factors contributed to strengthening the credibility of the NEPP. First, in the late 1980s,
there was a substantial increase in public concern over environmental degradation, and opinion polls in the
Netherlands consistently showed that the public considered environmental protection to be the single most
important issue. Second, a report Concern for Tomorrow was released in 1988 that provided an inventory of the
most serious environmental problems confronting the Netherlands. This report, which had substantial scientific
credibility, provided hard evidence the government's non-environmental departments that painful and expensive
measures would be required to meet the goals of the NEPP (Bennett, Graham. 1991. The History of the Dutch
National Environmental Policy Plan. Environment 33, 7: 7-33).
20 For a discussion of the role of the EU in national decision-making, see, e.g., Eising, R. 2004. Multilevel
governance and business interests in the European Union. Governance-an International Journal of Policy and
Administration 17, 2: 211-245; Jordan, A. J. 2003. The Europeanization of national government and policy: A
departmental perspective. British Journal of Political Science 33: 261-282; Kellow, A. and A. R. Zito. 2002.
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Table 6.7
to some extent the participation of non-government organizations in the planning process. While
most of the major interest groups sat on Advisory Boards to the NEPP process, these met
infrequently. In lieu of regular Board meetings, informal meetings between VROM and these
various interests were held on an irregular basis, and generally at the request of VROM. This
limited the degree to which NGO members of the Economic Growth Coalition could influence
the nature and the substance of the planning process. In addition, the precautionary coalition
benefited from close ties with the media, which tends to be more supportive of government than
the media in United States."
Table 6.8 Belief Scores for Participants in the Dutch Precautionary Coalition
Organization Average Belief Score
Government Agencies
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) 4.1
National institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM) 4.1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3.7
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN) 4.0
Environmental Organizations
Climate Action Network 4.9
World Wide Fund for Nature 4.9
Milleudefense/Friends of the Earth international 4.7
Netherlands Committee for IUCN 4.3
Stichting Natuur en Millieu 5.0
Greenpeace Netherlands 5.0
Legislature
D66 4.5
Christian Democrat Party 4.4
Labor Party (PvdA) 4.1
The Dutch precautiolary coalition also enjoyed strong public support." The Dutch have
always viewed themselves as being particularly vulnerable to pollution, and the release of the
Brundtland Report in 1987, followed in 1989 by the publication by RIVM of a report entitled
Concern for Tomorrow that suggested that the Netherlands faced a broad range of environmental
Steering through complexity: EU environmental regulation in the international context. Political Studies 50, 1: 43-
60; Montpetit, E. 2000. Europeanization and domestic politics: Europe and the development of a French
environmental policy for the agricultural sector. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 7, 4: 576-592; Sbragia, A. M.
1999. The changing role of the European Union in international environmental politics: institution building and the
politics of climate change. Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 17, 1: 53-68; Cameron, David R.
1995. Transnational Relations and the Development of European Economic and Monetary Union. In Transnational
Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, ed. Thomas Risse-
Kappen, pg. 37. New York: Cambridge University Press; and Vernon. 1993. Behind The Scenes: How
Policymaking In The European Community, Japan, And The United States Affects Global Negotiations.
21 Bovens suggests that MPs will often ask a journalist to write on a particular issue so that questions regarding it can
be raised in parliament. A triangle often exists between civil servants, members of parliament, and the media. A
civil servant will leak information to the MP, who then leaks it to a journalist. The journalist publishes an article
about it in the newspaper, after which the MP raises questions about in Parliament. The answers to these questions
may even be prepared by the individual who leaked the information in the first place. (Bovens, Geveke, and de
Vries. 1995. Open public administration in the Netherlands: The politics of leaking)
22 Opinion polls conducted in 1989 indicated that 70 percent of the population stated that they would be willing to
forgo any increase in their living standards for up to five years if that is the price of a cleaner country. (Green
Politics Can Hurt. Financial Times, May 4, 1989. 1 pg. 26).
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problems, generated substantial public support for stronger environmental policies." The
impacts of climate change are of particular concern, as the country is particularly vulnerable to
severe flooding as a result of rising sea levels." VROM was able to use this base of support to
mount a vigorous public awareness campaign, that attracting additional public support for action
to address climate change."
Environmental advocacy groups have also been strong in the Netherlands, with substantial
and widespread membership.26 These groups have played an important role in educating the
public and putting issues on the political agenda." They have also had close relationship with
VROM, which provides them with substantial financial support, and contributed to a number of
the proposals put forward by the Dutch government during the international negotiations.2"
While it is one of the most vulnerable of the OECD nations to the impacts of sea level rise,
Despite this strong support for environmental issues, the Dutch precautionary coalition was
constrained in general by the high priority that Dutch society puts on economic development and
international competitiveness. The Netherlands is densely populated, and its strategic location on
the North Sea has enabled it to become highly industrialized. Although its economy is less
dependant on coal and oil than other OECD countries, much of its emissions come from sectors
such as transportation that are difficult to control.2 9 In addition, Dutch society is highly
"pillarized," with the various subcultures within the country having very little contact with each
other." Lijphart has described the Dutch political system as rooted an "organized social
23 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
24 Some studies have suggested that raising the country's protective dikes could cost over $75 million per year by
2010 (Raun, Laura. Flood Tide of Environmental Concern Engulfs The Dutch. Financial Times, Feb. 16, 1989. I
pg. 2).
25 According to VROM, this public awareness campaign succeeded in raising awareness of the causes and effects of
climate change in 34 percent of the population, and in 1992, 38 percent of the population felt highly involved in the
climate change issue, up from 33 percent in 1990 (Netherlands. 1994. Netherlands'National Communication on
Climate Change Policies. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, Air and Energy Directorate,
Climate Change Division).
26 Cramer, Jacqueline. 1989. The rise and fall of new knowledge interest in the Dutch environmental movement.
Environmentalist 9, 2: 101-120, Kijkink, Gertjan and Herman van der Westen. 1992. Green politics in Europe: the
issues and the voters. Political Geography 11, 1: 7-11.
27 Cramer. 1989. The rise and fall of new knowledge interest in the Dutch environmental movement.
28 Interview #41. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 2002; Interview #50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Netherlands. Feb., 1908; Interview #47. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands.
Feb., 1908. In 1996, VROM paid $4.5 million to subsidize the operating costs of about 30 environmental NGOs
(Interview #45. Mileau Defens, Netherlands. Feb., 1908). See also van Harmelen, A. K, M. J. Boomsma, and R.
H. J. Korenromp. 2000. Building Bridges, Building Dikes: an Evaluation of the Dutch Policy-Making on Climate
Change. Dutch National Research Programme on Global Air Pollution and Climate Change.
29Almost 50 percent of fuel used in the Netherlands in 1992 was natural gas. Transportation contributed 20 percent
of the total energy-related CO 2 emissions, whereas electricity generation was responsible for only 27 percent of
emissions, below the OECD average of 34 percent. Industry was responsible for 24 percent of C02 emissions
(OECD. 1993. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Netherlands. Paris: Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development; OECD/IEA. 1994. Climate Change Policy Initiatives: 1994 Update. Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
30 Dutch society has traditionally been divided into four "pillars": Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals.
Until recently, individuals within Dutch society tended to identify themselves by these pillars and had very little
contact with members of other pillars (Tash, Robert. 2004. Dutch Pluralism: a Model in Tolerance for Developing
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heterogeneity" in which only the elites of each social group interact to make policy.3' As a
result, the vast majority of the Dutch have very little input into policy decision-making.
6.1.5. The Precautionary Coalition in Japan
The composition of the precautionary coalition in Japan was similar to that of the other
subsystems." However, it had far fewer active participants. Prior to 1989, it consisted primarily
of three government agencies (the Environment Agency, the Meteorological Agency, and the
Science and Technology Agency) and one environmental group (Greenpeace International).
However, it also had the support of the Keiseikai, the dominant faction within the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP)." Significant LDP participation in the coalition faded in 1993,
however, after leading members of the Keiseikai became embroiled in a financial scandal and the
LDP lost its 38-year hold on power. A few more environmental groups became involved in the
coalition in the early 1990's. The number of active NGOs increased once again after Kyoto was
designated as the site for COP 3." Several alternative energy companies also joined the coalition
at that point, as did the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (a
semi-governmental alternative energy research organization supported by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry)." Table 6.8 lists the major organizations participating in the
Japanese precautionary coalition during the 1988-1992 and 1992-1997 periods.
The precautionary coalition in Japan had few resources and substantial constraints at the
onset of the climate change policy debate. As in other countries, the Environment Agency was a
young agency, and was quite weak in comparison with the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and other ministries.36 It was also caught up in dealing with a number of
domestic pollution problems during the late 1980's, and was unable to devote much attention to
global issues at the time that climate change was emerging as a major issue.37
Democracies. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Co.; van Putten, Jan. 1982. Policy Styles in the Netherlands:
Negotiation and Conflict. In Policy Styles in Western Europe, ed. Jeremy Richardson. London: George Allen &
Unwin).
31 Lijphart, Arend. 2004. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One
Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
32The composition of the precautionary and economic growth coalitions was determined through a qualitative
analysis of those public documents available in English. Resources were not available to undertake a quantitative
documents analysis similar to those undertaken in the United States and the Netherlands.
3 This interest is ironic, as the Japanese policy-making system has traditionally been viewed as being dominated by
the "iron triangle" of the professional bureaucracy, the conservative LDP, and major business interests. See e.g.,
Johnson, A. K. 1998. The influence of institutional culture on the formation of pre-regime climate change policies
in Sweden, Japan and the United States. Environmental Values 7, 2: 223-244.
3 Interview #27. Friends of the Earth International, Japan. Feb., 1998.
3 Although many Japanese NGOs registered were registered as observers at COP 3, which was held in Kyoto, Japan,
most of these groups were formed simply to provide their members with a means for gaining access to the meeting
(Interview #3. World Resources Institute, Japan. Nov., 1998). Only those groups listed in Table 6.9 were engaged
in the policy debate internationally and within Japan for a number of years prior to COP 3.
36 Interview #22. Environment Agency, Japan. Feb., 2004; Johnson. 1998. The influence of institutional culture on
the formation of pre-regime climate change policies in Sweden, Japan and the United States; Schreurs, Miranda.
2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3 Johnson. 1998. The influence of institutional culture on the formation of pre-regime climate change policies in
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1988-1992
Government Agencies Legislature
Environment Agency Diet Environment Alliance
Meteorological Agency Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)/Keiseikai
Ministry of Transportation Environmental Organizations
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Citizens Alliance for Saving the Atmosphere and Earth
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Greenpeace Interational
1992-1997
Government Agencies Environmental Organizations
Environment Agency Citizens Alliance for Saving the Atmosphere and Earth
Meteorological Agency Friends of the Earth International
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Global Environment Forum-Kansai
Ministry of Transportation Greenpeace International
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kiko Forum'97
Alternative EnergylTechnology Organizations Peoples' Forum 2001, Japan
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
Organization World Wide Fund for Nature
Environmental advocacy groups in Japan were also very weak at the onset of the climate
change policy process. Most Japanese environmental NGOs were very local in organization and
membership, and tended to focus on local anti-pollution and victim compensation issues."8
Cultural norms discouraged challenges to authority, and Japan's closed policy-making system
made the use of the legal system to challenge public policy difficult. In addition, significant legal
and fiscal barriers impeded the efforts of national-level advocacy groups to incorporate, raise
money, and solicit memberships." As a result, few environmental groups were actively engaged
in the climate change issue in the late 1C980s.
This situation changed dramatically during the 1990s, due in part to the advent of the
Internet. Supported by international environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, Friends of the
Earth International, and the World Resources Institute, environmental activists in Japan came
together in early 1992 to form the People's Forum for the UNCED, an umbrella organization
intended to provide the Japanese environmental movement with a united voice at UNCED. 4 The
Sweden, Japan and the United States.
38Broadbent, Jeffrey. 1998. Environmental Politics in Japan, Networks of Power and Protest. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Reimann, Kim D and Forrest, Richard 2002 Connecting Global and Local Societal
Activism; International Politics, NGOs and the Environmental Movement of Japan.
C Interview #27. Friends of the Earth International, Japan. Feb., 2004. For example, until it was amended in 1998,
Japan's Non-Profit Organization Law required NGOs to receive approval from the local or national government
offices with jurisdiction over the relevant issue area in order to obtain non-profit status. This factor alone was cited
as a major disincentive for establishing indigenous NGOs. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, both
Greeipeace Japan and FOE Japan received virtually all of their funding from their international parent
organizations, and operated without receiving non-profit status (Interview #26. Greenpeace International, Japan.
Feb., 2004). See also Pekkanen, Robert. 2000. Japan's New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law. Journal of
Japanese Studies 26, 1: 613-644; Broadbent. 1998. Environmental Politics in Japan, Networks of Power and
Protest; Johnson. 1998. The influence of institutional culture on the formation of pre-regime climate change
policies in Sweden, Japan and the United States; and Scbreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany,
and the United States.
39 Interview #33. United Nations University, Japan. Jan., 1998.
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Organizations participating in the Japanese Precautionary CoalitionTable 6.9
People's Forum came to represente a wide range of activist groups, including consumer groups,
rainforest activists, public interest lawyers, Minamata victims, and climate scientists. It
regrouped in November 1993 as People's Forum 2001 with the goal of influencing government
policy on environment and development issues.
Using this same model, a group of approximately 70 environmental and citizen's groups
came together in December 1996 to form Kiko Forum '97 (the Citizens' Forum for Preventing
Climate Change/Global Warming).4' A primary goal of this group was to influence the shape of
the protocol to be adopted at COP 3 in Kyoto. During the period preceeding the Kyoto
conference, the group worked to educate the public on climate change, raise funds, and provide
logistical support for environmental NGOs attending the conference. These activities were
greatly facilitated by the rapid development of the Internet, which provided an inexpensive
means for these groups to communicate with each other and coordinate their activities.42 As a
result of these efforts, a network of over 225 Japanese environmental NGOs, agricultural
cooperatives, youth groups, and local living cooperatives attended the Kyoto conference.43
Japan's historical concern about its role in the world and need to find ways to
"internationalize" was an important resource for the Japanese precautionary coalition." During
the late 1980s, the publication of the Brundtland Commission report and the emergence of
"sustainable development" as an international environmental norm coincided with Japan's rise as
a global economic superpower. It was a principal proponent of the Brundtland Commission and
UNCED, and government leaders were under pressure to ensure that its domestic environmental
policies lived up to international standards."
The precautionary coalition was also bolstered when Prime Minister Takeshita began in
1989 to take a personal interest in the issue. As a result of his interest and influence, other
members of the Keiseikai, the dominant faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP,) began to support aggressive action to mitigate climate change.46 This influence waned in
1993, however, after many LDP members lost their seats in national elections and the LDP lost
control of the government.
41 The formation of this group was inspired in part by the success of Klimaforum '95, a German NGO umbrella
group active at COP 1.
42 Interview #27. Friends of the Earth International, Japan. Feb., 1998.
43 Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
"Gurowitz, Amy. 1999. Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic actors, immigrants and the Japanese State. World
Politics 51, 3: 413-435.
4 Reimann, Kim D and Forrest, Richard 2002 Connecting Global and Local Societal Activism: International
Politics, NGOs and the Environmental Movement of Japan.
46 Schreurs, Miranda. 2003. Divergent paths: Environmental policy in Germany, the United States, and Japan.
Environment 45, 8: 8-17 This interest is ironic, as the Japanese policy-making system has traditionally been
viewed as being dominated by the "iron triangle" of the professional bureaucracy, the conservative LDP, and major
business interests. See also Johnson. 1998. The influence of institutional culture on the formation of pre-regime
climate change policies in Sweden, Japan and the United States.
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6.2 THE ECONOMIC GROWTH COALITIONS
The "Economic Growth" coalition is comprised of those individuals and organizations that
are skeptical about the threat of climate change and are resistant to actions to address it that
might impede economic activity. They generally hold the fundamental normative belief that
unfettered economic growth is the best way to ensure the security for future generations.
6.2.1. Beliefs of the Economic Growth Coalition
The policy core beliefs of the Economic Growth Coalition can be summarized as follows:
" The threat of climate change is unclear, as the science of climate change is surrounded by
many uncertainties;
= The potential economic costs of strong measures to mitigate this change are substantial, and
are difficult to justify given the scientific uncertainties;
= Costly actions to mitigate climate change should not be undertaken until some of the
scientific uncertainties are resolved.
. If actions to reduce are taken, all countries should take them.
- Emission reductions should be made in those countries in which it is most cost-effective to
do so.
Table 6.9 lists the range of policy core beliefs of the economic growth coalitions examined
in this study. Statements by members of the coalitions would generally receive a score of around
1 or 2 (on a scale of 1 to 5) when coded using the coding framework described in the Appendix.
6.2.2. The Economic Growth Coalition in the International Climate Policy Subsystem
The international economic growth coalition was comprised primarily of officials from the
economic, trade, energy and, to some extent, foreign and other ministries of OECD countries;
representatives from industry groups and coalitions, and government officials from oil-producing
developing countries. While some international industry organizations, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce were present in some of the early meetings, its representatives did not do
much in terms of coordination. The Global Climate Coalition, formed in 1989 to coordinate a
common industry position within the United States, filled this role during most of the INC
meetings, as most of the business representatives at these meetings were members. This effort
was less successful in the later stages of the process as other business organizations holding
slightly more moderate views, such as the Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE) and
4 For example, Richard Darman, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for the Bushy
Administration, suggested in a speech at Harvard University in 1990, that the values of "the love of freedom,
respect for individual rights, distrust of excessively-centralized authority, appreciation of markets, a confident faith
in the future, and a heroization of risk-taking and the pioneering spirit.." led to America's strength, and that "the
environment can and should be protected within a pluralistic, market-and-growth-oriented framework." Some
members of this coalition, particularly within the United States, were also driven by the ideological concern that
environmentalists would use the climate change issue to impose their "anti-growth agenda" on the U.S. economy
(Nitze, William A. 1994. A Failure of Presidential Leadership. In Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of
the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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the International Climate Change Partnership (ICCP), became active.4 ' Figure 6.5 shows belief
scores of coalition members for the periods 1988-1992 and 1992-1997, while Table 6.10 lists
some of the major international and non-government organizations that participated in this
coalition.4 9
48 Interview #6. Climate Council, United States. Jan., 2005; Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition, United States.
Jan., 2005; Interview #13. National Mining Association, United States. Jan., 1998.
49 The organizations included on this table are those that participated in three or more meetings of the IPCC, the
INC, or the FCCC's COP. Although many more organizations participated in one or two meetings, they were not
considered to be major coalition members because of the short duration of their involvement.
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Table 6.10 Policy Core Beliefs of the Economic Growth Coalition
Policy core beliefs concerning climate change theory and models
Validity of theory that 1. Theory is not valid/any warming is due to natural eventsanthropogenic GHG 2. Theory is highly questionable/any warming is due primarily to natural eventsemissions are causing 3. Theory is somewhat uncertain/cause of any warming is unclearqlobal warming
Precision of climate 1. Models are highly inaccurate/completely inconsistent with observational data2. Models are generally inaccurate/mostly inconsistent with observational datamodels 3. Models are of uncertain accuracy/partially consistent with observational data
Clarity of current climate 1. The global climate is not warmingaenty o2. The global climate does not appear to be warming
3. Current trends are unclear
Policy core beliefs concerning Impacts of climate change and responses
Threat posed by climate 1. Climate change is not a threat/could have benefits
change 2. Climate change Is not likely to be a significant threat3. Risk is unclear
Economic costs of short- 1. Economic costs of short-term responses will be very high/much greater than costs of impacts
term responses 2. Economic costs of short-term responses will be high/most likely to be greater than costs of impactst 3. Costs of short-term responses are not clear/may be as high as costs of impacts
Policy core beliefs concerning nature of policy responses
1. Policy responses should be taken only when clearly justified by the science.Basis for national policy 2. Policy responses should be taken when justified for other reasons ("no regrets").
responses 3. Low cost/cost effective responses are justified now.
industrialized country 1. National actions should be voluntary (i.e., bottom-up approach, no targets or timetables)
responses/commitments 2. National targets may be set according to national circumstances, but no timetable should be adopted
before 2000. 3. Countries should stabilize emissions, but no timetable should be adopted
1. No commitments should be made
Commitments after 2000 2. Further commitments should be made, but only after thorough analysis.
3. Countries should commit to stabilization/reduction with differentiated targets and/or flexibility.
Mandated/ coordinated 1. Encourage voluntary actions only/no taxes or regulations
policy instruments 2. Encourage voluntary actions, modest demonstration programs, etc.3. Adopt some market-oriented policies (i.e., taxes), encourage voluntary actions.
Policy core beliefs concerning scope and coordination of commitments
Developing country vs. 1. Industrialized and developing countries must make similar commitments.
industrialized country 2. All countries must commit to specific emissions reductions, but industrialized countries must do more.
commitments. 3. Developing countries must commit to limiting growth in emissions.
Coordination or 1. National responses may be coordinated among all countries without limits/full joint implementationcooperation in national 2. National responses may be coordinated among all countries with minor limitationsresponses/ joint 3. National responses may be coordinated among industrialized countries/other countries with limits.implementation
Table 6.10 Major IGOs and NGOs in the International Economic Growth Coalition
Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy American Federation of and Congress of Industrial Organizations
Alliance for Responsible Environmental Alternatives Australian Council of Trade Unions
Business Council for A Sustainable Energy Future International Federation of Industnal Energy Consumers
Business Council of Australia United Mine Workers of America
Business Council on National Issues Natural ResourcesAgnoulture Industry Associations
Center for Business and the Environment Natural Resource Users' Group
Climate Council New Zealand Forest Owners'Association Inc.
Confederation of Finnish Industries Nudea Energy Organizations
European Business Council for A Sustainable Energy Future International Atomic Energy Agency
Federal Association of the German Industry Uranium Institute
Global Clinate Coalition
International Chamber of Commerce Canadian Electical Association
International Climate Change Partnership Edison Electric Institute
Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keldanren) Federation of Elric Power Companles
Business Couna International Union of Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Australian Coal Association National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
Canadian Petroleum Association
Coal Association of Canada Giobal Industrial and Social Progress Reseach Institute
International Gas Union Korea Energy Economics Institute
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Assoc
National Coal Association International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Secretr)an
World Coal Institute novereignty International
As was discussed in Section 6.1, members of the economic growth coalition were a small
minority of the participants in the international climate change policy subsystem at the onset of
the policy process. However, they had substantial economic resources at their disposal. A
critical attribute of the climate change problem is the direct relationship between GHG emissions
and economic activity. The worl's three largest economies, the United States, Japan, and
Russia, accounted for over 60 percent of global GHG emissions in 1990. Because an effective
treaty regime requires the participation of these three countries, the coalitions dominating the
national subsystems in these countries had effective veto power over the substance of the treaty
language. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the Economic Growth coalition
dominated the national subsystems of the United States and Russia during the period between
1988 and 1992. Although it lost its dominance in the United States during the period between
1992 and 1997, it maintained its dominance in Russia, and was able to gain sufficient power in
Japan such that neither coalition was dominant in that subsystem.
In addition, the wealthier governments, particularly Japan and the United States, could send
larger delegations to the negotiating sessions and undertake more research into key issues. In
contrast, few governments from the smallest but most vulnerable countries, the Small Island
States, could afford to send more than one or two delegates to the negotiating sessions.
Developing country governments often had to depend on their embassy representatives, many of
whom were unfamiliar with the issues being discussed and the state of play of the negotiations.
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Furthermore, members of the business community had greater financial resources to spend on
research and advertising then did members of the Precautionary Coalition.4
However, many members of the Economic Growth coalition had little understanding of or
experience with international treaty negotiations or international environmental issues when the
international process started in 1988, and had to spend substantial resources in gaining
knowledge of the issues." In addition, the perception of global climate change as an
environmental rather than an economic issue hampered early efforts by the Economic Growth
coalition to recruit additional members." Most corporations were focused primarily on domestic
markets during the 1980s and had little interest in what they perceived to be an obscure
international environmental issue." Although this perception changed to some degree through
the course of the 1990's as economic globalization took place, the number of participants in
Economic Growth coalition remained far fewer than that of the Precautionary Coalition.
6.2.3. The Economic Growth Coalition in the United States
The economic growth coalition in the United States was particularly vehement in its
opposition to the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and were the most visible of the coalitions in the
opposition." Prior to 1992, the principal actors in the Economic Growth coalition in the United
States were high-level officials of the White House, including John Sununu, President Bush's
Chief of Staff; Michael Boskins, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA),
Admiral James Watkins, Secretary of Energy; Richard Darman, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and Roger Porter, Bush's domestic policy advisor." Although Sununu
was ultimately replaced in 1991, the Economic Growth coalition remained entrenched in the
Bush Administration until the 1992 elections, with strong representation within the Departments
of Interior, Commerce, Energy and Agriculture.56 Table 6.12 lists the major organizations
participating in the U.S. economic growth coalition and their belief scores for the 1988-1992 and
1992-1997 periods. Figure 6.7 shows average belief scores for these participants.
50 Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition, United States. Jan., 2005.
51 Interview #6. Climate Council, United States. Jan., 2005; Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition, United States.
Jan., 2005.
52 See Bodansky, Daniel. 1994. Prologue to the Climate Change Convention. In Negotiating Climate Change: The
Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
5 Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition, United States. Jan., 2005.
5 McCright, A. M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2003. Defeating Kyoto: The conservative movement's impact on U.S.
climate change policy. Social Problems 50, 3: 348-373.
* Sununu was openly skeptical of the predictions by climate models, and was concerned that an agreement on
climate change would strengthen the Soviet Union, which had large natural gas resources. Trained as an engineer,
he often read technical articles and engaged scientists in debates on technical details. He even had a small climate
model installed in a computer in his office (Barnes, Fred. 1990. Raging bulls - John Sununu, Richard Darman
block tougher environmental policies. New Republic, Mar. 19, 1990. pg. 11). Darman repeatedly stressed the
primacy of economic growth over environmental protection. During the preparations for the 1991 G-7 Summit, he
reportedly told Bush, "Remember, there has never been an environmental regulation that has not hurt the
economy." (Easterbrook, Gregg. 1992. Black thumbs: Bush's green screwup. New Republic, Nov. 16, 1992. pg.
26).
56 Easterbrook. 1992. Black thumbs: Bush's green screwup.
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Table 6.12 Major Organizations participating in the U.S. Economic Growth Coalition
Economic Policy Research Organizations
American Enterprise Institute
Accuracy in Media
Heritage Foundation
Competitive Enterprise Institute
George C. Marshall Institute
Cato Institute
Science and Environmental Policy Project
Fossil Fuels Companies
ENRON Corporation
Texaco, Inc
Pitts Energy Group
Fossil Fuels Industry Associations
American Petroleum Institute
National Coal Association
The Climate Council
Westem Fuels Association
Economic Policy Research Organizations
Charles River Associates, Inc
Economic Strategy Institute
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Heritage Foundation
Science and Environmental Policy Project
Center for the Study of American Business
George C. Marshall Institute
Hoover institution
American Council for Capital Formation
Cato Institute
Center for Clean Air Policy
Fossil Fuels Companies
Conoco, Inc
Mobil Corporation
Exxon Corporation
Fossil Fuels Industry Associations
Natural Gas Supply Association
Westem Fuels Association
Climate Council
American Petroleum Institute
National Mining Association
General Industry Associations
Intemational Climate Change Partnership
Business Roundtable
Global Climate Coalition
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
United Fresh Fruit and Vegetables Association
General Policy Research Organizations
National Center for Public Policy Research
National Center for Policy Analysis
Government
Senate
House of Representatives
Treasury Department
Utility/Energy Distribution industry Associations
American Public Power Association
Electric Power Research Institute
1988-1992
General Industry Associations
International Chamber of Commerce
Global Climate Coalition
Government Agencies
Department of State
Department of Energy
Department of Justice
Office of the President
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Department of Treasury
Council of Economic Advisors
Transportation Companies
General Motors
Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Associations
Edison Electric Institute
Electricity Consumers Resource Council
Electric Power Research Institute
1992-1997
Housing/Construction Industry Associations
National Concrete Masonry Association
American Portland Cement Association
Nat. Assn. of Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors
Association of General Contractors
Labor/Workers Organizations
AFL/CIO
United Mine Workers of America
Manufacturing Industry Associations
National Association of Manufacturers
Chemical Manufacturers Association
American Iron and Steel Institute
Intemational Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers
Natural Resources/AgrIculture Companies
American Forest & Paper Association
Stone Container Corporation
National Grange
American Farm Bureau Federation
National Association of Wheat Growers
Other Advocacy Organizations
Sovereignty Intemational
Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow
Coalition for Vehicle Choice
Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation
Transportation Industry Associations
American Automobile Manufacturing Association
American Trucking Association
Association of American Railroads
National Automobile Dealers Association
Utility/Energy Distribution Companies
American Electric Power Services
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Edison Electric Institute
Northem Indiana Public Service Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Public Service Electric and Gas
Wisconsin Energy Company
The number of organizations actively participating in the coalition grew significantly after
UNCED and the signing of the FCCC. Much of this increase was due to an increased awareness
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of the issue created by media coverage of the Rio conference." Although a number of members
of Congress, primarily Republican and Democratic senators from coal-producing and heavily
industrialized states, were critical players in this Coalition through both the 1988-92 and 1992-97
periods, many more became active after the Republican Party gained control of both houses of
Congress in 1994. A wide variety of actors from many different industrial sectors were also
active in the Economic Growth Coalition, most important of which were the representatives of
energy generation and distribution, mining, transportation, and chemical manufacturing sectors.
Table 6.11 Belief Scores of the International Economic Growth Coalition
1988-1992
CIS/Russia Meteorological Service
OPEC Fossil Fuels Industry Assoc.
Energy Ministry
Foreign Affairs Ministry
Environment Ministry
Other OECD Foreign Affairs Ministry
Meteorological Service
CIS/Russla Environment Ministry
Meteorological Service
EU/Switzerland Fossil Fuels Industry Assoc.
Manufacturing Industry
Assoc.
Utility/Energy Distribution
Industry Assoc.
OPEC Embassy
Energy Ministry
Environment Ministry
Foreign Affairs Ministry
Fossil Fuels Industry Assoc.
Other OECD Foreign Affairs Ministry
Meteorological Service
United States Foreign Affairs Ministry
1992-1997
G77
United States
General Industry Assoc.
Manufacturing Industry Assoc.
Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Assoc.
Energy Ministry
Fossil Fuels Industry Assoc.
Economic Ministry
Planning Ministry
Economic Ministry
Economic Policy Research Org
Energy Ministry
Fossil Fuels Industry Assoc.
General Industry Assoc.
General Policy Research Org.
Manufacturing Industry Assoc.
Other Advocacy Org.
Utility/Energy Distribution Company
Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Assoc.
Unlike its international counterpart, the economic growth coalition in the United States had
substantial resources at its disposal at the onset of the climate change policy process. A
significant resource for the economic growth coalition in the United States was the structural
dependence of the United States on fossil fuels." By the early 1990s, the United States was the
57Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition, United States. Mar., 1989; Mazur and Lee. 1993. Sounding the Global
Alarm: Environmental Issues in the US National News; Dalby. 1996. Reading Rio, writing the world: The New
York Times and the 'Earth Summit'.
58 Levy, D. L. and D. Egan. 1998. Capital contests: National and transnational channels of corporate influence on the
climate change negotiations. Politics & Society 26, 3: 337-361.
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largest emitter of greenhouse gases and had the second highest per capita emissions of CO2 of all
OECD countries, in large part because of its high standard of living, climate, low energy prices,
and a transportation infrastructure that favored the use of automobiles. 9 Oil was the largest
single energy source, accounting for 38 percent of energy demand in 1992. Transportation
accounted for over 35 percent of U.S. energy demand in 1992, while industry consumed about 31
percent and the residential/commercial sector used about 30 percent of U.S. energy demand.60
This structural dependence provided the fossil fuels industry with strong ties to Congress,
particularly in rural states such as Texas, Louisiana and West Virginia. Coincidentally,
Congressional rules regarding seniority provided representatives from these states with a
disproportionate amount of power within Congress, as they tended to be re-elected more
frequently than their counterparts from more urban areas.6' In addition, they frequently had
allies from states with economies heavily dependent on transportation or construction-related
industries, such as Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.
This structural dependence on fossil fuels also provided the economic growth coalition with
substantial financial resources. For example, the Global Climate Coalition spent over $3 million
between 1994 and 1996 on the climate change issue. The National Coal Association spent more
than $700,000 in 1992 and 1993 on activities related to climate change, while the American
Automobile Manufacturers Association spent over $200,000 on similar activities.62 Although
figures are not available for the amounts spent on climate change by other organizations, such as
the American Petroleum Institute, the resources available to these organizations are far greater
than those available to non-profit environmental groups.
The economic growth coalition was also able to use the general lack of understanding about
climate change on the part of the general public to their advantage. The general public has had a
number of misconceptions about climate and climate change, including confusion between short-
term climate variability and longer-term climate change.6 3 Members of the economic growth
coalition were able to cause a certain amount of public confusion by pointing to various short-
term cold spells as evidence that the theory of climate change was flawed."
59Energy-related C02 emissions in 1992 constituted 48 percent of all OECD emissions and 23 percent of world
emissions (World Resources Institute. 1994. World Resources 1994-1995. New York, Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
60OECD/IEA. 1994. Climate Change Policy Initiatives: 1994 update.
61 McCubbins and Sullivan. 1987. Congress: Structure and Policy.
62 Gelbspan, Ross. 1997. The Heat Is On: The High Stakes Battle Over Earth's Threatened Climate. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
63 See, e.g., Rebetez, M. 1996. Public expectation as an element of human perception of climate change. Climatic
Change 32, 4: 495-509; Berk, R. A. and D. Schulman. 1995. Public Perceptions of Global Warming. Climatic
Change 29, 1: 1-33;Dunlap, Riley E. 1998. Lay perceptions of global risk - Public views of global warming in
cross-national context. International Sociology 13, 4: 473-498; Ungar, S. 1994. Apples and Oranges - Probing the
Attitude-Behavior Relationship For the Environment. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology-Revue
Canadienne De Sociologie Et D Anthropologie 31, 3: 288-304.
* Bord, R. J., A. Fisher, and R. E. O'Connor. 1998. Public perceptions of global warming: United States and
international perspectives. Climate Research 11, 1: 75-84; Cohen, Susan. The Warm Zone; Admit it: You don't
know what to believe about global warming. But don't worry. We're here to tell you why you're not alone.
Washington Post, July 16, 1995. Magazine pg. 17.; Bostrom, A., M. Granger Morgan, B. Fischhoff, and D. Read.
1994. What do people know about global climate change? Risk Analysis 14, 6: 959.
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6.2.4. The Economic Growth Coalition in the Netherlands
Prior to 1992, the economic growth coalition in the Netherlands was quite small, consisting
primarily of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Liberal Party in Parliament, VNO-NVW, the
major employers association in the Netherlands, and the Dutch Chemical Industry Association
(VNCI). After 1992, they were joined by the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Transport,
Public Works and Water Management; and SEP, the major association of utilities in the
Netherlands. Throughout these two periods, very few private corporations joined the coalition.
These corporations tended instead to focus their energies on specific measures, such as an energy
tax, that they believed were harmful to their interests. As shown in Table 6.15, the beliefs of the
Dutch economic growth coalition were a bit more "green" than their counterparts in the United
States. This is due in part to the generally stronger environmental ethic held by the Dutch, and
Europeans in general.
Like its counterpart in the United States, the Dutch economic growth coalition had
Table 6.14 Major Organizations participating in the Dutch Economic Growth Coal
1988-1992
Government Agencies General industry Associations
Ministry of Economic Affairs VNO-NVW
Legislature Dutch Chemical Industry Association (VNCI)
Liberal Party (VVD)
1992-1997
Government Agencies General Industry Associations
Ministry of Economic Affairs VNO-NVW
Ministry of Finance Dutch Chemical industry Association (VNCI)
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Assoc.
Legislature Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-Producktiebedrjven (SEP)
Liberal Party (VVD)
Table 6.15 Average Belief Scores of the Dutch Economic Growth Coalition
Organization Average Belief Score
Government Agencies
Ministry of Economic Affairs 1.9
Ministry of Finance 1.8
General Industry Associations
VNO-NVW 2.1
Dutch Chemical Industry Association (VNCI) 2.5
Legislature
Liberal Party (VVD) 3.3
Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Assoc.
Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-Producktiebedrijven (SEP) 1.0
substantial resources at its disposal when the climate change policy process began in the late
1980's. Industrial production is an important element of the Dutch economy.65 The chemical
industry is particularly important, constituting almost 17 percent of industrial production in 1997,
employing 9 percent of industrial workers, and contributing 16 percent of exports. Industry as a
65 Laroui, F. and M. J. vanLeeuwen. 1996. Fiscal policy and greenhouse gases: The case of the Netherlands.
Ecological Economics 18,3: 231-241.
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whole contributed 43 percent of total energy consumption in the Netherlands, and industrial
sources contributed 27 percent of total CO 2 emissions in 1995. The chemical industry was chief
contributor, contributing 10 percent of all emissions and consuming 32 percent of industrial
consumption of energy in 1998.66
The Economic Growth Coalition also controlled key Ministries. While VROM had
responsibility for coordinating the preparation of the NEPP, and could thus dictate much of the
agenda, the Ministry of Economic Affairs had ultimate responsibility for regulating industry.
Most of the measures proposed in the NEPP and NEPP-II consisted of voluntary agreements, or
covenants, with various industrial sectors. The Netherlands Agency for Energy and Environment
(Novem) negotiates these agreements with industry groups on behalf of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, and the final agreement is signed by the Minister of Economic Affairs.
The economic growth coalition was also strengthened by strong ties between industry
interests and the Ministry of Economic Affairs brought about by the traditional "consensus-
building" approach to policy development in the Netherlands and the reliance of Dutch industries
on organized associations. Industry groups could rely on the Ministry of Economic Affairs to
represent its interests in intra-governmental discussions, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs
could have confidence that individual corporations would go along with any agreements struck
with industry groups such as VNO-NVW and VNCI.67
The Dutch economic growth coalition was also constrained by number of factors. As in the
other subsystems, participants in the Dutch economic growth coalition suffered from a relatively
poor understanding of the scientific aspects of climate change. This weak understanding was
exacerbated by language difficulties. The Summary Reports for Policy Makers prepared by the
IPCC were written in English, as were most other documents intended to provide decision-
makers with general background information on climate change. Because most people in the
Netherlands speak conversational English fluently, little effort was made to translate these
documents into Dutch. However, the technical language contained in these documents was very
difficult for lay readers for whom English is a second language to understand. This difficulty in
turn hampered efforts by the coalition to recruit additional participants.'
In addition, the tremendous public support for strong environmental measures made it
difficult for the Ministry of Economic Affairs to object on economic grounds to measures
proposed by VROM in the NEPP and NEPP-II, particularly since these ministries had committed
themselves to the general objectives of the NEPP when the planning process was first established
in the mid-1980s. The scientific credibility of the report Concern for Tomorrow and its status
within the government effectively neutralized arguments they might have made regarding the
scientific basis of the problems.69
66 Kasa, Sjur. 2000. Explaining Emission Tax Exemptions for Heavy Industries: A Comparison of Norway, Denmark
and the Netherlands. Oslo, Norway: Center for International Climate and Environmental Research.
67 deRoo, G. and D. Miller. 1997. Transitions in Dutch environmental planning: New solutions for integrating spatial
and environmental policies. Environment and Planning B-Planning & Design 24, 3: 427-436; Kasa. 2000.
Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.
68 Interview #40. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 1997.
69 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
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6.2.5. The Economic Growth Coalition in Japan
The composition of the Economic Growth Coalition in Japan was very similar to its
counterpart in the Netherlands, although more government agencies were participants in the early
parts of the process. Prior to 1992, the principal actors were from the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, and a few industry groups such as the Federation of
Electric Power Companies and MITI's Advisory Committee on Energy. Additional government
agencies became involved as negotiations for the FCCC ensued, such as the Ministry of
Transport and the Ministry of Contruction. However, it was not until after 1992 that a significant
number of industry groups, such as Keidanren and the Japan Electrical Manufacturers
Association, became active in the coalition.
Like the Netherlands, Japan has a "consensual" approach to policymaking that fosters strong
ties between government agencies and the economic sectors on which they focus. Each ministry
has a set of Advisory Councils consisting of various stakeholders through which they exchange
information and reach a consensus on government activities. The various industrial sectors
affected by climate change were also well organized through Keidanren, which is the overarching
association representing Japanese industry.
The economic growth coalition in Japan was also constrained by a general lack of
understanding of the scientific issues associated with climate change. Unlike in the Netherlands,
however, far fewer people in Japan speak English fluently. As a result, many more documents
were available that explained the basic issues associated with climate change. However, the
coalition was hampered by another aspect of Japan's institutional structure: bureaucratic
turnover. Most mid- and upper-level officials in Japanese agencies are expected to change
positions every two years or so in order to advance their careers. Mastering the tremendous
complexity of the range of issues associated with climate change in this short period of time,
however, is difficult, and higher-level members of Japan's delegations to the international policy
process might only participate in two or three international meetings before moving on. This was
Table 6.14 Organizations participating in the Japanese Economic Growth Coalition
1988-1992
Government Agencies Economic Policy Research Organizations
Ministry of international Trade and Industry Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute
Ministry of Finance Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Associations
Ministry of Construction Federation of Electric Power Companies
Advisory Committee on Energy
1992-1997
Government Agencies Manufacturing Industry Associations
Ministry of Finance Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association
Ministry of Construction Japan Fiuorocarbon Manufacturers Association
Ministry of international Trade and Industry Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Associations
Economic Policy Research Organizations Centrai Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute Federation of Electric Power Companies
Institute of Energy Economics Global Environmental Action
General Industry Associations Advisory Committee on Energy
Japan Federation of Economic Organizations(Keidanren)
Japan Industrial Conference for Ozone Layer Protection
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particularly a problem for MITI, which tends to attract the most ambitious members of the civil
service.70 In contrast, the average tenure in Japan's Environment Agency tends to be longer,
about three to four years.71
Although the various international and national precautionary and economic growth
coalitions held similar policy core beliefs and each cooperated with their counterparts in other
substems, their behavior was different in each of the subsystems. The external events that shaped
their behavior and affected their political resources and constraints were also different for each
subsystem. These events and behaviors that drove the political dynamics within each climate
policy subsystem and the other subsystems with which they overlapped are described in the
following four chapters.
70 Interview #64. Ministry of Industry and Trade, Japan. Feb., 1998.
71 Interview #21. Environment Agency, Japan. Feb., 1998. These assertions are supported by an analysis of meeting
participant lists indicating that the average participation rate for MITI delegates was 2.9 INC/COP meetings, while
the average participation rates for Environment Agency and MFA delegates were 4.4 and 5 meetings, respectively.
The participation rate is the average number of INC/COP meetings in which a given delegate participated between
1990 and 1997.
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CHAPTER 7 - THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY SUBSYSTEM
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The processes of the international climate change subsystem that gave rise to the Kyoto
Protocol can be regarded as occurring in three general phases: the IPCC/INC phase (1988-1992),
the COP I/Berlin Mandate Phase (1992-1994), and the AGBM/Kyoto Protocol phase (1994-
1997). Each of these phases had a distinct policy outcome:
- The IPCC/INC phase resulted in the establishment of the INC and the negotiation of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change;
- The COP I/Berlin Mandate Phase resulted in the formation of the Ad Hoc Group on the
Berlin Mandate and the decision to negotiate a protocol; and,
= The AGBM/Kyoto Protocol phase resulted in the Kyoto Protocol itself.
Each of these phases also had a distinct outcome in terms of commitments by industrialized
countries to reduce their emissions:
- The IPCC/INC phase resulted in emissions reductions "aim" in the Framework Convention
on Climate Change;
- The COP I/Berlin Mandate Phase resulted in the decision that this commitment was
insufficient; and
- The AGBM/Kyoto Protocol phase resulted in the specific emissions reduction targets in the
Kyoto Protocol.
This chapter summarizes the dynamics that transpired within this subsystem between 1988 and
1997.
7.2 DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE SUBSYSTEM
The Precautionary Coalition can be said to have dominated the international climate change
subsystem during all three phases of the international process by being able to set the agenda and
dictating many of the terms of debate. The Economic Growth Coalition gained strength in the
latter stages of the IPCC/INC phase as powerful members became active in the subsystem.
Although this was sufficient to force a compromise on the policy outcome of that phase, they
arrived too late, to change the course of the discussions. The Economic Growth coalition lost
important members during the second two phases of the process, which enabled the
Precautionary Coalition to gain dominance in the subsystem. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol
generally reflects the policy core beliefs of the Precautionary Coalition.
7.2.1. Phase 1: The IPCC and the INC (1988-1992)
The first phase of politics within the international climate change subsystem started with the
chain of events leading to the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
in 1988, and ended with the signing of the UNFCCC at the U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in June of 1992.
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Figure 7.1 The International Climate Policy Subsystem
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The international climate change policy process, which began with the chain of events that
led to the creation of the IPCC, was initiated primarily by members of the Precautionary
Coalition. After the successful completion of the Vienna Convention on the Protection of 
the
Stratospheric Ozone Layer in 1985, UNEP Executive director Moustafa Tolba began to urge
national governments to initiate negotiations for a climate treaty, and proposed in 1987 that
UNEP convene a panel of experts to draft such an agreement.' Many OECD governments,
represented in UNEP by their Environment Ministries, were supportive of this effort, as were
representatives of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
However, officials from the White House, the U.S. Department of Energy, the Department of
Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Representative, the only members of the Economic Growth
coalition participating in the process at the time, were not. They viewed the scientific
assessments prepared thus far as being less than objective and that it was premature to consider a
climate change treaty.
2 
These officials were essentially the only members of the economic
Agrawala, S. 1999. Early science-policy interactions in climate change: lessons from the Advisory Group on
Greenhouse Gases. Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 9, 2: 157-169.
2 Interview #18. See also Agrawala, S. 1998. Context and early origins of the intergovernmental panel on climate
change. Climatic Change 39, 4: 605-620; Agrawala, S. 1998. Structural and process history 
of the
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growth coalition participating in the discussions at the time. Many developing countries,
dismayed that they had been left out of the process thus far, also resisted the proposal, as did
many individuals within WMO, viewing it as further encroachment into an area for which they
have prime responsibility.3
As a compromise, the United States proposed that UNEP and WMO jointly create an
intergovernmental panel to conduct a thorough scientific assessment of the problem and potential
responses.4 The United States was able to prevail with this proposal, in part because it was the
largest contributor to UN programs and the provider of half of all climate research at the time,
and the IPCC was established in the spring of 1988. It was charged with preparing, in time for
the Second World Climate Conference in 1990, "internationally coordinated assessments of the
magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change
and realistic response strategies."5
Because the IPCC was the only intergovernmental process in place that was addressing the
climate change issue, it quickly became the forum for debating political issues as well. Many
people expected these negotiations to occur in the IPCC, and both the Precautionary and
Economic Growth Coalitions used the IPCC meetings to advance their agendas. For example, it
was at the first meeting of the Response Strategies Working Group, in February, 1989, that
Secretary of State James Baker first announced the United State's "no regrets" policy, calling for
"prudent steps that are already justified on grounds other than climate change."' At the same
meeting, delegations from several European nations introduced a statement asking the IPCC to
endorse stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2000.7 A year later, in February of
1990, the United States used the third meeting of Working Group III to hold a "Saturday
Seminar" in which White House Counselor C. Boyden Gray and Assistant Attorney General
Richard Stewart introduced the "comprehensive approach" for dealing with greenhouse gases.'
intergovernmental panel on climate change. Climatic Change 39, 4: 621-642; Hecht and Tirpak. 1995. Framework
Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History; and Bodansky, Daniel. 1995. The Emerging
Climate Regime. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 20: 425-61.
3 Interview #58. Bert Bolin, the first Chairman of the IPCC, was quoted as saying "the IPCC was established
because many countries, especially developing countries, simply don't trust assessments in which their scientists
and policymakers have not participated." (Schneider, Stephen H. 1991. Three Reports of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Environment 25, Jan-Feb: 25).
4It should be noted here that a number of individuals within the U.S. government, most notably from the State
Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, supported Tolba's proposal for a climate treaty, but saw the
IPCC as a way to enhance the credibility of the problem, give governments a greater sense of ownership over the
process, and ultimately increase pressure for strong responses (Hecht and Tirpak. 1995. Framework Agreement on
Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History;Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary).
s United Nations. 1988. UN. General Assembly Resolution 43/53.
6 As will be discussed in the U.S. case study, the substance of this speech, which was written by State Department
officials supportive of strong action on climate change, angered John Sununu, the White House Chief of Staff, and
Secretary Baker soon recused himself from all climate issues soon afterwards.
7 These countries included Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden
Abramson, Rudy. Panel Rebuffs Global Warming Activists. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 8, 1990. A pg. 19).
8 Under this approach, all sources and sinks of all greenhouse gases, including CFCs (which were being phases out
under the Montreal Protocol)., would be included in any accounting system for greenhouse gas reductions (insert
Stewart article reference). Members of the Economic Growth coalition favored this approach because it took
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At this same meeting, delegations from Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France,
the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Italy renewed their calls for industrialized countries to
commit to stabilizing emissions of carbon dioxide by the year 2000, even though the IPCC had
no authority to adopt such policies.'
The creation of the IPCC, ostensibly an ad hoc scientific body, ultimately benefited the
precautionary coalition, as it provided a vehicle for members of the coalition both to improve
their understanding of the issue, educate neutral government representatives, and begin to engage
in a debate concerning policy measures in which many members of the Economic Growth
Coalition were not active. Almost sixty percent of the participants in the IPCC Plenary Meetings
prior to the completion of the First Assessment Report were from organizations active in the
Precautionary Coalition, while only fourteen percent of the participants were from economic
ministries, energy ministries, fossil fuel industry associations, and other organizations involved
in the Economic Growth Coalition. Although wider range of actors participated in meetings of
the Response Strategies Working Group, members of the Economic Growth Coalition still
comprised only eighteen percent of all participants.*
The Toronto Conference and Other International Meetings
While the IPCC was undertaking its work, members of the precautionary coalition within
other governments continued to push for a climate treaty in other fora. Principal among these
were a series of high-level environmental conferences that focused on the issue. The first and
most important was the June 1988 conference in Toronto, Canada, organized jointly by UNEP,
WMO, and Environment Canada, Canada's environment ministry. Although not an official
intergovernmental meeting, this conference helped the Precautionary Coalition set the terms of
the debate and establish the initial objective of a framework climate change treaty containing
legally-binding targets and timetables for GHG emissions reductions." Most of the 327
participants at this conference were members of the Precautionary Coalition, while members of
the Economic Growth, such as representatives of utilities, manufacturers, the fossil fuel industry,
and other business interests, comprised less than six percent of the participants." As might be
expected, the final conference declaration called for:
"...the development of a comprehensive global convention as a framework
for protocols on the protection of the atmosphere.. .with a view to having the
principles and components of such a convention ready for consideration at the
Inter-governmental Conference on Sustainable Development in 1992."
attention away from energy use, and the United States would get credit for the significant steps it was already
taking to phase out CFCs.
9 See Monastersky, R. 1990. Bush holds cautious course on global change. Science News, Feb. 17, 1990. pg. 102.
' Participation data on file with the author.
"1 Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary; Hecht and
Tirpak. 1995. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History.
1 Participation data on file with the author.
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It also called on governments to "...reduce CO 2 emissions by approximately twenty percent of
1988 levels by the year 2005." This twenty-percent reduction target became known as the
"Toronto target." 3
Following the Toronto meeting, members of the Precautionary Coalition, primarily from
European governments, pushed the issue of a climate treaty containing binding targets and
timetables at a number of subsequent international meetings, including a pair of
intergovernmental meetings hosted by the Netherlands in The Hague and Noordwijk during
1989, the Bergen Ministerial Conference on Sustainable Development in Norway in May, 1990.
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and other European also used the G-7 summit meetings to
press the issue of climate change with President Bush directly, pushing for commitments to
"clear reductions" in greenhouse gases."
The U.N. General Assembly
Representatives of a number of low-lying island countries also began to engage the U.N.
General Assembly on the issue. Malta, supported by various environmental NGOs, introduced in
September of 1988 a resolution declaring that climate change "is a common heritage of
mankind."" In the face of U.S. opposition, the resolution that was finally adopted fell short of
calling for negotiations on a climate treaty. However, Malta introduced a second resolution the
following year that again called for negotiations on a climate treaty to begin. The United States
again opposed the resolution, arguing that such a decision should not be made until after the
IiPCC work is completed. However, it was forced to reverse this position in December of 1989
after the Bush Administration was criticized both domestically and internationally for its position
on the issue. 6 In December of 1989, the General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting the
start of negotiations as soon as the IPCC completed its First Assessment Report. The treaty
would to be opened for signature in June of 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil." However, the resolution also stated that the
negotiations should proceed under the auspices of the General Assembly rather than under the
control of UNEP and the WMO, effectively removing UNEP from the policy process. 8
'3 Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary; Hecht and
Tirpak. 1995. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History. It is interesting to note
that, according to conference participants, this target was set by employing the rule of thumb used in the business
world that a twenty-percent change signals a clear break from the past (Interview #53n). Andresen and Agrawala
notes that many of the scientists at the meeting were playing the role of 'substitute policy makers' and that the
recommendations were determined more by politics than by science (Andresen, S. and S. Agrawala. 2002. Leaders,
pushers and laggards in the making of the climate regime. Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy
Dimensions 12, 1: 41-51).
14 Lauter, David. Bush, Kohl draft key compromises; Summit: Agreements on Soviet aid, global warming and trade
are likely to shape the 7-nation declaration. Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1990. pg. Al; Suro, Roberto. Europeans
Accuse the U.S. of Balking On Plans to Combat Global Warming. New York Times, July 10, 1990. pg. A10.
15 U.N. Resolutions 43/53.
16 Lauter, David. In Policy Shift, U.S. Seeks Talks on Global Warming. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 1989. pg. Al.
See also Bodansky. 1994. Prologue to the Climate Change Convention.
17 U.N. Resolution 44/207, Protection of the Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind.
1 Most industrialized countries felt that the negotiations should be held under the auspices of UNEP and WMO, in
effect continuing the IPCC process. However, many developing countries resisted this, as they felt largely
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Unilateral Adoption of Targets and Timetables and the Second World Climate Conference
A number of governments dominated by the Precautionary Coalition also attempted to move
the issue forward by adopting targets and timetables unilaterally (Table 7.1). The Netherlands
led the way in May of 1990 by announcing its intention to reduce C02 emissions by 5 percent
from 1990 levels by the year 2000. After the IPCC's Science Working Group, under the
leadership of the U.K.'s Sir John Houghton, approved in that same month a draft report
predicting a global temperature increase of about 0.3*C per decade, Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher broke from the United States by announcing that United Kingdom would stabilize its
emissions of carbon dioxide at 1990 levels by the year 2000.29 Chancellor Kohl announced in
June of 1990 that Germany would reduce its C02 emissions by 30 percent from 1987 levels by
2005, and the European Community as a whole followed suit in October by committing to
stabilizing C02 emissions by the year 2000 at 1990. Even Japan, the only other OECD country
at the time that was controlled by the Economic Growth Coalition, adopted a target, although it
was heavily qualified. 2' These events put tremendous pressure on members the Economic
Growth Coalition in the United States, as it was the only industrialized country that had not
adopted some sort of emissions target by the time the Second World Climate Conference was
held.
The Second World Climate Conference, held in November of 1990, marked the 10'
anniversary of the World Climate Program. As with previous conferences, this Conference was
largely dominated by the Precautionary Coalition. With most of the conference being technical
in nature, most of the participants were from scientific research organizations and ministries,
universities, meteorological organizations, and other organizations allied with the Precautionary
Coalition. Fewer than six percent of the participants represented groups and organizations that
were part of the Economic Growth coalition. As a result, the final Ministerial Declaration
reflected much of the Precautionary Coalition's policy core beliefs. For example, it stated that
the participating governments welcomed the "decisions and commitments by states to take
actions aimed at stabilizing their emissions.. .by the year 2000 in general at 1990 levels." In the
face of U.S. resistance, however, the declaration did not recommend that countries adopt this
target. Instead, it urged them "to establish targets and/or feasible national programmes or
strategies." The declaration also incorporates several other points favored by the United States,
including recognition of "the differences in approach and in starting point in the formation of
targets" and an acknowledgement of "the initiatives of some other developed countries which
will have positive effects on limiting emissions of greenhouse gases."
It was also at the Second World Climate Conference that Ambassador Robert Von Leirop,
the Permanent Representative from Vanuatu and a law professor at NYU law school, began
organizing the 40-country strong Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). This alliance was to
become a voting block of sufficient strength that it could attract substantial support from other
excluded from the IPCC. They also argued that climate change is a development as well as an environmental issue,
and that, given its political ramifications, is more appropriately addressed under the auspices of a political rather
than a technical body (Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary).
19 Whitney, Craig. 1990. Scientists Urge Rapid Action on Global Warming. New York Times, May 16, 1990. 1 pg. 6.
20 Japan announced in October, 1990, that it would "stabilize per capita CO 2 emissions at approximately the 1990
level by 2000," which gave room to accommodate economic growth.
124
developing countries representative not otherwise engaged in the issue, and was to become a very
important group within the Precautionary Coalition.
Table 7.1 National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets and Timetables
COUNTRY TARGET
Australia "Stabilize GHG emissions based on 1988 levels, by the year 2000 and to reduce these emissions by 20% by the year 2005..."
Austria 20% reduction of C02 emissions based on 1988 levels, by the year 2005
Belgium 5% C02 reduction by 2000 (1990 baseline)
Canada 20% reduction of CO2 emissions based on 1988 levels, by the year 2005
Denmark 20% reduction of C02 emissions based on 1988 levels, by the year 2005
France 2 tons of carbon per inhabitant by 2000
Germany 25-30% C02 reduction by 2005
Ireland 20% increase over figures of 1990 in accordance with the EU burden-sharing arrangement under the EU stabilization target
Italy Stabilization of C02 emissions at 1990 levels by 2000
Luxembourg Stabilization of CO2 emissions by 2000 and 20% reduction of C02 emissions, based on 1988 levels, by the year 2005
Japan Stabilization of per capita C02 emissions at approximately the 1990 level by 2000
Netherlands C02: 3-5% reduction in the year 2000, 1989-1990 base;
CH4: 10% reduction in 2000,1990 base.
N20: Stabilize in 2000,1990 base.
NOx: 55% reduction in 2000, 1988 base.
NMVOCs: 60% reduction in 2000,1988 base.
CO: 50% reduction In 2000,1990 base
New Zealand Retum net anthropogenic emission of C02 by 2000 to 1990 levels; objective is 20% reduction of C02 emissions based on 1988
levels by the year 2005
Norway Stabilization of C02 emissions by 2000,1989 base
Portugal 40% C02 emissions increase by 2000, 1990 base in accordance with the EU burden-sharing arrangement under the EU stabilization
target
Spain 25% C02 emissions increase by 2000, 1990 base in accordance with the EU burden-sharing arrangement under the EU stabilization
target
Sweden Stabilization of C02 emissions from fossil fuels by 2000, and decline after that, 1990 base. 30% reduction of methane emissions
from disposal of wastes by 2000, 1990 base
Switzerland "Stabilization, by the year 2000 of the consumption of fossil fuels and of resulting C02 emissions at their 1990 level, followed by a
gradual reduction
United Kingdom To retum each of the main GHGs to 1990 levels by the year 2000
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for the Framework Convention on
Climate Change began its work in December of 1990, meeting five times over a period of two
years to develop the Convention. Negotiations were difficult, as sharp divisions existed among
the countries involved in the negotiations over a tremendous number of issues." Environmental
2
'Numerous commentators have discussed the sharp divisions among the countries involved in the negotiations over
a tremendous number of issues. These included the objectives of the treaty, principles on which action should be
based, the gases to be covered, the nature and form of commitments, the extent to which countries can work
together in meeting these commitments, the extent to which these commitments apply to developing countries, and
financial and technical assistance. The greatest confrontation between the policy beliefs of the Economic Growth
and the Precautionary Coalitions, however, occurred over the nature of the treaty itself and the specific
commitments for industrialized countries that were to be contained in it. For a general discussion of the climate
change negotiations and their context, see, e.g., Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary; Victor, David G. and J. E. Salt. 1994. From Rio to Berlin - Managing Climate-
Change. Environment 36, 10: 6+; Reinstein. 1993. Climate Negotiations; and Mintzer and Leonard. 1994.
Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention. Grubb also provides a fairly thorough
discussion of the politics of targets and timetables (Grubb, Michael. 1990. The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating
Targets. International Affairs 66: 67-72).
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groups and the environment ministries of European and AOSIS countries argued strongly for a
substantive convention incorporating specific commitments' and implementation measures, in
particular a commitment to stabilization at 1990 levels by the year 2000 as a first step, with the
Toronto target to apply after that. Developing nations other than the oil-producing states and
Eastern European countries also supported this approach as long as they were differentially
handled with regard to commitments. 2 However, the United States, Russia, OPEC countries,
business interests, and other members of the Economic Growth Coalition opposed it. They
argued for a process-oriented framework convention that established general obligations
concerning such matters as scientific research and cooperation and only a skeletal legal and
institutional framework on which future commitments would be built.
Beginning with the first INC meeting and continuing throughout the negotiations, both
coalitions attempted to persuade others as to the merits of their positions by distributing articles,
study results, and other literature. A particularly effective means of communication used by the
Precautionary Coalition was the daily Eco newsletter. The Eco, which environmental NGOs
have published at major international environmental conferences since the Stockholm
Environment Conference in 1972, contained not only opinion pieces from various NGO
representatives but also daily updates on the negotiations. Because it was the only source of
information concerning events of the previous day, members of both coalitions came to rely on it
to stay current with the discussions.
During the second INC session, Robert Reinstein, the head of the U.S. delegation, Nobutoshi
Akao, the head of the Japanese delegation, and Katsuo Seiki of Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, worked together to develop a "Pledge and Review" process, which Japan
then introduced. Under this proposal, each country would pledge to meet an emissions goal and
develop a plan for doing so, and the international community would be responsible for reviewing
these plans and the adequacy of each country's efforts." Some European delegations such as
France and the United Kingdom. supported the idea as a compromise solution. 2s However, other
delegations, particularly those from developing countries, found it vague, confusing, and an
intrusion on national sovereignty. Environmental groups rejected it vehemently, labeling it
"Hedge and Retreat." The opposition was such that those delegations supporting the idea in INC
2 withdrew their support in INC 3, although the concept remains embodied in the final language
of the Convention.
22 See generally Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary
and Mintzer and Leonard. 1994. Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention.
23 Interviews #7 and #25.
24 For a review of the pledge and review concept, see Nitze, William A. 1991. Recommendations for Strengthening
Pledge and Review. In Pledge and Review Processes: Components of a Climate Convention, ed. Michael Grubb
and Nicola Steen. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs Energy and Environmental Programme. The
workshop report prepared by Grubb and Steen provides a more detailed examination of review processes contained
in other international treaties and some ideas on how these experiences might apply to the FCCC (Grubb, Michael
and Nicola Steen, eds. 1991. Pledge and Review Processes: Components of a Climate Convention. London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs Energy and Environmental Programme).
2s France, on behalf of the European Union, stated at the end of INC 2 that the Convention "should include what has
come to be called a pledge and review proposal." Quoted in Dasgupta. 1994. The Climate Change Negotiations.
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By the start of INC's fifth and final negotiating session in February of 1992, substantial
differences remained among the delegations on many issues, but particularly on the issue of
industrialized country commitments. Although the OECD countries caucused almost
continuously throughout the negotiating session, the United States remained firmly opposed to
targets and timetables, and the other industrialized countries could not agree on the exact terms
of the proposed targets and timetables. At the end of the two-week session, with the draft Treaty
text containing numerous brackets and alternatives, it was decided that the meeting would be
suspended for several months to give the Parties to work informally to find some basis for an
agreement.
To facilitate these informal talks, the INC chairman scheduled a meeting of the "Extended
Bureau," a group of 20-25 key industrialized and developing country delegations, April 15-17 in
Paris. Just prior to this meeting, the major industrialized country delegations met under the
auspices of the OECD to try to resolve the issue of targets and timetables. Unable to do so, they
emerged with two radically different proposals. The first, favored by European countries and
environmental groups, required countries to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.
The second, proposed by the United States, simply required parties to adopt policies and
measures that "will contribute to the global effort regarding this Convention, recognizing that the
reduction of growth of net anthropogenic emissions of the total of all greenhouse gases.. .would
be an appropriate signal that longer-term emissions trends have been modified consistent with
that objective."2"
During the Extended Bureau meeting, the U.S. delegation delivered an ultimatum to the
European delegations, making it clear that that the United States would not agree to a treaty that
required countries to stabilize their emissions. The German and U.K. delegations, recognizing
that their own constituents would have difficulty accepting a treaty regime that did not include
the United States, agreed to compromise. Reinstein; Ansgar Vogel, the head of the German
delegation; and David Fisk, the head of the U.K. delegation, drafted language to take back to
their capitals after the meeting that they thought would be accepted by both coalitions. To
provide the European delegations with a certain amount of "political cover", this draft language
was taken to Washington by Michael Howard, the U.K. Environment Minister, for discussion
with Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs.2 7
This compromise consisted two very ambiguous subparagraphs.2" The first establishes a
"quasi-target," requiring developed countries to adopt and report on national policies to limit
emissions and enhance sinks with the "aim of returning to" 1990 emissions levels.29 The second
states that a return by the year 2000 to "earlier" emissions levels would be recognized as a
26 Paragraph VI.2.1. of INC document A/AC.237/18/Rev.4 (April 15, 1992).
27Interview #7. Department of State, United States. Jan., 1989. See also Pearce, Fred. 1992. US Forces Earth
Summit to cut carbon commitment. New Scientist, May 9, 1992. pg. 6.
28 For a description of the negotiating history of these paragraphs, see Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary and Reinstein, Robert A. 1993. The Framework
Convention on Climate Change: Developed Country Commitments on Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Unpublished
article. On file with the author.
29 UNFCCC, Paragraph 4.2 (a). The initial compromise used the term "guideline" rather than "aim". However,
Germany requested that "aim" or "goal" be used in order to be more consistent with the negotiating history
(Interview #7. Department of State, United States. Jan., 1989).
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contribution to a modification of longer-term emissions trends. There is no explicit linkage
between the two paragraphs, however. In addition, the proposal called for Parties to provide
detailed reports to the Conference of the Parties (COP) on the policies and measures they are
being undertaking to meet this goal.
Although many European countries balked at the proposal, President Bush made it clear in
phone calls with EC President Jacques Delors, French President Mitterand, Dutch Prime Minister
Lubbers and Chancellor Kohl that the United States would not sign the treaty and that he would
not attend the Rio meeting unless the compromise language was accepted.30 The European
countries capitulated, and the compromise language was introduced when the INC's Fifth Session
resumed in June of 1992. This language was ultimately adopted by the negotiators in the final
treaty, allowing the Convention to be opened for signature at the 1992 U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
7.2.2. Phase 2: COP 1 and the Berlin Mandate (1992-1994)
Although members of the Precautionary Coalition, particularly representatives of
environmental groups and European and Small Island countries, viewed the final language with
its "soft" target as a defeat, they were able to require that the adequacy of these commitments
would be reviewed by the COP at its first session." Delegates also agreed at the last negotiating
session to a "prompt start" to the treaty by requiring Annex I countries to prepare and submit
their national communications to the Secretariat quickly so that they would be available this
review. 2 Most nations ratified the Convention quickly, and it entered force in March of 1994.
A critical event that shifted the balance of power between the two coalitions was the election
of President Clinton and Vice-President Gore in the fall of 1992. With the change in
administration, powerful members of the Economic Growth coalition were removed from both
the national and international policy-making process, while members of the Precautionary
Coalition, such as Vice-President Gore, gained significant decision-making authority. This
allowed the Precautionary Coalition to attempt once again to institute legally-binding targets and
timetables.
The INC held six additional sessions after the 1992 adoption of the FCCC in preparation for
COP I, which was to be held in the Spring of 1995 in Berlin, Germany. The first two INC
sessions, were devoted to various institutional issues, and discussions related to national
30 Gutfeld, R. How Bush Achieved Global Warming Pact with No Timetables. Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1992.
pg. Al.; Interview #7. Department of State, United States. Jan., 1989. Also see memo in Appendix A.
31 Article 4.2.(d). of the Convention requires that the COP at its first session review the adequacy of Articles 4.2(a).
and (b). in light of the best available scientific information and assessments of climate change and its impacts, as
well as relevant technical, social and economic information.
32 See Resolution INC/FCC/1992/I in A/AC.237/18 (Part II)./Add. 1, as well as Borione, Delphine and Jean Ripert.
1994. Exercising Common but Differentiated Responsibility. In Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of
the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Dowdeswell, Elizabeth and Richard J. Kinley. 1994. Constructive Damage to the Status Quo. In Negotiating
Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Chayes, Antonia H., Eugene B. Skolnikoff, and David G. Victor.
1992. A Prompt Start: Implementing the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Cambridge: Harvard Law
School/MIT Center for International Studies.
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commitments were not initiated until INC 8 (August 16-27, 1993) when the issue of joint
implementation (JI) was taken up.33  Proponents of JI - the United States, Canada, Japan, the
Nordic countries, Australia, and New Zealand - argued that the most cost-effective approach to
reducing emissions is to undertake mitigation efforts in those countries where it is the least costly
to do so." Most EU countries, as well as most environmental groups, were opposed to this
approach, viewing it as an effort to avoid making difficult choices domestically by shifting the
burden to developing countries." While not absolutely opposed to Joint Implementation, many
of the developing country delegates expressed the view that the language referring to joint
implementation was meant to apply only to transactions among Annex I countries. 36
The debate on the adequacy of commitments began during INC 9 (February 7-10, 1994),
which coincided with the release of a special IPCC report stating that atmospheric concentrations
would continue to rise for at least two centuries even if current C02 emissions were stabilized at
the global level. 37 The FCCC Secretariat also distributed at INC 9 an analysis of the first 15
national communications of industrialized countries that indicated that the actions being taken by
most of these countries would be insufficient to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels. In
response to these reports, delegates from the United States, the EU and its member states, and
many developing countries suggested that a review could only conclude that the commitments in
article 4.2.a and 4.2.b are inadequate and need to be strengthened.3" Environmental NGOs went
further, issuing a statement calling for the adoption at COP I of the Toronto Conference target
and stating that this target is the minimum first step towards reaching the objective of the
Convention. However, Australia and Japan, both of which were dominated by the Economic
Growth coalition, did not clearly state at this point that the commitments were clearly inadequate,
and no further progress was made during the next two negotiating sessions.
In an effort to force the issue, AOSIS, with support from a number of environmental groups,
introduced in INC 11 (February 6-17, 1995) a draft protocol that call for Annex I countries to
reduce their C02 emissions by 2005 to a level of at least 20 percent below that of 1990.
Germany, under pressure to take a leadership role in crafting further commitments, proposed
3 Article 4.2.a of the Convention states that Annex I countries may implement policies and measures "jointly" but
does not define how this might be done.
3 See, e.g., Kjellen, Bo. 1994. A Personal Assessment. In Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio
Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Wirl, F., C.
Huber, and I. 0. Walker. 1998. Joint implementation: Strategic reactions and possible remedies. Environmental &
Resource Economics 12, 2: 203-224 for a further discussion of Joint Implementation issues.
3 Opposition among developing countries was such that Ambassador Estrada, the INC Chairman, made a very
unusual statement from the chair on behalf of Argentina, stating that JI will allow those who have the money to
continue to do as they like (ECO Newsletter, INC 8, #5).
36 The G77 also drew a strong distinction between the use of Joint Implementation of "cooperation" and its use for
"credit," arguing that JI could be used in conjunction with additional post-2000 commitments, but should not be
used to meet the year 2000 commitments. Mexico, which was participating in a joint emissions reduction project
with Norway, broke with the G-77 during INC 8 by supporting the concept of JI among developed and developing
countries. Argentina and Colombia indicated support for this during INC 10, and it was ultimately agreed that a
'pilot phase' be initiated.
" IPCC 1994.
38 The most common reason given was that these paragraphs relates only to the end of the century and say nothing
specific about the ensuing time period. (ECO Newsletter, INC 9, Issue #2).
129
specific language for this Protocol, suggesting Annex I Parties commit to stabilizing emissions at
1990 levels by the year 2000, and that these Parties "... commit themselves to reducing their C02
emissions by the year (x) individually or jointly by (y)%." It did not, however, suggest specific
numbers and dates to replace (x) and (y). The United States, while not making specific
proposals, called for a "new post-2000 aim" and proposed "common actions" by Annex 1 parties.
Oil-producing countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Venezuela, argued against
further negotiations, saying they felt existing commitments by developed countries must be met
first before addressing the question of adequacy.
Heated debate also ensued regarding the scope of any new commitments. The German
proposal included a provision that would work toward further reporting commitments for non-
Annex I countries, as well as "commitments to limit the rise of emissions in the case of certain
more advanced developing countries." The United States called for "broader leadership" in
efforts to combat climate change by differentiating among non-Annex I countries and promoting
new efforts by the more "advanced" developing countries to limit their greenhouse gas
emissions. The G-77 countries, however, vehemently objected to this, arguing that any review of
paragraphs 4.2.a & b, and any further commitments based on this review, should be restricted to
Annex I parties.
These debates were ultimately resolved during COP I in April of 1995. Environmental
NGOs invested tremendous effort to broker a compromise among members of the G-77 and the
EU. The host country, Germany, together with other EU member States, cleared the way for
progress by clarifying that they would not require developing country commitments to be on the
agenda of protocol negotiations.39 A so-called "Green Group" of developing countries, led by
India and comprised of most other G-77 countries except for the OPEC countries, therefore
agreed that negotiations should begin to strengthen the commitment of Annex I countries.
Finally, with the Clinton Administration publicly supporting a commitment to stabilizing
emissions by the year 2000, the United States joined other countries in concluding that the
specific commitments contained in the FCCC were inadequate to meet the Convention's
objectives, and that additional commitments were necessary. The Parties at the COP agreed to
begin a process that would strengthen the commitments for Annex I parties for the period after
2000. These strengthened commitments were to include "quantified limitation and reduction
objectives within specified time-frames...," i.e., targets and timetables. This "Berlin Mandate"
was to be carried out by an "open-ended ad hoc group of Parties," which became known as the
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), and was to be completed in time for adoption at
COP 3 in 1997.
7.2.3. Phase 3: COP III and the Kyoto Protocol (1994-1997)
The AGBM met eight times between COP 1 and COP 3. The range of issues that Parties
needed to resolve in a relatively short period of time were substantial, including:
. Whether the "quantified limitation and reduction objectives" would be legally-binding;
. The strength and timing of these targets and timetables;
39 To facilitate this agreement, Germany hosted in March an informal Ministerial meeting of 16 key developed and
developing countries. It was at this meeting that an informal agreement was reached on the 1997 deadline ( 1995.
EU to Push for Coordinated Measures in Climate Protocol. Environment Watch Western Europe, Mar. 17, 1995.).
130
" Whether or not different targets would apply to different countries;
. Whether specific targets would be developed for each GHG or a single target would apply
to all GHGs as a group; and,
. The extent to which "flexibility mechanisms," such as JI and emissions trading, could be
used to meet targets;
Although the Precautionary Coalition now dominated the policy-making process in the
United States and most other industrialized countries, the Economic Growth coalition was still
able to exert sufficient influence in Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia,
Norway, and New Zealand, which collectively became known as the JUSSCANZ group. In
particular, the Economic Growth coalition was able to demand that, for the sake of equity,
developing countries also take on additional commitments, although this was beyond the scope
of the Berlin Mandate. In addition, these countries took the position that a detailed analysis and
assessment of policies and measures (PAMs) was necessary before negotiations could commence
on specific targets and timetables, and that negotiations should not start until after the IPCC
released its second assessment report at end of 1995.
When the IPCC's Second Assessment stated that "the balance of the evidence suggests that
there is a discernible human influence on global climate," the United States reversed its position,
announcing at AGBM 3 in the spring of 1996 that negotiations regarding specific targets should
begin.4" Germany, supported by some other EU countries, immediately proposed that
industrialized countries should reduce 1990 levels of CO2 by 10 percent by 2005 and 15-20
percent by 2010.4" Australia, Russia, and the OPEC countries refused to accept the SAR as a
basis for further negotiations, however, arguing that the prevailing uncertainties did not justify
doing so.
The Precautionary Coalition within the United States continued to exert its position
regarding targets and timetables during COP 2 (July, 1996 in Geneva) when U.S. Under-
Secretary of State Timothy Wirth called for intensified international negotiations on a "realistic,
verifiable and binding medium-term emission target." 2 Although Australia, Russia, and the
OPEC countries continued to oppose the use of the SAR as the scientific basis for the
development of legally-binding targets and timetables, the change in the U.S. position enabled
agreement on the Geneva Ministerial Declaration, which called for Parties to accelerate
negotiations of legally-binding protocol or another legal instrument that includes commitments
for Annex I Parties regarding "quantified legally-binding objectives for emission limitations and
significant overall reductions within specified time-frames..." 3
No proposals for specific targets and timetables were put forward until AGBM 6, in March
1997. At this session, the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the EU, proposed that the
combined emissions of C0 2, CH4, and N20 in industrialized countries should be cut by 15
40IPCC. 1995. IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information Relevant to Interpreting
Article of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC.
41 There was a substantial debate within the EU, however, as to whether targets should be derived from PAMs or
vice-versa, as well as whether there should be differentiated targets within the EU. See FCCC/AGBM/1996/5 and
Earth Negotiations Bulletin Vol. 12, No. 27, March 11, 1996, for reports of AGBM 3.
42 Speech by Timothy Wirth, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, on file with the author.
4 See FCCC/CP/1996/15 and Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 38, July 22, 1996, for a more detailed
account of COP 2.
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percent by 2010. To resolve substantial struggles within the EU as to differentiation, the EU
developed an internal burden-sharing agreement, or "bubble," in which this target would be
applied to the EU as a whole, but countries within the EU would have different targets.
The United States and other JUSSCANZ countries were more concerned at this point with
finding ways to ensure that countries would have flexibility in how they meet their commitments.
As part of this effort, the United States introduced a "Draft Protocol Framework" that included 5-
year emission budgets, JI, emissions trading, and the borrowing of emissions "units" from one
period to the next." The United States and other JUSSCANZ countries also continued to push
for additional developing country commitments, with the United States proposing that the
Protocol contain an "Annex B" list of countries without legally-binding targets that would
voluntarily adopt emission limitations, and that commitments for all Parties should be agreed by
2005. Developing countries firmly rejected this proposal, however.
At AGBM 7, the EU modified its initial proposal by suggesting an intermediate cut of GHG
emissions of industrialized countries by 7.5 percent of 1990 levels by 2005. At AGBM 8, Japan
proposed a formula for differentiated emission reduction targets up to 5 percent for C0 2, N20,
and CH 4 collectively (i.e., a "basket approach"). The G-77 and China tabled a proposal that
called for industrialized countries to reduce C0 2, CH4 , and N20 by 7.5 percent by 2005, 15
percent by 2010, and 35 percent by 2020, in essence supporting the EU position.4 ' The United
States also expanded on its draft protocol framework at AGBM 8 by proposing that emissions of
C0 2, CH4, N20, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 collectively be returned to 1990 levels in the budget
period 2008-2012, with all countries required to meet the same target. However, Parties would
be able to use JI and emissions trading and borrow from subsequent budget periods in order to
meet their commitments. It also said that it would not assume binding obligations "unless key
developing nations meaningfully participate" in the effort.4 6  Little common ground could be
found among these competing proposals, however, and AGBM 8, the last negotiating session
before COP 3, ended without agreement.
In the months prior to COP 3, a number of countries, concerned that COP 3 would end in
failure, began intensive informal talks, both multilaterally and bilaterally. Although most of
these efforts were unsuccessful, some resulted in slight forward movement. 47  For example,
during a tour of Latin America in October of 1997, President Clinton was able to persuade
Argentinean President Menem to issue a statement acknowledging that any meaningful solution
to the problem of global warming had to address the question of developing countries emission
limits. In November of 1997, during a visit to Saudi Arabia by Prime Minister Hashimoto of
44 See FCCC/ABGM/1997/MISC.1.
4 To gain the support of OPEC countries, the proposal also called for the establishment of a Compensation Fund that
would compensate those developing countries adversely affected by efforts by industrialized countries to reduce
emissions. See FCCCC/AGBM/MISC. 1/Add. 6, 8, and 10.
46 Remarks by the President on Global Climate Change, National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C. October 22,
1997, on file with the author.
47 For example, German environment minister Angela Merkel visited China and Japan in August of 1997, while other
high-level environmental officials met with their counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other eastern
European countries. In November of 1997, the EU environment commissioner and the environment ministers of
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met with chief US negotiators, and the U.K. Environment
Minister John Prescott held talks with Australia and New Zealand.
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Japan, Crown Prince Abdullah promised that Saudi Arabia would provide constructive
cooperation at Kyoto.4 ' At the same time, Japan host an informal meeting for Environment
Ministers of key countries at which the participants agreed that industrialized countries should
meet legally binding targets expressed in budget periods of up to five years. Brazil and the
United States also developed a common understanding at the meeting regarding a mechanism for
cooperation between developing countries and industrialized countries, which was to evolve into
the Clean Development Mechanism.
Despite these efforts, there were considerable differences among the Parties on most of the
critical issues when COP 3 began. The main meeting of the COP was held on Dec 1-7, 1997,
followed by a high-level ministerial segment on Dec 8-10. Among the unresolved issues were:
- The size, timing, and design of emission limits;
- The number of gases covered by these limits;
- Whether or not all countries would be required to meet the same target;
- Whether and to what extent sinks would count towards emission reduction targets
- How developing countries would be involved; and,
- Whether and to what extent JI, emissions trading, and the EU bubble would be allowed.
Although the United States changed its position on differentiation during the first week of
COP 3, most of the remaining issues were still unresolved when the Ministerial segment began,
at which point the United States, the European Union, and Japan began intensive trilateral
discussions regarding the exact size of the targets to be adopted in the hope that a resolution on
this issue could help resolve negotiations on sinks, emissions trading, and joint implementation.
On Monday, December 7, Vice-President Gore made a quick appearance in Kyoto to try to
break the impasse. Before he departed, he announced that he had instructed the U.S. negotiators
to "show increased flexibility" in reaching an agreement. This helped break the logjam. Stuart
Eizenstat, the lead negotiator for the United States, agreed that night to accept more aggressive
cuts in emissions, and other countries responded with similar concessions
By December 9, the basic framework for an agreement began to take shape, with agreement
having been reached on a number of issues, including differentiated targets for the commitment
period 2006-2010; joint implementation between industrialized countries, including the EU
"bubble"; and the inclusion of some categories of sinks. However, agreement had not yet been
reached on the exact size of the targets, the number of gases involved, emissions trading, and
developing country involvement.
This final impasse was broken during a five-hour meeting late in the evening of the 9th after
United States finally retreated from its insistence on a mechanism to bring developing countries
gradually into the protocol. Japan then agreed to accept an emissions target significantly higher
that what negotiators had said was Japan's bottom line. After 24 hours of intense negotiations
both in Kyoto and among capitals, an agreement was reached on targets of 8 percent, 7 percent,
48 In return, Hashimoto agreed to launch negotiations on an investment protection agreement to boost Japanese
investment in Saudi Arabia and to look at ways to increase Saudi oil imports. "Fahd appears to favor renewing oil
concessions in talks with Hashimoto", Daily Yomiuri, November 17, 1997.
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and 6 percent below 1990 levels for the EU, the United States, and Japan. Japan and the United
States were also able to force the EU to accept emissions trading as part of the package, and the
draft text also contained a provision for "voluntary commitments" by developing countries."9
The targets for the remaining countries (Table 7.7) were the result of "voluntary pledges"
made by each country." Although justified on basis of "special situations," the numbers were not
based in science or negotiation, but were set by each negotiator's estimate of what domestic
constituencies would tolerate. A certain amount of "gamesmanship" among these countries also
took place once the EU, Japan, and the United States reached an agreement on their targets, with
a number of countries backing away from the targets to which they had agreed only a day earlier.
For example, during the closing hours of the negotiations, Russia and the Ukraine rejected the 5
percent reduction that had been acceptable only two days earlier, refusing to go beyond
stabilization. The EU target had been proposed for most of the Eastern European countries, as
they were expected to join the European Union with a few years. However, Hungary and Poland
rejected this after the targets for Russia and Ukraine were changed. The EU, Japan, and the
United States did little to counter these shifts, however, as they did not want to alienate other
countries and put their own fragile agreement at risk.
The final adoption of the Protocol began at 1 am in the morning of December 11, 1997, even
though the final numbers for industrialized country targets had not yet been released. The
Table 7.7 Proposed Targets for Annex I Countries as of December 9, 1997
Country or Country Group Target
EU and other European countries 8% below 1990 levels
New Zealand Stabilization
Russia 5% below 1990 levels
Ukraine 5% below 1990 levels
United States 5% below 1990 levels
Canada 5% below 1990 levels
Japan 4.5% below 1990 levels
Norway 5% above 1990 levels
process soon came close to collapsing once again when the G-77 and China, which had not been
a participant in the final negotiations regarding the targets, rejected the provisions on emissions
trading. Without these provisions, however, the United States and Japan would not sign on to the
agreement. The developing countries eventually agreed to allow the principle of emissions
trading to stand while putting off for a year discussions regarding the details of its
49 Interview #1. Department of State, United States. Dec., 1998; Warrick, Joby. 1997. Pact Rescued in Final Hours:
Turbulence Pervaded First round of Greenhouse Gas Talks. Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1997. A pg. 1.
50 Oberthur, S. and H. Ott. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
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implementation. In exchange, however, they were able to win the removal of the section on
"voluntary commitments."0
si Sullivan, Kevin and Joby Warrick. Weary Delegates Set Emissions Cuts for Developed Nations. Washington Post,
Dec. 11, 1997. A pg. 1.
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CHAPTER 8 - U.S. CLIMATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
U.S. climate change policy between 1988 and 1997 was determined in the U.S. Climate
Policy Subsystem. Within this subsystem, U.S. climate change policy was developed in three
phases. The first phase, from 1988 to mid-1992, resulted in the release of the policy paper "U.S.
Views on Global Climate Change" at INC5 and agreement on the Framework Convention on
Climate Change. The second, from mid-1992 to late 1993, resulted in the first U.S. Climate
Change Action Plan. The third phase took place from late 1993 to late 1997, and resulted in the
2"1 U.S. Climate Action Report and agreement on the Kyoto Protocol.
The 1993 U.S. Climate Change Action Plan, the policy output of the second phase of the
U.S. climate policy subsystem, described almost 50 measures covering a wide variety of
activities that would reduce U.S. GHG emissions. Despite this plan, U.S. emissions of GHGs
continued to rise, and, by 1997, it had become clear that emissions of GHGs at the end of the
decade would be at least 13 percent above 1990 levels.' The U.S. failure to meet the goal of
reducing U.S. emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000 that President Clinton announced
in May of 1993 has been attributed to several causes, including an unexpectedly high rate of
economic growth and low fuel prices. However, it can also be attributed to a failure of
implementation. In some cases, it failed to persuade Congress to pass legislation necessary to
implement a number of measures, such as an energy tax and the removal of a tax break for
employers that subsidize parking spaces for their employees. Although the energy tax was not
included in the 1993 Action Plan, Congress also blocked the implementation of a number of
measures that were included in the plan. For example, Congress cut substantially financing for
energy conservation measures, and temporarily blocked the Energy Department from issuing new
energy efficiency standards for household appliances. It also blocked efforts to require energy-
efficiency labels on care tires. The Energy Department itself failed to issue new efficiency
standards for electrical distribution transformers on power lines, while forestry agencies missed
to goals for planting trees.2
The remainder of this chapter will describe the dynamics of the U.S. Climate Policy
Subsystem between 1988 and 1997 and three overlapping subsystems: U.S. tire regulation
subsystem, the U.S. Green Lights policy subsystem and the U.S. tax policy subsystem (Figure
8.1). They provide good examples of the dynamics that occur among and within overlapping
subsystems to implement an international agreement in a country in which social forces are more
developed, public institutions are fragmented, and power is distributed among a number of
agencies and institutions.
Ellis, Jane and Karen Treanton. 1997. Recent trends in energy-related C02 emissions. Energy Policy 26: 685-96;
Stone, Peter. 1997. The Heat's On. National Journal, July 26, 1997. pg. 1595.
2 Cushman, John H. Why the U.S. Fell Short of Ambitious Goals for Reducing Greenhouse Gases. New York Times,
Oct. 20, 1997. pg. A15.
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Figure 8.1 The U.S. Climate Policy Subsystem and selected overlapping policy subsystems
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8.2 THE U.S. CLIMATE POLICY SUBSYSTEM
Like the International Climate Policy Subsystem, each of the three phases of the U.S.
climate policy subsystems involved two competing coalitions: an Economic Growth Coalition
and a Precautionary Coalition. The Economic Growth Coalition largely dominated the first
phase, while the Precautionary Coalition was able to dominate the second and third phases. In
the latter two phases, however, the Economic Growth coalition maintained a substantial amount
of strength, particularly within Congress, and was able to prevent the Precautionary Coalition
from achieving many of their policy goals.
8.2.1. Phase 1: 1988-1992
The first phase of the U.S. climate policy process started in late 1987 after the Montreal
Protocol was signed. Scientific agencies such as EPA, NASA, NOAA, and NSF had been
contributing significant resources to both domestic and international science programs on climate
change, and produced a number of different reports detailing both the causes of climate change
and its impacts.3  Following the completion of the Montreal Protocol, members of the
3 See, e.g., National Academy of Sciences. 1975. Understanding Climatic Change, A Program for Action.
Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences; Geophysical Research Board. 1977. Energy and Climate.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences; Council on Environmental Quality. 1981. Global Energy
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precautionary coalition began arguing that work on a climate treaty should begin immediately.
Initially, their primary opposition came from DOE's Carbon Dioxide Research Division, which
argued that more research was needed.4 However, the Reagan White House quickly became
involved, taking control of issue away from State and EPA, gave lead to White House Domestic
Policy Council's Working Group on Energy, Natural Resources, and Environment (ENRE).5
Working under the auspices of ENRE, the two coalitions eventually reached agreement on a
proposal for the creation of the IPCC.6 When the IPCC was formed under the auspices of UNEP
and the WMO, the United States assumed the chairmanship of Working Group III, the Response
Options working group.
EPA and the State Department received considerable support from members of Congress,
particularly Senators Al Gore and Tim Wirth. With the leadership of these two senators,
Congress passed the 1987 Global Climate Protection Act, which was attached to the FY1988-89
foreign aid bill. The Act designated EPA as the lead agency for the development of national
policy options and the State Department for coordinating foreign policy in order to "obtain
international participation in addressing the problems of global climate change."' While the
State Department was able to establish an interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to
address international climate change issues, other executive branch agencies, particularly the
Office of Management and Budget and the Departments of Interior, Energy and Commerce,
successfully resisted EPA's efforts to coordinate the development of a domestic policy.!
Climate change began to receive considerable public attention during the summer of 1988,
when the United States experienced one of its hottest summers in decades.' Campaigning for the
Presidency, Vice-President Bush attempted to separate himself from the Reagan Administration
by stating publicly that he would support international action on climate change and that he
Futures and the Carbon Dioxide Problem. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office;
U.S.Environmental Protection Agency. 1983. Can We Delay A Greenhouse Warming? Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency; and U.S.Environmental Protection Agency. 1988. The Potential Effects of
Global Climate Change on the United States: Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office..
4 Interview #18. Environmental Protection Agency, United States. Mar., 1998.
5 ENRE was not involved in international environmental issues until the Departments of Commerce and Interior and
other domestic agencies became aware of the potential impact on U.S. industry of the reductions in CFC
production and consumption being proposed by U.S. negotiators under the Montreal Protocol (Interview #6. The
Climate Council, United States. Jan., 1998).
6 Hecht and Tirpak. 1995. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History. For some,
the IPCC was seen as one means of addressing the scientific uncertainties. For others, it was viewed as a means to
slow down international movement towards a convention.
7 Public Law 100-204. Although federal activities regarding climate change had been coordinated by NOAA's
National Climate Program Office since 1978, this office was largely regarded as ineffective, and ceased to exist
after 1989.
8 Nitze. 1991. Improving U.S. Interagency Coordination of International Environmental Policy Development.
9 In June, 1999, NASA physicist James Hansen declared at Senate Energy Committee hearing that "99 percent
certainty" that global warming "is here" (Weisskoff, Michael. 1988. 'Greenhouse Effect' Fueling Policy Makers.
Washington Post, Aug. 15, 1988. 1 pg. 13). In October of that year, EPA released report on impacts of climate
change that stated that the cost of protecting major U.S. cities from climate change could reach 111 billion dollars
by the year 2100.
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would hold high-level meeting on global warming during his first year in office.'0 He was
elected President that November, and took office in January of 1989. During the first six months
of his administration, however, John Sununu, his chief of staff and most other high-level officials
were too engaged in managing the transition between the two administrations to focus on the
climate change issue. This left the precautionary coalition from the State Department and EPA
in control of U.S. climate policy."
Although the economic growth coalition began to regain control of the policy process during
the following year, a series of highly public missteps forced it to fulfill President Bush's
campaign pledge to host a global workshop in the fall to identify and address the issues required
to start negotiations on treaty." With this publicity, industry representatives started to become
more active in the economic growth coalition. In June of 1989, sixteen trade associations formed
Global Climate Coalition, which was to become the principal voice of industry on the issue."
The promised meeting, however, did not materialize for another year.
The Bush administration again faced pressure to commit to emissions reductions in
November at the Noordwijk conference on climate change. Despite intense preparatory work by
the conference organizers and and EPA, the United States rejected a conference statement in
which the participating governments agreed to stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by the year
2000." With polls showing that more than 70 percent of Americans thought that the United
10 During his campaign, Bush stated that "Those who think we're powerless to do anything about the 'greenhouse
effect' are forgetting about the 'White House effect.' As president, I intend to do something about it." (Balzar,
John. Bush vows 'zero tolerance' of environmental polluters. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 1, 1988. 1 pg. 1).
" An example of this can be seen in Secretary of State James Baker's speech at the first meeting of IPCC WG III in
January 1989, when he said, "We can probably not afford to wait until all the uncertainties have been resolved
before we do act. Time will not make the problem go away." In the spring of 1989, the National Security Council
(NSC). Policy Coordinating Committee on Oceans, Environment and Science (PCC/OES). took over coordination
of international environmental policy positions from ENRE as part of a reorganization of the NSC. Chaired by
State Department Assistant Secretary of State Fred Bernthal, the PCC/OES had representation from all domestic
and national security agencies. A Working Group on Climate Change was created under the PCC/OES that was
chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bill Nitze. Both of these individuals were important members of
the precautionary coalition in the State Department.
12 In May of 1989, Sununu and Darman rejected a request by EPA Administration Bill Reilly for permission to
announce at IPCC WGIII workshop that the United States would support the development of an international
convention on climate change (Weisskoff, Michael. 1989. Sununu blocked plan to seek convention on global
warming. Washington Post, May 6, 1989. pg. A2). At this same time, Darman's Office of Management and
Budget forced James Hansen to tone down testimony he was to give before the Senate Commerce subcommittee on
science, technology and space (Peterson, Cass. Experts, OMB spar on Global Warming. Washington Post, May 9,
1989. pg. Al). See also Weisskoff, Michael. 1992. Bush Was Aloof in Warming Debate. Washington Post, Oct.
31, 1992. A pg. 1; Weisskoff, Michael. 1989. U.S. Commits to talks on 'Greenhouse'. Washington Post, May 13,
1989. pg. Al.
'3 Companies included Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Edison Electric Institute, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, American Paper Institute, National Coal Association, National Association of Manufacturers, and
others.
14VROM had been working with EPA on preparations for the meeting, and had invited the EPA administrator to
attend (Interview #53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Jan., 1998).
Several weeks prior to the meeting, Reilly, supported by Baker, asked the PCC to support an announcement that
the United States would stabilize C02 emissions at present level and would host an international conference
following year to start negotiations. The PCC, led by Sununu and Darman, rejected these proposals Sununu,
Darman, and most other members of the DPC also wanted to prevent Reilly from attending the meeting, but
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States should take action against climate change, the White House was finally forced to drop its
resistance to negotiations on a climate treaty soon after the meeting."
This change was also due in part to a softening in views by Bromley and Secretary of Energy
Watkins. Soon afterward the Noordwijk meeting, the White House transferred the responsibility
for coordinating domestic policy on climate change to a special White House Working Group on
Climate Change that was chaired by Bromley (the "Bromley Group"). Bromley, a nuclear
physicist from Yale who had substantial influence over Bush on scientific issues, used this
position to become more familiar with the issue, and agreed with Reilly and Baker that
negotiations should begin.'' At his recommendation, President Bush announced at a summit
meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in December that the United States would host
a conference in the fall to prepare for negotiations of a framework convention on climate change.
Bush also announced plans for an international meeting in the spring at the White House for top-
level scientific, environmental and economic officials on global climate issues.
In January of 1990, Sununu and others in the economic growth coalition sought to strengthen
its control of the State Department by replacing several key individuals." Robert Reinstein
became the point person within the State Department on climate change issues. Secretary of
State Baker, who had been an ally of Reilly, recused himself from the issue and handed
responsibility for it to Robert Zoellick, the State Department counselor." However, Reinstein
reported directly to the White House rather than to Zoellick.9
Despite committing additional missteps during the spring of 1990, President Bush and other
members of the economic growth coaltion continued to refuse additional commitments on
climate change.2" To fulfill its pledge of the previous spring, the White House held a Conference
acquiesced after it was agreed that Bromley would lead the delegation (Frankel, Glen. U.S. Moves To Block Pact
On Emissions. Washington Post pg. Al).
" Schwartz, Maralee. Warming to the idea of leadership. Washington Post, Dec. 6, 89 A.D. pg. A10.
'
6B:romley reportedly spent the six weeks after the Noordwijk issue meeting with a wide range scientists (Dolan,
Maura and Rudy Abramson. Politics, Science shift bush stand on global warming. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 5,
1989. A pg. 1; Chen, Edwin. Scientists find a new home at the white house. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 18, 1989. B
pg. 3).
'7 Curtis Bohlen, the senior vice president of the World Wildlife Fund, replaced Fred Bernthal, who was transferred
to the National Science foundation. Bohlen immediately recused himself on the issue, citing potential conflicts of
interest with holdings in the oil industry. Bill Nitze, who was viewed by Sununu as being too aggressive, was fired
(Holden, Constance. 1990. Environmentalist Shakeup at state. Science 247, 4941: 407; Weisskoff. 1992. Bush Was
Aloof in Warming Debate).
18 Weisskoff, Michael. 1990. Baker Sitting Out Global Warming Debate. Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1990. pg. A25;
Weisskoff. 1992. Bush Was Aloof in Warming Debate.
19 Interview #7. Department of State, United States. Jan., 2005.
20 For example, speaking at the third meeting of the IPCC in February of 1990, President Bush called for more
research before specific commitments are made to reduce emissions, stating, "Our policies must be consistent with
economic growth" and complained that in some areas of the debate, "politics and opinion have outpaced the
science (McNulty, Timothy. Bush links economics to environmental answers. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 6, 1990. 1 pg.
3). A public furor quickly arose regarding the speech, which was rewritten by Sununu and Darman after they
found first draft, written by Reilly, Watkins, and a few others, too strong. On a television news show, Sununu
acknowledged revising the speech to make it "more reflective of administration policy," and said, "There's a little
tendency by some of the faceless bureaucrats on the environmental side to try and create a policy in this country
that cuts off our use of coal, oil and natural gas. I don't think America wants not to be able to use their
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on Science and Economic Research Related to Global Change in April of 1990. In his opening
speech, Bush stated that actions "already justified on economic and other grounds" should be
taken." However, the Administration suffered considerable embarrassment when participants,
particularly those from Europe, sharply criticized the conference as focusing on research instead
of action, and the Administration was forced to state clearly that research is not a substitute for
action."
Through the remainder of the year, the two coalitions pursued various strategies to put
forward their views. At the G-7 summit in Houston in July, European leaders, particularly
Chancellor Kohl of Germany, pressured Bush to agree to a statement committing to stabilizing
emissions of greenhouse gas emissions, while environmental NGOs embarrassed the
administration by releasing "environmental scorecard" that placed United States far behind other
countries on protecting the environment." In October, Democratic and Republican Senators had
sent letters urging action on climate change at the upcoming Second World Climate
Conference." On the other side, members of the economic growth coalition also pursued their
agenda, arguing that the uncertainties were too great to warrant immediate action." At the
Second World Climate Conference in November, the United States again refused to commit to a
declaration that again called for the stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.2"
automobiles." (Engleberg, Stephen. Sununu says he revised speech on global warming. New York Times, Feb. 5,
1990. A pg. 15). According to White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, the speech was intended to signal
a call to research" rather than "a call to action."(Dumanski, Dianne. An 'environmental president' backpedals on
acid rain. Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1990. pg. 16).
21 Sununu was deeply involved in the planning of this workshop, including choosing speakers, editing press releases
and demanding hourly reports. (Weisskoff. 1992. Bush Was Aloof in Warming Debate).
2 Atlas, Terry. U.S. rebuffed at talks on global warming. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 19, 1990. News pg. 11. The
Administration was also embarrassed by leak of talking points highlighting skepticism of issue. For example,
among the points listed under "debates to avoid" was the statement that is was "not beneficial to discuss whether
there is or is not" global warming or how much or how little warming. It stated that, in the eyes of the public, " we
will lose this debate. A better approach is to raise the many uncertainties that need to be better understood on this
issue." (Shabecoff, Philip. Bush Denies Putting Off Action On Averting Global Climate Shift. New York Times,
Apr. 18, 1990. B pg. 4.).
23 Beamish, Rita. U.S. Remains on Hot Seat in Environmental Dispute. Associated Press, July 10, 1990.;Pine, Art.
High Noon In Houston? White House Fears Confrontation. Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1989. H pg. 8; Suro,
Roberto. Bush defends blocking Kohl environment plan., July 12, 1990. A pg. 14.
24 Dumanski, Dianne. US seen stalling effort to end global warming. Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1989. National/Foreign
pg. 1.
25For example, in May of 1990, an economic assessment of potential U.S. policy responses to global climate change
funded by the GCC and the Electric Power Research Institute suggested that such responses could cause a
significant drop in U.S. GDP. This effort was undertaken at the prompting of representatives in the Department of
Commerce and the International Trade Administration, who felt that previous analyses had underestimated these
costs (Interview #15. Department of Commerce, United States. Jan., 1998). That December, the White House
Council of Economic Advisors issued a report stating that economic costs to deal with climate change could be
"$800 billion under optimistic scenarios of available fuel substitutes and increasing energy efficiency to $3.6
trillion under pessimistic scenarios between now and 2010."
26 Notably, the U.S. delegation to the conference was headed by John Knauss, the head of NOAA, rather than Bill
Reilly, serving to maintain the administration's emphasis on research.
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The Administration also resisted efforts by members of the precautionary coalition in Congress
to address climate change as part of the reauthorization of the Clean Air Act.27
Negotiations for a framework convention on climate change began in February of 1991 with
the United States hosting the first U.N. International Negotiating Committee session in Chantilly
Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.2" At this first meeting, the administration released
"America's Climate Change Strategy: An Action Agenda" that highlighted comprehensive
actions that the United States was taking had already planned or proposed that would hold U.S.
net greenhouse gas emission in the year 2000 to below 1987 levels.2 9
As negotiations progressed through 1991, Sununu and others in the U.S. economic growth
coalition exerted tight control over the U.S. position at the negotiations. They were supported
in this effort by an aggressive campaign against a treaty mounted by various industry groups."
Early in December of 1991, however, Sununu was forced to resign as chief of staff. Although
this bolstered the hopes of the precautionary coalition that the U.S. position would change when
the fourth INC meeting began later that month, Darman and others in the economic growth
coalition remained securely in control of U.S. climate change policy."
At the 5 1h INC session in New York in February 1992, the Administration released a
"Statement on Commitments" that delineated a set of measures that it would undertake to
27Throughout the latter part of 1990, Congress and the Administration had been embroiled in negotiations over the
reauthorization of the Clean Air Act. Sununu, Darman and Roger Porter, Bush's domestic policy advisor, removed
restrictions on C02 and watered down other provisions over the objections of Reilly, and when the Clean Air Act
Amendments were passed by Congress in December, they did not address GHGs. For example, at one point during
the negotiations, Reilly told several members of a House subcommittee by telephone that the administration
opposed attempts to dilute a program that encouraged the use of alternative fuels in automobiles. However, an aid
to Sununu was in the committee room, countermanding Reilly's statements (Roberts, Steven V., Kenneth Walsh,
Michael Satchell, Ann Andrews, and Dorian Friedman. 1990. Is Bush in nature's way? U.S.News & World Report,
Mar. 19, 1990. pg. 20; Harbrecht, Douglas and Lee Walczak. 1990. Sununu's bite is as bad as his bark. Business
Week, May 28, 1990. pg. 22). The administration also thwarted a proposal to raise car fuel-efficiency standards,
although the amendments promoted clean coal technologies and energy efficiency improvements in utilities.
28 Coincidentally, temperatures at Washington's National Airport hit 70*F, breaking a record set in 1883.
29 These actions included meeting international commitments to phase out chlorofluorocarbons, complying with new
Clean Air Act, limiting methane emissions from landfills and implementing energy efficiency measures contained
in its recently published National Energy Strategy (Abramson, Rudy. 1991. Talks on global warming pact could
put U.S. in the hot seat. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3, 1991. A pg. 5).
30 Sununu was very aware of status of negotiations during the first year of negotiations, with Reinstein, the lead
negotiator, briefing Bromley every morning and Bromley in turn briefing Sununu (Interview #7. Department of
State, United States. Jan., 1989).
31 Western Fuels, a U.S. utility association, spent around $250,000 to produce a video called "The Greening of Plane
Earth," which made the claim that "C02 fertilization of the atmosphere helps produce more food for people and
wildlife." Enterprise for Education, which markets "educational" materials on behalf of clients in the utility and
energy sectors, produced a kit called "The Greenhouse Effect and Global Warming" that suggested that global
warming may not be a serious problem. A number of coal, oil, and utility groups also established the Information
Council for the Environment (ICE)., which developed a sophisticated print and radio media campaign intended to
"reposition global warming as theory, not fact." According to internal ICE documents, the campaign was
deliberately targeted at "older, less educated men" and "young, low income women." (Levy and Egan. 1998.
Capital contests: National and transnational channels of corporate influence on the climate change negotiations;
Gelbspan. 1997. The Heat is On: The high stakes battle over Earth's threatened climate).
32 Palmer, Randall. Climate Change Talks Resume., Dec. 7, 1991.
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mitigate climate change." Despite efforts by the precautionary coalition to shift the U.S.
position, however, United States made it clear to the international community that Bush would
not attend the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in June if the precautionary
coalition continued to insist on a treaty containing targets and timetables." This position was
reiterated at the OECD meeting in Paris later that month."
At the resumption of the INC's fifth session in May of 1992, the Administration released a
document entitled U.S. Views on Global Climate Change that outlined a series of actions then
being taken that would reduce projected net greenhouse gas emissions by 125 to 200 million
metric tons in the year 2000. In doing so, it suggested that United States might not be far from
the goal of reducing its net emissions of CO2 to 1990 levels by 2000. However, Reinstein
continued to reject treaty language referring to targets and timetables.
As discussed in Chapter 7, the precautionary coalition was forced to retreat from its
insistence on such language, as European delegations realized that their own domestic
constituencies would complain if the United States did not sign the treaty. Reinstein; Ansgar
Vogel, the head of the German delegation; and David Fisk, the head of the U.K. delegation,
worked out a two-paragraph compromise that required developed countries to adopt and report
on national policies to limit emissions and enhance sinks, with 1990 emissions levels serving as a
"guideline" for doing so. Although the Bromley group accepted this initial language, the German
delegation had some difficulties with the term "guideline," as it had never been used before in the
negotiations. Vogel asked that a term such as "aim" or "goal" be used instead of "guideline" in
order to be more consistent with the history of the negotiations.
Most members of the Bromley group did not want to accept this change, particularly
Darman, Boskins, and several others who were looking for a reason to the walk away from the
negotiations. However, Watkins, Reilly, and several others recognized the need for an
agreement, and were able to convince President Bush to accept the use of the word "aim."36 The
3 These included improvements in energy efficiency, transportation, and other areas. Although some saw the
statement as an indication that the United States might be willing to limit its emissions, others criticized it as being
only a compilation of measures already planned or required under existing law (Weisskoff, Michael. 1992. Global
Warming Rift Threatens Treaty. Washington Post, Feb. 28, 1992. pg. A3).
3 To increase public pressure, Senator Gore released a U.S. position paper leaked to him that suggested that the
United States could change its position if certain conditions were met (Stevens, W. Washington May Change Its
Position On Climate. New York Times, Feb. 18, 1992. C pg. 1). At the same time, EPA circulated informally plan
that would stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, but could be abandoned if it proves unrealistic or too
expensive for U.S. businesses (Shabecoff, Philip. A Political Freeze on U.S. Policy. New York Times, Feb. 24,
1992.).
35Prior to the meeting, many in precautionary coalition thought that the United States would change position because
of election year politics and public concern regarding the environment reaching an all-time high (Shabecoff, Philip.
Environmental Concern Higher Than Ever. Greenwire, Apr. 21, 1992.). However, Clayton Yeutter, who had
replace Andrew Card as domestic policy chief, reiterated that Bush would only attend UNCED if he could sign an
agreement that "is in the best interest of the United States." (Kriz, Margaret. 1992. Global Warming Causes
Political Heat. National Journal, Apr. 11, 1992. pg. 881; Weisskoff. 1992. Bush Was Aloof in Warming
Debate;Beamish, Rita. White House Debating Whether Bush Should Attend Earth Summit. Associated Press, Apr.
5, 1992.).
3 6Watkins found the word "aim" was preferable over "goal" because "a goal is like a target: you need to hit it or it
doesn't count. However, you can aim at a target, but you might miss" (Interview #7. Department of State, United
States. Jan., 1989).
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revised language was incorporated into the final draft of the FCCC and Bush agreed to travel to
Rio de Janeiro to sign the treaty. The Administration aggressively pursued ratification of the
treaty by the Senate and, in December of 1992, the United States became the first industrialized
country to ratify the Convention. Although the outcome was a severe disappointment to the U.S.
precautionary coalition, the U.S. economic growth coalition was quite satisfied."
Table 8.1 Members of Precautionary Coalition
Clinton Administration
Affiliation Prior To 1992 Elections
T. J. Glauthier World Wide Fund For Nature
Eileen Claussen Environmental Protection Agency
David Doniger Natural Resources Defense Council
David Harwood
Kathleen McGinty
William Nitze
Rafe Pomerantz
Robert Watson
Timothy Wirth
Carole Browner
Karl Hausker
Senate, Office Of Timothy Wirth
Senate, Office Of Al Gore
Alliance To Save Energy
World Resources Institute
National Aeronautics And Space Administration
Senate
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
Appointed to High-Level Positions in the
Position In Clinton Administration
Associate Director for natural resources, energy, and
science, Office Of Management And Budget
Senior Director for Global Environmental Affairs, National
Security Council; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans,
Environment and Science, Department Of State
Counsel to the Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and
Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency
Chief of Staff for Global Affairs, Department Of State
Director, Office Of Environmental Policy
Assistant Administrator for International Affairs,
Environmental Protection Agency
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment and
Development, Department Of State
Associate Environmental Director, White House Office Of
Science And Technology Policy
Undersecretary for Global Affairs, Department Of State
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection
Anionmi
8.2.2. Phase 2: 1992-1994
The election of President Clinton in 1992 brought a dramatic policy shift within the
executive branch, with the Precautionary Coalition gaining substantial power. Important actors
in the Precautionary Coalition, many of whom had been extremely active in the international
policy subsystem, replaced members of the Economic Growth Coalition in high-level positions
of the White House and Cabinet Departments. Most significant among these was Vice-President
Gore, but others included Kathleen McGinty, Gore's former environmental aide, as the head of
the new White House Office of Environmental Policy; Carole Browner, Gore's former legislative
director, as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; Senator Wirth as Under
Secretary of State for Global Affairs; and Bruce Babbitt as Secretary of the Interior. Other
members of the Precautionary Coalition, many of whom came from environmental groups,
assumed key positions in the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council,
the State Department, the Department of Interior, and the Department of Energy. Table 8.1 lists
some of these individuals and the changes in their positions. With this change, representatives of
federal agencies became much more active in the precautionary coalition and wielded much more
influence.
37 Shortly after an agreement was reached on the compromise language, Yeutter wrote a letter to Rep. John Dingell
explaining that the key language in the agreement was contained in two sections, and said, "Neither binds the
United States to specific commitments of any kind." (Weisskoff. 1992. Bush Was Aloof in Warming Debate).
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While the precautionary coalition gained power, the economic growth coalition began to
splinter and by 1994 it was no longer speaking with a consistent voice.38 A number of members
of the economic growth coalition, including some in the media, continued to emphasize the
uncertainties associated with the issue.39 Others, such as the GCC, saw this argument as
counterproductive, and began to emphasize the need for developing countries to commit to
emissions reductions." Without a receptive audience to whom it could deliver its message and
without a consistent message to deliver, the economic growth coalition found itself unable to
have a substantial effect on U.S. climate policy during this period.
Once the members of the precautionary coalition assumed decision-making positions within
the Clinton administration, they began working together immediately effect a change in U.S.
climate change policy. In his State of the Union address in February of 1993, President Clinton
announced his planned BTU tax, saying that it would reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and
the budget deficit. At INC 7 the following month, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated
that the administration was undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S. policy regarding climate
change in order to determine if greenhouse gas emissions could be stabilized by the year 2000.
In May of that year, President Clinton announced that the United States was committed to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000, and the Administration
then began to develop a climate change strategy to meet this target.
On June 10-11, 1993, the White House sponsored a Conference on Global Climate Change,
bringing together more than 800 participants from the federal government, industry, state and
local governments, and non-government environmental organizations. The conference
established ten working groups to develop specific measures for emissions reductions in a
number of different areas. The final set of 47 measures were initially described in the
38 Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition, United States. Mar., 1989; Interview #13. National Mining Association,
United States. Jan., 1998. There were several reasons for this fracturing. More industries became engaged in the
debate, particular after the FCCC was ratified in 1992. Global Climate Coalition itself had grown to 54 members
by the end of 1992 (Wamstad, Dennis. Global Climate Coalition Prepares for the long haul. Energy Daily, Nov.
17, 1992.). A more diverse group of industries also became engaged in the issue, and, some of the industries
themselves began to change. For example, many of the major oil companies began to divest themselves from coal,
which weakened their ties to such groups as the National Mining Association (Interview #13. National Mining
Association, United States. Jan., 1998). Finally, some industries that had previously been opposed to emission
reduction efforts began to see benefits in energy efficiency improvements. For example, some in the utility
industry began to express the view that their primary concern was with the distribution of energy rather than the
means though which it was produced, and that improvements in energy efficiency could help them put off the need
to make additional capital investments to meet rising energy demand (Interview #15. Department of Commerce,
United States. Jan., 1998). As early as 1991, Southern California Edison and the Los Angeles Department of Water
& Water announced plans to reduce their emissions of C02, and the New England Electric System endorsed the
idea of a "modest" C02 tax the following year.
39Stevens describes a number of reports issued during the early 1990 that attempted to downplay any threat from
climate change, including 1993 articles in the Washington Times and the Wall Street Journal (Stevens, W.
Scientists Confront Renewed Backlash on Global Warming. New York Times, Sept. 19, 1993. pg. Al).
40 Interview #13. National Mining Association, United States. Jan., 1998; Interview #4. Global Climate Coalition,
United States. Mar., 1989.
41 Richter, Paul. President Backs Plan To Address Global Warming. Los Angeles Times, Apr. 22, 1993. A pg. 1.
42 These included energy supply, energy demand (residential, commercial, and industrial)., transportation (auto/light
truck, commercial, and infrastructure)., methane and other gases, sinks, and joint implementation.
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Administration's Climate Change Action Plan, released in October of 1993. They were provided
to the INC in September of 1994 as the U.S. Climate Action Report." These measures and the
agencies responsible for implementing them are listed in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 Policies and Measures Contained in the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan
Policy/Measure Agency Policy/Measure Agency
Climate Challenge agreements for emissions reductions DOE, EPA Clean Air Act Guidelines for natural gas substitution EPA, DOEClimate Wise -agreements for emissions reductions DOE, EPA High-Efficiency Gas Technologies DOE
Energy Star Buildings and Rebuild America DOE, EPA Natural gas regulatory reform DOE
Green Lights -energy efficient lighting DOE, EPA Renewable-Energy Technology Consortium DOE
State Buildings Energy Incentive Fund DOE Profitable Hydroelectric Efficiency Upgrade DOE
Home Energy-Rating Systems/Energy Efficient DOE, HUD Distribution Transformer Standards DOE
Mortgages
Residential Building Code DOE Energy Star Identification for distribution transformers DOE
Cool Communities (tree planting) EPA, DOA Expanded Assistance for Integrated Resource DOE, EPA
_________________________________________Planning
Colden Carrot energy efficient appliances DOE Forest harvest reductions and ecosystem DOA
________________________________________management_________
Residential Appliance Standards DOE Private forest management assistance DOA
Motor Challenge-efficient electic motors DOE Natural Gas STAR emissions controis DOE
Golden Carrots for energy-efficient Industrial Equipment DOE Landfill methane emissions reductions EPASource reduction, product recycling, pollution prevention EPA Coalbed and landfill outreach program DOE, DOI
Cash Value of Parking DOT AgSTAR Partnerships EPA, DOAInnovative Transportation Strategies DOT HFC and PFC Control Strategies EPA
Tire-Labeling Program DOT Improved Fertilizer Management DOA
Telecommuting DOT, OPM I___________I____
While the Administration was engaged in this internal planning process, it was also working
with Congress to enact the energy tax and improved fuel efficiency standards for automobiles,
two key pieces of legislation that it needed to ensure that the United States would be able to
fulfill President Clinton commitment to reducing emissions to 1990 levels in the year 2000."
Petroleum, automobile and manufacturing groups immediately opposed these proposals. The
administration was forced to make numerous concessions in order to get support within
Congress. The energy tax was eventually whittled down to 43 cents per gallon gasoline tax that
would have virtually no effect on U.S. GHG emissions."5 Reluctant to confront Congress on
similar energy issues, the Administration decided not to introduce the legislation it had been
preparing that would raise the automobile fuel-efficiency standard to 40 miles per gallon by the
year 2000.46 In the absence of Congressional support for an energy tax or fuel economy
standards, the 1993 Action Plan was expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 8
U.S.State Department. 1994. Climate Action Report: Submission of the United States of America Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
"4As part of the deficit reduction package it submitted to Congress in 1993, the Administration proposed to raise$71.4 billion over five years by taxing the energy content, as measured in British thermal units, of virtually all
fuels. This energy tax was expected to achieve as much as one-fifth of the necessary emissions reductions
(Interview #1. Department of State, United States. Dec., 1998).
0 The policy dynamics surrounding the energy tax proposal are discussed in greater detail in Section 8.3. 1.
46 Noah, T. Clinton May Modify Pledge to Reduce U.S. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases. Wall Street Journal, June,
1916. pg. A2.
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percent by the year 2000, far short of the Administration's goal of stabilize U.S. GHG emissions
at 1990 levels by the year 2000."
8.2.3. Phase 3: 1994-1997
As Phase 3 of the U.S. policy process began in 1994, the economic growth coalition began to
regain some of the power it had lost in 1992. After industry representatives found themselves
shut out of the decision-making processes taking place within the administration, they began to
turn to Congress to get their voices heard.48 In addition, a number of members of the Economic
Growth Coalition who had not been previously involved in the subsystem, particularly members
of Congress, began to work actively to block consideration of significant policy measures.4 9 The
precautionary coalition also began to encounter some resistance from within the administration,
particularly from Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers, and National Economic Advisor Gene Sperling."
The U.S. precautionary coalition also began to lose some of its power as this third phase of
the U.S. policy process began, particularly in terms of its ability to marshal public support for its
efforts. Public concern about the environment had declined after the 1991-1992 recession, as did
media coverage of environmental issues." In addition, the country itself became more
conservative." Finally, the precautionary coalition found itself without a clear means to ensure
that U.S. GHG emissions would be reduced to their 1990 levels after the defeat of its efforts to
establish an energy tax or more stringent fuel economy standards. Despite these setbacks
47 Measures already in force as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and the 1992 Energy Policy Act were
expected to contribute substantially to the necessary emissions reductions, including regulations limiting air
pollution from power plants, vehicles and industry and measures to improve energy efficiency and promote
alternative fuel sources (Lee, Gary. Clinton Sets Plan to Cut Emissions. Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1993. A pg. 1).
48 Industry Fears Global Warming Process Being Designed to Exclude Detractors. Utility Environment Reporter,
May 28, 1993. pg. 12. A representative of the National Mining Association complained that, after the Clinton
administration took office, their usual contacts within the various agencies "wouldn't talk to us anymore."
(Interview #13. National Mining Association, United States. Jan., 1998).
49 Only two or three Congressional staff joined the U.S. delegation to the INC sessions on a regular basis, and few
attended in the 1993 White House Conference. While almost 400 individuals from U.S. industry groups attended
the 1993 White House Conference, only about 30 representative of industry interests, primarily representatives of
industry coalitions and associations such as the Global Climate Coalition and the National Coal Association, were
regular observers at INC sessions. Although some of these individuals represented organizations that were
members of the GCC, they were not necessarily familiar with the issues. Many others had no representation at all
at the INC, including approximately 40 representatives of state and local governments.
50 Interview #19. Office of Management and Budget, United States. Aug., 1998Schneider, Keith. Gore Meets
Resistance in Effort for Steps on Global Warming. New York Times, Apr. 19, 1993. A pg. 17Interview #8.
Environmental Protection Agency, United States. Jan., 2005; Cushman, John H. No Simple Fight: The Forces That
Shaped the Clinton Plan. New York Times, Dec. 1, 1997. F pg. 3.
si For example, dues-paying membership in the major activist environmental organizations peaked in 1990 at 2.4
million, and declined to 2.1 million members by 1995, while network news coverage of environmental issues
dropped 60 percent from its 1989 peak (Schneider, K. Big Environment Hits a Recession. New York Times, Jan. 1,
1995. pg. F4; Allen, S. Murky Times for Environmentalism. Boston Globe, Nov. 12, 1994. pg. 1; Carmody, K.
1995. It's a Jungle Out There: Environmental Journalism in an Age of Backlash. Columbia Journalism Review pg.
45).
52 Paarlberg, R. L. 1996. A domestic dispute: Clinton, congress, and international environmental policy.
Environment 38, 8: 16.
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however, it continued its pursuit of its primary goal: an international agreement containing
legally binding targets and timetables
The first step in this pursuit was the public recognition that the FCCC needed to be changed.
In February of 1994, Undersecretary of State Wirth announced at INC 9 meeting that the
commitments of industrialized countries "do not...adequately address policies and measures to
be taken beyond the year 2000, and we urge (the INC) to begin a serious effort to explore how we
may all further the objective of this convention."53  This announcement came in spite of
complaints by members of Congress such as John Dingell and a fierce lobbying effort by industry
representatives who argued that such an announcement was premature and the necessary of the
science had not been conducted. 4
It was also becoming clear that the Clinton administration's efforts to reduce emissions were
not adequate to meet the goal that the President had laid out the previous year. In April, an
analysis by NRDC indicated that the measures laid out in the 1993 Action Plan would achieve
only a third of the emissions reductions needed to meet goals.5 The administration held a two-
day public meeting that summer to look at how current programs could be changed and what
additional measures could be considered to strengthen its plan.56 Later that year, the FCCC
Secretariat reported that its preliminary review of the U.S. action plan indicated that U.S.
emissions would be 3 percent higher than 1990 levels. Then at COP I in April, 1995,
Undersecretary Wirth also conceded that the United States would fall short of its goal to reduce
emissions by about 30 percent.57
Although the economic growth coalition lost power in 1992 with the election of President
Clinton and Vice-President Gore, it regained significant power when the Republicans took
control of Congress in January of 1995.58 This enabled key members of the economic growth
coalition to assume the chairs of important Congressional committees and other leadership
positions. Some of these individuals and the positions they assumed are shown in Table 8.3.
This shift enabled the economic growth coalition to use the Congressional budget process to
affect climate change programs. Several members sponsored legislation in the House that would
5 Statement of Undersecretary of State Timothy Wirth at the Ninth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee of the U.N Framework Convention on Climate Change. February 10, 1994. On file with the author.
54 Utilities' Lobbying Effort Fails as U.S. Questions Adequacy of Climate Treaty. Utility Environment Report, Feb.
18, 1994. pg. 16.
ss Wamstad, Dennis. Environmentalists See Emissions Gap In Climate Plan. Energy Daily, Apr. 19, 1994.; Adler,
Tina. 1994. Clinton emissions program under fire. Science News, Apr. 30, 1994. pg. 278.
56 Behrens, Lisa. EPA Official Says Greenhouse Regulations May Be Needed To Bridge Gap. Inside Energy, Aug. 1,
1994. pg. 3.
5 Katz, Lee Michael. US To Fall 30% Short of Target. USA Today, Mar. 14, 1995.
58 Prior to the 1994 elections, the Republic Party held 42 percent of all Congressional seats. After the elections, they
held 53 percent of all seats, a 28 percent increase (McCright and Dunlap. 2003. Defeating Kyoto: The conservative
movement's impact on U.S. climate change policy). The Republicans leaders were generally more hostile to
environmental regulation. Paarlberg notes that Senior Democrats in the 10 3rd Congress in both the House and
Senate were rated three times higher by the League of Conservation Voters than senior Republicans. However,
senior Republicans in both houses were rated four times higher by the Competitive Enterprise Institute than senior
Democrats (Paarlberg. 1996. A domestic dispute: Clinton, congress, and international environmental policy). See
also Dellios, Hugh. Environmental Groups Now On List of Endangered Species. Chicago Tribune News pg. 3.
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have cut funding for the Climate Action Plan by forty percent. " Others in the Senate attempted
to cut U.S. contributions to the IPCC and INC.60  Finally, they began to use Congressional
Table 8.3. Economic Growth Coalition Members Gaining Key Positions in Congress after 1994
elections
EGC Member Position
Bob Dole Senate Majority Leader
Jesse Helms Chair, Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
Frank Murkowski Chair, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
Newt Gingrich Speaker, House of Representatives
Dana Rohrbacher Chair, House Science Energy And Environment Subcommittee
Tom Delay Majority Whip, House of Representatives
Robert Walker Chair, House Science Committee
hearings to emphasize the beliefs of the economic growth coalition.'
In April 1995, at the First Conference of the Parties in Berlin, Vice President Gore joined the
EU in stating that that FCCC is inadequate. He called for the Parties to produce a mandate that
sets in motion a process that examines "what we each can do to contribute to further reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions."6 2 Because the administration was finding it difficult to find
politically-viable means for achieving further reductions domestically, it had been forced to
conclude the previous year that some of the U.S. reductions would need to be achieved through
59 Noah. 1916. Clinton May Modify Pledge to Reduce U.S. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases; Hebert, Josef. Reducing
Greenhouse gases runs Into Political, Economic Realities. Associated Press, Mar. 27, 1995. For example, Dana
Rohrbacher, Chairman of the House Science Energy And Environment Subcommittee, proposed substantial cuts in
funding for climate change research, and to completely eliminate funding for the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan
(Interview #17. House of Representatives, United States. Mar., 1998). Rep. Rohrbacher, who regarded climate
change science as "liberal claptrap," stated, "In another area of savings, trendy science that is proposed up by
liberal politics rather than good science has cost us billions... We will not permit scare mongers and Chicken
Littles to successfully push Federal policies that tax our people into lower standards of living, raise the price of
products they buy and regulate them out of a job. Nowhere is scientific nonsense more evident than in global
warming programs that are sprinkled throughout the current year budget" (Brown, George E. 1996. Environmental
Science Under Siege: Fringe Science and the 104th Congress. Democratic Caucus of the Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives). See also Kriz, Margaret. 1995. Global Warming - Proof and Politics. National
Journal, Dec. 9, 1995. pg. 3062; and Stevens, W. Trying to Stem Emissions, U.S. Sees Its Goal Fading. New York
Times, Nov., 1928. pg. Al.
6 For example, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed to cut U.S. funding for
the IPCC and the UNFCCC to levels that would have severely affected their operations (Lippman, Thomas. Helms
Target U.N. Programs for Cuts. Washington Post, May 6, 1995. A pg. 4). Because the United States provides 25
percent or more of the funding for most U.N. programs, these cuts would have severely undermined the
international policy process.
61 These hearings were used to highlight the scientific uncertainties and the potential economic costs, and well-
known "skeptics" and other members of the economic growth coalition were frequent witnesses. McCright and
Dunlap note that by 1997, 54 percent of all Congressional testimony was given by witnesses allied with various
industry groups and conservative think tanks, while only 19 percent of such testimony was given by scientists and
representatives of environmental groups (McCright and Dunlap. 2003. Defeating Kyoto: The conservative
movement's impact on U.S. climate change policy). See also Brown. 1996. Environmental Science Under Siege:
Fringe Science and the 104th Congress.
62 Bajak, Frank. Top U.S. Diplomat On Environment Keeps Expectations Low At Climate Talks. Associated Press,
Apr. 4, 1995.
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joint implementation.6 3 It insisted, therefore, that JI must be part of mandate." It also insisted
that developing countries such as India and China also commit to emissions reductions as part of
the Berlin Mandate. It dropped these conditions, however, when it became clear that to
continuing to do so would jeopardize any possibility of an agreement." This sudden shift
surprised and angered many members of the economic growth coalition, particularly in
Congress.66
The Clinton administration and other members of the precautionary coalition began again in
September 1995, to look for ways to strengthen the U.S. Action Plan, and once again raised the
possibility of taxes or emissions reductions. Industry groups resisted this effort, arguing that
more time was needed for the voluntary programs currently being implemented to work.67 Later
that year, the "Car Talks," a year-long effort by administration, NGO and automobile industry to
reach an agreement on some of the transportation-related measures proposed in the 1993 Action
Plan, fell apart after they were unable to reach an consensus." Early the following year, Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole introduced proposal to repeal the 4.3 cents per gallon gas tax.
Despite these setbacks, the Precautionary Coalition continued to pursue its goal of an
international agreement containing legally binding targets and timetables. At COP 2 in July
1996, Tim Wirth made this goal explicit by calling for intensified international negotiations on a
"realistic, verifiable and binding medium-term emission target" that would be adopted in Kyoto
the following year.69 The following January, the United States submitted to the FCCC Secretariat
a "Draft Protocol Framework" containing more specific language for a treaty." The framework
also proposed that the Protocol contain an "Annex B" list of countries without legally binding
targets that would voluntarily adopt emission limitations, and that commitments for all Parties
should be agreed by 2005. It did not, however, propose any specific targets and timetables, as
members of the precautionary and economic growth coalitions within the administration could
not reach an agreement on a set of targets and timetables to which the United States could
realistically commit itself.
63 Interview #1. Department of State, United States. Dec., 1998.
64 Atkinson, Rick. Greenhouse Gas Cutback Goals Left Up in Air. Washington Post, Apr. 8, 1995. A pg. 24.
65 Behrens, Lisa. White House Faulted for Backing New Greenhouse Gas Plan in Berlin. Inside Energy, Apr. 17,
1995. pg. 5.
66 Industry groups and members of Congress complained that, in a March 31 letter to Rep. John Dingell, President
Clinton stated that "the U.S. delegation will not accept any outcome or agree to any process that adversely affects
the United States and its industrial competitiveness." ( Industry says Clinton Administration Reneged On Pledge
During Berlin Talks. Energy Report; Wamstad, Dennis. Business Groups Unhappy With U.S. Climate Change
Stance. Energy Daily, Aug. 22, 1995.).
67 Cushman, John H. Clinton Administration Considers Tougher Measures. New York Times, Sept. 24, 1995. 1 pg.
31.
68 One reason for the collapse was that automobile manufacturers refused to consider tougher fuel economy standards
and incentives for consumers to purchase fuel-efficient cars. (Cushman. 1995. Clinton Administration Considers
Tougher Measures; Interview #10. Department of Transportation, United States. Jan., 1998; Culbertson, Katherine.
1995. Oil Industry balks at endorsing report on global warming. Oil Daily, Dec. 3, 1995. pg. 3).
69 Speech by Timothy Wirth, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, on file with the author.
70 This proposed language specified, among other things, 5-year emission budgets, JI, emissions trading, and the
borrowing of emissions "units" from one period to the next. See FCCC/ABGM/1997/MISC. 1.
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In early 1997, the economic growth coalition intensified its campaign against the emerging
Kyoto Protocol. The GCC, the National Association of Manufacturers and other members of the
economic growth coalition enlisted the help of the labor movement, particularly the United Mine
Workers of America and the AFL-CIO." These labor unions, together with the National Mining
Association, began to lobby Congress to take a firmer stance against the treaty.72
At AGBM 7 in June, the United States elaborated on the proposal it made earlier in the year.
This elaboration included specific language for emissions trading, joint implementation, and a
requirement that developing countries identify and adopt "no-regret" measures." It also
established a White House Climate Change Task Force to coordinate the development of a
revised climate change action plan that would be submitted to the FCCC Secretariat prior to COP
3 in December. The administration also held climate change roundtable early the following
month as first step in public education campaign intended to build support for the Kyoto
Protocol.74
The administration remained unable to reach an agreement internally on a specific set of
targets and timetables to which it could commit and the fissure between members of the
precautionary and economic growth coalitions within the administration deepened as the summer
progressed.7" The debate became one of competing models and forecasts, with the economic
growth coalition arguing that a stringent target would launch the United States into recession and
the precautionary coalition arguing that such target would stimulate the development of new
technologies.76
This debate intensified in late July with the passage in the Senate of the Byrd-Hagel
resolution. Introduced by Senators Robert Byrd and Chuck Hagel, the resolution urged the
Administration not to sign a treaty that could result in "serious harm" to the economy or that
would limit greenhouse gas emissions in the United States but does not impose specific
restrictions and similar timetables on developing nations." The resolution was the result of the
" Although coal miners held just 80,000 jobs in the United States in 1997, emissions targets would have
disproportionate impact on the United Mine Workers. Coal minors also had significant clout in AFL-CIO, as
Richard Trumka, a former United Mine Workers president, was the secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO and played
an important role in presenting the coal miners case. The labor federation was particularly influential in the Clinton
administration, and played a crucial role in defeating Clinton's labor policy the previous year (Cushman, John H.
Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty. New York Times, Dec. 7, 1997. 1 pg. 28).
72 To support these efforts, the Business Round Table retained the public affairs firms Powell Tate and Ketchum
Public Relations to produce a $1 million ad campaign against treaty (Stone. 1997. The Heat's On).
73 Fact Sheet on U.S. Climate Change Proposal. U.S. Department of State. June, 1997.
74 Warrick, Joby. 1997. Clinton Outlines Global Warming Education Plan; Nation Remains Skeptical of Greenhouse
Effect. Washington Post, July 25, 1997. A pg. 3. This effort was supported by such groups as the Business Council
for Sustainable Energy, which started its own public campaign to build support for the treaty.
5Tensions were such that members of the economic growth coalition attempted to meet with President Clinton
privately without informing Vice-President Gore beforehand (Interview #20. Office of Environmental Policy,
United States. Aug., 1998).
7 6 Cushman. 1997. No Simple Fight: The Forces That Shaped the Clinton Plan.
7 Music, Kimberley. 1997. Senate Demands all nations agree to climate pact. Oil Daily, July 28, 1997. pg. 1. Byrd,
a Democrat from West Virginia, was opposed to the Protocol because of its potential impacts on coal mining in his
state. Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska, was opposed to the treaty primarily for ideological reasons (Zengerle,
Jason. 1998. Hagelianism. New Republic, Feb. 9, 1998. pg. 12).
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intense lobbying by the labor unions and the National Mining Association." Although non-
binding, it was a substantial victory for the economic growth coalition, which was able to
capitalize on a general lack of knowledge of the issue on the part of most Senators to garner a 95-
0 unanimous vote.7 9
Members of the economic growth coalition continued its efforts to solidify Congressional
opposition to the Kyoto Protocol in September by launched a $13 million dollar advertising
campaign against the treaty.8" The following month, the precautionary coalition launched its own
public education campaign in support of the Kyoto Protocol. At a day-long policy conference,
President Clinton outlined the basic elements of the revised U.S. climate change action plan."
This plan, the result of negotiations between senior-level members of the precautionary and
economic growth coalitions within the administration, consisted of three sequential stages
leading to binding emissions reduction targets.82 However, the Administration remained unable
to resolve its internal debate regarding the target itself.
Three options for such a target were being considered at this point. The first, favored by the
precautionary coalition, would be to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by 2010. The second,
78For example, the NMA sent approximately 40 chief executives up to Capitol Hill in early June, where they visited
more than 50 Senators. Byrd introduced the resolution shortly after he met with executives from several coal
companies, including Peabody Coal Co., which is headquartered in West Virginia (Stone. 1997. The Heat's On).
Took advantage of generally uninformed congress.
79Although many members of Congress had adopted a position on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, few had
much of an understanding of the various scientific, economic, and political issues involved (Schmitt, Eric.
Congress, the Kibbitzer at the Climate Table, Waits for Its Turn. New York Times, Dec. 1, 1997. F pg. 6). Much of
could be due to a generally poor understanding of international affairs. At the time of the vote, a majority of House
members and forty percent of Senators had been elected after the fall of the Berlin wall, and a third of all members
of Congress lacked passports (Apple, R. W. Clinton on His Foreign Policy: A Rose-Tinted World. New York
Times, Dec. 18, 1997. A pg. 12).
80 The Global Climate Information Project, which featured radio and TV commercials, ads in major newspapers, and
an Internet Web Site, criticized the Kyoto Protocol by saying, "It's not global, and it won't work" and predicting
"dire consequences" for Americans if the Clinton administration signs the agreement. Sponsors of the project
included the National Association of Manufacturers, the Air Transport Association of America, the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association, the United Mine Workers of America, and others (Warrick, Joby. Business Gears
Up. Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1997. A pg. 1). Eileen Claussen commented, "By targeting Congress, the industries
responsible for the advertising campaign have widened the rift between the two branches. This had the effect of
pulling the United States farther away from most other countries and hardening its position on what would
constitute an acceptable target and on what should be required of developing countries." Although several
environmental groups attempted to mount a modest campaign to counter the GCIP, they could not devote a
comparable amount of funding to the effort (Cushman. 1997. Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty).
81 As one part of the administration's public education campaign, more than 100 TV weather forecasters were
brought to the White House for an all-day teach-in on global warming and to ask them to help educate the public so
that it would support the Protocol (Rankin, Robert A. TV forecasters recruited for global-warming war. Denver
Post, Oct. 2, 1997. A pg. 15; Cushman, John H. Clinton Hones Sales Pitch on Global Warming Pact. New York
Times, Oct. 4, 1997. A pg. 10).
82 The first stage, which would begin immediately, would involve federal support for research into and development
of new technologies; tax incentives for early action; and industry consultations. The second stage would involve an
in-depth review and evaluation of the various actions taken in the previous stage in preparation for a system of
tradable emissions permits. The final stage, which would not occur for another decade, would involve meeting
binding targets through a domestic and international emissions trading program (Cushman. 1997. No Simple Fight:
The Forces That Shaped the Clinton Plan).
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favored by the economic growth coalition, would be to gradually reduce the growth rate of
emissions and to freeze them eventually. The third, a compromise between the first two, would
be to stabilize emissions by 2015 or 2020. To address congressional concerns regarding
economic costs, all thee would include an escape mechanism that would limit the amount of
money companies would need to spend to meet any emissions targets."
It was not until late October that the administration was able to reach an internal agreement
on targets. At the AGBM 8 meeting in Bonn, the United States proposed that all countries be
required to reduce their emissions of C0 2, CH 4, N20, HFCs, PFCs, and SF 6 collectively to 1990
levels in the budget period 2008-2012. However, Parties would be able to use JI and emissions
trading and borrow from subsequent budget periods in order to meet this target. It also said that
it would not assume binding obligations "unless key developing nations meaningfully
participate" in the effort."
When COP 3 began on December 1, 1997, in Kyoto, the United States indicated that it was
willing to abandon an across-the-board target and accept differentiated targets, including the EU
bubble. Stuart Eizenstat, who had replaced Timothy Wirth as the lead negotiator for the United
States, made this concession in an effort to jump-start the negotiations." Eizenstat's concession
drew no response from the EU, however, and the negotiations remained stalled through the first
week of the conference.
At the beginning of the following week, Vice President Gore traveled to Kyoto in an effort
to break the deadlock. He had become in constant communication with the U.S. delegation since
the beginning of the meeting, and become increasingly concerned that COP 3 would end without
an agreement. After consulting with U.S. negotiators, democratic senators, and President
Clinton, he instructed Eizenstat to take a softer line on emissions targets if other countries would
agree to a framework of flexible, market-based implementation programs and on "meaningful
participation" by developing countries." This helped restart the negotiations, as other countries
responded to Eizenstat's agreement to accept more aggressive cuts in emissions with concessions
of their own.
On the last day of the meeting, the United States, Japan, and the EU had reached a tentative
agreement on targets and the number of gases. However, it was understood that this agreement
was not final until agreements had been reached on the other elements of the proposed treaty. It
had also become clear that none of the various U.S. proposals for bring developing countries into
the agreements would be accepted. To reach an accord, Gore gave Eizenstat permission to back
down from this demand without reopening the discussion on targets. 87 Gore then called Japanese
83Interview #1. Department of State, United States. Dec., 1998; Cushman, John H. Top Aides Urge Clinton to Ease
Global Warming Emission Goal. New York Times, Oct. 10, 1997. A pg. 1 .
84 Remarks by the President on Global Climate Change, National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C. October 22,
1997, on file with the author.
85 Tim Wirth had left the State Department the previous month to be the director of Ted Turner's United Nations
Foundation.
86Interview #7. Department of State, United States. Jan., 1989; Interview #1. Department of State, United States.
Dec., 1998; Warrick. 1997. Pact Rescued in Final Hours: Turbulence Pervaded First round of Greenhouse Gas
Talks.
87 Interview #1. Department of State, United States. Dec., 1998; Warrick. 1997. Pact Rescued in Final Hours:
Turbulence Pervaded First round of Greenhouse Gas Talks.
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Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to urge him to accept a target that was one percentage point
above the 5 percent target that Japanese negotiators had said was their bottom line. By the
morning of December 10, the Parties had reach an agreement on targets of 8 percent, 7 percent,
and 6 percent below 1990 levels for the EU, the United States, and Japan, respectively, that
would apply to C0 2, CH 4, N20, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 collectively, for the budget period 2008-
2012. In accepting this agreement, however, President Clinton announced that the administration
would not submit the treaty for ratification in the Senate until it could persuade key developing
nations such as China and India to limit their emissions of GHGs."
8.3 OVERLAPPING SUBSYSTEMS
As was discussed in Section 8.2.2, most of the measures considered for or proposed in the
1993 U.S. Climate Change Action Plan were to be developed and implemented in a number of
different overlapping subsystems. The remainder of this chapter discusses the dynamics that
transpired in three of these subsystems: the Tire Regulation Subsystem, the Tax Policy
Subsystem, and the Green Lights/Energy Star program.
8.3.1. The U.S. Tire Regulation Subsystem
Policy related to the proposed tire labeling system was negotiated between 1994 and 1995
within what can be called the U.S. Tire Regulations subsystem. It is within this subsystem that
policies, regulations and standards regarding vehicle tires sold in the United States are
determined. This subsystem partially overlapped with the U.S. climate policy subsystem in that a
few members from both the Precautionary and Economic Growth coalitions participated in both
subsystems. As in the other subsystems, two opposing coalitions formed within this subsystem:
a pro-labeling coalition and an anti-labeling coalition. The pro-labeling and Precautionary
coalitions shared some members, as did the anti-labeling and Economic Growth coalitions.
However, many participants in this subsystem, particularly from Congress and the tire industry,
were not participants in the larger subsystem and were not overly concerned with the climate
change issue. The anti-labeling coalition ultimately dominated the subsystem and was able to
defeat the proposal.
The development of a rating for rolling resistance was first introduced at the 1993 White
House Conference on Global Climate Change. At a meeting of the Auto and Light Truck
Workshop of the Transportation Working Group of the Conference, Michelin presented a paper
asserting that the average rolling resistance for original equipment all-season radial tires was 22
percent less than that for typical replacement tires, and that fuel economy could be improved if
replacement tires had the same rolling resistance as original equipment tires. This led the
Administration to include in its Climate Change Action Plan an initiative in which the
Department of Transportation would issue new rules and test procedures requiring manufacturers
to test and label tires relative to their rolling resistance.
Responsibility for the development of the tire-labeling program fell to the Department of
Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). On April 25, 1994,
NHTSA published a Request for Comments in the Federal Register requesting public comment
8 Baker, Peter and Helen Dewar. Long Road Ahead for Global Warming Pact; Administration Turns to Process of
Making Its Case in Congress. Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1997. A pg. 1.
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on a proposal to amend the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (UTQGS) by replacing the
existing temperature resistance grade with a rolling resistance/fuel economy grade.'9 in making
this proposal, the NHTSA argued that most of the tire-buying public was not aware of or did not
understand the significance of the temperature resistance rating.9' Making this change would
provide a measure of a key fuel economy characteristic of tires and respond to the President's
Climate Change Action Plan.
Seven tire manufacturers responded to the request for comments, of which Michelin was the
lone supporter.91 Nine trade and consumer associations also responded to the Initial Request for
Comments, five of which supported a rolling resistance grade and four of which were opposed.
Opponents to the rolling resistance grade cited a wide range of objections. Some asserted that
the government should not force consumers to bear the cost of testing and remolding a new
UTQGS symbol which will be passed on to them by manufacturers, while other expressed
concern that addition of a rolling resistance rating could cause consumers to purchase tires that
have a lower overall traction performance. They also argued that there is no need to establish a
rolling resistance grade, as the rolling resistance of original equipment (OE) tires is constantly
being improved to meet CAFE standards and that that technology is included in after-market tires
through standardization. 92
Michelin, the only company that had undertaken significant research into approaches for
reducing rolling resistance, supported the deletion of the temperature resistance grade, stating
that it does not serve the purpose for which it was intended and does not provide useful consumer
information.93 NHTSA also supported the change, noting that tire manufacturers have been
producing low rolling resistance OEM tires for vehicle manufacturers since 1980 and equivalent
low rolling resistance tires are available on the replacement market.
In June of 1995, the NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in which it formally
proposed to amend the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards by replacing the temperature
resistance grade with a rolling resistance/fuel economy grade. The Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking generated over 120 comments from from a wide range of individuals and
89 59 FR 19686.
90 The existing UTQGS required tires to be labeled with their temperature resistance grade indicating the extent to
which heat is generated and/or dissipated by a tire. Heat is generated by the energy absorbed by the tire from the
friction caused by the flexing and slipping of the rubber as it rolls along the road. If the tire is unable to dissipate
that heat effectively or if the tire is unable to resist the heat buildup, its ability to run at high speeds without failure
is reduced.
91 Opponents included Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (BF)., The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, General Tire
(GT)., MTS Systems Corporation, Dunlop Tire Corporation, and Cooper Tire and Rubber Company.
92 Arguments cited in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for amendments to the Uniform Tire quality Grading
Standards, 60 FR 27472.
93 Interview #11. Department of Transportation, United States. Jan., 1998; Interview #10. Department of
Transportation, United States. Jan., 1998. Michelin also argued that vehicle manufacturers, in order to meet fuel
economy requirements, have long required their tire suppliers to provide low rolling resistance original equipment
(OE). tires while still imposing strict standards on treadwear, traction, and speed durability. The establishment of a
rolling resistance grade for all tires would encourage manufacturers to improve the rolling resistance characteristics
of replacement tires and bring them up to the capabilities of OE tires. Finally, it argued that the additional
consumer cost would be no more than $2.50 per tire, and that these costs would be more than offset by the value of
the fuel conservation and reduction of global warming gases that rolling resistance labeling would make possible.
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organizations, including members of Congress; the Department of Energy; tire manufacturers,
wholesalers, and dealers; and environmental, safety, and consumer advocates. Except for
Michelin, the tire industry and members of Congress strongly opposed the fuel economy
proposal. Particularly vocal were Senator John Glenn and other representatives from Ohio,
where the headquarters for Goodyear and Cooper Tire are located and which has long been a
center for tire manufacturing.94 The Department of Energy, on the other hand, along with most
advocacy groups and most members of the public, supported the proposal.
The NHTSA hosted a public meeting on the UTQGS proposals on July 28, 1995, in order to
provide additional opportunity for commenting. The NHTSA then extended the NPRM
comment period once again, to September 1, 1995, to permit participants at the public meeting an
opportunity to file written responses to matters presented at the public meeting. Although the
comment period closed on September 1, 1995, NHTSA continued to receive correspondence on
both sides of the rolling resistance issue, including letters from various members of the
Congress. 95
In the meantime, opponents of the proposal within Congress used the appropriations process
to stop the rule change. That July, a provision was inserted into the House version of the
Transportation Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that prohibited the NHTSA from
planning, finalizing, or implementing any rulemaking which would require that passenger car
tires be labeled to indicate their low rolling resistance. 6 Although the Senate version of the bill
did not contain a similar provision, opponents of the proposal were able to have it included in the
conference report without opposition. In early November, 1995, while NHTSA was still
evaluating the comments and data from the NPRM and the public meeting, the Transportation
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 was enacted prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of
any funds:
"[T]o plan, finalize, or implement any rulemaking to add to section 575.104 of title 49 of
the Code of Federal Regulations any requirement pertaining to a grading standard that is
different from the three grading standards (treadwear, traction, and temperature
resistance) already in effect."
This effectively halted all further work on a rolling resistance grade. 7
8.3.2. The U.S. Tax Policy Subsystem
The fate of Clinton Administration's proposal for an energy tax was determined in the U.S.
Tax Policy Subsystem between 1993 and 1994. This subsystem had a precautionary coalition
94 Interview #10. Department of Transportation, United States. Jan., 1998.
95 Interview #11. Department of Transportation, United States. Jan., 2005; Interview #10. Department of
Transportation, United States. Jan., 1998.
96In including this provision, the House Appropriations Committee stated that there is evidence showing that the
promotion of low rolling resistance characteristics negatively impacts safety, while is little evidence to indicate that
the proposal will have a positive impact on fuel economy (House Rpt.104-177 - Department Of Transportation
And Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1996).
97 Final Rule, amendments to the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards, 61 FR 47437. Similar language was also
included in the 1997 transportation appropriations bill.
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that was parallel to and shared the same beliefs as that of the U.S. climate policy subsystem, but
were not as organized and vocal in their support for the proposed tax." Opposing this coalition
was an anti-tax coalition made up of a wide range of individuals and organizations. Many
members of this anti-tax coalition were not participants in other climate subsystems, and did not
necessarily hold the same beliefs as the Economic Growth coalition. However, they were
sufficiently powerful that they were able to transform the proposed BTU tax into a minor gas tax
increase.
When President Clinton announced the U.S. commitment to reducing emissions to 1990
levels in the year 2000, the Administration had anticipated achieving much of this reduction from
an energy tax and improved fuel efficiency standards for automobiles." As part of its deficit
reduction package introduced in Congress in 1993, the Administration proposed an energy tax
that was expected to achieve as much as one-fifth of the necessary emissions reductions."4 The
initial proposal was to raise $71.4 billion over five years by taxing the energy content, as
measured in British thermal units, of virtually all fuels. Coal and gas were to be taxed at a rate of
25.7 cents per million BTUs while oil was to be taxed at a much higher 59.9 cents to discourage
its use and offset the advantage that it would otherwise have over coal. Vice-President Gore had
initially proposed a more narrow "carbon" tax on fossil fuels. However, Clinton decided that
Congress would never approve such an approach, as it would have an unacceptably high impact
on coal producing and coal using states, particularly in the Midwest. 1 '
The proposal was immediately opposed by petroleum and manufacturing groups such as the
American Petroleum Institute and the National Association of Manufacturers, as well as many
members of Congress. Representatives from the coal producing states and the coal industry, led
by Senator Byrd, argued that the coal industry was already overburdened by the terms of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments and should be exempted from the surcharge. When the
administration gave in to the coal industry but left the proposed surcharge in place for petroleum,
representatives from oil-producing states and those states with colder climates were angered.
The tax was also attacked as putting the burden on the middle class, which had been promised a
tax cut rather than a tax increase in the 1992 elections. The administration was -forced to make
numerous concessions in order to get support within Congress." 2 Even then, the House of
Representatives approved it by only two votes.'03
The energy tax proposal became completely stymied in the Senate Finance Committee,
which has jurisdiction over tax issues. Democrats David Boren of Oklahoma and Bennett
Johnston of Louisiana, both of whom sat on the Committee and opposed the tax, introduced a
bipartisan alternative that eliminated energy taxes altogether, replacing them with caps on
98 Paarlberg. 1996. A domestic dispute: Clinton, congress, and international environmental policy.
99 Interview #1. Department of State, United States. Dec., 1919. See also Paarlberg. 1996. A domestic dispute:
Clinton, congress, and international environmental policy.
100 The tax as introduced would tax B.T.U.'s. or British Thermal Units, and was expected to reduce carbon emissions
by 25 million metric tons by 2000. (Noah, T. The Clinton Tax Package: Increase in Gasoline Levy Mulled as
Energy Tax Comes Under Fire. Wall Street Journal, May 28, 1993. pg. A4).
101 Paarlberg. 1996. A domestic dispute: Clinton, congress, and international environmental policy.
102 Gosselin, Peter. New Twists in fuel tax proposal. Boston Globe, Apr. 2, 1993. National/Foreign pg. 1.
03Calmes, J. Democratic Leaders Push Gas Tax Boost. Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1993. pg. A12.
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entitlement spending."04 Another Democrat on the Committee who opposed the energy tax, John
Breaux of Louisiana, suggested instead a gasoline tax.'05 Although the transportation lobby
vigorously opposed this gas tax, it was strongly supported by automobile manufacturers, which
hoped it would avert tougher fuel efficiency standards.0 6 The White House was forced to go
along with Breux's proposal in order to get the measure out of the Committee, and a 4.3 cent-per-
gallon gasoline tax was passed in the Senate by a single vote, that of Vice President Gore.
In the Conference Committee, where the House BTU tax and the Senate gasoline tax were to
be reconciled, Senate Democrats again vigorously opposed any sort of energy tax, with Senator
Boren once more playing a key role.'07 Senator Max Baucus, a Democrat from Montana, also
rejected any gas tax above the 4.3 cents-per-gallon tax passed by the Senate. Once again, the
Administration was forced to accept the lower gas tax in order to get a deficit-reduction bill
passed at all.
10 4Calmes, J. Clinton Faces A New Threat On Energy Tax. Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1993. pg. A2.
"' Noah. 1993. The Clinton Tax Package: Increase in Gasoline Levy Mulled as Energy Tax Comes Under Fire.
10 Seib, G. F. and M. K. Frisby. Selling Sacrifice: As Opponents Gear Up, Clinton Prepares Pitch for his Economic
Plan. Wall Street Journal, Feb., 1905. pg. A2; Templin, N. and T. Noah. Auto firms Urge Higher Gasoline Tax to
Avert Tougher Fuel-Use Standard. Wall Street Journal, Jan., 1922. pg. A4.
107 Calmes, J. Clinton Agrees To Look for Alternatives To Proposed BTU-Based Energy Tax. Wall Street Journal,
June 18, 1993. pg. A2
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CHAPTER 9 - CLIMATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
IN THE NETHERLANDS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands, national policy regarding climate change has been determined within a
Dutch Climate Policy Subsystem. The climate policy process between 1988 and 1997 occurred
in three phases. The first, from 1988 to mid-1990, resulted in first National Environmental
Policy Plan (NEPP) containing the commitment to stabilize emissions of C02 at 1990 levels by
1995 and reduced by 3 to 5 percent by 2000. The second, from 1992 to mid 1994, resulted in a
set of emission reduction measures contained in the second National Environmental Policy Plan
(NEPP-II) and the Netherlands' national report submitted to the FCCC Secretariat that were
expected to reduce stabilize CO 2 emissions at 1990 by 2000. The third phase took place from
late 1993 to late 1997 and resulted in the final Kyoto target of 8 percent below 1990 levels by
2012.
The NEPP and the NEPP-II called for the implementation of range of policies and measures
that would meet these objectives. Emissions continued to rise over the course of the following
years, however. By 1995, CO2 emissions were almost 7 percent higher than in 1990, and were 8
percent higher than 1990 levels in 2000.1 Like the situation of the United States, this increase
was due to a number of reasons. Economic growth had been higher than expected. Budget
constraints had reduced energy and other subsidies.2 However, this increase was also due to
problems in the implementation of various measures. The Netherlands Society for Nature and
Environment (SNM) suggested, however, that by 1995 the proposed measures were being
implemented with difficulty and delay, if at all.3 Efforts to meet the emission reduction targets
contained in voluntary agreements with industry were poorly monitored and the targets
themselves were rarely met.4 Reducing emissions from road transport and methane emissions
from manure also proved to be difficult, and numerous obstacles hampered the development of
wind energy and biomass conversion programs.'
Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning and Environment. 2002. The Progress of the Netherlands Climate Change
Policy: an Assessment at the 2002 Evaluation Moment. Den Haag: Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and
Environment Most ghg reductions were for methane, which declined due to recovery of landfill gas, less dumping
of organic waste, and a decrease in livestock populations.
2 Climate Action Network. 1997. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD
Countries: Fifth Review, October 1997.
* Climate Action Network. 1995. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD
Countries: Third Review, January 1995.
4 Rietbergen, M. G., J. C. M. Farla, and K. Blok. 2002. Do agreements enhance energy efficiency improvement?
Analysing the actual outcome of long-term agreements on industrial energy efficiency improvement in The
Netherlands. Journal of Cleaner Production 10, 2: 153-163; van Rooijen, Sascha and Mark van Wees. 2003.
Green Electricity Policy in the Netherlands. Oslo, Norway: Center for International Climate and Environmental
Research.
s Climate Action Network. 1997. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD
Countries: Fifth Review, October 1997; Westhoek, H., R. van den Berg, W. de Hoop, and A. van der Kamp. 2004.
Economic and environmental effects of the manure policy in The Netherlands: synthesis of integrated ex-post and
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As in the United States, many aspects of Dutch climate policy were formulated and
implemented in several overlapping policy subsystems. Most of these overlapping subsystems
were national, provincial, or municipal subsystems. Unlike in the United States, however, the
Dutch climate policy subsystem was also overlapped by two EU-wide subsystems: an EU climate
policy subsystem in which the climate policies of 15 (as of 1995) EU member states were
coordinated and an EU tax policy subsystem in which an EU energy/carbon tax proposal was
considered.
This case study examines the dynamics that occurred between 1988 and 1997 within Dutch
national climate policy subsystem, the EU climate and tax policy subsystems, the Dutch domestic
tax policy subsystem in which a proposal for an expanded energy levy was pursued, and the
Dutch energy policy subsystems in which a proposed wind energy program was developed and
implemented. Figure 9.1 depicts these overlapping subsystems.
9.2 THE DUTCH CLIMATE POLICY SUBSYSTEM
As in the other subsystems, climate policy in the Netherlands was driven by two competing
coalitions: an Economic Growth Coalition and a Precautionary Coalition. These coalitions held
similar beliefs and had many of the same members as their counterparts in the international and
U.S. climate policy subsystem. Unlike the other subsystems, however, the Precautionary
Coalition was able to dominate the subsystem through all three phases of the policy process
between 1988 and 1997.
9.2.1. Phase 1: 1987-1990
The Netherlands' climate change policy has its roots in the environmental planning process
initiated by VROM in 1982. At that time, VROM began to prepare rolling three-year
Environmental Programs, updated yearly, that established general guidelines for the Ministry's
activities. This planning process was expanded in 1984 to become the National Environmental
Policy Plan (NEPP). Although the first NEPP was supposed to be released in 1986, it was
delayed first until 1987, and then until 1988.6 In 1988, the National Institute for Public Health
and Environmental Protection (RIVM) released report entitled Concern for Tomorrow, which
was a comprehensive review of country's environment and forecast of future conditions. This
ex-ante evaluation. Water Science and Technology 49, 3: 109-116; Wolsink, Maarten. 1996. Dutch wind power
policy: Stagnating implementation of renewables. Energy Policy 24, 12: 1079; Wolsink, Maarten. 2000. Wind
power and the NIMBY-myth: institutional capacity and the limited significance of public support. Renewable
Energy 21, 1: 49-64; Junginger, M., S. Agterbosch, A. Faaij, and W. Turkenburg. 2004. Renewable electricity in
the Netherlands. Energy Policy 32, 9: 1053-1073; Raven, R. P. J. M. 2004. Implementation of manure digestion
and co-combustion in the Dutch electricity regime: a multi-level analysis of market implementation in the
Netherlands. Energy Policy 32: 29-39.
6 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
7 The report, which was commissioned by VROM, looked at carrying capacity of Dutch environment, predicted that
pollution would need to be reduced by 70 to 90 percent by 2010 in order to remain within carrying capacity of the
Dutch environment.
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Figure 9.1 The National Climate Policy Subsystem in the Netherlands and Selected Overlapping
Policy Subsystems
report, together with several highly-visible events caused by pollution, galvanized public support
for environmental reform.'
Among the threats highlighted by the RIVM report was catastrophic flooding as a result of
climate change and sea level rise. This threat was a major factor in the decision by the Dutch
government to advocate strong actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases internationally as
well as within the Netherlands. Later that year, VROM and other members of the precautionary
coalition in the Netherlands helped Environment Canada organize the Toronto Conference and
draft the Conference Statement, which call for a 20 percent reduction in global CO 2 emissions
from 1988 levels by the year 2005.' Among the conference participants, was Environment
8 The release of the RIVM report coincided with the death of 14,000 North Sea harbor seals in a distemper epidemic
after their immune systems were weakened by water pollution. These events motivated Queen Beatrix to make the
environment a major point in her 1988 Christmas Address. She warned the Dutch people that "the earth is slowly
dying and the inconceivable - the end of life itself - is actually becoming conceivable." Raun. 1989. Flood Tide of
Environmental Concern Engulfs The Dutch.
9 Proceeding of the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, Toronto, June
27-30, 1988. WMO Doc. 710.
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Minister Nijpels, who used the opportunity to announce that the Netherlands would host a
ministerial meeting the following year on climate change.'
VROM, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began planning for the Ministerial
Conference immediately following the Toronto meeting. As a prelude to this meeting, which
was to be held in Noordwijk, the Dutch government, together with France and Norway,
sponsored a summit meeting in The Hague on global environmental issues." Although this
meeting addressed a broader range of environmental issues than just climate change, one of its
purposes was to develop a consensus among the EU countries on the Toronto target. 2
As planning for the Noordwijk meeting progressed, VROM was also nearing completion of
the first NEPP. VROM, in consultation with other ministries, altered the NEPP to address each
of the issues raised by the RIVM report, and set an initial long-term goal of restoring the Dutch
environment within 25 years." To address climate change, the plan called for emissions of CO2
in the Netherlands to be stabilized at the 1990 levels by 2000. However, this proposal was
widely criticized in the media and by environmental groups as inadequate given the threat that
climate change posed to the Netherlands and the statements that Nijpels had made in Toronto.
By March of 1989, agreement had been reach the NEPP within the government, although
with some reluctance on the part of ministries such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the
Ministry of Transport. With the environment becoming an important issue for the 1990
elections, few ministers wanted to appear recalcitrant, particularly since they had endorsed the
concept of the NEPP as a comprehensive environmental plan several years earlier."
As details of the plan became known, members of the economic growth coalition began to
express concerns over its cost. As presented to parliament, the NEPP would require additional
government expenditures of about $3 billion from 1990 to 1994, and the total cost of the plan
was projected to be as much as $200 billion by 2015." However, 80 percent of cost of the plan,
which was based on the "polluter pays" principle, was to be met by industries and consumers.
During negotiations within the government, Minister of Finance Onno Ruding had expressed
concern about the high costs of NEPP and about the rather vague agreements on how some of the
plan's measures would be financed."' As it was being presented to parliament, industry groups
such as VNCI also expressed concern over its cost.'
10 Interview #53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Jan., 1998.
" Representatives of twenty-four countries, including seventeen heads of state or government, attended the meeting.
However, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan were not invited.
12 Interview #53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Jan., 1998.
" The NEPP process consisted of four distinct types of plans: a long-term plan that set out general environmental
goals for the country, a 10-year strategic national plan that established general policies that would achieve these
objectives; rolling operational plans, prepared every four years but updated annually, for implementing these
policies, and corresponding strategic and operational plans prepared by regional and local authorities. The NEPPs
themselves needed to be approved by Parliament. (Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National
Environmental Policy Plan).
14 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
1s Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
16 Raun, Laura. Dutch Environmental Plan Near Completion. Financial Times, Apr. 25, 1989. 1 pg. 2.
'7 1989. Dutch chemical companies worry over added environmental costs. Platt's Petrochemical Report, Mar. 9,
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When the plan was presented to Parliament in April of 1989, members of the Liberal party
supported Ruding's criticisms even through the party's own ministers in the cabinet, including
Environment Minister Nijpels, had approved the plan. In particular, the Liberals opposed a
proposed increase in a duty on gasoline and diesel fuel and an end to the existing tax deduction
for commuting to work by private car. They viewed this proposal as unfair, as it forced
motorists, and commuters in particular, to bear substantially higher costs in order to finance the
plan.
Despite the opposition from within their own party, the Liberal cabinet ministers continued
to support the plan. Led by Prime Minister Lubbers, a Christian Democrat, both the Liberal and
the Christian Democrat cabinet ministers approved the plan on April 29, 1989. Three days later,
the Liberal party called for the cabinet to withdraw the proposals for increasing the duty on
gasoline and diesel fuels and for abolishing the tax concessions on commuting by private car and
announced that they would withdraw their support from the coalition government if the motion
were not accepted."'. When Lubbers refused to do so, the Liberals introduced a motion of no
confidence. When with the cooperation of the opposition Labor party, Lubbers was forced to
offer the resignation of cabinet. Queen Beatrix accepted it and called for new elections to be held
in September. Although the NEPP was published on May 25, 1989, debate and formal approval
of the plan would need to until the new government was formed in September.
The Christian Democrats maintained their seats in the September elections, and Lubbers
remained Prime Minister. However, the Liberals lost 5 of their 27 seats, in part because of their
opposition to the NEPP.'9 In September, all four major Parties accepted NEPP in its existing
form, but advocated tightening timetable for reducing GHGs. Although all four parties accepted
the basic framework of the NEPP, they called for a number of adjustments to be made in it to
reflect commitments made during the elections. In particular, they sought a tightening of the
timetable for reducing CO2 emissions. The process of amending the plan, which was to become
known as NEPP+, would take an additional nine months.
As VROM was moving ahead with revisions to the NEPP, it was also proceeding with its
efforts to elicit commitments to emission reductions from other countries at the Noordwijk
Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change in November of 1989.
This meeting was notable in that it was the first high-level meeting focusing specifically on
climate change. VROM used its network of contacts within environment ministries to negotiate
a draft ministerial statement prior to meeting.2 o Initial declaration had called for (insert
statements). When this formulation was rejected by the United States, Japan, and the Soviet
Union, the declaration was revised to call for industrialized countries to stabilize their ghg
1989.
18 The dispute over the car tax was actually just final straw in long series of disputes between the Liberals and the
Christian Democrats. The Liberals were the smaller of the two parties in the coalition government, and had felt
that they were consistently being shortchanged by Lubbers, a Christian Democrat. Liberals objections were
regarded as effort to protect car users from a progressive environmental policy (Raun, Laura. Dutch Government to
Quit Over Plan for Environment. Financial Times, May 3, 1989. 1 pg. 22).
19 Cody, Edward. Lubbers' Party Wins Again In Dutch Vote; Antipollution Drive Seen as Key Issue. Washington
Post, Sept. 7, 1989. A pg. 31.
20 Interview #53. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Jan., 1998.
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emissions "as soon as possible." However, it also noted that the view of "many" industrialized
countries that stabilization should be achieved "as a first step at the latest by the year 2000."
The NEPP+, published in June of 1990, called for emissions of CO2 to be stabilized at
1989/1990 levels by 1994/195 and reduced by 3 to 5 percent by 2000." The cost of plan was
estimated to be about $8.5 billion, 50 percent of which would be funded by government."
Petroleum and fuel oil taxes were increased in January of 1990 to raise the necessary revenue. In
response to these developments, industrial and agricultural groups began to become concerned
about the economic risks of moving too far ahead of other EU countries, particularly with regard
to CO2 emissions. However, environmental groups continued to criticize the plan as a retreat
from 10 percent reduction promised in Toronto."
9.2.2. Phase 2: 1990-1994
The second phase of the Dutch climate policy process was marked by the implementation of
the NEPP+, the preparation of NEPP-II, and the submission of the Netherlands' National Report
under the FCCC. Problems with implementation of the NEPP+ became apparent soon after it
was adopted. By early 1991, only small number of 228 mostly voluntary measures in plan had
been put into effect. There were a number of reasons for this. Environmental policy makers and
pollution control authorities had limited capability to implement many of the measures, as many
were in the form of voluntary agreements, or covenants, with various industries. These
industries and other target groups were also not prepared to respond quickly to the measures
contained in the plan.2" Finally, there were some instances, such as the expansion of Schipol
airport in Amsterdam, in which decisions were made that clearly fell short of objectives of
NEPP. 26
VROM released the Second National Environmental Policy Plan, the NEPP-II, in December
1993. The NEPP-I employed four basic mechanisms for reducing emissions: standards and
regulations, subsidies, taxation, and voluntary agreements. Notably, most of these policies had
been prepared by VROM with only limited involvement from other ministries and stakeholders."
The standards and regulations focused primarily on building codes and appliance standards,
while the subsidies were intended to promote energy efficiency and the development of
alternative energy sources. In addition, voluntary agreements with a number of industrial sectors
21 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
22 Spinks, Peter. Dutch back green plan. Guardian, Aug. 2, 1990.
23 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
24 Covenant is civil contract giving industry more control over the interim goals and measures used to fulfill the
governments targets. Under covenants, government specifies results to be achieved by a certain deadline, but
allows industries to choose the mix of technological, economic, and planning measures they will used to achieve
the result. This allows industries to choose the most efficient measures and integrate environmental modifications
into their business planning. As of 1995, over 100 covenants had been established (OECD. 1995. Environmental
Performance Review 1995. Paris: OECD).
25 It had been calculated that a 20 percent increase in industrial energy efficiency would be necessary to achieve the
2000 target of a three percent reduction of C02 emissions (Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for
heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands).
26 Bennett. 1991. The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan.
2 van Rooij en and van Wees. 2003. Green electricity policy in the Netherlands.
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would be strengthened, and a number of different mechanisms would be used to improve energy
use in the transport sector. However, the main instrument through which the Netherlands would
fulfill its pledge of reducing CO2 emissions by 3 percent before 2000 was to the proposed
regulatory energy levy. VROM recommended that it be imposed unilaterally by 1996 if an EU-
wide energy tax was not imposed before then.2"
In August 1994, the "purple coalition" of the Labor Party, the Democrats 66 Party, and the
Liberal Party (VVD) replaced the Christian Democrats as the governing coalition. Wim Kok of
the Labor Party became prime minister. Although this new government upheld the tax proposal,
it limited the energy price increase to 15 to 25 percent, and large energy-intensive industries
remained exempt.29 Unexpectedly, this exemption caused some members of Parliament to rebel
against the proposal, forcing the government to make some additional adjustments in order to
gain the parliament's approval. The NEPP-II was approved in December of 1994 after it was
agreed that the levy would not come into effect until January of 1996.30 It should be noted here,
however, that approval of the NEPP-II did not constitute approval of the energy levy itself, which
would also require approval by Parliament before it could take effect.
The NEPP-II became the basis for the 1994 Netherlands' National Communication on
Climate Change Polices." The plan as described in the National Communication was considered
to be one of the most aggressive of the national climate plans. It was also one of few in which
policies and measures are described that could come close to achieving the stated emissions
reduction target of a 3 to 5 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from average 1990
levels by the year 2000." A list of these measures is contained in Table 9.1.
9.2.3. Phase 3: 1994-1997
Phase 3 of the Dutch Climate Policy Subsystem was focused primarily on the negotiations of
the Kyoto Protocol. The positions of the Netherlands in these discussions were coordinated by
International Affairs Coordination (CIM) committee, which was convened by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. However, this committee was heavily dependant on VROM to do much of the
work, as the MOF had only two people dedicated to the issue." VROM, on the other hand, had
established a substantial taskforce to work on the negotiations."
28 Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands.
29Although the Liberal Party opposed the levy, it accepted the proposal in exchange for other concessions in the
coalition agreement (Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands).
30 See the OECD Environmental Performance Review for the Netherlands for an overview of the NEPP 2 and a
general discussion of Dutch environmental policy (OECD. 1993. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews:
Netherlands).
3' Netherlands. 1994. Netherlands'National Communication on Climate Change Policies.
32 Climate Action Network. 1995. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD
Countries: Third Review, January 1995.
3 Among other things, the MOF relied on VROM to prepare the agenda and background papers for CIM meetings.
(Interview #42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 1998).
3 van Harmelen, Boomsma, and Korenromp. 2000. Building Bridges, Building Dikes: an evaluation of the Dutch
policy-making on climate change.
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Table 9.1. Policies and Measures Contained in the Netherlands' National Communication on
Climate Change Policies
POLICY/MEASURE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY
Consultations regarding energy conservation for electricity generation VROM
Promotion of wind energy, energy from waste incineration MEA, VROM
Vehicle taxes, road taxes, excise taxes to improve automobile construction and MOF, MOT, VROM
use
Improved spatial planning and parking policies VROM
Long Term Agreements for efficiency improvements for freight Transport MEA, VROM
Improvements to alternative freight transport facilities MOT, VROM
Energy registration and control system for the manufacturing sector MEA, VROM
Long Term Agreement for efficiency improvements for manufacturing MEA, VROM
Restrictions on landfilling and energy recovery VROM
Long-Term Agreements to improve energy efficiency in commercial buildings VROM
Energy efficiency standards for new buildings VROM
Energy efficiency program for government buildings, VROM
Long-Term Agreements to improve energy conservation in subsidized housing VROM
Higher Insulation and energy efficiency standards for private housing VROM
Long-Term Agreements to improve energy efficiency in agriculture Mi. Agriculture, VROM
Extension of forest cover through subsidies to farmers Mi. Agriculture, VROM
Long-Term Agreements for energy conservation in energy distribution sector MEA, VROM
Cogeneration, district heat recovery of industrial heat MEA, VROM
By April 1995, voluntary covenants for energy efficiency had been established with 22 of 35
major industrial sectors. Most covenants required a 20 percent reduction Of CO2 emissions by
2000, with the Ministry of Economic Affairs providing financial assistance for new investments
and research and development."5 In June 1995, however, the Central Planning Bureau and RIVM
reported that energy consumption would rise significantly in coming years as result of
strengthening economy and low energy prices .3 ' Environment Minister Margreet de Boer
promised in reaction to these reports to limit a rise in energy consumption, but was forced to
concede in October 1995 that a reduction in CO2 emissions of 5 percent below 1990 levels by
2000 would not feasible, and that the Netherlands would aim for a 3 percent reduction.
Within the CIM, VROM continued to push for aggressive commitments. Both the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, however, were concerned about effect of
targets on Dutch economy. In addition, the MEA stressed the importance of achieving some of
these reductions abroad. Although neither ministry was fully engaged on the issue, these
differences prevented the CIM from reaching an agreement on a new emissions reduction target.3"
VROM also had some concerns about means for achieving a post-2000 target, and began to push
harder for discussion of agreements on specific policies and measures (PAMs) in international
discussions.38
In the summer of 1996, the Dutch cabinet set up a steering committee made up of
representatives from Ministries of Economic Affairs, Environment, Agriculture and Transport to
" OECD. 1995. Environmental Performance Review 1995.
36 Interview #44. Netherlands Academy of Sciences, Netherlands. Feb., 1989.
37~ Interview #42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 1998; Interview #40. Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 1997.
38 Interview #46. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Feb., 1998.
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examine additional measures for reducing CO 2 emissions.39 That September, the committee
reported that emissions had risen 7 percent from 1990 to 1995 due largely to economic growth
and increased energy consumption, and that CO2 emissions increased by 3.9 percent in 1995. In
reaction to this report, MPs from Labor and the D66 parties, together with opposition Christian
Democrats and Green Parties, called for the cabinet to allocate additional funds to emission
reduction efforts. The stalemate within the government regarding a post-2000 target continued,
however, with both the MEA and MOF wanting the government to wait until the United States
had set its target before announcing their own.'
Unable to reach agreement within the government on a national emissions reduction target,
VROM shifted its focus in late 1996 to trying to get agreement on an EU-wide target and burden-
sharing agreement when it took over the EU Presidency in January 1997.4' VROM began
working with State University of Utrecht to develop an analytical approach for determining
differentiated targets within EU. With the assistance of this "Triptique" model, VROM was able
to forge an agreement with other EU countries on a set of targets that added up to an EU-wide
reduction of about 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010.4 Under this EU "bubble agreement,"
the Netherlands also would have a target of 10 percent below 1990 levels. On March 23, 1997,
this agreement was endorsed by the EU Environmental Council, which, also, called for all
industrialized countries to reduce emissions by 15 percent below 1990 levels by 2010.
Although the Netherlands relinquished the EU Presidency to Luxembourg in June of 1997, it
continued to play a leadership role in the AGBM process. Because Luxembourg had only a
limited capacity to negotiate on behalf of the EU, a troika of Luxembourg, the Netherlands as
Luxembourg's predecessor, and the United Kingdom and its successor, led the negotiations at
COP 3. Thus Dr. Bert Metz, the head of VROM's climate change unit, became one EU's chief
negotiators in Kyoto. Close coordination took place at this point between VROM and the
network of Dutch environmental NGOs. When proposals from the United States or other
JUSCANZ countries were put forward during closed negotiating sessions, someone from the
delegation informed someone from one of the NGOs (usually WWF, Friends of the Earth, or
Stichting Natuur en Millieu). They in turn used the CAN network to apply pressure against the
39 Dutch budget for decreasing C02 emissions. Power Europe, Sept. 20, 1996. pg. 25.
40 Interview #42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. Feb., 1998.
41 The President of the Council is responsible for determining the agenda of the Council, chair sessions of
preparatory groups and to co-ordinate and represent the EU and its member states in international negotiations.
Thus VROM becomes responsible for setting the agenda for the EU Environment Council when the Netherlands
holds the Presidency (Oberthur and Ott. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: International climate policy for the 21st
century).
4 2The approach, known as "Triptique" separated the economies of member countries into three broad economic
sectors: the domestic sector, heavy industry, and electricity generation. Emission targets were calculated by adding
up individual allowances for each sector and by taking into account economic growth, population changes, and
climate-adjusted energy use (Blok, K., G. J. M. Phylipsen, and J. W. Bode. 1997. The Triptique Approach: Burden
Differentiation of C02 Emission Reduction Among European Union Member States. Utrecht: Department of
Science, Technology and Society, Utrecht University). Notably, the Triptique model was developed entirely
within VROM; no other ministries were involved (van Harmelen, Boomsma, and Korenromp. 2000. Building
Bridges, Building Dikes: an evaluation of the Dutch policy-making on climate change). See also Berdowski, Jan,
Michael Gager, Bernhard Raberger, Manfred Ritter, and Antoon Visschedijk. 1999. Overview of National
Programmes to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Copenhagen: European Environment Agency.
169
proposal." With this combined pressure, VROM was able to force the United States and Japan
to accept targets well below those that these countries had put forward at the beginning of the
Conference.
9.3 OVERLAPPING SUBSYSTEMS
The various policies and measures contained in the NEPP-II and the Dutch National
Communication to the UNFCCC Secretariat were to be developed and implemented in a number
of different overlapping national, regional, and local policy subsystems. Policy processes
occurring within policy subsystems of the European Union also affected these measures." The
remainder of this chapter discusses the dynamics that transpired within the EU policy subsystems
that considered EU climate policy and an EU-wide energy tax. It then describes the dynamics of
the Dutch national energy tax subsystem in which the national energy levy was considered.
Finally, it discusses the dynamics occurring among the national renewable energy subsystem and
overlapping regional wind energy subsystems and municipal zoning regulation subsystems, all of
which were involved in the implementation of the Dutch Wind Energy program.
9.3.1. The EU Climate and Tax Policy Subsystems
EU policy related to climate change between 1988 and 1997 was determined in two
overlapping subsystems: an EU climate policy subsystem and an EU tax policy subsystem. EU
climate policies pertaining to the negotiations of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were
determined within the climate policy subsystem. However, the fate of an EU-wide energy/carbon
tax, an important aspect of the EU's climate policy, was determined within an EU tax policy
subsystem.
The EU climate policy subsystem was comprised of a wide range of actors, including
representatives from the European Commission's Directorate-General on Environment (DGXI);
the Directorate-General on Energy (DGXIII); the Council of Environment Ministers, the Council
of Energy Ministers; representatives of environment, energy, economic, finance and other
ministries of member states, and a panoply of NGO lobbyists." These different actors and
43Interview #51. World Wide Fund for Nature, Netherlands. Feb., 1998; Interview #39. Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Feb., 1998.
"4For a general discussion of the political dynamics of the European Union concerning environmental issues, see,
e.g., Breckinridge, R. E. 1997. Reassessing regimes: The international regime aspects of the European Union.
Journal of Common Market Studies 35, 2: 173-187; Cameron. 1995. Transnational relations and the development
of European economic and monetary unionEising. 2004. Multilevel governance and business interests in the
European Union; Haigh, Nigel. 1999. European Union environmental policy at 25: retrospect and prospect.
Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 17, 1: 109-112; Hosli, M. 0. 2000. The creation of the
European economic and monetary union (EMU): intergovernmental negotiations and two-level games. Journal of
European Public Policy 7, 5: 744-766; Kellow and Zito. 2002. Steering through complexity: EU environmental
regulation in the international context; Sedelmeier, U. 2002. Sectoral dynamics of EU enlargement: advocacy,
access and alliances in a composite policy. Journal of European Public Policy 9, 4: 627-649Tallberg, J. 2002.
Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International Organization 56, 3: 609-
45 The European Commission, which functions as the executive branch of the European Union, is organized into
Directorate Generals (DG). These were referred to by their number through most of the 1990s. Although DGXI
(Environment). had primary responsibility for climate change, a number of other DGs also had partial
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organizations formed two broad coalitions that paralleled the Precautionary and Economic
Growth Coalitions of the Dutch and International Climate Policy Subsystems.4 6 It was largely
dominated by the Precautionary coalition, as the climate change issue was considered to be the
purview of DGXI and the Environment Council.
The EU tax policy subsystem was also comprised of a wide range of actors. These included
representatives from the European Commission's Directorate-General on Economic Analysis
(DGII); the Directorate-General on Taxation (DGXXI); the Council of Economic and Finance
Ministers (ECOFIN); and representatives of various other ministries of member states and
NGOs. These different actors and organizations also formed two broad coalitions that paralleled
the Precautionary and Economic Growth Coalitions of the Dutch and International Climate
Policy Subsystems. However, it was largely dominated by the Economic Growth coalition, as
taxation issues were the purview of DGII, DGXXI and ECOFIN.
The climate policy process was initiated in 1988 when DGXI proposed to the European
Council that the European Community develop a common policy on climate change.4 7 In June of
1990, a joint Council of Energy and Environment Ministers agreed that CO 2 emissions should be
stabilized at 1990 levels within the EU as a whole by the year 2000.4 That October, this joint
responsibility for aspects of climate change policy, including DGI, (external relations)., DGII (economic analysis).,
DGIII (the internal market)., DGVI (agriculture)., DGVII (transportation)., DGVIII (development aid)., DGXII
(research)., DGXIII (energy). and DGXXI (taxation). The European Council of Ministers, which oversees, the
Commission, is also organized into several Councils, including Environment Council, an Energy Council, a
Finance Council, and others.
46 It should be noted here that the determination that the EU climate policy subsystem was dominated by two major
coalitions was not based on a detailed documents analysis, but a more general assessment based on interviews,
document analyses conducted for other subsystems, and a review of the literature. Virtually all of the members of
the International Precautionary Coalition who were from European countries also coordinated their activities in the
EU climate policy subsystem. However, many actors and organizations participating in the EU Economic Growth
Coalition were allied with members of the International Economic Growth Coalition but did not participate in the
international policy process.
47 The European Union has two basic approaches to environmental policies: introducing common policies at the EU
level in areas in which it has exclusive competence (in which case power is transferred to the EU). and
coordinating national policies in areas where it has mixed competence. Under the 1992 Treaty on the European
Union, the EU has exclusive competence over trade related matters and mixed competence in areas of agriculture,
transport and environmental protection. This mixed competence is subject to the principle of subsidiarity, which
provides that the EU can take environmental measures only when the objective of environmental policy can be
better achieved through joint action at the Community level (Ringius, L. 1999. The European Community and
Climate Protection: What's Behind the 'Empty Rhetoric'? Oslo: Center for International Climate and
Environmental Research). For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of EU climate policy, see, e.g., Gupta,
Joyeeta and Nicolien van der Grijp. 2002. European Union Leadership on Climate Change. Amsterdam: Instituut
voor Milieuvraagstukken, Vrije Universiteit; Gupta, Joyeeta and L. Ringius. 2000. EU Leadership: Between
Ambition and Reality. Amsterdam: Instituut voor Milieuvraagstukken, Vrije Universiteit; Haigh, Nigel. 1996.
Climate Change Policies and Politics in the European Community. In Politics of Climate Change: a European
Perspective, ed. Tim O'Riordan and Jill Jaeger, pg. 155-185. London, New York: Routledge.
48 This target not based on care analysis of existing and planned policies and measures, but general sense on the part
of the Ministers that such a target was feasible (Ringius. 1999. The European Community and climate protection:
What's behind the 'empty rhetoric'?).
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Council formally committed the EU countries to this target and asked the Commission to develop
a plan for achieving it.49
The European Commission presented a plan for achieving the stabilization target to the
Council of Ministers in May 1992. This plan, prepared jointly by DGXI and DGXIII, was
composed of five elements:
= Energy efficiency improvements through the implementation of existing SAVE (Specific
Actions for Vigorous Energy Efficiency) program proposals;
= Strengthening measures for promoting the dissemination of better energy conversion and use
technologies through the THERMIE program;
= A program of support for renewable energy technologies;
- A combined energy/carbon tax, to be introduced at a level of three dollars per barrel of oil
equivalent in 1993, rising by $1 per year to level of $10 in 2000; and,
= Additional unspecified measures to be taken by member states."
After heavy lobbying by members of the Economic Growth coalition, the Commission
recommended that the imposition of the energy tax should be contingent on the implementation
by the United States and Japan of identical taxes so that European industries are not put at
competitive disadvantage. Energy-intensive industries and major exporters were also exempted
from the proposed tax.5
At the urging of Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana, most environment and energy
ministers supported the carbon/energy tax proposal. At this point, however, the proposal was
taken up within the EU tax policy subsystem, where it ran into significant difficulties. Despite
intense lobbying from industry groups, economic and finance ministers from Denmark, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands supported the plan, including the imposition of the
energy/carbon tax." However, ministers from the remaining countries rejected the proposed tax.
France wanted only a carbon tax so that its nuclear industry would be protected. The United
Kingdom opposed tax on principle, arguing that such a tax should be the responsibility of
individual member countries. Poorer countries, Spain being the most vocal, opposed the plan
because they feared it would burden their economies. Because the Maastrich Treaty required that
49 This stabilization target implicitly acknowledged a need for differentiation among EU countries, as the EU itself
could only facilitate the coordination of national climate policies. A number of countries, including the
Netherlands, attempted tried to determine what this target would mean for individual states, but an agreement was
never reached on specific numbers (van Harmelen, Boomsma, and Korenromp. 2000. Building Bridges, Building
Dikes: an evaluation of the Dutch policy-making on climate change).
50 van Rooijen and van Wees. 2003. Green electricity policy in the Netherlands.
5 EC Sets Energy Tax, but implementation hinges on U.S. and Japan adopting them. Electric Utility Week, May 25,
1992. pg. 7. The lobbying was sufficiently intense that EU Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana described it
as a "violent assault" (Newell and Paterson. 1998. A climate for business: global warming, the state and capital).
See also Sebenius, James. 1994. Towards a Winning Climate Coalition. In Negotiating Climate Change: The
Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
52 Particularly vocal in its opposition to the tax was Europa, the European Petroleum Industry Association, which
demanded proof that the tax would be the most economically efficient way of meeting the stabilization target
(Newell and Paterson. 1998. A climate for business: global warming, the state and capital).
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member countries be in unanimous agreement in order to impose any EU-wide fiscal measure
such as the energy/carbon tax, the plan was rejected. This left Denmark, Germany and
Netherlands as only countries with concrete plans on how to achieve the CO2 stabilization target
when the EU and its members signed the UNFCCC in June 1992."
The energy tax debate continued within the EU the following year as it contemplated
ratification of the UNFCCC, but without resolution. The EU had to ratify the FCCC by
December 31, 1993, if the agreement was to enter into force the following year. Germany, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, France and Italy had been insisting that ratification be
contingent on the adoption of EU-wide instruments such as an energy tax to ensure compliance,
but dropped this demand as the December deadline loomed. The Environment Council ratified
the UNFCCC on December 15, 1992, but without an energy tax. However, it requested that
instruments for implementing the agreement be established by end of 1994."
In the fall of 1995, VROM began urging the Belgian government, which held the EU
presidency at the time, to seek once again an agreement on an EU-wide CO2 tax. The EU
Council of Ministers debated the issue in November 1995. The United Kingdom remained
opposed to it, however. In the face of this opposition, the EU formally abandoned its effort to
establish a common CO 2 tax in December 1994. In doing so, ECOFIN declared that any member
state desiring to do so could introduce an energy or CO 2 tax unilaterally."
In March 1995, DGXI prepared a working paper describing the current state of climate
policy developments within the EU and putting forward proposals for policy options for the
period 2005-2010. This detailed report of member states' attempts to reduce emissions showed
that, while the EU would come close to stabilizing emissions in the 1990-1996 period, the
primary reason that it would be able to do so was that reductions in UK and Germany had been
offsetting increases in emissions from the remaining thirteen countries.' Given trends at the
time, CO 2 emissions in the EU were expected to exceed 1990 levels by 5 to 8 percent by 2000."
When COP 1 convened the following month, EU Environment Ministers stated that the
Berlin meeting should map out mandate for negotiations on a protocol to be completed by 1997,
and called for internationally coordinated policies and measures (PAMs) for reducing ghg
emissions." The EU was facing a significant credibility problem, however, as the political goals
outlined by the political leaders of member countries were widely viewed as being unrealistic and
unachievable. Despite efforts by the Commission to show leadership on this issue, the EU
" Ringius. 1999. The European Community and climate protection: What's behind the 'empty rhetoric'?. In protest,
Ripa de Meana, the EC environment commissioner, refused to participate in UNCED.
5 1994. EU Member States to Ratify Climate Convention Without Energy Tax. Europe Energy, Jan. 7, 1994.
" Environment Council abandons common C02 tax. Europe Environment, Dec. 20, 1994. pg. 45.
56 Moreover, circumstances and policies largely unrelated to climate protection policies were the reasons for the
reductions in both of these countries. Reductions in Germany were due in large part to the economic restructuring
in the former East Germany, while reductions in the United Kingdom were the result of privatization in the energy
sector (Berdowski, Gager, Raberger, Ritter, and Visschedijk. 1999. Overview of National Programmes to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions).
". 1995. Commission Tables "Working Paper" on C02. Europe Environment, Mar. 6, 1995.
58 1995. EU to Push for Coordinated Measures in Climate Protocol.
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Environment Council remained unable to reach agreement on specific PAMs or targets and
timetables. "
As preparations for COP 2 were underway in the spring of 1996, the EU Environment
Council issued a statement concluding that "global average temperatures should not exceed two
degrees above pre-industrial levels and that therefore concentrations levels lower than 550 ppmv
should guide global limitation and reductions efforts." Disagreement continued regarding
specific targets, however. Germany, supported by Austria, the Netherlands and several other
countries, proposed that all industrialized countries should reduce 1990 levels of CO2 emissions
by 10 percent by 2005 and by 15-20 percent by 2010. The United Kingdom and other countries
continued to argue that a target should not be set until agreement had been reached on PAMs,
and that targets should be differentiated."
With the Netherlands due to take over the Presidency in January 1997, VROM began to
realize that the EU would be successful of the AGBM negotiations only if it could reach an
internal agreement on targets and timetables, and that such an agreement would need to include
differentiation among member states. Led by Bert Metz, VROM began working with the State
University of Utrecht to develop an analytical approach for establishing these differentiated
targets. The resulting "Triptique" approach enabled VROM to take the lead on negotiating a
burden-sharing agreement within the EU.61 To show that these targets were achievable, VROM
worked with DGXI to evaluate the effect of specific policies and measures, resulting in a report
by the Commission that emissions of C0 2, CH 4 , and N20 could be reduced significantly by 2010
if all existing and planned policies and measures were implemented.6 2
As a result of these efforts, the EU Environmental Council agreed in March 1997 on an EU
"bubble" in which EU member states accepted individual national targets that collectively would
reduce emissions of C0 2 , CH4 , and N20 by 10 percent from 1990 levels by the year 2010 (Table
9.2). The Environment Council went on to endorse the position that all industrialized countries
59 Prior to COP 1, Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard had asked that DGXI be given a mandate to
coordinate the EU position in the climate change negotiations. This request was rejected, as environment ministers
from many member states were reluctant to give the Commission additional power. This left progress on the
development of EU climate policy dependent to a large degree on the country holding the rotating Presidency of
the Council (Ringius. 1999. The European Community and climate protection: What's behind the 'empty
rhetoric'?).
60 Oberthur and Ott. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: International climate policy for the 21st century.
61 Triptique was a bottom-up approach to differentiation that separated the economies of member countries into three
broad economic sectors: the domestic sector, heavy industry, and electricity generation. Emission targets were
calculated by adding up individual allowances for each sector and by taking into account economic growth,
population changes, and climate-adjusted energy use (Blok, Phylipsen, and Bode. 1997. The Triptique Approach:
Burden Diferentiation of C02 Emission Reduction among European Union Member States). Notably, other
ministries were not involved in this effort (van Harmelen, Boomsma, and Korenromp. 2000. Building Bridges,
Building Dikes: an evaluation of the Dutch policy-making on climate change). See also Berdowski, Gager,
Raberger, Ritter, and Visschedijk. 1999. Overview of National Programmes to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions.
62 European Commission. 1997. Communication From the Commission: An Overall View of Energy Policy and
Actions. Brussels.
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should reduce emissions by 15 percent below 1990 levels by 2010, although it was not clear how
the additional 5 percent in emissions reductions would be achieved.63
The EU Precautionary Coalition received a substantial boost in May of 1997 when Tony
Blair's Labor Party replaced John Major's Conservative Party as the governing party in the
Table 9.2 EU Targets as of March, 1997
Member Target (C0 2 , CH4, N20)
Austria -25
Belgium -10
Denmark -25
Finland 0
France 0
Germany -25
Greece +30
Ireland +15
Italy -7
Luxembourg -30
Netherlands -10
Spain +17
Sweden +5
Portugal +40
United Kingdom -10
United Kingdom. Not only was this new government more inclined towards working
cooperatively with the rest of Europe, but also went on to immediately fulfill its campaign pledge
to set a national goal reducing CO 2 emissions by 20 percent by 2010." This shift paved the way
for an Environment Council agreement in June 1997 that an interim target should be set at 7.5
percent reduction by 2005, half of the 2010 reduction. It also agreed that member states could
use emissions trading to achieve their targets, but it was to be supplemental to domestic action."
The United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands worked closely together to
coordinate the EU position in the AGBM negotiations after Luxembourg took over the EU
Presidency in the second half of 1997. During COP 3, UK Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott
became the de facto negotiator for the EU. Bert Metz and other VROM staff also played an
important role in the discussions. Despite this leadership, however, all negotiating positions had
to be formally approved by all member states during internal coordination meetings. Because
consensus was required, this became a time-consuming and difficult process.66
During the final hours of negotiations, UK Prime Minister Blair and German Chancellor
Kohl became personally involved in the discussions, reaching out to the heads of other member
63 :van Harmelen, Boomsma, and Korenromp. 2000. Building Bridges, Building Dikes: an evaluation of the Dutch
policy-making on climate change.
6 Oberthur and Ott. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: International climate policy for the 21st century.
65 Yamin, Farhana. 2000. The Role of the EU in Climate Negotiations. In Climate Change and European
Leadership, ed. Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb, pg. 47-66. Dortricht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
66 Delegates from member states not directly involved in the final negotiations began to feel excluded from the
discussions, and frequently complained that concessions were being made too easily. Danish Environment
Minister Svend Auken was particularly outspoken in complaining about the conduct of the EU negotiators
(Oberthur and Ott. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: International climate policy for the 21st century).
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states in an effort to ensure an agreement on such critical issues as emissions trading and the
inclusion of certain categories of sinks. By the end of the conference, the EU, Japan, and the
United States were able to reach an agreement on emissions reduction targets of 8 percent, 7
percent and 6 percent, respectively, below 1990 levels by 2012. These targets that, while not as
aggressive as those that the EU had called for the previous March, were much lower than the
stabilization target espoused by the United States.67
Once the 8 percent target for the EU had been established, member states had to once again
negotiate among themselves to reach an agreement on targets for each member state. Even
though an analytical approach was again used for this, the negotiations were as difficult as they
Table 9.3. EU Targets as of March 1997 and resulting from the Kyoto Protocol
March 1997 target (C02, CH4, N20) Final Kyoto target (6 gases)
Austria -25 -13
Belgium -10 -7.5
Denmark -25 -21
Finland 0 0
France 0 0
Germany -25 -21
Greece +30 +25
Ireland +15 +13
Italy -7 -6.5
Luxembourg -30 -28
Netherlands -10 -6
Spain +17 +15
Sweden +5 +4
Portugal +40 +27
United Kingdom -10 -12.5
had been earlier. This was due in part to the involvement of a number of players, particularly
from the Economic Growth Coalition, who had not participated in the earlier discussions. In
June of 1988, EU member states reached an agreement on the individual targets that would
constitute the EU's 8 percent target (Table 9.3). For its part, VROM was forced by the MOE and
MOF, which had not participated in the development of the Triptique model, to argue for a target
of 6 percent below 1990 levels rather than the 10 percent figure accepted the previous year."
9.3.2. The Dutch Energy Tax Policy Subsystem
As with other national policy issues, tax policy in the Netherlands is developed through a
very complex process of negotiations among multiple actors within what can be called the Dutch
energy tax policy subsystem. Among these actors were VROM, the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, various political parties in Parliament, industry groups, and
other NGOs. Although these actors held a wide range of interests and beliefs, they generally
cooperated in two competing coalitions: a pro-tax coalition and an anti-tax coalition.
67 Yamin. 2000. The role of the EU in climate negotiations; Gupta, Joyeeta and Nicolien van der Grujp. 2000.
Perceptions of the EU's Role. In Climate Change and European Leadership, ed. Joyeeta Gupta and Michael
Grubb, pg. 67-82. Dortricht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
68 Interview #47. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Netherlands. Feb., 1998.
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Prior to 1992, the Ministry of Economic Affairs was the dominant player with regards to
energy policy development, with other ministries playing very minor roles. VROM and the
Ministry of Finance gained some influence in the mid-1990s, although MOE retained formal
authority for energy policy. Industry groups, which had close ties to MOE, also had a substantial
influence on energy policy.'9 On the other hand, environmental NGOs and consumer groups had
a much more limited role, focusing more of their attention on EU-wide energy policies.70
In early 1992, VROM began to consider means both to make additional emissions reductions
and to find additional ways to pay for the NEPP+. This was proving to be difficult, as the
economic climate in the Netherlands was different than it had been four years earlier and
agreements had already been reached with most of those target groups that are easily organized.7'
Among the measures that it proposed were an environmental levy on fuel and a regulatory energy
levy." At this point, the EU was considering an energy tax that would apply to all countries
within the community (see Section 9.3.1). However, VROM proposed that these taxes be
imposed unilaterally.
These proposals caused a significant fissure within the Dutch government. The regulatory
energy levy proved particularly divisive, with industry and the Ministry of Economic Affairs
arguing that the levy was equivalent to raising labor costs by 15 to 20 percent, and that these
costs were being imposed on top of costs associated with implementing the voluntary agreements
to reduce emissions.73 Although VROM argued that the levy would be offset by reductions in
other taxes, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and larger energy-intensive companies complained
that they would not receive the same amount paid out and that a levy imposed unilaterally would
have dire effects on investment and competitiveness.74
As a compromise, the environment minister Hans Alders and economic minister Koos
Andriessen agreed to appoint a commission to study effects that the levies would have on the
Dutch economy in general and corporate sector in particular." This commission, known as the
Wolfson Commission, issued its report in February of 1992. It concluded that in the absence of a
tax at the EU level, a domestic energy tax could have substantial negative effects on energy-
69 Newell and Paterson. 1998. A climate for business: global warming, the state and capital.
70 van Rooijen and van Wees. 2003. Green electricity policy in the Netherlands; Interview #45. Mileau Defens,
Netherlands. Feb., 1998.
71 While the first NEPP was published when the economy was growing at 4 percent, economic growth in 1993 was
negligible ( 1993. Going Dutch. Economist, Nov. 10, 1993. pg. 82).
72 R.evenues from environmental levies are used to fund environmental projects, while regulatory levies are returned
to the corporate sector in other ways.
7 Agreement on the environmental levy, which was known as WARM, was eventually reached after the government
offered energy-intensive industries compensation in return for reductions in energy use, and it went into effect later
that year.
74A number of major energy-intensive companies based in the Netherlands, including Shell, Hoogovens, KNP, Akso,
DSM and Dow, threatened to transfer their investments abroad in the future if the government introduced a carbon
tax. Some foreign companies based in the Netherlands also suggested that they may be forced to close down their
Dutch plants if their parent companies consider them to be a drain on corporate resources. (Spinks, Peter.
Multinationals get hot under the collar over Europe's carbon tax. Guardian, Mar. 20, 1992. pg. 31; Dutch plan for
eco-energy levies enrages minister, major companies. European Energy Report, Feb. 7, 1992. pg. 2).
7s Dutch government mulls incentives in return for energy efficiency. European Energy Report, Feb. 21, 1992. pg. 4.
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intensive industries. If enacted unilaterally, it should be limited to small-scale users such as
households and small consumers.76 Prior to its release, however, Andriessen used leaked
information from the report to reiterate his opposition to any unilateral increase in energy taxes.
This galvanized sufficient opposition to the proposal that no further action was taken on it until
VROM revived it the following year.77
After VROM failed in its efforts to get an EU-wide energy/carbon tax enacted, it once again
raised the idea of a unilateral Dutch energy tax in the NEPP-II when it was published in
December 1993, promoting it as the main instrument through which the Netherlands would fulfill
its pledge of reducing CO 2 emissions by 3 percent before 2000.78 The Ministry of Economic
Affairs and the Dutch employers union VNO-NCW immediately protested the inclusion of the
tax measure. However, a substantially watered-down version of it was upheld when the "purple
coalition" of the Liberal Party (VVD), Labor and Democrats 66 formed a new cabinet following
the 1994 elections.79 At the insistence of the VVD, it was agreed that the amount of the tax
would be reduced to between 15 and 25 percent, and that large-scale users would remain
exempt." It was also agreed that the imposition of the tax would be put off until 1996, and that it
would only be imposed if the EU failed to enact a similar EU-wide tax.
Debate within the EU energy tax subsystem regarding the unilateral imposition of the eco-
levy resumed in 1995 after VROM's efforts to gain approval of an EU-wide tax were
unsuccessful. Most of this debate took place within Parliament, which had yet to approve the
tax. In October 1995, the lower house of parliament took up consideration of the eco-levy.
Under intense pressure from the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV), many MPs called for
levy to apply to industrial energy users as well." After a complicated two-day debate, the
government's three coalition parties reached compromise agreement. Industrial users of gas
would have to pay the tax, but a study would be conducted to determine if and when large-scale
users of electricity would be required to do so. The horticultural industry, the only large-scale
76 The Commission investigated the impacts of a tax that would increase energy prices by 25, 50 and 100 percent. Its
analysis showed that if a tax were imposed on all energy use in a small, open economy such as the Netherlands,
energy-intensive industries would simply relocate to countries that did not have the tax, thus incurring the costs of
restructuring without affecting emissions. However, this tax would not cause this dislocation if it were applied
only to small-scale energy use, and the study suggested that there might be a modest economic benefit (Kasa. 2000.
Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands).
77 Bovens, Geveke, and de Vries. 1995. Open public administration in the Netherlands: The politics of leaking.
78 Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands.
79 While the Liberal Party opposed the energy tax, it accepted the proposal in exchange for other concessions in the
coalition agreement. (Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands).
80 The exemption, a compromise between the VVD and its coalition partners, was justified on the basis that energy
tax was to be subordinate and complimentary instrument to the long-term voluntary agreements with industry.
Although the VVD generally opposed measures that favored some industries over others, energy-intensive
industries were particularly influential in the party (Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy
industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands).
8 As workers in labor intensive industries and the service sector increasingly dominated union membership, FNV
saw the broadening of the C02 tax as beneficial for most of its members (Kasa. 2000. Explaining emission tax
exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands).
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users of gas, would be exempted from the tax on gas, although they would still be required to pay
a tax on electricity use." The proposal passed the lower house on October 12, and was sent on to
the upper house.
The upper house of parliament took up consideration of the tax proposal in December 1995.
The D66 and Green parties, core members of the precautionary coalition, immediately supported
it. Initially, many members of the Labor party opposed it out of concern about its effects on the
poor. To gain the party's full support, the government agreed to conduct study on how to help
low income families whose energy bills are high because they live in poorly-insulated housing.
With the Christian Democrats firmly opposed to the tax, agreement by the VVD became crucial
to the success of the proposal. With many VVD members concerned that the tax was being
imposed unilaterally instead of Europe-wide, that it would affect competitiveness of industry, and
that there was insufficient compensation for small and medium-sized companies, a vote on the
proposal was delayed for several weeks.83 Eventually, however, an agreement was reached, and
the upper house passed the energy tax on December 20, 1995.
The new tax went into effect on January 1 1996. In its final form, electricity consumption
exceeding 800 kWh was subject to tax of NLGO.035 per kWh. Natural gas consumption in
excess of 800 m3 was taxed at rate of NLG 0.038 per m3 . However, consumption above 50,000
kWh of electricity and 170,000 m3 of natural gas was not taxed, effectively exempting energy-
intensive industries from having to pay the tax on much of its energy consumption.84
9.3.3. Dutch Wind Energy Policy Subsystems
The development and implementation of wind energy policy in the Netherlands provides an
example of the dynamics that can occur among overlapping national and subnational policy
subsystems. This development and implementation took place through interactions among a
national renewable energy policy subsystem, seven different provincial wind energy subsystems,
and approximately 200 municipal zoning policy subsystems. General policies regarding
renewable energy and mechanisms for implementing these policies (e.g., covenants, subsidies,
and taxes) were set at the national level. These policies were implemented through voluntary
agreements with regional energy production and distribution companies, which were responsible
for constructing and operating the requisite wind turbines. However, decisions regarding the
issuance of siting permits for these wind turbines were made at the local level in accordance with
local zoning regulations.85
82 Environmental tax on gas and electricity. Power Europe, Nov. 3, 1995. pg. 19.
83 Dutch parliament postpones vote on disputed tax. European Energy Report, Dec. 5, 1995. pg. 5.
84 K asa. 2000. Explaining emission tax exemptions for heavy industries: A comparison of Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands.
85 Land use planning in the Netherlands is driven by local zoning systems in which municipalities have instituted
regulations stipulating building and land use requirements for various zones within the municipality. Local
officials can only issue a building permit appropriate for the zone in which it is to be local. Because most zoning
systems were not set up to accommodate wind turbines, the systems needed to be changed or a variance issued if
the project developer is to be granted a building permit. Changing a zoning system or acquiring a variance is
generally a lengthy process of public hearings and other public processes involving multiple agencies.
Furthermore, those unhappy with the final outcome of these processes can appeal the decision in the courts.
Although the central government has the authority to instruct local authorities about various aspects of local zoning
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The Dutch national wind energy policy grew out of a research and development effort
undertaken following 1973 energy crisis. During the 1980s, Dutch wind energy policy was set by
a coalition of energy production companies; the MEA; SEP, which was the association of energy
producers; and KEMA, a research organization funded by power distribution companies. In
January 1985, the MEA initiated the Integrated Programme Wind Energy (IPW) program. This
program consisted largely of subsidies from MEA and VROM that were intended to support
domestic wind turbine manufacturers and stimulate the wind energy market.8 ' After studies by
the MEA of economically and technically viable sites, the MEA and VROM set a goal for the
program of having 1000 Mw of wind energy operational by the year 2000. In setting this goal,
they assumed that almost any site that was considered appropriate for wind turbines could
actually be used for building them.87
The IPW program failed to have the desired effect, as producers chose to import greater
amounts of wind energy rather that to build new domestic facilities. By 1990, only 40 Mw of
wind turbines had been installed in the Netherlands, far short of interim goal set by the IPW of
100-150 Mw by 1990.8 A major reason for this was the difficulties and delays that energy
producers encountered in finding sites on which to install turbines.89 Numerous surveys had
indicated that as much as 90 percent of the Dutch population approved of the increased use of
wind power." However, local residents vigorously opposed many of the proposed projects. A
wide range of reasons were given for this opposition, including the noise, the flickering shadows
created by the turning blades, and hazards posed to birds and other wildlife.9' Since virtually all
siting proposals requiring changes to or variances from local zoning regulations, wind projects
were delayed by months or years, and were often cancelled before ground was broken.
In late 1990, EnergyNed, the national association of energy distributors, developed
Environmental Action Plan (MAP) to implement the voluntary agreements reached with the
MEA and VROM under the NEPP+. To pay for the investments into energy conservation and
renewable energy required by the NEPP+, the utilities were allowed to impose levy on distributed
electricity. 92 The MEA and VROM also signed an agreement with seven provincial electrical
schemes, this authority is rarely used in practice (Wolsink. 1996. Dutch wind power policy: Stagnating
implementation of renewables).
86 The subsidy provided by the MEA was a 35-40 percent subsidy on investments in newly built turbines, conditional
upon the completion of the project, including the issuance of safety and operating certificates, in the year in which
the subsidy was granted. This subsidy was reduced each year in expectation of turbine improvements and
improved economic performance of windfarms. The subsidy issued by VROM consisted of an "environmental
premium" (MilieuPremie). subsidy on capital investments in selected suitable areas as well as a bonus for low
noise turbines (Junginger, Agterbosch, Faaij, and Turkenburg. 2004. Renewable electricity in the Netherlands).
87 Wolsink. 1996. Dutch wind power policy: Stagnating implementation of renewables.
88 Junginger, Agterbosch, Faaij, and Turkenburg. 2004. Renewable electricity in the Netherlands.
89 Other problems were low buy-back tariffs and difficult demands put by utilities on turbine manufacturers.
90 Krohn, S. and S. Damborg. 1999. On Public Attitudes towards Wind Power. Renewable Energy 16, 1: 954-
960Wolsink. 2000. Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: institutional capacity and the limited significance of public
support.
91 Interview #44. Netherlands Academy of Sciences, Netherlands. Feb., 1989Wolsink. 1996. Dutch wind power
policy: Stagnating implementation of renewables.
92 Up until 1989, the same provincial and regional energy production companies that generated electricity handled its
distribution. This provided SEP, the national association of energy producers, with effective control of national
180
that called for up to 3,000 turbines that would generate 1,000 Mw of electricity by 2000, an
increase of more than 7 percent over the 1990 output.93 These seven utilities developed a project
called Stichting Windplan, to coordinate the effort, and pledged to invest an additional 250 Mw
by the year 1994 beyond what was required by the initial agreement.
For its part, the MEA replaced the IPW program with the Support Programme for
Application of Wind Energy in the Netherlands (Toepassing Windenergie in Nederland, or
TWIN). The production goal of TWIN program remained the same as that of the IPW: 1000 Mw
of wind energy operational by the year 2000, with an intermediate goal of 400 Mw installed by
1995. Two-thirds of program funds were devoted to technology and product development, while
the remainder was to be used for subsidies that would stimulate the domestic wind power market.
In an effort to resolve some of the siting difficulties, the MEA, VROM, and seven coastal
provinces also agreed to a siting plan for wind energy facilities.94 However, this effort failed to
solve the problems. Since the 200 municipal governments affected by the plan were not involved
in its development, they made little effort to incorporate it into their zoning systems. 95 The
ensuing difficulties were such that the Windplan was dissolved in 1993 with only small part of
fund spent and few wind turbines installed.
Recognizing the difficulties that were being encountered in siting unpopular facilities such
as waste facilities, manure processing facilities, and wind farms, Parliament passed in 1993 the
"Nimby" Act. This law gave national and provincial governments the authority to require
municipalities to specify in their zoning plans locations for unpopular facilities. However, it was
heavily criticized its hierarchical, top-down approach, and resistance to it was such that it was
never enforced. 96 In June 1995, Economic Affairs Minister Hans Wijers admitted that the target
of producing 1,000 Mw of electricity through wind turbines by 2000 would not be met. Only 150
Mw of electricity was being by wind turbines at that point, and additional facilities were being
constructed at a rate of only 30 Mw per year.97
The publication by the MEA in December 1995 of the Third White Paper on Energy marked
a new phase in Dutch renewable energy policy. This paper stated that 10 percent of energy
consumption, amounting to 17 percent of total electricity output, should come from renewable
sources by 2020, and that wind energy was to contribute 45 percent of this primary energy."
energy planning. In 1989, however, the Electricity Act was enacted that separated electricity production and
distribution. The law also allowed energy distribution companies to generate up to 25 Mw of energy (Slingerland,
S. 1997. Energy conservation and organization of electricity supply in the Netherlands. Energy Policy 25, 2: 193-
203).
93 Vidal, John. Week at the knnes - Eco Diary. Guardian, Feb. 8, 1991.
94 Administrative agreement of government and provinces on the issue of siting wind energy facilities, Ministry of
VROM, the Hague, July 1991.
95 Although the Dutch provinces have the authority to design regional plans, these plans only designate general areas
suitable for certain types of development (Wolsink. 1996. Dutch wind power policy: Stagnating implementation of
renewables).
96 Wolsink, Maarten. 2003. Reshaping the Dutch planning system: a learning process? Environment and Planning A
35, 4: 705-723.
97 Netherlands' wind power target will not be met. Power Europe, July 28, 1995. pg. 16.
98 van Rooijen and van Wees. 2003. Green electricity policy in the Netherlands.
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However, these goals were to be achieved primarily through the use of market mechanisms rather
than through direct subsidies. The 1996 regulatory energy tax (see Section 9.3.2) was intended to
stimulate demand for green electricity through exemptions for renewable energy generators,
importers, and consumers. The revenues from the tax were then used to subsidize renewable
energy producers. Although the tax was successful in stimulating a demand for renewable
energy, the siting issues remained unresolved. Only 52 Mw wind power was installed in 1996, as
distributors turned to importing more renewable energy rather than seeking domestic sources.99
In 1997, the MEA acknowledged once again that its efforts to promote the production of
wind energy had failed. It placed the blame on a number of implementation problems, including
overlapping claims on land; insufficient capacity at the local level to deal with these overlapping
claims; appeals by opposing residents and environmental organizations, resulting in delays and
cancellations; and poor cooperation among various government departments. It then introduced
new Renewable Energy Program that included tax incentives for renewables (contingent on EU
approval) increased R&D budgets, increased efforts to resolve siting problems, and a new
renewable energy target for energy distribution companies for the year 2000."0 As of 1998,
however, the total amount of wind power installed in the Netherlands remained only 396 Mw.'
99 Junginger, Agterbosch, Faaij, and Turkenburg. 2004. Renewable electricity in the Netherlands.
100 Climate Action Network. 1997. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD
Countries: Fifth Review, October 1997.
101 Junginger, Agterbosch, Faaij, and Turkenburg. 2004. Renewable electricity in the Netherlands.
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CHAPTER 10 - CLIMATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION IN JAPAN
10.1 INTRODUCTION
In Japan, national policy regarding climate change is determined within a Japanese Climate
Policy Subsystem. As in the other subsystems, the policy process in this subsystem between
1988 and 1997 occurred in three major phases. The first, from 1988 to mid-1990, resulted in the
Action Program to Arrest Global Warming. The second, from mid-1990 to mid- 199, resulted in
the development of a new Basic Law on the Environment. The final phase, which transpired
from mid-1993 to COP 3 in December 1997, ended with the acceptance of a ghg emissions
reduction target of 6 percent from 1990 levels by 2012.
Like the United States and the Netherlands, Japan has been unable to meet the emissions
reductions target it adopted in the early 1990's. Although Japan adopted the target of stabilizing
per capita CO2 emissions at 1990 levels between 2000 and 2010 in its 1990 Action Program to
Arrest Global Warming, emissions rose throughout the decade. Per capita CO 2 emissions had
increased by 6.7 percent by 1995, and total CO2 emissions had increased by 8.3 percent.' By
2000, per capita emissions had increased by 9.4 percent, while total CO 2 emissions had increased
by more than 12 percent.2
Much of this rise in emissions can be attributed to a failure to implement measures contained
in the initial Action Plan.3 In particular, MITI encountered tremendous difficulties in building
the nuclear power plants that were expected to contribute much of the expected reductions.4 As
with the case of wind energy in the Netherlands, the formulation of Japan's national nuclear
energy policy took place within a national energy policy subsystem. However, policies regarding
specific sites on which the facilities were to be built were determined within a number of
prefecture-level nuclear energy policy subsystems. The remainder of this chapter describes the
dynamics that occurred within and among these overlapping subsystems: the Japanese national
climate policy subsystem, the Japanese national nuclear energy policy subsystem, and several
prefecture nuclear energy policy subsystems. Figure 10.1 depicts these overlapping subsystems.
Climate Action Network. 1997. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD
Countries: Fifth Review, October 1997.
2 World Resources Institute. 2004. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.
3 It should be noted here that, like in the United States and the Netherlands, some of the failure to meet this target can
be attributed to inaccurate forecasts of economic growth. (Climate Action Network. 1997. Independent NGO
Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD Countries: Fifth Review, October 1997).
4 Other examples of implementation failures included lax enforcement by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI). of existing laws intended to reduce industrial energy consumption and stalled efforts to improve
public transportation caused by a lack of coordination among key government ministries (Climate Action Network.
1997. Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Mitigation - OECD Countries: Fifth Review,
October 1997; Interview #57. Keidanren, Japan. Feb., 1998).
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10.2 THE JAPANESE CLIMATE POLICY SUBSYSTEM
As in international climate policy subsystem and the other national climate policy
subsystems, the three phases of the Japanese climate policy subsystem were driven by two
competing coalitions: an Economic Growth Coalition and a Precautionary Coalition. These
coalitions held similar beliefs and had many of the same members as their counterparts in the
international climate policy subsystem. Although Economic Growth Coalition was able to
dominate all three phases, the subsystem dynamics were such that the Precautionary Coalition
was able to extract significant compromises in terms of the policy outcomes of each phase.
Figure 10.1 Overlapping Climate Change Policy and Nuclear Energy Policy Subsystems in Japan
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10.2.1. Phase I: 1988-1990
Prior to 1989, most of Japan's involvement with global environmental issues such as climate
change was left largely to the Japan's Environment Agency, which formed the core of the
Precautionary Coalition at the time.' During the early 1980's, Environment Agency Director-
5 For a more detailed discussion of environmental politics in Japan, see, e.g., Broadbent. 1998. Environmental
Politics in Japan, Networks of Power and Protest; Gibbs, David and James Longhurst. 1995. Sustainable
development and environmental technology: A comparison of policy in Japan and the European Union.
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General Kujiroaka convinced Prime Minister Zinko Suzuki to establish an Ad Hoc Committee of
Global Environmental Problems. The committee's report, which urged greater international
attention to the problems of deforestation, desertification, global warming, biodiversity loss, and
other global environmental issues, prompted Bunbei Hara, Kujiraka's successor, to propose at the
1()0t anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm Convention that a World Commission on Environment
and Development (WCED, also known and the Brundtland Commission). This commission
issued in 1987 the report "Our Common Future," which in turn led to the 1992 UN Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED). 6
In response to the WCED report, the Environment Agency started in the late 1980s to pay
more attention to global environmental issues. In 1988, it established the Research Group on
Global Warming, and created a Global Environmental Protection Office the following year. At
the same time, Japanese policymakers and politicians were searching for means for improving
Japan's image internationally. Stung by severe international criticism for its reluctance to sign
the Vienna Convention and limited by Article Nine of its constitution to non-military types of
international contributions, Japanese government turned to official development assistance
(ODA) and the environment as a means to become an international leader!
As international climate change politics began to gain momentum, Prime Minister Sosuke
Uno established an Interministerial Council on Global Environmental Protection in July of 1989
to coordinate the government's policies regarding international environmental issues. Leadership
of the Council was given to the Environment Agency and the director-general of the
Environment Agency named global environment minister.
It was at this point that the various actors and organizations began to coalesce into the
precautionary and economic growth coalitions. MITI and MFA had traditionally been the most
powerful ministries in the Japanese government, which had been dominated throughout most of
its post-war history by the conservative, pro-business Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Both
MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had sought to lead the Interministerial Council.
However, the Environment Agency and others in the precautionary coalition were bolstered by
the support of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita. As Prime Minister, he saw global
environmental issues as a means for strengthening Japan's stature internationally.' When fallout
from a political scandal forced him to resign in June 1989, he made the environment his "special
issue area." Returning to the Diet, he became chairman of the Diet Environment Alliance (zoku).
Environmentalist 15, 3: 197; Kawashima, S. 1995. A Survey of Environmental Law and Policy in Japan. North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 20, 2: 231; Schreurs. 2002. Environmental
Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States; Schreurs. 2003. Divergent paths: Environmental policy in
Germany, the United States, and Japan; and Taylor, J. 1999. Japan's global environmentalism: rhetoric and reality.
Political Geography 18, 5: 535-562;
6 See chapter 7.
7 Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
8 Reimann, Kim D and Forrest, Richard 2002 Connecting Global and Local Societal Activism: International Politics,
NGOs and the Environmental Movement of Japan; Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany,
and the United States.
9 Interview #56. Globe Japan, Japan. Jan., 1998; Interview #23. Environment Agency, Japan. Jan., 1998; Schreurs.
2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States. The LDP controlled Japan's government
for most of the post-war years, and remains Japan's most powerful political party..
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With his influence, the environment became a popular cause among politicians allied with the
Keiseikai, the dominant faction within the LDP that he controlled." Global environmental issues
also began to gain substantial public support and as greater attention from the press." As was
discussed in Chapter 6, however, few domestic NGOs were engaged in the issue at the time."
Soon after it was established, the Interministerial Council on Global Environmental
Protection began to formulate its Action Plan to Arrest Global Warming. Sharp differences
emerged at this point between MITI and the Environment Agency. The Environment Agency
supported the idea of a legally-binding international target as called for by the EC at the
Noordwijk conference in the fall of 1989. MITI officials were more concerned about the
economic implications of "premature action."" However, they were also influenced by Prime
Minister Takeshita's concern about the issue, their own concerns for energy diversification, and
the opportunity that the issue presented to showcase Japan's successes in improving energy
efficiency and reducing pollution." Rather than to advocate inaction, MITI supported a plan that
promoted energy efficiency and the development of new technologies.
In an effort to take control of the climate change issue away from the Environment Agency,
MITI first unveiled its plan, entitled New Earth 21: An Action Program for the 21s Century, at
the White House Conference on Science and Economic Research Related to Global Change in
April of 1990. The plan called for international cooperation in establishing a 100-year program
to clean up the global environment through the accelerated introduction of clean energy. This
effort would include the construction of safer nuclear power plans, the introduction of new and
renewable energy sources, and the development of environment friendly technologies and
production processes."' The Interministerial Council had not yet approved the plan, however, and
it was received with skepticism by the international community. It was not until July 1990 at the
Houston Summit that it gained the support of U.S. EPA Administrator Bill Reilly, at which point
the Interministerial Council also gave its approval.
While MITI was pursuing approval of New Earth 21, the Environment Agency continued
with its efforts to win support for the EU proposal of a CO2 stabilization target. Using analyses
prepared by its Energy Agency, MITI had argued that at best, CO 2 emissions could be kept to a
16 percent increase over 1990 levels by 2000. The Environment Agency responded with its own
analyses suggesting that stabilization could be achieved with the implementation of various
energy efficiency measures, fuel switching, and co-generation. It eventually gained the support
of several other ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Transportation, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries. More importantly, it won
10 For example, when the Diet formed an Investigating Committee on Basic Environmental Problems, it named a
powerful former finance minister as its chair, and a number of influential LDP politicians became members
(Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States).
" The number of news articles on climate change in the Japanese press increased from 6 in 1989 to 98 in 1990 and
328 in 1991. In a March 1990 survey of public opinion on the environment, global environmental issues were
ranked as being of greatest concern (Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United
States).
12 Interview #3. World Resources Institute, Japan. Nov., 1998. See Section 6.1.2.
13 MITI Official warns C02 reduction may cut GNP. Japan Economic Newswire.
'4 Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
1s MITI, New Earth 21: Action Program for the 21s' Century. 1990.
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the support of the LDP, which was anxious to be able to announce a CO 2 reduction target prior to
the Second World Climate Conference.16
With this support, the Environment Agency was able to force MITI to back down from its
refusal to accept any sort of stabilization target. Using a very complex set of analyses, MITI
suggested that total CO2 emissions could be reduced after 2013, and that stabilization could be
achieved on a per capita basis by 2000." The Environment Agency, however, continued to insist
on an unqualified stabilization target. With neither group willing to compromise any further, the
Interministerial Council agreed on October 23, 1990, that Japan's Action Plan to Arrest Global
Warming would consist of two parts. The first was MITI's revised plan calling for stabilization
of per capita CO 2 emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. However, if technological developments in
new energy and CO 2 sequestration occurred faster than expected, the Environment Agency's plan
would be put effect. Although it was MITI's plan that was announced by Japan at the Second
World Climate Conference, the Environment Agency won an important symbolic victory in that
its plan was also incorporated into the package."
10.2.2. Phase 2: 1990-1993
As negotiations for the FCCC got underway in early 1991, MITI and other members of the
economic growth coalition began to exert greater control over Japan's climate policy process.
Although Nobutoshi Akao of the MFA headed most of Japan's delegations to the INC, he
worked closely with Katsuo Seiki of MIT.' 9 The Environment Agency, while well represented
on all of the delegations, was generally given a more secondary role.20 At the beginning of INC
2 in June of 1991, Seiki and Akao worked informally with Robert Reinstein, the head of the U.S.
delegation, to develop the "Pledge and Review" proposal (see Chapter 7). Several days later,
Akao formally introduced the proposal into the negotiations. Although a few European
delegations viewed it as an initial step towards a compromise, it was severely criticized by the
international NGO community.
The proposal was also attacked in Japan by both the LDP and the Environment Agency, in
part because MITI and the MFA had failed to obtain their approval prior to introducing the
initiative. The LDP's Special Committee on Global Environmental Problems criticized the
ministries for "going it alone," and refused to give its approval to the proposal without
substantial modification. The Committee went on to insist that, at a minimum, the plan should
incorporate the EC's stabilization 2000 stabilization target. Shortly afterwards, Environment
16 Interview #29. University of Tokyo, Japan. Jan., 1998; Interview #25. Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, Japan. Jan., 1998.
1 In making this proposal, MITI assumed that while CO2 emissions were expected to increase 6 percent by 2000,
Japan's population would also increase by approximately 6 percent. Emissions would be stabilized, therefore, if
they were measured on a per capita basis.
18 Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
19 Interview #25. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan. Jan., 1998.
20 Interview #32. Asahi Shimbun, Japan. Jan., 1998.
21 Interview #25. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan. Jan., 1998; Interview #7. Department of State,
United States. Jan., 1989.
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Agency Director-General Achi announced to Washington that Japan intended to agree to a firm
target."
At this same time, members of the Precautionary Coalition began to push for the
establishment of a new basic law on the environment. The Diet had already begun considering
revising Japan's Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control, which had been established in
the early 1970s following the Stockholm Conference. At Takeshita's urging, the LDP
established in February 1992 an Investigatory Committee on Basic Environmental Problems.
Several months later, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced that he had ordered
government agencies to begin working on creating a new Basic Environment Law.
With the strong support of former Prime Minister Takeshita, the Environment Agency joined
forces with the Ministry of Finance to promote consideration of carbon taxes and the elevation of
the Environment Agency to ministerial status as part of the revisions of the Basic Law."
Takeshita hosted an international eminent persons meeting in April 1992 to promote
international discussion of carbon taxes, and the Environment Agency released a report the
following month that argued that such a tax could ensure that Japan would stabilize its CO2
emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.
The tax proposal sparked strong opposition by MITI and industry groups, and served to
reinvigorate the economic growth coalition. In particular, the Keidanren, the Japanese
Federation of Economic Organizations, became much more active in the debate." Although it
generally accepted the need for Japan to take additional measures to reduce emissions, it argued
that the consumption tax should be raised, as this would be distributed more widely. Many with
the LDP also opposed the idea for fear that it would cost the party public support.26
In May 1992, the Environment Agency established a team to work out the framework for the
new law. The Agency issued its proposal for a Basic Law on the Environment, including the idea
of a carbon tax, in January 1993. Two months later, however, it fell victim to the Sagawa
Kyubin scandal in which Takeshita's mentor, Shin Kanemaru, was accused of accepting bribes.
The scandal caused Takeshita's Keiseikai faction of the LDP to collapse and Takeshita himself to
lose tremendous political influence. More importantly, Takeshita and other supporters of the
carbon tax became too preoccupied to pay much attention to the Basic Law as it worked its way
through the Diet. This provided MITI, Keidanren and other opponents of a carbon tax with an
opportunity to put their own version of the law into place. As a result, the House of
Representatives environment committee passed on May 18, 1993, a compromise version of new
Basic Environmental Law containing only a reference that the government would seek public
understanding and cooperation in introducing economic sanctions as a way of preserving the
environment.27 The environment committee of the House of Councilors did the same on June 14,
22 Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
23 The Ministry of Finance viewed the tax as a means to help pay for the large increases in environmental
expenditures that the government had incurred since the late 1980s (Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in
Japan, Germany, and the United States).
24 Environment Agency of Japan, An Appraisal of Instruments to Prevent Global Warming. May 1992.
25 Interview #35. Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan. Jan., 1998.
26 Scbreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
27 Schreurs. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
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1993. With these approvals, the bill's passage into law was virtually assured. On June 18, 1993,
only days before a vote was to be taken, the Diet was dissolved as a result of fallout from the
Sagawa Kyubin scandal and the LDP lost its 38-year hold on power. It was not until November
1993 that a similar bill was passed under the Hosokawa administration.
10.2.3. Phase 3: 1993-1997
With the passage of the new Basic Environmental Law, attention returned once again to the
international policy process. During the lull in the negotiations between July 1992 when the
FCCC was opened for signature and its entry into force in March 1994, both the precautionary
coalition and economic growth coalition experience substantial turnover in membership. MITI
was hit particularly hard by the loss of experience and knowledge caused by this turnover; MITI
officials on the Japanese delegations to the INC meetings leading up to COP 1 participated in an
average of fewer than one previous meeting. Although the Environment Agency experienced a
similar turnover, the MFA did not 2 This was due in part by the continued involvement of
Nobutoshi Akao, the MFA's senior negotiator.
As preparations for COP 1 ensued, representatives of the Environment Agency and the MFA
joined forces once again in to propose that Japan host COP 3 in Kyoto. The MFA saw the offer
as a means for Japan to show additional leadership on international environmental issues. The
Director General of the Environment Agency, Sohei Miyashita, wanted Japan to host the meeting
in order to strengthen its own hand domestically, anticipating that, as host, Japan would face
substantial international and domestic pressure to take more aggressive action to reduce its
emissions.29 Although MITI did not favor the proposal, the MITI officials most directly involved
in the negotiations were relatively new in their positions, and failed to recognize the leadership
expectations that would be put place on Japan as the host country. Keidanren and other members
of the economic growth coalition also failed to notice the proposal. It was not until after the offer
was accepted at COP 2 that they became aware of the proposal and begin to understand its
domestic ramifications.30
After COP 2, Japan began to receive pressure to develop its own proposal for a protocol.
The MFA, MITI, the Environment Agency, and the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) began
interministerial negotiations on a proposal in August 1996. Immediately, however, there were
substantial differences among them, particularly with regards to an emissions reduction target.
The Environment Agency wanted to propose that Parties take on differentiated targets, but only if
they agreed to start reducing emissions in 2000. If they could not agree to do so, the Agency
supported the imposition of the same target for all countries. MITI and MOT both supported
28 As discussed in Chapter 6, most mid- and upper-level officials in Japanese agencies are expected to change
positions every two years or so in order to advance their careers. An analysis of INC/COP meeting participation
rates showed that that the average participation rate for MITI delegates fell from 3 meetings during the 1990-1992
period to 1.7 meetings during the 1992-1995 period. The participation rate for Environment Agency delegates fell
from 4.1 meeting in the 1990-1992 period to 2 meetings during the 1992-1994 period. However, the MFA
participation rate increased from 2.7 meetings during the 1990-1992 period to 5.1meetings during the 1992-1995
period. The participation rate is defined here as the average number of previous INC/COP meetings in which a
given delegate to a meeting taking place during that period had participated.
2 9 Interview #59. Environment Agency, Japan. Jan., 1998.
30 Interview #57. Keidanren, Japan. Feb., 1998; Interview #32. Asahi Shimbun, Japan. Jan., 1998.
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differentiated targets, but argued that further reductions domestically were impossible and that
Japan should not put forward any proposal. MFA believed that Japan could not present a
proposal that did not work towards a reduction in emissions, but also believed that it should not
present a proposal that it could not meet. MFA also supported differentiated targets, fearing that
the United States would not participate in a protocol containing a universal target.
After two months of negotiations failed to resolve the differences among the ministries, the
MFA drafted a proposal that reflected what it hoped would be a viable compromise. As
introduced at AGBM 5 in December 1996, the proposal called for each industrialized party to
select one of two targets:
a. To maintain its anthropogenic emissions of CO2 over the period from [2000+x] to [2000+x+(5)]
at an average yearly level not more that p tons of carbon per capita, or
b. To reduce its anthropogenic emissions of CO 2 over the period from [2000+x] to [2000+x+(5)] at
an average yearly level of not less than q per cent below the level of the year 1990.31
The proposal was not well received by environmental groups or the international
community, however, as the x, p, and q values were left unspecified.
With negotiations in the AGBM at a virtual impasse, international pressure grew over the
course of the following months for Japan, as the host of COP 3, to take a greater leadership role.
MITI, MFA and the Environment Agency remained unable to resolve their differences well into
1997, however. The Environment Agency wanted Japan to propose at a 7 percent reduction in
CO2 emissions by 2010, arguing that analyses by the National Institute for Environmental Studies
demonstrated that a reduction of CO2 emissions of as much as 7.6 percent below 1990 levels by
2010 was feasible. The MFA argued that a minimum of a 5 percent reduction by 2010 would be
necessary to meet an "internationally acceptable" rate of reduction. MITI did not want to see
anything more than a stabilization target for 2010, and did not want Japan to make any proposal
until the United States had made its position clear.
This stalemate continued until July 1997, at which point Prime Minister Hashimoto was
forced to intervene. Hashimoto had taken a personal interest in ensuring the success of the Kyoto
meeting, and instructed his Cabinet Secretariat to facilitate a compromise. Hashimoto went on to
order MITI, MFA, and the Environment Agency to work with the Secretariat in developing a
domestic policy in time for the final AGBM meeting in the fall.
As discussions with the Cabinet Secretariat ensued, MITI flatly rejected the 7 percent
reduction target proposed by the Environment Agency. Recognizing that Japan's role as host
required that its proposal be internationally acceptable, the Secretariat proposed that MFA's 5-
percent reduction target be used as the basis for further discussions. With MITI continuing to
insist that Japan could not meet any target beyond stabilization, the Secretariat focused on
finding ways to incorporate flexibility into the proposal. A formula for differentiated targets
based on per capita emissions, emissions per unit of GDP, and expected population growth
reduced Japan's required emissions reductions from 5 percent to 2.5 percent below 1990 levels.
Expanding the target from CO2 to a basket of three gases (C0 2, CH4 , and N20) gained an
additional .5 percent. To bridge the remaining 2-percent gap, the MITI and the Secretariat
31 Government of Japan. Proposals on the Elements to be Included in the Draft Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. December 1996.
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proposed that a 2-percent "noncompliance buffer" be established to protect those Parties making
good-faith efforts to reduce their emissions fall short of their target."
On October 6, 1997, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka announced the compromise
proposal. All industrialized countries would be required to reduce their emissions of C0 2, CH4 ,
and N20 collectively by 5 percent below 1990 levels for the period of 2008-2012. This target
would be adjusted, however, to take into each country's national circumstances. A
differentiation formula based on each country's per capita emissions, emissions per unit of GDP,
and expected population growth would be used to revise upwards each country's 5 percent target
by up to 5 percentage points. This would mean would only be required to stabilize their
emissions at 1990 levels.
After the United States proposed in October 1997 that industrialized countries return their
emissions of six gases to 1990 levels by 2012, Japan found itself positioned between the United
States and the EU when COP 3 began in December 1997. Although not entirely comfortable
with Japan's 2.5 percent reduction requirement, MITI, Keidanren, and other members of Japan's
economic growth coalition had been assured by their counterparts in the United States that the
Clinton Administration would be unable to go beyond their stabilization target." Thus they were
caught completely by surprise when Vice President Gore and Stuart Eizenstat, the U.S. lead
negotiator, announced that the United States was willing to reduce emissions by 7 percent below
1990 levels by 2012. This shift put Japan, as the host country, in the uncomfortable position of
appearing to be a laggard at a meeting on which it had staked its reputation as an environmental
leader.
During the final hours of the negotiations, the United States agreed to back off from its
demand for meaningful participation by developing countries, while the EU agreed to accept
differentiated targets and an emissions trading system. However, both the United States and the
EU insisted that the differentiation in targets among the United States, the EU, and Japan be no
more than 2 percentage points in order to minimize any effects on competitiveness. This meant
that Japan would need to accept an emissions reduction target of 6 percent below 1990 levels.
This raised immediate problems for MITI, as the 2-percent non-compliance buffer had also
been rejected. Furthermore, the agreement to include the three fluorocarbons in the basket of
gases reduced Japan's potential emissions reductions by 2 additional percentage points. The
inclusion of removals by sinks increased potential reductions by only .3 percent, meaning that
MITI had to account for an additional 5.2 percent of emissions reductions in order to accept the
agreement. Faced with the imminent collapse of the negotiations, MITI agreed that the loss of
buffer could be accommodated through undefined research and technology development efforts.
At the urging of Prime Minister Hashimoto, it agreed that the remaining reductions could be
achieved, at least in theory, through afforestation, emissions trading, and joint implementation.
With the crisis resolved, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced in a phone conversation with
Vice President Gore that Japan would accept the -6 percent target.
3 Kawashima, Yasuko. 2000. Japan's Decision-Making about Climate Change Problems: Comparative Study of
Decisions in 1990 and 1997. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 3 (2000): 29-57.
3 Interview #30. Keidanren, Japan. Feb., 1998; Interview #24. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan.
Jan., 1998.
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10.3 OVERLAPPING SUBSYSTEMS
The Japan's National Report submitted to the INC Secretariat in 1993 was based on the
Action Plan to Arrest Global Warming. As in the other countries, it described a wide range of
measures intended to reduce per capita CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. However, it
expected to achieve much of the necessary reduction through a sharp increase in nuclear
generating capacity. MITI's 1990 New Earth 21 program called for the doubling of the amount
of energy generated by nuclear power by 2010, which would require the construction of 40 new
power plants." This goal was implicit in its first national communication, and made explicit
once again in MITI's 1994 Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook, which called for an
increase in Japan's total nuclear generating capacity from 41 gigawatts (GW) in 1995 to 70
gigawatts in 2010." Implimenting this plan, however, has been difficult, due in part to the
resistance of local communities in which the new plants were to be sited. As of 2001, nuclear
energy had increased to only 42 GW, far short of the goal anticipated 8 years earlier.36 This
section describe the dynamics that occurred within the national nuclear energy subsystem in
which this goal was formulated and the prefecture-level subsystems in which decisions regarding
the siting of particular plants was determined.
10.3.1. The Japanese National Nuclear Energy Subsystem
National nuclear energy policy in Japan is set by three key agencies. The central nuclear
policy making body is the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), which establishes the
Japan's nuclear energy program through its Long-Term Program (LTP). These Long-Term
Program documents were released every 5-7 years, and were intended to guide the development
of the nuclear energy program during that period. Through the 1990's, the JAEC was supported
in this effort by the Science and Technology Agency (STA) and MITI." The STA was
responsible for supporting the JAEC through research and analyses. MITI was responsible for
preparing periodically a Long-Term Outlook on Energy and working with industry to facilitate
the implementation of the LTP.
Responsibility for implementing the program fell primarily to MITI and a coalition of
private corporations and public-private entities or "special status" corporations. The industries
involved in the implementation process included the nine regional utilities (e.g., Tokyo Electric
Power Corporation (TEPCO)) and a number of major manufacturers (e.g, Mitubishi Heavy
Industries, Toshiba, Hitachi, and Fuji). The major special-status corporations included Power
Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC), the Japan Atomic Power Company,
and the Electric Power Development Corporation."
3 4 Report calls for doubling nuclear power share by 2010. Japan Economic Newswire.
35 UNFCCC. Report on the in-depth review of the national communication of Japan. June 1996.
36 Pickett, S. E. 2002. Japan's nuclear energy policy: from firm commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing
stocks of plutonium, program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure. Energy Policy 30, 15: 1337-
1355.
"7 The STA was abolished in 2001, with its responsibilities given to the Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXTI). and MITI, which is now the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI).
38 The MFA and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). also played a role in the policy process. The MFA was responsible
for negotiating the crucial agreements with the United States, which was the only supplier of the fuel used by
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Until 1996, Japan's national nuclear energy policy was developed through a very closed,
tightly controlled decision-making process.39 Although JAEC, MITI, and STA often had
differing organizational objectives, the officials involved in the program shared a common set of
policy core beliefs regarding Japan's nuclear energy, and worked hard to ensure that their
industrial and research stragies coincided. In addition, MITI worked closely with the utilities in
developing its commercialization plan, and relied heavily on a council of experts selected from
the inner circles of the nuclear industry and government. These experts all held the same
fundamentsl view that nuclear energy should be promoted and was necessary to establish Japan's
long-term energy security. This coordination was also facilitated by the frequent rotation of
personnel among the different agencies and industry engaged in the process.4" Finally, the LDP
played an important role in ensuring cooperation among utilities, government agencies, and local
officials."
When the JAEC was established in 1956, it immediately set to work in developing Japan's
nuclear energy program. The first successful nuclear power plant, the Japan Power
Demonstration Reactor (JPDR) went into operation in 1963, and the first commercial nuclear
power plant went into operation in 1966. By 1990, 38 nuclear power plants were in operation,
and another 15 were under construction."
After the 1986 Chernobyl accident, however, public concern about the safety of nuclear
power began to increase sharply. In February 1988, 3000 people turned out to demonstrate
against a plan to start up a nuclear power plant in Ikata on Shikoku Island, a marked change from
the relatively small cadre of environmentalists and local residents that had been engaged in
previous protests. In April of that year, on the second anniversary of the Chernobyl accident,
more than 20,000 people attended an antinuclear demonstration in Tykyo organizaed by about
150 local groups.43 To counter these protests, the agencies and corporations directing the nuclear
energy program launched a substantial public relations campaign to promote nuclear energy."
Japan's Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs). The MOF was involved in decisions regarding the funding of new projects
as well as subsidies and other incentivies provided to local communities.
39 During the early days of the program, decisions were often achieved through an implicit process known as
nemawash, which translates literally to "working aournd the root of the tree." NemawashI refers to the subtle
negotiations and discussions that occur between key players prior to official meetings (Pickett. 2002. Japan's
nuclear energy policy: from fmn commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing stocks of plutonium,
program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure).
40 Interview #38. Kyoto University, Japan. Feb., 1998; Interview #57. Keidanren, Japan. Feb., 1998; Pickett. 2002.
Japan's nuclear energy policy: from firn commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing stocks of plutonium,
program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure.
41 Samuels, Richard J. 1987. The Business of the Japanese State Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical
Perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
42 . Report calls for doubling nuclear power share by 2010.
43 Dauvergne, P. 1993. Nuclear-Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the Politics of Reciprocal
Consent. Asian Survey 33, 6: 576-591.
"The STA's 1989 public relations budget for nuclear power was 10 times larger than that of 1988, while MITI's
public relations budget was almost 5 times larger in 1989 than it was the previous year (Ishida, Yukio. Japan
Spends Billions of Yen to Promote Nuclear Energy. Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 9, 1989.). TEPCO increased its PR
budget by 20 percent in 1989 (Dauvergne. 1993. Nuclear-Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the
Politics of Reciprocal Consent). Thoughout the 1990's, the annual budget for this PR campaign was more than
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Despite these public relations efforts, public opposition to nuclear power continued to rise.
A series of mishaps in several plants during the late 1980s and early 1990s added to this
opposition. A poll in December 1990 indicated that while 65 percent of the public thought that
nuclear power was necessary, 90 percent felt "uneasy" about it, 46 percent thought that it was
unsafe, and less than half supported its further expansion." A few years later, fewer than 22
percent of the population supported its continued aggressive growth.4 6
This growing public opposition coupled with a series of lawsuits led to lengthy delays in the
construction of new plants. By the mid-1990's, the lead time for approval of nuclear plants had
grown to 154 months, more than twice what was needed for a fossil-fuel powered plant." The
nuclear plants completed during the 1980's had taken an average of 17 years and four months
from the time of their proposal to the start of operations. As of 1991, however, the 14 plants
scheduled to begin operating the the 1990s had taken an average of 25 years and seven months
from the time of the proposal, assuming at that point that they would stay on schedule. 8
Despite these difficulties, MITI, STA, and the nuclear power industry continued to maintain
ambitious goals for the expansion of nuclear power in Japan. In 1994, MITI issued its Long-
Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook, which called for an increase in Japan's total nuclear
generating capacity to over 70 gigawatts by 2010. This would entail the construction of over 20
new power plants.
In December 1995, however, an accident at the new Monju Fast Breeder Reactor
reinvigorated the opposition. The following year, the residents of Maki, Niigata Prefecture,
rejected a plan to build a nuclear power plant that the town authorities had once approved. This
led the governors of Fukui, Niigata and Fukushima, three prefectures in which 60 percent of
Japan's nuclear power plants are located, to issue a letter to the Prime Minister calling for a
national concensus before proceeding any further with nuclear power development.
Because the governor of a prefecture has the authority to veto plans for a new facility, the
governors' letter forced open what had previously been a very closed decision-making process.49
The JAEC quickly began working to develop this "national consensus," creating a number of
informal Advisory Panels and holding a series of roundtable discussions and public symposiums
on the decision-making process. The utilities and government agencies also began to make
V10 billion annually (Yasuhiko, Yoshida. 2000. Nuclear Safety Issue Jars Japan to Reconsider Its Policy Program.
Japan Quarterly 47, 1: 56).
41 Suzuki, Tatsujiro. 1991. Japan's Nuclear Dilemma. Technology Review 94, October 1991: 47-48.
46 Pickett. 2002. Japan's nuclear energy policy: from firm commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing
stocks of plutonium, program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure.
47 Lesbirel, S. H. 1998. NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
48 Dauvergne. 1993. Nuclear-Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the Politics of Reciprocal Consent.
49 If the governor decides to veto a facility plan, the plan is for all practical purposes terminated, as a new law would
need to be passed in the Diet in order to override a governor's veto. Similarly, if the governor approves a plan,
there is no official recourse that the community to take. A local community may call for a referendum to prevent
the sale of land to a utility, which can stop the progress of a government or utility plan. These referendums are
non-binding, however, and the outcome of siting negotiations can be altered by the election of a new mayor or city
council (Dauvergne. 1993. Nuclear-Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the Politics of Reciprocal
Consent).
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greater efforts to explain their work and activities through community meetings and extended
advertisements.
These changes in the decision-making process did lead to some adjustments in the
government's nuclear energy policy as it was put forth in the 2000 LTP. Deadlines were made
more flexible, and delays placed on various aspects of Japan's Fast Breeder Reactor program. It
also called for more diverse options for research and development projects in order to provide
greater flexibility in their implementation. The core aspect of the plan remained unchanged,
however, in that it still called for the construction of 20 new nuclear power plants by 2010.5
10.3.2. Japanese Prefecture Nuclear Energy Subsystems
The implementation of Japan's nuclear energy policy depended in large part on the
coordination among MITI, the various utilities and corporations planning to build the facilities
the local and prefecture officials responsible for approving the plans of the facilities. Although
the plans themselves were developed by the utilities, MITI was responsible for approving the
siting, design and operation of the plants. Local government officials, fishing cooperatives, and
the governor of the prefecture in which the facility was to be sited were also part of the process.
Although the governor of the prefecture has the authority to make the final decision, he was
unlikely to do so without the consent of local officials. Much of this coordination was facilitated
by the LDP, which generally controlled the government at all three levels.
During the early phases of Japan's nuclear energy program, cooperation among these many
different players were ensured through a system of tacit commitments and promises. Many of the
smaller towns were in need of jobs and infrastructure. The central government promised to
provide these if the residents accepted the development of a nuclear power plant in their
community. As a result, agreements with local communities were generally accompanies by
governmental and private financial packages and incentives. This compensation system was
made official in 1963 when MITI established the Compensation Standards for Electric Power
Development, a set of guidelines meant to facilitate the siting of new power plants. The system
was expanded further in 1974 with the passage of the Three Laws for Power Source
Development, which provided a siting promotion subsidy and additional funding for
infrastructure development.
In general, the siting process would transpire as follows. The utility would conduct various
preliminary studies, select a site, and develop plans for the facility. Local hearings were then
held in which local citizens often expressed opposition to the plans. Negotiations among the
MITI, the utilities, local cooperatives and the town council would ensue in which a compensation
package would be developed in exchange for approval by the town council. This compensation
could be in the form of tax benefits, public works projects, schools, roads, and athletic centers. If
other minor conflicts arose between the local community and the utility, they were resolved
through negotiations with the relevant stakeholders supported by various compensation
packages." The process was also facilitated by political maneuverings by the LDP at both the
50 Pickett. 2002. Japan's nuclear energy policy: from firm commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing
stocks of plutonium, program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure.
si Dauvergne. 1993. Nuclear-Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the Politics of Reciprocal Consent;
Lesbirel. 1998. NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict; Pickett.
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local and national levels that ensured that the utilities had the upper hand in the bargaining
process."
By the late 1980's however, this system had begun to unravel. With Japan's strong
economic growth, income levels had risen to a point that offers of employment and infrastructure
not longer satisfied the local communities. This forced the utilities and MITI to develop more
elaborate and expensive compensation packages. In addition, the negotiations were made more
difficult by the increased public opposition to nuclear power. Opponents began to use the courts
and local ballot to halt the construction of plants." This culminated in August 1996 when the
residents of Maki, Niigata Prefecture, prevented the construction of a nuclear facility by the
Tohoku Electric Power Company by voting against the sale of a crucial plot of land. This led the
governor of Niigata, together with the governors of Fukui and Fukushima, to call for a halt in the
construction of nuclear power facilities until a national concensus on the issue had been
developed. At this point, the damage had already been done. The number of plans for new
nuclear power plants decreased from 11 in the 1970s to 4 in the 1980s and none in the 1990s. 4
As of 2002, the most recent approval of a nuclear power plant occurred in December 1986,
sixteen years earlier.
2002. Japan's nuclear energy policy: from firm commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing stocks of
plutonium, program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure.
52 Lesbirel. 1998. NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict. For
example, the central government would stack the hearings process in a way that facilitated power company efforts
to divide local opposition. Out-of-town interests such as opposition party leaders or national environmental groups
would be barred from the hearings altogether.
* In 1989, for example, antinuclear activists tried to halt the construction of the Tomari Nuclear Power Plant, and
residents in Fukui filed suit in 1991 charging that the Takahama facility violated area residents' personal right to
safety (Dauvergne. 1993. Nuclear-Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the Politics of Reciprocal
Consent).
1 Pickett. 2002. Japan's nuclear energy policy: from firm commitment to difficult dilemma addressing growing
stocks of plutonium, program delays, domestic opposition and international pressure; Dauvergne. 1993. Nuclear-
Power Development in Japan - Outside Forces and the Politics of Reciprocal Consent.
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CHAPTER 11 - DISCUSSION
In chapter 5, I suggested five propositions that could be used to test the ACF perspective on
treaty implementation outlined in the first two sections of this study. The first four propositions
address the dynamics that transpire within and among subsystems. The fifth proposition, based
on the discussion of power contained in Chapter 4, examines the relationship between coalition
power and treaty implementation. This chapter discusses the application of these propositions to
the experiences of the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands in implementing the Framework
Convention on Climate Change.
11.1 PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2: SUBSYSTEM DYNAMICS AND POLICY CHANGE
The first two propositions described in Chapter 5 pertain to the relationship between
subsystem dynamics and treaty implementation.
11.1.1. Proposition 1: Policy Change and Dominant Coalitions
Proposition (1): The policy core attributes of a domestic government
program are most likely to be significantly revised to implement an international
agreement when (1) the coalition that instituted the initial domestic program does
not remain in power within the national subsystem, and (2) the international and
national policy subsystems are dominated by parallel coalitions.
This proposition contends that, if dominant coalition in a national policy subsystem is not the
same one that dominates the international policy subsystem, then the policy core attributes of
national government programs will be changed to implement the treaty as long as the coalition
with an interest in maintinaing the status quo remains the dominant coalition in the subsystem.
This proposition is demonstrated most clearly in the policy change that occurred within the
U.S. climate policy subsystem following the 1992 elections. In this case, U.S. climate policy was
changed to conform to changes that were being made in international climate policy. Despite
many missteps, the economic growth coalition in the United States was firmly in control of the
domestic policy process during the period immediately preceding the elections. It lost this
control, however, when many of its members in the Bush administration were replaced by
members of the precautionary coalition (most notably, the replacement of Dan Quail by Al Gore).
With this change, the precautionary coalition was in a position to reverse U.S. policy regarding
targets and timetables and the negotiation of additional commitments for the post-2000 period.
Thus condition (1) of the proposition is satisfied.
This example also satisfied condition (2) of the proposition. Many of the U.S. economic
growth coalition members that were replaced after the 1992 elections were important sources of
power for the international economic growth coalition. Their removal allowed the international
precautionary coalition to assume greater control of the international policy process. Thus the
U.S. and international climate policy subsystems were both controlled by precautionary
coalitions. These two coalitions held a common set of policy core beliefs, cooperated extensively
with each other, and indeed contained many of the same actors.
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The validity of this proposition is also illustrated in the case of Japan. Prior to 1989, the
economic growth coalition controlled the climate policy subsystem in Japan. In 1989, however,
Prime Minister Takeshita's fall from grace and his ensuing decision to adopt the environment as
his personal cause enabled the precautionary coalition to wrest away this control. As a result of
Takeshita's concern for environmental issues and his creation of an environmental zoku within
the LDP, Parliament forced MITI to drop its resistance to Japan's commitment to a firm
emissions reduction target. A similar event occurred in 1995, when, as a result of system-wide
personnel turnover, relatively inexperienced MITI officials failed to resist efforts by the
Environment Agency and the MFA to have Japan host COP 3. The acceptance of this offer
strengthened the Environment Agency's hand domestically, and also gave a tremendous boost to
Japan's environmental NGO community.
11.1.2. Proposition 2: Policy Change and External Events
Proposition (2): If the international and national policy subsystems are not
dominated by parallel coalitions, then significant perturbations external to the
national subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion,
system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a
necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a
national governmental program.
Building on Proposition 1, this proposition states argues that external changes are necessary to
substantially alter the distribution of political resources among coalitions within the national
subsystem. However, such perturbations are not, by themselves, sufficient to cause changes in
national policy. The minority coalition must also be able to exploit the changed conditions such
that it is able to achieve dominance and bring about the necessary policy changes.
The U.S. case provides an interesting example of this proposition as well. Prior to 1992, the
U.S. and international climate policy subsystems were dominated by opposing coalitions: the
precautionary coalition was in control of the internal subsystem, while the economic growth
coalition controlled the U.S. subsystem. The 1992 elections, a system-wide event, allowed the
precautionary coalition in the United States to take control of the U.S subystem away from the
economic growth coalition and enabled the international precautionary coalition to solidify its
control of the international policy subsystem. In the United States, the election enabled the
precautionary coalition to replace key decisionmakers who were members of the economic
growth coalition with some of its own members and reverse some of the decisions made by the
previous administration. These reversals include the switch from a rejection of the stabilization
goal to a commitment that the United States should stabilize its emissions at 1990 levels in 2000
and from a rejection of legally binding targets and timetables in the FCCC to their acceptance in
the Kyoto Protocol. In the international climate policy subsystem, the elections and subsequent
changes in U.S. climate policy removed the major barrier to renewed negotiations on a post-2000
commitment and legally binding targets and timetables.
The U.S. case also points to a situation in which such a change was necessary but by itself
insufficient to cause a major policy change. The economic growth coalition flatly rejected any
sort of carbon or energy tax while it was in control of the U.S. climate policy subsystem. The
adoption of such a tax became possible when the 1992 elections allowed the precautionary
coalition to gain control of the subsystem. This control did not extend to the overlapping tax
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policy subsystem, however. Although the policy emanating from climate policy subsystem
called for a substantial BTU tax, it was reduced to an insignificant gas tax in the tax policy
subsystem.
This example also illustrates how policy change is a long-term process (i.e., taking place
over the course of a decade or more). When the Republican Party gained control of the House in
1994, members of the U.S. economic growth coalition were able to exploit the opportunities
presented by this system-wide event to reverse, or at least impede, some of the decisions made by
the precautionary coalition. In particular, it made substantial cuts in the funding of various
programs required to implement the precautionary coalition's goal of stabilizing emissions at
1990 levels in 2000. These cuts were partially responsible for the failure of the United States to
meet this goal.
11.2 PROPOSITIONS 3 AND 4: ACTORS, COALITIONS, AND OVERLAPPING
SUBSYSTEMS
The second two propositions pertain to the relationships among overlapping subsystems and
the effect of these relationships on treaty implementation.
11.2.1. Proposition 3: Actor participation in overlapping subsystems
Proposition (3): The degree to which the content of national government
programs are changed to be consistent with an international agreement is directly
related to extent to which significant actors the national policy subsystems
traditionally responsible for the programs to be changed also participated in the
national policy subsystem that was involved in negotiating the agreement.
This proposition argues that the extent to which national government programs are changed in
response to an international agreement is a function of the extent to which the subsystems
responsible for the programs are nested within the subsystem involved in negotiating the
agreement. More cooperation and coordination is likely to occur among nested subsystems
because coalitions actors are more likely to share policy beliefs than those in policy subsystems
with a lesser degree of overlap. There is also more likely to be a greater correspondence in
nested subsystems in terms of both the number of subsystem coalitions and the nature of the
power dynamics within the subsystems. Finally, because of the nature of policy-oriented learning
is the only mechanism through which belief systems change and cooperation develops,
cooperation is likely to be greatest in situations where significant domestic players in relevant
national subsystems are able participate in the international fora in which policy-oriented
learning is taking place.
None of the cases included an example of completely nested subsystems, as this would
require all of the participants in the smaller subsystem to also be active in the larger subsystem.
All of the cases demonstrate a range of overlap, however, sufficient to suggest the validity of this
proposition. Each of the cases provides examples in which a subsystem responsible for a
national program overlapped substantially with the national climate policy subsystem engaged in
the international negotiations. Each also provides examples in which there was very little
overlap among the subsystems.
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In the United States, the experience with the tire-labeling program illustrates a situation in
which there was very little overlap between the subsystem engaged in the international
negotiations and the subsystem responsible for determining U.S. tire-labeling policy. When the
tire-labeling program was proposed in 1993, representatives of the Department of Transportation
were the only individuals actively engaged in both the U.S. climate policy subsystem and the
U.S. tire labeling subsystem. They were supported in their proposal of the labeling system by
Michelin and a few consumer groups, none of which had participated actively in the U.S. climate
policy discussions.' None of the opponents of the proposal, primarily members of Congress and
domestic tire producers and distributors. Although the reduction of ghg emissions was cited as a
reason for implementing the program, most of the debate focused on economic, feasibility, and
safety issues. Ultimately, opponents in Congress blocked the measure. In doing so, they cited
feasibility and utility issues, and made no mention of emissions reductions.
Wind energy policy in the Netherlands and nuclear energy policy in Japan are two more
complex examples of this proposition. Both of these cases involved three overlapping
subsystems: a national climate policy subsystem, a national energy policy subsystem, and several
sub-national policy subsystems. In both countries, there was substantial overlap between the
national climate policy and the national energy policy subsystems, but virtually no overlap
between the national climate policy subsystem and the various sub-national policy subsystems.
In the Netherlands, coordination among officials of VROM and MEA created the overlap
between the two national subsystems. Although not all of the officials involved in each of these
issues were active in both subsystems, there was fairly strong coordination among the different
departments of each Ministry. None of the regional utilities involved in the development of
national renewable energy policy in the Netherlands were engaged in the national climate policy
process. However, their views were consistent with those of the MEA, and there was strong
cooperation between the utility representatives and MEA officials. As a result, the policies
emerging from the national climate policy subsystem and the national climate policy subsystem
were consistent with each other.
There was virtually no overlap between the national climate policy subsystems and the
various regional and local wind energy policy subsystems in the Netherlands, however. None of
the utilities, provincial officials, and local authorities was engaged in the climate policy
discussions, nor were any of the local resident who opposed the construction of wind turbines. A
few Dutch environmental NGO had individuals engaged in one issue or the other (e.g., Stichting
Natuur en Millieu), but not both. In these cases, however, there was virtually no cooperation
among these individuals, and the organizations themselves became deeply divided.2 The policies
emerging from these two subsystems were also divergent, with the national climate policy
advocating the development of wind energy to reduce emissions and the local siting policy
prohibiting the construction of wind turbines.
In Japan, many of the STA and MITI officials involved in the development of Japan's
national nuclear energy policy were also involved in the development of its climate policy, as
were some of the major utilities such as TEPCO. This created a substantial degree of overlap
Although Michelin and some of the other tire companies did participate in the 1993 White House climate
conference.
2 Interview #44. Netherlands Academy of Sciences, Netherlands. Feb., 1989.
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between the two subsystems. The results of this overlap can be seen in the strong consistency
among the Japan's 1990 Action Program to Arrest Global Warming, its 1993 National
Communication and MITI's 1994 Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook.
As in the Netherlands, however, there was virtually no overlap between Japan's national
climate policy subsystem and the various local- and prefecture-level site approval subsystems.
None of the local residents and officials involved in local siting deliberations in involved in the
national climate policy process, nor was the Environment Agency or MFA involved in local
siting policy debates. Although MITI and some utilities were engaged in both subsystems,
individuals within each organization were not. Quite a few members of the Kiko Forum that
participated in COP 3 were local environmental groups and antinuclear activists. However, these
individuals and groups did not become actively engaged in the climate debate until 1996, well
after the local policy debates had ended. Furthermore, while they were important members of the
precautionary coalition in Japan and supported aggressive reductions in ghg emissions, they did
not support the further development of nuclear power to do so.3 Thus there was a fundamental
disconnect between Japan's national climate policy goal of stabilizing per capita emissions at
1990 level through, in part, the construction of 20 new nuclear power facilities and the policies of
key prefectures and local communities blocking the construction of these facilities.
11.2.2. Proposition 4: Overlapping Subsystems and Policy Change
Proposition (4): The degree to which national government programs are
changed to be consistent with an international agreement is inversely related to
the number of overlapping national (and sub-national) policy subsystems falling
within the policy domain of the international agreement.
This proposition can be viewed as the converse of Proposition (3). In general, the broader the
policy domain of an international agreement, the larger the number of national and subnational
subsystems with responsibility for implementing various aspects of the agreement. This makes
coordination and cooperation among subsystems more difficult, in turn reducing the probability
that polices at the national level will be changed to be consistent with the international
agreement.
The validity of this proposition is the most difficult of these propositions to support through
the case studies used in this analysis, as none of the examples involved fewer than two
subsystems or illustrate a situation in which a national government program was changed to be
completely consistent with the international agreement. However, all three cases taken together
suggest that this proposition would hold up against further analysis. In general, changes in
policies falling within the domain of only two overlapping subsystems tended to move in the
direction of what was required by the international agreement. On the other hand, changes in
policies falling within the domain of three or more subsystems, tended to be very minor if they
occurred at all.
Situations in which national policies were changed to be more consistent with the FCCC
include the energy tax in the Netherlands and the gas tax in the United States. Although the
3 Although this antinuclear stance was a policy core belief of one faction of Japan's precautionary coalition, it was
not a central issue in Japan's climate policy debate and was not included as a policy core belief of the coalition as a
whole.
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development of Dutch energy/carbon tax was complicated by the overlapping EU tax policy
subsystem, it was ultimately determined through coordination between the national energy tax
policy subsystem and national climate policy subsystem. Although the final tax policy exempted
major energy-intensive industries, it represented a substantial change towards the further
reduction of CO 2 emissions in the Netherlands. While the gasoline tax passed by the U.S. Senate
in 1993 was substantially different from the BTU tax proposed by the Clinton Administration,
passage in and of itself indicates some level of cooperation among the subsystems.4
Policy change in the direction of consistence with the FCCC did not occur situations
involving three or more overlapping subsystems. Examples of these include wind energy policy
in the Netherlands and nuclear energy policy in Japan. In the former case, policies were not
changed at the local level to be more consistent national efforts to implement international
climate policy. In the latter case, changes were made in local policies that were inconsistent with
national efforts in implement international climate policy.
11.3 PROPOSITION 5: TREATY IMPLEMENTATION AND SOURCES OF POWER
The final proposition described in Chapter 5 pertains to the relationship between coalition
dynamics and sources of power.
Proposition (5): In the absence of external events, a government program is
not likely to be changed in response to an international agreement unless the
coalition advocating the change possesses, or is able to acquire, (1) decision-
making authority or (2) the ability to offer inducements sufficient to compel the
cooperation of those possessing decision-making authority.
With this proposition, I suggested that the five sources of power described in Section II fall into
one of two categories: (1) primary sources of power, and (2) secondary sources of power.
Primary sources of power, i.e., decision-making authority and, so some extent, the ability to offer
inducements, are those sources that enable the possessors with direct control over the decisions
being made within the subsystem. Secondary sources of power, i.e., persuasion, deference, and
strategic skill, depend on circumstance or the receptivity of those possessing decision-making
authority in order to have the desired effect. The ability to offer inducements is also a secondary
source of power when the inducements by themselves are not sufficient to compel favorable
decisions. With Proposition 5, I suggest that coalitions will not be able to cause substantial
changes in government programs to implement international agreements solely through the use of
secondary sources of power. This is due in large part to the difficulty with which policy core
beliefs change and the large number of actors engaged in the multiple overlapping subsystems
that mark treaty implementation.
The cases generally support this proposition. In each situation where policy change
occurred, it did so because one coalition or the other gained either decision-making authority or
the ability to offer inducements sufficient to gain the support of those possessing this authority.
4 Although the U.S. tire labeling program was described in Chapter 8 as involving two subsystem, it can be argued
that a third subsystem, the U.S. appropriations subsystem, was also involved in the process, and that it was in this
third subsystem that the decision was made to block the program. For this reason, I am not including it in this
analysis.
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In the United States, for example, U.S. climate policy changed when key decision-makers
participating in the economic growth coalition were replaced by members of the precautionary
coalition in 1992. Similarly, Japan's national climate policy was changed in 1990 only when
former Prime Minister Takeshita, who could offer other LDP members substantial inducements
in terms of political support, decided to support the change. Japan's MFA found the potential for
increased international influence to be a sufficient inducement to support the policy change.
When Takeshita lost his influence in 1993, the precautionary coalition immediately lost its power
to enact a proposed carbon tax.
The importance of decision-making authority and the ability to offer inducements can also
be observed by comparing situations in which a coalition possessed either decision-making
authority or the power to offer inducements with situations in which a coalition had neither. For
example, the U.S. precautionary coalition prior to 1992 possessed strong powers of persuasion,
deference, and strategic skill derived from strong scientific evidence, internationally renowned
scientists and politicians, and the experience of the Montreal protocol negotiations. However, it
had neither decision-making authority nor the ability to offer substantial inducements. For the
most part, U.S. climate policy during the period remained entirely consistent with the policy core
beliefs of the economic growth coalition, and changed only when the economic growth coalition
was forced to do so by the threatened loss of public support. Although the precautionary
coalition gained decision-making authority following the elections, the economic growth was
able to acquire a substantial negative inducement in the form of a threat by the Senate to
withhold its consent to the Kyoto Protocol. This balance of power forced the precautionary
coalition to retreat from its ambitions to enact substantial reductions in U.S. ghg emissions.
The effect of this balance of power can also be seen the stalemate between the precautionary
and economic growth coalitions during the initial negotiations of the FCCC. Although the
precautionary coalition controlled most of the decision-making within the international
subsystem, the economic growth coalition held as a negative inducement a refusal by the United
States to sign a treaty that it was not happy with. Because it was widely recognized that a treaty
that did not include the United States would be ineffective, this inducement was sufficient to
force the precautionary coalition to compromise on the issue of targets and timetables.
As noted in Chapter 5, I do not describe these propositions as hypotheses because of the
difficulties in testing hypotheses with what is essentially a single case study. Examples can be
found among the experiences of.the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands in implementing
the FCCC that support each of the propositions. However, a great deal more research must be
conducted before their applicability to the broad range of environmental treaties can be
determined. That said, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the implications of this study
for the ACF, the climate regime, and international environmental agreements in general. These
conclusions are presented in Chapter 12.
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CHAPTER 12 - CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter presents some conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis. These
conclusions are presented in two parts. In the part, I discuss some of the strengths and limitations
of using the ACF to examine treaty implementation and outline some areas for further research.
In the second and final part, I suggest some implications of the study for the development and
implementation of international environmental treaties in general and future directions for the
climate regime in particular.
12.1 APPLICATION OF THE ACF To INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
As was noted above, much of the international relations literature now recognizes the
importance of domestic politics in the formation and maintenance of international regimes.
None, however, successfully explain the nature of the interactions between international,
national, and sub-national decision-making processes, particularly those involving the
implementation of international environmental agreements. These explanations are important if
we are to gain a better understanding of the problem of "involuntary defection," or the failure to
implement the domestic policies needed to comply with international agreements. The results of
this study suggest that the ACF is useful in shedding light on these interactions. In particular, the
ACF provides a means for evaluating the efficacy of various approaches that can be used in
agreements such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change so that the risks of
involuntary defection are minimized. However, additional work is needed to fully explore the
applicability of the ACF to these problems.
12.1.1. Breaking Down the "Black Box" of the State
As discussed in Chapter 1, the International Relations literature has traditionally examined
interstate relations in terms of their "level of analysis," or the units in which the independent
variables have been conceptualized. International-level (or "systemic") analyses have been used
to explain a state's position in the international system; domestic-level analyses examine the
society, culture, and political institutions of individual states; and individual-level analyses look
at the personal or psychological characteristics of individual statesmen. Because these three
levels have traditionally been viewed as mutually exclusive, most attempts to explain such issues
as treaty development and compliance have treated the state as a monolithic "black box." This
study suggests that the application of the ACF to the development and implementation of
international environmental agreements such as the FCCC can be useful in breaking open this
black box of the State. In particular, it demonstrates the importance of coalitions of individuals
sharing common beliefs and coordinating their activities among the different levels of
governance involved in treaty development and implementation.
The ACF portrays the policy process as a function of interactions among competing
coalitions within an issue-specific policy subsystem and the effects of system-wide parameters
and events on the constraints and resources of the various coalitions. Policies emanating from a
domestic subsystem are reflective not of the belief system of the state as a whole but of the
beliefs held by the coalition dominating the domestic subsystem at that particular point in time.
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Furthermore, the extent of this consistency depends very much on the balance of power of the
competing coalitions active within the subsystem. Because the policy process is continual, shifts
in this balance of power can result in changes in policy. As was seen in the United States. A shift
sufficient to enable a subordinate coalition to become dominant within the domestic subsystem
can result in a substantial change in policy. This sudden change can often surprise and appear
inexplicable to those expecting the state to behave as a rational, monolithic unit.
In breaking down this black box, the ACF can also help illustrate and explain treaty
implementation, or the failure of this implementation. Implementation in the context of the ACF
occurs when governmental authorities in the subsystem make decisions regarding the
institutional rules, resources allocations, and appointments pertaining to the government policy or
program. These decisions result in a set of policy outputs, which in turn produces both intended
effects and a range of unintended side effects. Policy outputs will often have a significant effect,
intended or not, on other subsystems with which they overlap, and decisions made in the
overlapping subsystems will often have a reciprocal effect on the first subsystem.
As defined in Chapter 1, an international regime is the set of "implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations." An international treaty is the formal codification of these principles,
norms and rules. The initial development of an international regime entails a change from the
status quo of little or no convergence among states to one of some degree of convergence, or
cooperation, among a set of states to address a common problem. In order for this convergence
to occur, however, each state much change its own domestic policies to be consistent with those
of the other states participating the regime. The development and implementation of an
international regime, therefore, is a function of the political dynamics occurring within and
among these international and multiple domestic policy subsystems.
As shown in this study, the implementation of the FCCC by countries such as the United
States, Japan, and the Netherlands can involves multiple overlapping subsystems at different
levels of governance. Decisions made at the international level can be expected to have a direct
effect on those made within the national subsystems with which they overlap. Decisions made
within these overlapping national subsystems affects not only decisions made in the international
subsystem but those made other overlapping national and subnational subsystems. If the
effective implementation of an international treaty requires the convergence of beliefs among all
of the coalitions dominating each of the overlapping international, national, and subnational
subsystems, one can understand why treaty implementation is so difficult, and why "involuntary
defection" poses a significant problems.
12.1.2. Limitations and Areas for Additional Research
There may be limits to applicability of the ACF to international regime dynamics, however.
It is well recognized that there are significant differences between international and domestic
politics, and the ACF may fail to explain particular phenomena occurring in relationships among
states. In particular, it is not clear at this point how the ACF accounts for the involvement of a
dominant power in regime creation and maintenance, which is the principle focus of theories of
structuralism and hegemonic stability. Before these limitations can be understood, however,
further work must be done both in reconciling the ACF with the predominant structural, strategic,
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and functional theories of international relations as well as the empirical application of the ACF
to a variety of international issues.
The applicability of the ACF to the dynamics of international regimes may also be limited by
the sheer scope of the investigation and the resources required to apply it in a complete and
comprehensive manner. This study examined the dynamics among 14 subsystems: the
international climate policy subsystem and selected subsystems of the United States, Japan, and
the Netherlands. Full inventories of subsystem actors and belief systems were conducted for only
3 of these 14 subsystems. If the implementation of each of the 47 measures contained in the U.S.
1994 National Communication is assumed to have involved an average of 2 overlapping
subsystems, the full implementation of the U.S. Climate Action Program would have involved at
least 90 different subsystems. Documenting the belief systems of the full set of actors involved
in these subsystems and analyzing the political dynamics that transpired among them presents a
daunting challenge.
These challenges become more daunting for a comprehensive analysis of the full climate
treaty regime. If it is assumed that each of the 40 countries (not including the EU) that are listed
in Annex 1 of the FCCC are similar to the Dutch case in that their national communications list
only 18 measures to be implemented, and that each of these measures involves 2 overlapping
subsystems, a comprehensive study would involve more than 1400 subsystems. While such a
comprehensive study is clearly not feasible, it is not clear what the maximum feasible study size
would be.
Although the resource demands of a more comprehensive study present significant
challenges, much could be gained by such a study. It would be particularly useful in providing
additional insights into the nature of coalition's domination of a subsystem and the resultant
policy changes in the context of overlapping subsystems. The study was also limited in that it
examined only a small set of propositions drawn from the initial hypotheses of the Advocacy
Coalition Framework. Examination of the hypotheses concerning advocacy coalitions, coalition
learning, coordinated behavior within coalitions, and successful professional/scientific fora can
also be expected to provide further insight.
Finally, further work needs to be done to explore the nature of power within subsystems and
the dynamics of the balance of power among subsystem coalitions. In this study, I suggest that
coalitions have five general sources of power. Two of these, decision-making and the ability to
offer substantial inducements, can be viewed as primary sources of power (i.e., sufficient to alter
or significantly influence decisions by governmental authorities). Persuasion, deference, and
strategic skill are secondary sources of power in that, in and of themselves, they are insufficient
to alter policy decisions. However, additional work is needed in operationalizing this conception
of power independent of policy success. In particular, an approach is needed for measuring the
relative power of coalitions possessing different mixes of these sources of power and
understanding the implications of these different mixes on policy change.
12.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE bt VELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
Although far from comprehensive, the results of this study suggest a number of implications
for the future development of international environmental agreements in general. It also has
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more specific implications for the Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto
Protocol.
12.2.1. Implications for International Environmental Agreements
The results of this study have a number of implications for the development and
implementation of international environmental agreements. In particular, it suggests that
international environmental agreements are more likely to be fully implemented if the issues
being addressed in the regime are of limited scope and complexity and the range of actors
involved in the regime are well-defined. It also suggests that the probabilities for compliance
could be improved if the full range of actors and coalitions involved in implementing a regime
also participate in its development.
Limiting Regime Scope and Complexity
This study suggests that an international agreement is more likely to be successfully
implemented if limits are placed on its scope and complexity. Such limits would have a number
of effects. First, it would limit the number and range of issues that the regime is attempting to
address. This would in turn limit the number of potential conflicts among the policy core beliefs
of competing coalitions. Such conflicts, when they do occur, will always be difficult to resolve.
However, reducing their number improves the odds that policy-oriented learning can resolve
some of the differences. In addition, limiting the scope and complexity of the regime would limi
the number of overlapping subsystems involved in its implementation. This study suggests that
policy change will occur only with great difficulty if three or more policy subsystems are
involved. Although it remains difficult if only two overlapping subsystems are engaged in the
issue, there is greater potential for some degree of forward movement.
The notion of limiting the scope and complexity of a regime runs counter to the
recommendations of those theorists who argue that enlarging the scope of an agreement increases
the number of opportunities for side payments and linkages among issues. This side payments
and linkages increases the likelihood that those involved in the negotiations will be able to reach
a satisfactory agreement at some point in time. However, policy change is a continual process
that occurs over time, typically ten years or more. As was demonstrated in all of the case studies,
agreements reached in one subsystem at one point in time can often be negated or reversed by
decisions in overlapping subsystems at other points in time. Limiting the scope and complexity
of a regime reduces the potential for this to occur by reducing the number of subsystems involved
in the issue.
Defining Actors And Coalitions
This study also suggests that an international regime is more likely to be fully implemented
if the range of actors and coalitions involved in the policy process are clearly defined. This is
closely related to that of limiting the scope and complexity of the regime in that it is easier to
define the actors and coalitions involved in a regime when the scope and complexity of the
regime is limited. However, it also suggests that those involved in the development of a regime
be proactive in identifying relevant actors and coalitions and defining their policy core beliefs.
This is similar to the identification of stakeholders in a dispute resolution process. Doing so will
not make the process of reaching an agreement any easier. Some may argue that it will
210
exacerbate the tendency of international environmental agreements to be driven by "the lowest
common denominator." However, efforts to identify and define the full range of actors and
coalitions involved in the implementation of an international environmental agreement are likely
to improve the changes that the objective of the regime would be met.
Involving Relevant Actors and Coalitions in Regime Development
Finally, the study suggests that efforts to involve in the development of an international
environmental regime the full range of actors and coalitions responsible for its implement.
Doing so will maximize the degree of overlap among the relevant subsystems, in turn improving
the probabilities that the overlapping subsystems will be controlled by parallel coalitions. It
could also promote the development of interdependencies among subsystems, which also
improves the probability of cooperation among subsystems. Finally, it improves opportunities
for policy oriented learning, as it promotes the exchange of a fuller range of ideas, issues, and
concerns.
Efforts to expand the range of actors involved in regime development could encounter a
number of institutional difficulties. For example, the processes through which foreign and
domestic policies are developed are often separate and distinct. In the United States, the
executive branch is fiercely protective of the President's exclusive right to conduct foreign
policy, and would likely oppose efforts to recognize Congress, state governments, and NGOs as
full partners in the international negotiations process.
12.2.2. Implications for the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol
As preparations are being made for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, this study also
suggests some ways in which the climate regime can become more effective as these agreements
evolve. These include:
= Shifting away from a targets and timetables approach
= Recognizing the political limitations of market mechanisms;
= Developing regional agreements; and
- Coordinating specific policies and measures.
Adopting these approaches may require the international community to make a fundamental
shift away from its comprehensive, top-down approach to complex, global environmental
problems such as climate change and adopt a more bottom-up, incremental approach.
Shifting away from targets and timetables
This analysis of the experiences of the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands in
implementing the FCCC suggest that the targets and timetables approach that is currently
embodied in the Kyoto Protocol is not likely to be effective in reducing emissions over the long
run. Numerous observers have discussed the shortcomings of this approach, including the short-
term nature of the targets, their potential economic costs, their failure to have a substantial
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impact on climate change, and the difficulties associated with their enforcement.' The results of
this study support the view that the targets and timetables approach presents the climate regime
with significant implementation, and therefore compliance, difficulties. The major problem with
the targets and timetables approach is that those responsible for implementing targets and
timetables not involved in their negotiation. The Kyoto targets were negotiated by a very small
group of individuals and were given political legitimacy by the approval by heads of state and
ratification by legislatures. As shown in these case studies, these heads of state and legislatures
often lack the ability or even the authority to enforce the measures needed to meet the targets;
i.e., there is little or no overlap among the subsystems in which the targets were negotiated and
approved and the subsystems in which the policies and measures necessary to meet these targets
are implemented.
Efforts to include in the negotiating process actors and coalitions engaged in the full set of
subsystems would address the exclusion issue, as it would increase the amount of overlap among
the various subsystems. However, the process itself would become unworkable due to the
tremendous number of individuals participating in the process. As noted in Chapter 7, over
15,000 individuals were involved in the international climate policy subsystem between 1988 and
1997. This number could increase into the hundreds of thousands of individuals if the
international subsystem were enlarged to include the full range of domestic actors from the 163
countries that are Parties the FCCC.
Recognizing the political limitations of market mechanisms
This study also suggests that the use of market mechanisms such as emissions trading and
carbon taxes are likely to have limited effectiveness in addressing climate change. The use of
these market mechanisms helps eliminate the participation problem by transferring much of the
responsibility for implementation to individuals and economic markets. Developing systems that
can use these market forces effectively presents numerous political challenges. As was seen in
the cases of both the United States and the Netherlands, decisions regarding taxes, markets, and
other economic issues are generally the purview of subsystems dominated by those most affected
by the policy outputs from these subsystems. Policies regarding energy and carbon taxes will
generally be determined within subsystems dominated by the industries and other entities most
affected by them. Furthermore, they will generally be determined on the basis of economic rather
than environmental considerations. Although the gasoline tax in the United States and the energy
levy in the Netherlands were introduced for environmental reasons, decisions regarding them
See, for example, , McKibbin, W. J. and P. J. Wilcoxen. 2004. Estimates of the costs of Kyoto: Marrakesh versus
the McKibbin-Wilcoxen blueprint. Energy Policy 32, 4: 467-479; Nentjes, A. and G. Klaassen. 2004. On the
quality of compliance mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. Energy Policy 32, 4: 531-544; Gupta, Joyeeta, X.
Olsthoorn, and E. Rotenberg. 2003. The role of scientific uncertainty in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol to the
Climate Change Convention. Environmental Science & Policy 6, 6: 475-486; Babiker, M. H. and R. S. Eckaus.
2002. Rethinking the Kyoto emissions targets. Climatic Change 54, 4: 399-414; Cohen, B. C. 2002. The Kyoto
instruments: are they adequate for achieving the stabilization of carbon dioxide concentrations? International
Journal of Environment and Pollution 17, 3: 275-278Schelling, T. C. 2002. What makes greenhouse sense? Time
to rethink the Kyoto Protocol. Foreign Affairs 81, 3: 2-+; Corfee-Morlot, J. and N. Hohne. 2003. Climate change:
long-term targets and short-term commitments. Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 13,
4: 277-293; Victor, David G. 2001. The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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were made on economic and fiscal rather than environmental grounds. Furthermore, they were
accepted only after the proposals were watered down to the point that the economic impacts on
the coalition dominating the subsystem were minimal.
As was seen in the Netherlands and EU situations, these coalitions may be willing to accept
more significant impacts if other countries adopted similar taxes such that the effects on
competitiveness are minimized. This would entail coordination among a large number of
national tax policy subsystems. Given the many differences among tax systems and economic
circumstances among the countries that would be involved in such coordination, it is highly
unlikely that parallel coalitions could be able to become sufficiently dominant within all of the
overlapping subsystems to ensure coordination among them.
Similar problems face those attempting to develop an international emissions trading system.
The Kyoto Protocol calls for the development of such a "flexibility" mechanism, and many
analysts argue that it is the most cost-effective means for reducing global emissions.2 However,
the large number of overlapping international and national subsystems involved in the
development of such a system makes the probability that they could effectively coordinate their
activities relatively low, at least in the near term (i.e., 20 to 30 years). Even if there is a high
degree of interdependence among the subsystems such that the probability is high that all of the
subsystems will cooperate with each other, the probability that such cooperation will actually
remain low simply because of the large number of subsystems involved.
For example, one might assume that the participation of 20 of the 40 Annex B countries is
needed to create a market sufficiently large to function. Each country must agree on three basic
program elements (e.g., number of gases covered, industries participating, initial allocation of
quotas) if the program is to work. If one assumes that the probability that all 20 countries will
agree on all three conditions is 95 percent, the probability that the system will actually become
operational is less than 5 percent.3 This assumes that only one subsystem is involved in the
decisionmaking within each country. If one assumes that there is sufficient interdependence
among the subsystems that there is a 99 percent probability that each will agree to the three basic
elements of the program, the probability of success increases to slightly less than 55 percent.
However, if one assumes that two subsystems are involved in the decisionmaking within each
country, the probability of success falls to less than 30 percent even if there is a 99 percent
probability that each subsystem will cooperate with the others.
I use this hypothetical example only to illustrate the difficulties that the large numbers of
overlapping subsystems pose for the implementation of complex global environmental
agreements such as the current climate regime. It follows, therefore, that this regime can be
made more effective if fewer subsystems are involved in the regime and if the subsystems
2 See, e.g., Banks, F. E. 2000. The Kyoto negotiations on climate change: An economic perspective. Energy Sources
22, 6: 481-496; Wiener, J. B. 1999. Global environmental regulation: Instrument choice in legal context. Yale Law
Journal 108, 4: 677-+; Jenkins, T. N. 1996. Democratising the global economy by ecologicalising economics: The
example of global warming. Ecological Economics 16, 3: 227; IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC).
3 This probability is determined by the formula P=(p).(" X *, where p = the probability that a favorable decision will
be made (.95)., c = the number of countries involved (20)., and d = the number of decisions on which all countries
must agree. See, e;g., Pressman and Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation.
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themselves were smaller with more participants. This might be undertaken through a
combination of two approaches: (1) replacing the current global regime with a series of regional
climate agreements; and (2) focusing on the coordination of policies and measures rather than
targets and timetables.
Developing regional agreements
An alternative to the global approach embodied in the FCCC and its Kyoto Protocol would
be the development of a series of regional climate change agreements involving various like-
minded countries. Each agreement would be tailored to the particular circumstances and needs
of the countries involved. This approach presents several advantages. The number of
overlapping subsystems and actors within each coalition is reduced, increasing possibilities for
including the full range of actors involved in implementing emissions reduction measures. A
reduction in the size of the international subsystem and a focus on involving like-minded
countries is also likely to reduce the range of issues being considered and the complexity of these
issues. Finally, this regional approach may narrow the differences among the policy core beliefs
of competing coalitions, increasing the probability that overlapping subsystems will be
dominated by parallel coalitions. A narrowing of differences will also promote possibilities for
policy change through learning.
Coordinating policies and measures
This regional approach could be combined with the development of sector-specific
agreements in which specific policies and measures are coordinated. This policies and measures
approach is embedded in the FCCC and was a major priority of countries such as the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom during the early phases of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. However, it
was pushed to the background by the emphasis on targets and timetables.4
These sector-specific agreements could take a wide variety of forms, including cooperation
on emissions standards, technology standards, or even engage in the trading of emissions credits
with a sector. A variation proposed by Barrett is a regime in which countries coordinate R&D
efforts as well as cooperate in setting of standards.' These approaches would all present similar
advantages. Agreements involving a single sector or set of industries would involve a smaller set
of actors and coalitions, potentially narrowing the differences among policy core beliefs. A
sectoral approach would also minimize the number of overlapping subsystem both within each
country and across the regime as a whole.
The adoption of these approaches, however, would represent a fundamental shift in the
orientation of the current climate regime. The global, top-down orientation of the current regime
was adopted in part because it has been believed the global nature of the problem necessitates a
global response, and that all countries shold be involved in efforts to address it. Such an
4 See, e.g., OECD/IEA. 1995. Policies and Measures for "Common Action" - Initial Report. OECD/IEA Joint
Project on National Communications under the Framework Convention on Climate Change; Corfee-Morlot and
Hohne. 2003. Climate change: long-term targets and short-term commitments; Grubb, Michael and J. C. Hourcade.
2000. Implementing EU Commitments Under Kyoto. In Climate Change and European Leadership, ed. Joyeeta
Gupta and Michael Grubb, pg. 239-262. Dortricht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
5 Barrett, S. 2001. Towards a Better Climate Treaty. Policy Matters, November.
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orientation facilitates efforts to gauge the success of the regime in solving the problem. The
ultimate objective of the FCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions "at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." Specific emissions
reduction targets provide a clear and unequivocal means by which the contribution of each
country can be assessed in terms of achieving this objective.
Adopting a regional and/or sector specific approach would switch the regime from this "top-
down" success-focused orientation to a more "bottom-up," incremental approach. Although
ensuring compliance with each individual agreement may become easier with this new
orientation, assessing the effectiveness of the regime in mitigating climate change would become
much more difficult, if not impossible, to assess. It would also become much more difficult to
guage the relative contribution of the various parties in addressing the problem. This may not be
a tremendous loss, however, as the current Kyoto targets are widely recognized as making only a
very modest contribution towards achieving the FCCC's ultimate objective.'
The process of preparing actions to address climate change is complex, and highly
dependent on the belief systems of actors dominating the policy-making process. The belief
systems of those dominating the international decision-making process may not necessarily be
consistent with those dominating the national and sub-national processes. However, it is
ultimately the decisions made at these national and sub-national levels that determine whether or
not the problem will be addressed. Aspects of belief systems can change through the process of
policy-oriented learning, and it is essential that the full range of policy-makers participate in this
process. Ultimately, however, the ability of nations to cooperate in making significant policy
changes may depend on the rise to political dominance in each country of a group of individuals
who share the same core values regarding the need to protect the earth's environment.
6 Cohen. 2002. The Kyoto instruments: are they adequate for achieving the stabilization of carbon dioxide
concentrations?; Corfee-Morlot and Hohne. 2003. Climate change: long-term targets and short-term commitments.
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Appendix A: Methodology
Conducting this study involved several steps, including: (1) defining the boundaries of each
subsystem and identifying the major actors participating in them for long periods of time; (2)
characterizing the belief systems of these major actors and; and (3) defining the coalitions in each
subsystem and exploring the dynamics of their interactions both within each subsystem and
among the overlapping subsystems. A number of data collection methods were used to do this,
including content analyses of speeches, articles, and other documents; interviews with subsystem
participants; and data derived from literature reviews.
Defining Subsystem Boundaries
The first task in each of the cases was to define the subsystem boundaries. Policy
subsystems are defined by both a set of actors and a certain "organizational residue." At the
international level, the "organizational residue" consists of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, and the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and its subsidiary bodies. Participant lists from the 1988-1990
meetings of the IPCC, the 1989-1994 meetings of the INC, and 1994-1997 meetings of the COP
were used to determine the spectrum of actors participating in this subsystem. Over 12,000
individuals have participated in these meetings, and many of the key actors have been active in
all three organizations since their inception. The participant list from the 1988 Toronto
Conference on the Changing Atmosphere was also used in this analysis, as it was at this meeting
that the initial "Toronto Target" was established.
These participant lists, information available in public documents and the literature, and
interviews with key actors within each county were used to determine the actors participating in
the national climate change policy subsystems. The United States, the Netherlands, and Japan,
like most OECD countries, each have specialized units within their foreign, environment, and
other ministries that deal with climate change, and many of the key actors from these units
participate in the international subsystem. For the United States, the participant lists from the
1993, 1995 and 1997 White House Climate Change Conferences also provided information on
actors involved in the national climate change policy process.
The specific policies and actions listed in each National Action Plan served as the starting
point for the investigation into the other national policy subsystems overlapping with these
national climate change policy subsystems. News reports and interviews with key individuals
associated with these programs were the primary source of information on these subsystems,
although secondary literature was also used where was available.
Determining Actor and Coalition Belief Systems
The second task for each case was to determine the actor and coalition belief systems. The
principal tool for doing this in the international, United States and the Netherlands climate
change subsystems was a structured analysis of over 600 public documents containing over 11,00
statements by various subsystem actors.' In the international subsystem, the reports of meetings
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, a content analysis of public hearing records and transcripts, other
government documents, and interest-group publications have a number of advantages over other methods for
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of the IPCC, the INC, and the COP were particularly important, as were summaries of these
meeting prepared by organizations such as the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. NGO newsletters and
reports distributed at these meetings were also used to document beliefs of key actors (primarily
in the NGO community) who did not make formal statements at these meetings. In the national
subsystems of the United States and the Netherlands, transcripts of Congressional and
Parliamentary hearings on climate change were important, as were press releases, transcripts of
speeches, and articles and editorials appearing in newspapers and magazines.
The analysis was conducted using the methodology described by Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith.2 A short coding framework, shown in Table Al, was prepared describing the range of
policy core beliefs held by subsystem actors. The statements contained in the coding framework
reflect the range of fundamental policy positions expressed by actors engaged in the climate
policy process. They were derived from a preliminary review of documents used for the
documents analysis as well as the authors ten years of experience with climate change policy.
Table A2 describes relationships among the ACF Policy Core Precepts (Table 3.2) and Coding
Framework. Each document was examined in light of this framework, with the statements
expressed by each actor scored on a scale of 1 to 5. The belief score for a given actor was
determined by the average belief score of the statements contained in each document.
It should be noted here that using this documents analysis approach to assess coalition
beliefs in the international and national climate change subsystems presented several difficulties.3
The tremendous number of players active in these subsystems made it very difficult to ensure that
the documents collected represented the full range of views. With over 11,000 individuals from
almost 1,500 different organizations participating in the international subsystem alone, the task
of collecting documents from the representatives of all organizations active in all four
subsystems would have required resources well beyond those available for this study.
documenting elite beliefs. It permits a more detailed analysis of beliefs than can be captured by partisan affiliation
or interest-group scorecards. It also -enables the researcher to monitor a broad range of actors representing interest
groups, administrative agencies, research organizations, etc., and public documents spanning long periods of time
are relatively easy to obtain and code.
2 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach.
3 Because this analysis was intended to discern a general set of core policy beliefs rather than to measure changes in
these beliefs, the belief statements contained in the coding framework tend to oversimplify some very complex
issues. As was noted in Chapter 2, a fundamental assumption of this study is that an actor's policy core beliefs do
not change substantially over time, and that changes in a coalition's policy core come about primarily from
turnover of coalition members. Because the issue of climate change is so complex, controlling for changes in
beliefs in this study would have required a far more detailed coding framework. Furthermore, resources were not
available to ensure that sufficient documents were available from different time periods for all of the key actors in
each subsystem given the tremendous number of individuals involved. While the analysis does suggest that the
policy core beliefs of a few individuals did change over time in certain situations, this was not the intent of the
study. Periodic reliability checks in which a second person periodically recoded some of the documents were
conducted in order to ensure that the documents coding process was consistent. over time.
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Table Al. Documents Coding Framework
1. POUCY CORE BEUEFS CONCERNING CUMATE CHANGE THEORY AND MODELS
A. Validit of theory that GHG emissions from human activities will cause alobal warming.
1. Theory is not valid/any warming is due to natural events
2. Theory is highly questionable/any warming is due primarily to natural events
3. Theory is somewhat uncertain/cause of any warming is unclear
4. Theory is probably valid/any warming is most likely due to human activity
5. Theory is completely valid/any warming Is due to human activity
B. Precision of climate models
1. Models are highly inaccurate/completely inconsistent with observational data
2.Models are generally inaccurate/mostly inconsistent with observational data
3. Models are of uncertain accuracy/partially consistent with observational data
4. Models are generally accurate/mostly consistent with observational data.
5. Models are highly accurate/very consistent with observational data
C. Clarity of current climate trends
1. The global climate is not warming
2.The global climate does not appear to be warming
3. Current trends are unclear
4. The global climate appears to be warming
5. The global climate is warming
2. POUCY CORE BEUEFS CONCERNING IMPACTS OF CUMATE CHANGE AND COST OF RESPONSES
A. Threat Dosed by climate change
1. Climate change is not a threat/could have benefits
2. Climate change is not likely to be a significant threat
3. Risk is unclear
4. Climate change could present a significant threat
5. Climate change is presents a most significant threat
B. Economic costs of short-term responses
1. Economic costs of short-term responses will be very high/much greater than costs of impacts
2. Economic costs of short-term responses will be high/most likely to be greater than costs of impacts
3. Costs of short-term responses are not clear/may be as high as costs of impacts
4. Costs of short-term responses are likely to be less than costs of impacts
5. Near-term responses will be much less than irpacts/could have economic benefits.
3. POUCY CORE BEUEFS CONCERNING NATURE OF POUCY RESPONSES
A. Basis for national olicv responses
1. Policy responses should be taken only when clearly justified by the science.
2. Policy responses should be taken when justified for other reasons ("no regrets").
3. Low cost/cost effective responses are justified now.
4. Moderate responses are justified now/strong measures should be phased in over time
5. Strong policy responses must be taken immediately.
B. Aproac to industrialized country resonses/cmmitments before 2000.
1. National actions should be voluntary (i.e., bottom-up approach, no targets or timetables)
2. National targets may be set according to national circumstances, but no timetable should be adopted
3. Countries should stabilize emissions, but no timetable should be adopted
4. Countries should stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000
5. Countries should reduce emissions 20% by 2005 (i.e., top-down approach, Toronto target)
C. Commitments after 2000
1. No commitments should be made
2. Further commitments should be made, but only after thorough analysis.
3. Countries should commit to stabilization/reduction with differentiated targets and/or flexibility.
4. Countries must commit to reductions with common target for all countries/minimal flexibilty
5. Countries must commit to reductions of 20% by 2005 (Toronto target)
D. Mandated/coordinated policy instruments
1. Encourage voluntary actions only/no taxes or regulations
2. Encourage voluntary actions, modest demonstration programs, etc.
3. Adopt some market-oriented policies (i.e., taxes), encourage voluntary actions.
4. Adopt stronger market-oriented policies, limited regulatory policies (i.e., technology standards)
5. Impose full range of market-oriented and regulatory command-and control policies.
4. POUCY CORE BEUEFS CONCERNING SCOPE AND COORDINATION OF COMMITMENTS
A. Develong ountry vs. Industrialized ountry Commitments
1. Industrialized and developing countries must make similar commitments.
2. All countries must commit to specific emissions reductions, but industrialized countries must do more.
3. Developing countries must commit to limiting growth in emissions.
4. Developing countries may commit to limiting/reducing emissions voluntarily.
5. Industrialized countries alone must commit to reducing emissions.
B. Coordination or Cooperaio In National Responses/oint Iemn
1. National responses may be coordinated among all counties without limits/full joint implementation
2. National responses may be coordinated among all countries with minor limitations
3. National responses may be coordinated among industrialized countries/other countries with limits.
4. National responses may not be coordinated.
5. National responses may only be coordinated among industrialized countries.
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In addition, public documents reflecting the beliefs of many of these participants were
simply not available. Every effort was made to collect enough documents from actors
representing the major organizations, organization types, countries and country groups such that
the average belief scores for each are a reasonably accurate representation of reality. In all,
documents were coded for approximately 25 percent of the organizations, and approximately 90
percent of all types of organizations, that participated in at least four international climate change
meetings (thus indicating a relatively high level of commitment to the process).4 Table A3 shows
the percentage of documents coded for government organizations for each country group, and
Table A4 shows the percentage of documents coded for each type of non-government
organization.
Table A2. Relationships among ACF Policy Core Precepts (Table 3.2) and Coding Framework
Belief Statements (Table Al)
Fundamental Normative Precepts
1. Orientation on basic value priorities; 3.A. Basis for national policy responses
2. Identification of groups or other entities whose 4.A. Developing Country vs. Industrialized Country
welfare is of greatest concern; Commitments
Precepts with a Substantial Empirical Component
3. Overall seriousness of the problem: 1.B. Precision of climate models
1.C. Clarity of current climate trends
2.A. Threat posed by climate change
2. B. Economic costs of short-term responses
3.C. Commitments after 2000
4. Basic causes of the problem; 1.A. Validity of theory that GHG emissions from human
___________________________________activities will cause global warming.
5. Proper distribution of authority between 3.D. Mandated/coordinated policy instruments
government and market;
6. Proper distribution of authority among levels of 3.B. Approach to industrialized country
government; responses/commitments before 2000.
7. Priority accorded various policy instrument N/A(e.g., regulation, insurance, education, direct
payment, tax credits);
8. Method of financing; 4.B. Coordination or Cooperation In National
___________________________________Responses/JointImplementation
9. Ability of society to solve the problem (e.g., N/A
zero-sum competition vs. potential for mutual
accommodation; technological optimism vs.
pessimism).
10. Participation of public vs. experts vs. elected N/A
officials. I________________________
4 A tremendous number of individuals and organizations attended only one or two meetings, or each of the three
meetings of the Conference of the Parties. These individuals and organizations were more observers than active
participants, and should not be considered as members of the various coalitions. I am assuming here that
participation in four or more meetings represents a relatively high level of commitment to the policy process.
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Table A3 Percentage of Government Organizations Coded In International Subsystem
AOSIS* CIT/Russla** EU/SwItzerland
Agriculture Ministry 3 0 0% 2 0 0% 7 1 14%
Chief of State's Office 3 0 0% 0 0 0% 4 1 25%
Economic Ministry 1 0 0% 2 0 0% 13 0 0%
Energy Ministry 1 0 0% 2 0 0% 7 0 0%
Environment Ministry 22 6 27% 18 6 33% 18 14 78%
Finance Ministry 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 5 0 0%
Justice Ministry 3 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0%
Legislature 1 0 0% 4 0 0% 8 1 13%
Meteorological Service 16 2 13% 15 3 20% 11 0 0%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Embassy 33 13 39% 21 8 38% 16 16 100%
Natural Resources Ministry 2 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0%
Overseas Development Ministry 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 4 0 0%
Planning Ministry 7 0 0% 1 0 0% 3 0 0%
Science/Research Ministry 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 8 0 0%
Transportation Ministry 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 4 0 0%
Total 93 21 23% 67 17 25% 110 33 30%
G77*** OPEC*** Other*
Agriculture Ministry 11 0 0% 2 0 0% 0 0 0%
Chief of State's Office 4 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0%
Economic Ministry 10 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
Energy Ministry 20 2 10% 6 5 83% 2 0 0%
Environment Ministry 78 24 31% 7 3 43% 3 1 33%
Finance Ministry 3 0 0% 1 0 0% 0 0 0%
Justice Ministry 10 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
Legislature 3 1 33% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
Meteorological Service 76 9 12% 4 0 0% 2 0 0%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Embassy 89 39 44% 8 5 63% 4 2 50%
Natural Resources Ministry 10 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
Overseas Development Ministry 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
Planning Ministry 11 1 9% 2 0 0% 1 0 0%
Science/Research Ministry 10 1 10% 1 0 0% 0 0 0%
Transportation Ministry 2 0 0% 1 0 0% 0 0 0%
Total 337 77 23% 32 13 41% 13 3 23%
Other OECD United States
Agriculture Ministry 2 0 0% 1 0 0%
Chief of State's Office 4 2 50% 1 1 100%
Economic Ministry 7 1 14% 1 1 100%
Energy Ministry 3 0 0% 1 1 100%
Environment Ministry 8 7 88% 1 1 100%
Finance Ministry 6 0 0% 1 0 0%
Justice Ministry 2 0 0% 1 1 100%
Legislature 5 0 0% 1 1 100%
Meteorological Service 5 1 20% 1 0 0%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Embassy 8 8 100% 1 1 100%
Natural Resources Ministry 3 0 0% 1 1 100%
Overseas Development Ministry 3 0 0% 1 0 0%
Planning Ministry 2 0 0% 1 0 0%
Science/Research Ministry 5 1 20% 1 1 100%
Transportation Ministry 2 0 0% 0 0 0%
Total 65 20 31% 14 9 64%
*Alliance Of Small Island Developing States (Small island countries)
**Countries In Transition (Former Soviet bloc countries)
***Group of 77 (Developing Countries)
****Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Using the documents coding technique on statements made by national representatives in
international meetings also presents several challenges.' Sabatier notes that the beliefs of public
5For a discussion of these problems, see generally Larson, Deborah W. 1988. Problems of Content-Analysis in
Foreign-Policy Research - Notes From the Study of the Origins of Cold-War Belief Systems. International Studies
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officials in national policy subsystems are moderated by the need of these officials to be
responsive to several different national authorities, statements by government representatives in
international subsystems are constrained by the national positions negotiated in their respective
national foreign policy subsystems." As such, wording of these statements reflects not so much
the views of the individual making it but the beliefs of the coalition dominating the underlying
national subsystem or a compromise between the dominant coalition and one or more minority
coalitions. It can be assumed, however, that, in general, the individual making the statement is a
member of this dominant coalition if he or she is speaking on behalf of the state, and that the
beliefs embedded in the statement are more or less consistent with the individual's own beliefs.
Because the goal of this analysis is simply to determine coalition membership, this potential
inconsistency does not present a significant problem.7
Table A4. Percentage of NGOs Coded in International Subsystem
Environmental Organization
Development/Social Change Organization
Environmental Policy Research Organization
General industry Association
University
Fossil Fuels Industry Association
United Nations/Other International Organization
Alt. Energy/Technology Organization
Utility/Energy Distribution Industry Association
Manufacturing Industry Association
Science Research Organization
General Policy Research Organization
Labor/Workers Organization
Nuclear Energy Organization
Economic Policy Research Organization
Other Advocacy Organization
Housing/Construction Industry Association
Transportation Industry Association
Local/Regional Government
Utility/Energy Distribution Company
Manufacturing Company
Insurance Industry Association
Natural Resources/Agriculture Industry
Association
Total
24
20
16
15
13
12
10
10
8
8
6
5
5
5
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
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9.9%
8.3%
6.6%
6.2%
5.4%
5.0%
4.1%
4.1%
3.3%
3.3%
2.5%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
0.8%
0.8%
0.8%
0.8%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
3.8%
5.7%
7.5%
1.9%
7.5%
0.0%
0.0%
9.4%
3.8%
3.8%
3.8%
3.8%
0.0%
0.0%
1.9%
0.0%
1.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.4% 0 0.0%
100.0% 53 100.0%
Document analyses were conducted for the international climate policy subsystems, and the
climate policy subsystems of the United States and the Netherlands. Tonno Cramer of the
University of Amsterdam assisted me by conducting the analysis of documents in the Dutch
language. Periodic intercoder reliability tests, in which each of us coded the same English
language document, were conducted in order to ensure comparability among the subsystems.
Interviews with subsystem participants and information gleaned from news reports and other
sources were the primary source of information on coalition beliefs in the Japanese climate
Quarterly 32, 2: 241-255.
6 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach.
7 This inconsistency could present a problem if one were trying to measure changes in beliefs, however. Such an
analysis would require many more documents and a more complex coding framework than was used here.
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8.3%
15.0%
25.0%
6.7%
30.8%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
25.0%
25.0%
33.3%
40.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
21.9%
change subsystem, as the resources needed to obtain both documents and assistance in coding
them were not available. These sources were also used in all of the case studies to determine the
beliefs of coalitions active in the various national and sub-national subsystems overlapping with
each national climate change subsystem.
Defining Subsystem Coalitions and Documenting their Interactions
The subsystem coalitions were determined using the documents analysis described in the
previous section and information gathered from newspapers, journals, the published literature,
and interviews with subsystem participants. The documents analysis was used to identify those
actors holding a set of common beliefs. As discussed in Chapter 6, those actors holding beliefs
consistent with the precautionary coalition generally received average belief scores of greater
than 3, while those expressing beliefs consistent with the economic growth coalition generally
received average belief scores of less than 3. Evidence regarding cooperative behavior among
these actors was derived the other sources of information as well as documents used in the
documents analysis. Actors receiving an average belief score of 3 were included in a coalition if
information from these various sources indicated sustained cooperation with other coalition
members.
Information on subsystem events and coalition interactions was also obtained through the
documents analysis, newspapers, journals, published literature, and participant interviews. Sixty-
three interviews were conducted over the course of some 75 hours with individuals in the United
States, Japan, the Netherlands, and the IPCC and INC/FCCC secretariats. Because the
individuals interviewed were promised anonymity in exchange for candor in our discussions,
they are identified in Table A5 only by interview number and organization. Although the scope
of each interview varied depending on the role that the individual played, the interviews
generally covered coalition belief systems, interactions and coordination, and participation in the
national and international subsystems.
Table A5. Subsystem and Organization Affiliation for Study Interviewees (by interview number)
Subsystem
International Japan Netherlands United States
Environmental Advocacy Group 3, 26, 27 54, 51 16
Utility/Energy Dist. Industry Group 49
Fossill Fuels Industry Group 52 13
General Industry Group 30, 57 48 4, 6
Legislature 31,56 17
Economic Ministry 24, 25, 63 40 15
Environment Ministry 21, 22, 23, 55, 59 39, 46, 47, 53, 54 2, 8, 9, 18, 20
Foreign Affairs Ministry 34 41, 42, 50 1, 7,14
Finance Ministry 19
Meteorological Service 43
Science/Research Ministry 44 12
Transportation Ministry 10,11
General Press/Newspaper 32, 35
Science Research Org 36, 37
IPCC/FCCC Secretariat 54, 58, 18
University 5,28, 29, 33, 38 60, 61, 62
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